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As early as the mid-1970s, observers of private sector employment 
practices in the United States commented on an emerging new phenom-
enon: the increasing use of nonstandard workers—that is, employees 
who are hired under a variety of nonstandard arrangements without a 
permanent connection to an employer. These include part-time employ-
ment; hiring through temporary help employment agencies, such as 
“Kelly Girl” clerical services; self-employed consultants; employees 
leased, contracted, or subcontracted from business service firms such as 
advertising or janitorial firms; multiple-job holders; and day laborers.1 
Although companies historically have used nonstandard workers, 
the relatively rapid growth rate of these workers in a wide range of in-
dustries and occupations has become pervasive (see Nye [1998] for ex-
amples). At the time the change was identified, the available data made 
it difficult to measure exactly what was occurring, although the trend 
appeared to be similar in both the private and public sectors (see Light 
[1999] for examples in the federal government). Today we have better 
data but they provide disparate estimates of the extent of nonstandard 
employment. 
Nonstandard employment arrangements have received increased at-
tention due to several factors. First, ongoing changes suggest that the 
trend toward greater use of nonstandard employment is likely to con-
tinue. The restructuring of the economy in the post–World War II era in 
an increasingly global economy has continued. The pace of this change 
has been heavily driven by technological advances and the “informa-
tion age,” and encouraged by the increase in the share of total compen-
sation (i.e., wages and fringe benefits) represented by legally required 
benefits such as Social Security and nonwage benefits such as health 
care. These economic forces have encouraged employers to seek more 
options to control or reduce labor costs. Illustrative examples include 
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the use of temporary workers during a short period of peak demand and 
long-term strategies to improve productivity by subcontracting the pe-
ripheral activities of the firm to companies specializing in services such 
as accounting. Several terms are used interchangeably to identify these 
employment arrangements, including nonstandard work or nonstan-
dard employment, atypical employment, contingent work, alternative 
staffing strategies, flexible work arrangements, as well as the phantom 
workforce and the shadow workforce (Belous 1989; Carré et al. 2000; 
Delson 1995; Light 1999; Nollen and Exel 1996; Nye 1988; Polivka, 
Cohany, and Hipple 2000; Reilly 2001).2 
Second, while nonstandard employment provides for many employ-
ers a buffer for market changes, it often provides relatively unstable 
employment for workers due to their dependence on the varying needs 
of the employer. Also, wages can be lower, and many workers do not 
receive benefits such as health care and pensions. Consequently, the 
perceived movement away from the twentieth-century model of “good 
jobs,” defined as full-time employment with a continuous attachment 
to one employer, has raised questions about how “good jobs” will be 
defined in the future.3  
Finally, it has become apparent as we have learned more about the 
nonstandard workforce that it is disproportionately staffed by women, 
younger workers, and minorities (see Fagan and O’Reilly [1998] and 
Zeytinoğlu and Muteshi [1999] for further discussion). Indeed, early 
research in the United States particularly stressed the negative impact 
on women.4 Furthermore, not all of these workers are voluntarily in 
contingent employment. Some would prefer full-time employment in a 
standard work arrangement.
Our understanding of the growth of nonstandard employment and 
its impact on employers, employees, the labor force, and public policy 
has evolved over the past two decades. In the 1980s much attention was 
focused on the identification of the dimensions of the change and trying 
to explain why it was occurring. During the 1990s, more sophisticated 
explanatory models were developed and tested. These models explained 
the advantages and disadvantages of nonstandard work from the per-
spectives of both the employer (the demand side of the labor market) 
and employee (the supply side of the labor market). This was a depar-
ture from previous research, which tended to focus primarily on either 
the demand or the supply side of the market, and treated this workforce 
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as a relatively homogeneous group without appropriate attention to the 
multiple forms of nonstandard employment arrangements. Not surpris-
ingly, different authors with varying foci reached different conclusions 
about the positive, negative, or neutral impact of these arrangements. 
For example, those studying the implications for unions typically saw 
the impact on the labor force as highly negative, while those analyzing 
the benefits for employers generally concluded that there were many 
positive benefits. 
Researchers today present a more balanced outlook, which has 
synthesized the divergent perspectives of employers and employees. It 
recognizes the heterogeneity of this group of workers and both the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of nonstandard employment to the parties 
involved. This in turn is encouraging more attention to the public policy 
measures designed to provide more protections and improve working 
conditions for nonstandard employees. 
This book provides an overview of the facts and issues of nonstan-
dard employment in the countries where this labor market phenom-
enon has been most studied: the United States, Japan, and the Euro-
pean Union.5 Although the authors have used nontechnical language 
for general readers who are not specialists in labor market analysis, 
scholars and human resource professionals also will find these essays 
of interest. The book presents a balanced perspective on the advantages 
and disadvantages of nonstandard employment arrangements from the 
viewpoint of employers and employees; it does not advocate a particu-
lar philosophical perspective. Chapters 2 through 6 focus on the United 
States, while Chapters 7 through 9 focus on Japan and Europe. The final 
chapter summarizes the future directions for research identified by the 
authors.
KEy CONCEPTS 
A number of concepts are used repeatedly throughout the book 
that are key to understanding the discussions. These concepts include 
the measurement of the shadow workforce, the heterogeneity of these 
workers, labor market flexibility as seen from both the employer and 
employee perspectives, the use of core and noncore workers in strategic 
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hiring decisions, and the tension between regulation and deregulation in 
the public policy debates.
Measuring the Nonstandard Workforce
Those interested in studying the nonstandard workforce initially 
were hindered by the lack of labor market employment data designed 
to focus in detail on this segment of the workforce. Also, the variety of 
forms of nonstandard employment made it difficult to determine how 
many people were in each employment category. In response to the 
need for data, in 1995 the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) added 
more questions to the Current Population Survey (CPS) in a supple-
mental survey conducted every two years called the “Contingent and 
Alternative Work Survey” (CWS). The CWS measures the size of the 
labor force in nonstandard work arrangements by the type of employ-
ment arrangement and for workers employed for less than one year in 
jobs that are contingent on the needs of the employers. We now have 
time-series data indicating that, since 1995, the characteristics of con-
tingent workers have changed little.
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, the data show that, by 
2005, workers hired in nonstandard employment arrangements rep-
resented about 4.1 percent of the labor force based on the broadest 
measure of contingent work developed by the BLS, but this is about a 
1.1 percent decrease from 1995.6 These facts sharply contrast with the 
popular perception that nonstandard work is rapidly replacing standard 
work arrangements. However, the estimate is based on the responses 
provided by workers, but not all workers were able to answer the ques-
tion of whether their employment was contingent. If the respondents 
who were uncertain about the contingency of their employment ar-
rangements were included, contingent employment would be about 10 
percent (Belman and Golden 2000). 
The BLS definition of alternative employment arrangements indi-
cates that about 10.7 percent of the workforce fell into this group in 
2005, but there is some overlap between this measure and the contingent 
work measure.7 Several studies have analyzed this overlap. Even when 
using the broadest measure of contingency, one-third of the employees 
of temporary help agencies were not contingent workers in 1995, and in 
1997 about 19 percent of total employment was in regular self-employ-
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ment or regular part-time employment (Cohany 1996; Polivka 1996). 
However, if the regular self-employed and regular part-time workers 
also are included, 29.9 percent of the labor force in 1999 was in a non-
standard employment arrangement (Hipple 2001; Polivka, Cohany, and 
Hipple 2000). Because this group of employees has been relatively in-
visible to employers, as well as within the total labor force, it has been 
labeled as a “phantom” of the larger full-time labor force employed in 
standard employment arrangements; its true size is unknown.8 
The Heterogeneity of the Nonstandard Workforce
Analysis increasingly has taken into account the substantial dif-
ferences between the various subgroups of nonstandard employees, 
whether the choice to be in nonstandard employment is voluntary or 
involuntary, and the resulting economic impact of the employment ar-
rangement on the employee. For example, a male computer program-
mer who is a college graduate and voluntarily chooses to work as a 
well-paid, full-time consultant to a software firm is in a very different 
arrangement than a female with a high school education who works 
part time in a retail store earning the minimum wage when she prefers a 
full-time position. She usually has no fringe benefits such as health in-
surance or an employer-provided pension, and she experiences inferior 
working conditions and has little or no job security. 
Although both workers are in nonstandard employment arrange-
ments, it is clear that the consultant is not harmed by this arrangement; 
he may in fact be employed for several years on a project with the same 
employer. In contrast, the female retail clerk is disadvantaged in the 
labor market by her contingent status. Consequently, relatively few pol-
icy concerns have been articulated about workers such as the computer 
consultant. Most of the public policy discussion has focused on workers 
who, like the retail clerk, are relatively disadvantaged by involuntary 
contingent employment, particularly those who are working-class, mi-
nority or immigrant, and less educated (Bernasek and Kinnear 1999; 
Carré et al. 2000; Zeytinoğlu 1999). Without careful attention to this 
heterogeneity, research may either over- or understate the labor market 
problems faced by these workers. This, in turn, can result in inappropri-
ate and ineffective policy recommendations (Lester 1998). 
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Consequently, care must be taken to avoid generalizations about the 
impact these highly varied employment arrangements have on workers. 
Such generalizations do not provide useful insights and can be mislead-
ing. The impact of being in a contingent job varies greatly with the 
type of employment arrangement, industry sector, occupation, educa-
tion, and employee demographic characteristics such as age, gender, 
and race (Belman and Golden 2000). As Ferber and Waldfogel (2000, 
p. 214) note: “. . . the answer to the question of whether part-time jobs 
are bad jobs is ‘it depends.’” 
Core and Noncore Workers
Discussions about the use of nonstandard employment arrange-
ments frequently draw a distinction between two groups of employees. 
The first is the “core” workers who perform the work most closely tied 
to the primary economic activities of the employer. Core employees 
are in standard employment arrangements, which means they have full-
time jobs with a permanent connection to a single employer, usually 
receive a range of social insurance benefits, and have some protection 
from arbitrary dismissal (Vosko 1998). The second is the noncore, or 
“peripheral,” workers whose work is not the core work of the organiza-
tion (see Reilly [2001, pp. 47–49] for a typical discussion of core and 
peripheral workers). An example for a manufacturing company would 
be the use of a core employee trained to perform a specialized task on 
an assembly line, while a peripheral employee would be hired to per-
form janitorial work through a subcontract with a firm that specializes 
in janitorial services. 
The use of noncore workers in various types of nonstandard em-
ployment arrangements offers the firm more flexible opportunities to do 
its work while protecting the employment security and avoiding layoffs 
of its trained and experienced core workers. The use of contingent em-
ployees can be an ad hoc tactical approach to address short-term needs, 
such as covering the maternity leave of a core employee, or a strategic 
response developed to deal over time with an increasingly global and 
dynamic economic environment. Nonstandard employees allow an em-
ployer to use “just-in-time” management of labor to increase, decrease, 
or reassign its workforce (Lewis and Molloy 1991). Nonstandard em-
ployment arrangements can be used, for example, to adjust to fluctua-
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tions in the demand for its products, reduce labor costs, reduce the in-
house time spent on a variety of human resource administrative and 
monitoring functions for peripheral workers, subcontract for special 
projects for which a set of skills is needed for only a limited time pe-
riod, manage unexpected or temporary staffing needs such as an illness 
or vacations, and to temporarily add a position as a way to determine 
whether a new core position is needed. To achieve the flexibility desired 
for both tactical and strategic adjustments one employer may use one or 
more of these different employment arrangements simultaneously. For 
a detailed discussion of how to determine whether to hire a core or non-
core employee for a particular job, see Roberts and Gleason (2000).
Flexibility
As discussed earlier, flexibility gives employers more options for 
rapid and nimble adjustments to changes in the economic environment 
through internal adjustments to their strategic hiring and staffing plans. 
Similarly, some employees want greater flexibility so they can more 
easily combine work with their lifestyle preferences. 
Much of the discussion of employer flexibility has focused primar-
ily on numerical flexibility at the enterprise level, i.e., adjusting the 
number of workers or hours of work in response to product demand. 
However, two other types of flexibility also are important to employ-
ers. Functional flexibility, the design and organization of jobs so that 
employees can be used in a wide range of tasks, permits rapid reas-
signment to different jobs. Financial flexibility includes hiring deci-
sions designed to control or reduce short- and long-term labor costs 
and the use of different systems of compensation such as subcontract-
ing.9 However, when this results in contingent employment with lower-
wage jobs and fewer benefits for workers, the welfare of workers is 
reduced, and some workers are unable to exercise their preferences for 
full-time employment.
Some employees voluntarily choose nonstandard employment be-
cause of lifestyle preferences or because it provides the flexibility to 
combine employment with other daily demands. For example, women 
with small children may be conceptualized as making a labor market 
choice among three options: not working, working part time, or work-
ing full time. Some women will voluntarily choose part-time work so 
Gleason.indb   7 11/13/2006   9:06:41 AM
8   Gleason
they have time to care for their children (Tam 1997). As a result, greater 
workforce diversity had placed new demands on employers to develop 
employment options that are more family-friendly and recognize the 
different needs of employees.
The concept of the “flexibilisation of labor” was coined by Delson 
(1995) to denote an inclusive framework of factors that result in great-
er labor market flexibility. This includes employer actions, employee 
choices, and the legal and institutional framework that structures labor 
market relationships. Reilly (2001) discusses the concept of “mutual 
flexibility” which “. . . lies in balancing the understandable needs of 
employers to be efficient and competitive with the equally understand-
able needs of employees to protect their incomes and lead the lifestyle 
that suits them” (p. xi). These are both multidimensional views of flex-
ibility, broadly defined. 
Regulation or Deregulation
Fundamental transformations are under way in the global economy. 
New forms of technology are developing, and the structure of the indus-
trialized nations is continuing to shift away from traditional manufactur-
ing toward services and information technology industries. In response 
to these changes, nations are evaluating the laws and labor market in-
stitutions created in the past to identify the changes required for the 
dynamic global economy of the twenty-first century. A frequent tension 
encountered is whether, or to what degree, good public policy should 
regulate or deregulate the institutions that structure labor market activi-
ties. This is a debate about the role of government policy in supporting 
or limiting labor market flexibility. Tensions arise between regulation 
advocates, who seek to develop new laws to address problems faced 
by nonstandard employees, and deregulation advocates, who want to 
remove the legal and institutional barriers to flexibility created by exist-
ing laws. Thus, what employers and workers can and cannot do is con-
strained by public policy as embodied in law and other regulations. This 
public regulation is complemented by the private regulation negotiated 
by employers and unions through collective bargaining. 
Each type of nonstandard employment exists in its current form 
because there is either a relative absence of a regulatory environment 
or a regulatory environment that frames its use. For example, in the 
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United States employers have been able to expand the use of part-time 
employees with few legal obstacles and little effort to change the insti-
tutional framework. Also, the temporary help industry has worked since 
the 1960s to establish the legal concept of a temporary help firm as the 
employer, instead of the client firm that actually uses the workers being 
defined as the employer.10 This makes the client firm the customer firm, 
which may—but not always—relieve it of a number of costly legal re-
sponsibilities, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. This result has been 
achieved through lobbying and seeking influence over state administra-
tive agencies, and has succeeded in achieving “conditional legitimacy” 
for the employer status of temporary help firms (Gonos 1997, p. 105). 
The business community in this case played a dominant role in the de-
velopment of the law and public policy applied to temporary help firms. 
As a result the temporary help supply industry grew rapidly from 1972 
to 1997 at an annual rate of more than 11 percent (Estevao and Lach 
2000, p. 123).
The regulatory framework has, in turn, affected economic decision 
making. For example, in the United States the use of workers provided 
by temporary help firms is generally expected to reduce labor costs due 
to the relatively weak regulatory structure. In contrast, the European 
Union has created a regulatory environment designed to provide greater 
protections to these workers, which limits the degree to which client 
firms can expect to reduce labor costs (Vosko 1998, pp. 24–26). 
Labor unions also are important labor market institutions that influ-
ence the legal and administrative framework. Many labor unions tend 
to oppose legal changes that will expand opportunities for part-time 
and temporary work at the expense of full-time employment. Recent 
evidence in the United States suggests that this opposition is not based 
on the lower hours of employment per se, but instead reflects the con-
cern that part-time workers are paid a lower wage per hour than full-
time workers. Various strategies are used to address unions’ concerns. 
Unions in the United States have used collective bargaining to limit or 
control the growth of nonstandard employment. In Japan and Europe 
unions have supported regulation by the government to control tempo-
rary employment agencies (Delson 1995, p. 108). 
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OvERvIEW OF THE BOOK
This book is organized into three sections. The primary focus is 
the nonstandard workforce in the United States. Chapter 2 provides an 
overview of the nonstandard workforce in the United States, its demo-
graphic characteristics, and why it has grown. Chapters 3–6 build on 
this foundation, with discussions about the employer’s decision to hire 
contingent workers, labor union responses to the threats and challenges 
created by contingent work for unionized employees, the legal frame-
work in which the decision to hire nonstandard workers of various types 
is made, and the impact of current public programs such as unemploy-
ment insurance on these workers. Chapters 7–9 focus on Japan and Eu-
rope and explore how these mature industrialized nations are coping 
with, and adapting to, contingent work within different socioeconomic 
and legal systems. Finally, Chapter 10 presents a summary and ideas 
for future research. 
Perspectives from the United States
In Chapter 2, von Hippel et al. provide an overview of the facts, 
theories, and issues related to the nonstandard workforce in the United 
States. As the authors note, even the seemingly simple question “How 
large is this segment of the workforce?” does not have an easy answer 
due to the variety of definitions used to measure this heterogeneous 
group of workers and the associated methodological challenges en-
countered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS uses three 
estimates ranging from narrow to broad to measure “contingent em-
ployment,” which is work that is expected to last less than one year, 
and a fourth measure of “alternative employment arrangement,” which 
groups workers into four categories: 1) independent contractors, 2) on-
call workers, 3) temporary help agency workers, and 4) workers pro-
vided by contract. The characteristics of the nonstandard workforce are 
identified by type of alternative employment arrangement, age, gender, 
race, level of educational attainment, occupational category, and indus-
trial sector.
The chapter then provides an overview of the demand and supply 
sides of the labor markets employing contingent workers. Data are pro-
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vided on workers’ preferences for nonstandard work arrangements, as 
well as the impact of these arrangements on their earnings and selected 
fringe benefits. Workers’ preferences for contingent or permanent work 
reflect their interests in flexibility for lifestyle or life cycle reasons. Em-
ployers use these workers to address the challenges they face, including 
the need to control or reduce labor costs, to be more flexible in adjust-
ing to dynamic market conditions, and to avoid legal and other restric-
tions. 
The authors argue that the changing nature of the employment re-
lationship within the current global economic context suggests that the 
size of the nonstandard workforce is likely to increase in the future. 
As employers and employees understand more clearly the changing 
nature of employment relationships, both see the benefits from more 
flexible employment arrangements. This in turn means that we need to 
overcome some of the negative stereotypes previously associated with 
part-time and other forms of nonstandard work; we also need to address 
inequities in the operation of our social support systems, which were 
designed to serve primarily full-time employees in standard employ-
ment arrangements. 
Miller and Barney discuss in detail in Chapter 3 how employers 
are responding to the rapidly changing competitive environment that 
has encouraged their increased use of contingent workers. They recog-
nize that the use of contingent workers is only one option for managing 
the monetary expenses of wages and benefits and nonmonetary labor 
costs. Nonmonetary costs include a variety of transactions costs such 
as time spent interviewing job candidates, teaching firm-specific skills, 
and handling the administrative costs associated with contingent em-
ployees. The empirical research on the impact on labor costs of various 
transactions costs is summarized. 
The authors argue, however, that the creation of a flexible work-
force through appropriate investments in permanent employees, such 
as training in a broad range of skills, is an alternative to the use of 
contingent workers. The relative productivity of contingent and per-
manent workers depends on the employment situation. Consequently, 
when monetary and nonmonetary costs are considered, hiring contin-
gent workers is not always the most cost-effective strategy. 
Miller and Barney’s analysis extends the basic benefit/cost analysis 
used by employers to evaluate strategic hiring decisions by combin-
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ing two perspectives: the real-options approach and the resource-based 
approach. The real-options approach borrows from financial analysis 
the concept of “real options,” that is, investing in a real asset under 
conditions of uncertainty about demand, technology, and the actual 
productivity of employees. The owner of the option uses it for finan-
cial benefit when there are favorable conditions. For example, hiring 
temporary employees can be considered a real option during periods of 
high uncertainty, but companies may desire a larger and more flexible 
permanent workforce under low uncertainty. Thus, the employer can 
adjust the mix of contingent work arrangements and flexible perma-
nent employees to address demand, technological, and measurement 
uncertainties. Similarly, the resource-based approach focuses on how 
organizations gain competitive advantages by managing resources that 
are rare, valuable, hard to imitate, and uniquely used due to the cul-
ture, history, and structure of an organization. Consequently, the use 
of a hard-to-imitate flexible permanent workforce can be a least-cost 
strategy for a firm seeking flexibility. Depending on the circumstances, 
a flexible permanent workforce and contingent workers are substitute 
methods to create value under conditions of uncertainty. Bringing the 
two frameworks together generates some additional insights into how 
managers can gain competitive advantage through adjustments in their 
labor forces.
Chapter 4, by Lundy, Roberts, and Becker, discusses U.S. labor 
unions’ responses to the use of contingent work. In an era when union 
membership has been declining, the potential loss of additional full-
time union members due to nonstandard employment arrangements 
threatens the strength of unions and the job security and economic wel-
fare of their members.11 Labor unions in the United States, like those 
in Japan and Europe, generally oppose nonstandard employment. Most 
unions continue to focus solely on their traditional membership of full-
time permanent employees. They have done little to organize contin-
gent workers, or to seek to provide protections in wages, hours, and 
conditions of work similar to those provided traditionally to organized 
workers.
Lundy, Roberts, and Becker reviewed the collective bargaining 
contracts from a variety of private and public sector employers to de-
termine how unions are addressing contingent work as reflected in the 
contract language. Their analysis indicates that the economic sector in 
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which the union operates is an important although imperfect predictor 
of union tactics. Unions in industrial or goods-producing sectors are 
more likely to use strategies of exclusion to prohibit or limit contingent 
employment arrangements, such as subcontracting or outsourcing. In 
contrast, unions in the service sector are more likely to use strategies of 
inclusion so that these workers are covered by their collective bargain-
ing agreement, such as including part-time employees in the bargaining 
unit and negotiating prorated benefits for them.
The authors discuss the guidelines provided by the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB), which governs the inclusion in a bargaining 
unit of temporary, part-time, and leased employees, as well as some less 
common employee categories, such as students. Also, employers’ use 
of outsourcing, privatization, and independent contractors limits union 
membership and is resisted by unions. However, when unions are able 
to organize contingent workers, unions may face tensions over what 
is negotiated for contingent workers relative to the full-time members 
who want more family-friendly policies and greater scheduling flex-
ibility, as well as improved economic welfare through better wages, 
benefits, and conditions of work. In this context unions face challenges 
when bargaining for seniority, wages, and prorated benefits for contin-
gent workers.12 
Chapters 5 and 6 review in more detail the public policies that affect 
contingent workers in the United States. Chapter 5 reviews the legal 
framework that structures the contingent work arrangements between 
employers and employees. Chapter 6 reviews public policies affect-
ing workers’ economic welfare and the conditions of work that affect 
individual workers directly, such as unemployment insurance and job 
safety. Although some of these topics are briefly discussed in earlier 
chapters, the focus here is a more detailed analysis of the effects of 
these policies on contingent workers.
In Chapter 5, Coens and Storrs note that much of the literature about 
employers’ advantages in nonstandard employment arrangements cre-
ates the impression that these arrangements are options for escaping a 
variety of legal obligations and liabilities related to employment. The 
authors discuss in detail why this impression is incorrect and why there 
is “no safe harbor” from these obligations; employers are responsible 
for complying with the laws. However, understanding compliance is 
complicated for employers because there is no single definition of em-
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ployee that is used consistently throughout U.S. labor law. In addition, 
the terminology used to describe the various contingent employment ar-
rangements, such as independent contractor, also varies. Consequently, 
the same nonstandard employment arrangement can be treated differ-
ently under different laws. 
The authors focus on the definitions and legal interpretations used 
by federal agencies to differentiate “employees” from independent con-
tractors, temporary employees, and leased employees. For example, the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses the multifactor “common law test” 
to determine whether a worker is considered an employee or an inde-
pendent contractor for tax purposes. This test focuses on how much 
direct control the employer has over the work done by the employee. 
However, the Wage-Hour Division of the Department of Labor uses 
the broader multifactor “economic realities” test to determine which 
workers should be covered as employees by the federal minimum wage 
law. This test incorporates the control issues of the narrower common 
law test but focuses on the degree to which the individual depends on 
the employer for his or her economic livelihood. As a result of the dif-
ferences in these approaches, the same worker might be classified as 
an employee for the purposes of minimum wage coverage and as an 
independent contractor for tax purposes. The chapter discusses the need 
to change the present fragmented approach to defining employees to 
provide greater consistency and uniformity, as well as to provide more 
guidance to help employers understand what they must do to comply 
with the current complex and often confusing laws.
Wenger in Chapter 6 discusses the relative lack of public policy re-
sponses to date in both federal and state public policy to the growth of 
nonstandard employment. This lack of responses reflects the history of 
existing labor market policies which were developed to protect full-time 
employees in standard employment arrangements. Furthermore, there 
is no true national labor market policy in the United States, but rather 
a fragmented system in which the states implement federal legislation 
while the courts interpret it. When workers in nonstandard employment 
arrangements are covered by public policies, it is unintended since the 
definitions of eligibility for coverage were designed for full-time em-
ployees. Understanding the eligibility rules for coverage thus is critical, 
since these rules determine who is covered and who is not. The broader 
the definition of “employee,” the more workers are covered.
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The major programs and policies that directly affect contingent 
workers are reviewed by Wenger: health care and pensions, unemploy-
ment insurance, Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), minimum 
wage law, and occupational safety and health. The eligibility require-
ments for each policy are reviewed. Also, the impact on contingent 
workers is evaluated based on four standard criteria used for public 
policy evaluations: economic efficiency, equity, security, and liberty. 
His analysis and these four criteria guide the identification of appropri-
ate policy reforms. Wenger argues that the ongoing changes on both 
the supply and demand sides of the labor force require public policy 
responses to provide benefits, social insurance, and work site protec-
tions to nonstandard workers equivalent to those provided to full-time 
workers. He provides six recommendations for reforms that will help 
adapt U.S. social welfare protections to provide better protection for 
nonstandard employees. 
Perspectives from Japan and Europe
The same basic forces for change generated by the increasing im-
pact of global economic competition on national economies have af-
fected all of the mature industrialized nations, including those of Japan 
and Europe. Not surprisingly, the phenomenon of the increase in the use 
of nonstandard employment also has been experienced in these coun-
tries, and has given rise to concerns similar to those discussed for the 
United States. Like the United States, other nations have struggled with 
measurement issues and finding the most appropriate way to measure 
the growth of these varied employment arrangements. However, due to 
different institutions and cultures, the focus on nonstandard employ-
ment has taken some unique twists when compared with the experience 
in the United States. For example, in Japan the adjustments to expand-
ing nonstandard employment reflect a movement away from a national 
labor market policy commitment to employment stability embodied in 
the concept of “lifetime employment” that has dominated the Japanese 
labor market since World War II.13 In Europe, the growth of temporary 
employment agencies reflects a movement away from a historical public 
policy commitment to institutions that support full employment rather 
than labor market flexibility. Consequently, both Japan and Europe are 
working to devise an appropriate infrastructure through deregulation 
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to encourage a previously prohibited or limited labor market institu-
tion—private sector temporary employment agencies. 
The discussion of the growth of nonstandard employment in Ja-
pan is set in the context of the “bursting of the bubble” of economic 
prosperity in 1989.14 As a consequence of the economic changes that 
resulted, Japanese employers have been moving away from “lifetime 
employees” or “regular employees” to use alternative employment ar-
rangements.
 A by-product of the bursting of the bubble was the Japanese gov-
ernment’s recognition that its labor markets had to become more flex-
ible as the economy was opened to both more domestic and global 
competition (Porter and Sakakibara 2004). National policy initiatives 
to support flexibility included the expansion of public employment of-
fices and services as well as training. Temporary employment agencies 
also were given greater freedom to operate. Prior to 1985 such employ-
ment arrangements were prohibited by law in Japan in part as a way 
to encourage hiring for lifelong employment. However, as the need 
for greater labor market flexibility was recognized, temporary employ-
ment agencies were legalized and the types of jobs they could fill were 
expanded. 
Ozeki and Wakisaka in Chapter 7 provide an overview of the dif-
ferent types of nonregular employment in Japan and the demographic 
and industrial characteristics of these workers. As a group, nonregular 
workers represented 33 percent of the labor force in 2005, an increase of 
more than 5 percent since 1999, and tended to be more heavily concen-
trated in the service-oriented industries. Like U.S. employers, Japanese 
firms attribute the use of contingent workers to factors such as labor 
cost savings and more flexible adjustments to changes in demand. Fur-
thermore, Japanese workers’ explanations for why they are nonregular 
employees are similar to those of American workers.
The chapter pays particular attention to two groups of nonregular 
workers: part-time workers, who are the largest group of nonregular 
workers, and “dispatched workers” sent by temporary employment 
agencies to client companies. Dispatched workers are the component of 
the nonregular workforce that is expected to grow the most quickly in 
the foreseeable future. 
There are two categories of part-time workers in Japan: those who 
work shorter hours (similar to the definition used in the United States) 
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and those who are not on the lifetime employment career path but may 
work 35–40 hours a week (fewer hours than “lifetime” employees). The 
large number of women in part-time employment reflects not only the 
cultural norms of employment for men and women, but also financial 
inducements provided by the Japanese government and many compa-
nies to encourage women to work less than full time. The chapter also 
discusses the effects of contingent employment on pay, unemployment 
insurance, bonus programs, and retirement benefits. Although wages 
and benefits generally are lower for nonregular employees in Japan, the 
national health insurance system ensures that everyone has health care. 
In Chapter 8 Honda builds on the discussion by Ozeki and Waki-
saka by providing more detail about the Japanese government’s em-
ployment policies and the labor unions’ responses to the growth of part-
time and dispatched workers. He discusses the three major employment 
policies used for these two groups of workers: the Part-Time Work Law 
(PWL) and job placement assistance focused on part-time workers, and 
the Worker Dispatching Law (WDL) developed to protect workers dis-
patched by temporary employment agencies.15 The PWL was developed 
to provide protections for part-time workers by improving job security, 
providing better management practices where they are employed, and 
improving the social security system. Unfortunately, since the PWL is 
not legally binding, it appears to have had little impact; indeed, many 
employers are only vaguely aware of its existence. As discussed earlier, 
temporary employment agencies are relatively new in Japan. The WDL 
was created to permit a legal private sector mechanism to match em-
ployers and employees that would supplement the public employment 
services while regulating these temporary agencies to protect employee 
welfare. 
The chapter also discusses unions’ responses to the growth of non-
regular employees. The Japanese union structure is dominated by en-
terprise unions in relatively large companies—the same companies that 
have built their human resource management structures around lifetime 
employment for regular employees. Japanese labor unions have been 
heavily involved in the development of Japanese government labor pol-
icies for part-time and dispatched workers. However, like U.S. unions, 
they have shown little interest in organizing these workers. 
Chapter 9 by Michon provides an overview of nonstandard work in 
Europe and discusses one institutional response—the growth of tem-
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porary help firms (also called temporary work agencies [TWAs]). As 
the need for more flexible labor markets has become evident, tempo-
rary work agencies have emerged as institutions that facilitate flexibil-
ity. However, like Japan, a number of European countries previously 
have prohibited or severely limited temporary employment agencies as 
part of their national policies to support full employment; the notable 
exception is France. Consequently, these relatively new labor market 
institutions still are evolving within each country as well as in the con-
text of the European Union (EU). The EU is working toward common 
approaches to regulating employment policies and labor markets and 
institutions such as temporary work agencies to facilitate greater labor 
market integration.16 
Michon provides an overview of temporary agency work (TAW) in 
the member nations of the EU. He discusses the difficulties of compara-
tive analysis across countries because there is no common definition of 
TAW or common method of regulating TAW through laws and collec-
tive bargaining.17 The heterogeneity of national differences in the regu-
lation of TAW has resulted in differing workforce characteristics. For 
example, in Germany TAW is primarily used in the industrial sector and 
employs male manual laborers, while in Denmark it is found primarily 
in the service sector employing white-collar females. 
The chapter provides an overview of the complexities of the various 
national approaches to regulating TAW and the activities of the “social 
partners” (employers and unions). While employers have created na-
tional TWA employer organizations, unions typically have not created 
comparable associations due to their hostility to TAW. Michon discuss-
es the ways in which the differences in perspectives on public policy 
of the employer organizations and unions are being negotiated in some 
countries, and he reviews the attention being given in varying degrees 
to protections of TAW workers in the member nations. The chapter con-
cludes with a brief discussion of the challenges of developing within 
the EU a more standardized approach to regulating temporary agency 
work.
Where Do We Go from Here?
Chapter 10 discusses the directions for future research. The research 
challenges created by the available data and theoretical models are re-
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viewed, and attention is focused on options to develop public policies 
that are more customized to address the needs of those workers who are 
involuntarily contingent employees (Bendapudi, Mangum, and Tansky 
2001). In addition, the chapter discusses recommendations for future 
research provided by the contributors to this volume. These include 
further analysis of employer decision-making processes, analysis of 
factors affecting the extension of coverage of employment protections 
and benefits, comparative research to provide insights into the impact 
of different models of regulation, and evaluations of the impact of the 
activities of unions and nonprofit organizations. 
CONCLUSION
One of the most challenging labor market developments in the past 
three decades has been the increased use in the United States, Japan, 
and Europe of nonstandard employment arrangements. These employ-
ment arrangements are not new; however, their use has raised questions 
about what workers in these countries can expect for their future career 
paths. Also, there is increasing recognition that social systems have not 
changed appropriately to support nonstandard workers who are disad-
vantaged in the labor market, whether by the provision of training to 
support lifelong learning, the accommodation of variations in life cycle 
preferences for work for men and women, or the provision of health 
care and pensions.
The countries discussed in this volume are struggling to find answers 
to many questions that will help define the future of work and what a 
“good job” should provide for workers. Each country is trying to deter-
mine how to create a new approach to the social and psychological con-
tracts previously provided by the standard employment relationship.18 
As our understanding of the forces creating the nonstandard workforce 
has improved, more discussion has focused on the implications of this 
change as part of a larger conversation about the future of work. 
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Notes
 1. For a more detailed discussion of the definitions of these various employment 
arrangements see Polivka, Cohany, and Hipple (2000).
 2. Although in 1996 there were about 1.9 million civil servants, Light (1999) es-
timates that the “shadow of government” was 12.7 million full-time-equivalent 
jobs due to job creation by federal contracts, and through grants and funds al-
located to state and local governments. If the military and postal workers are 
counted, a total of nearly 17 million people were employed through federal ex-
penditures for this shadow workforce (p. 1).
 3. However, it should be noted that this twentieth-century model differs from the 
historical model of employment in which contingent employment was the norm 
for most workers (Kelloway, Gallagher, and Barling 2004). 
 4.  For example, 9to5, National Association of Working Women published a report 
in 1986 noting that almost two-thirds of the part-time workforce in 1985 was fe-
male, and over 62 percent of the temporary help industry jobs in 1984 were filled 
by women. Furthermore, the report documented the poor wages and conditions 
of employment of these workers (DuRivage 1996).
 5. Counting contingent workers is not an easy task, even in mature countries with 
well-established procedures for collecting accurate labor market data, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. Unfortunately, the evolving data collection systems in rap-
idly developing countries such as China generate unreliable or incomplete labor 
market measures. This makes it impossible to evaluate nonstandard employment 
in a meaningful way. See Banister (2005) for a discussion of the problems. 
 6. To determine the employment status of workers, BLS survey respondents are 
asked a series of questions to determine the absence of either an implicit or ex-
plicit commitment by an employer for long-term employment. The key factor 
used to make this determination is whether the job is temporary or not expected 
to continue (Hipple 2001).
 7. Polivka (1996, p. 56) states “. . . not all workers in alternative work arrangements 
are contingent, and conversely, not all contingent workers are in alternative ar-
rangements. Therefore, by and large, contingent workers and workers in alterna-
tive arrangements are analyzed separately.” 
 8. Belous (1989) illustrates the challenge this creates for employers, as well as data 
collection, by quoting senior executives in two companies. The “. . . senior hu-
man resource executive admitted, ‘I don’t call it a contingent workforce; I call it 
a phantom workforce. In many cases, we just don’t know what we are doing. We 
don’t know the size of this phantom workforce, but we think it is very large. We 
don’t know our liability in terms of benefits to this phantom workforce. We don’t 
know how to control it or who in the company should control it’ ” (p. 58). A sec-
ond executive states: “We call it the hidden workforce, and our hidden workforce 
is out of control . . . We are trying to get a handle on it” (p. 60).
 9. In addition, some authors discuss wage flexibility, that is, changing wages to re-
flect the external labor market supply and demand conditions as well as pay flex-
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ibility internally. For a more detailed discussion of flexibility see Reilly (2001) 
and Ozaki (1999). 
 10. The standard two-party employment relationship provides a direct relationship 
between the employer (the firm hiring and paying the employee) and the employ-
ee (the worker performing the services for the employer). This contrasts with the 
temporary employment agency, which creates a triangular employment relation-
ship: the agency with the client (customer) company, the agency with the worker, 
and the client company with the worker. The temporary employment agency has 
a contract with the client company to which temporary workers are sent. The 
agency handles the activities that would otherwise be undertaken by the human 
resource department of the client firm, such as recruiting workers, conducting 
reference checks, evaluating qualifications, and perhaps providing training, and 
places the workers with employers. In addition, the agency generally is held 
responsible for paying various taxes such as payroll and Social Security taxes, 
protecting the safety and health of their workers, and ensuring equal employment 
opportunity laws are followed. Thus, the agency generally is considered the legal 
employer (see Chapter 5 for legal uncertainties arising from these “coemploy-
ment” situations), and is paid an hourly fee by the client which covers the wage 
of the employee plus the firm’s markup for its services. The temporary agency 
also has an employment contract with the temporary employee and pays the em-
ployee. Some agencies provide benefits in addition to pay. Finally, the temporary 
employee provides services to and receives direction from the client company 
(Gonos 1997).
   Temporary employment agencies are distinguished from leasing companies 
which take over from a client company the payroll of an existing workforce 
and handle hiring and firing. Leasing companies also are more likely to provide 
benefits. Typically work assignments are for longer term than those of tempo-
rary workers. The leasing company is the legal employer in these situations. The 
number of leasing companies also has grown rapidly (Carey and Hazelbaker 
1986; Lewis and Molloy 1991; Segal and Sullivan 1997). 
 11. However, some full-time workers also would be willing to accept a lower wage 
under certain conditions. A survey by Friedman and Casner-Lotto (2003) found 
that about one-quarter of unionized workers would reduce their scheduled work 
time if they could cut back without experiencing severe reductions in income, 
benefits, and job security. For example, they would find it acceptable to work 
90 percent of a full-time work schedule and get paid 90 percent of their current 
wages and benefits.
12. In 2003, 14.2 percent of employed full-time workers in the United States were 
members of unions, while 6.8 percent of employed part-time workers were mem-
bers (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2004).
 13. Gao (2001) states that Japan privatized social protections by basing its strategy 
for total employment on 
 . . . three pillars. First, big corporations institutionalized a perma-
nent employment system, providing job security to their employ-
ees; second, medium-size and small companies, with support from 
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the state, organized numerous cartels to avoid bankruptcy and keep 
everyone in business; and third, family-owned mini shops were 
protected by heavy government regulations. All these measures 
served to reduce pressure on public spending for unemployment 
assistance. (p. 114)
   This system created stability and protected inefficient companies. When unem-
ployment grew, the Japanese government used public works projects to create a 
safety net.   
   For those employees hired by the big corporations that could provide lifetime 
employment, the benefits were significant. Employees knew that although their 
salaries started low they would rise steeply with the accumulation of training 
and experience, and they would be rewarded with seniority-based promotions 
within the company. These expectations typically tied employees to one em-
ployer for their entire careers. However, lifetime employment has been primarily 
enjoyed by male workers. The buffer in the Japanese employment system has 
been female employment heavily concentrated in part-time work. The female 
labor force participation remains low in Japan relative to the United States and 
most industrialized nations, but is expected to increase as more women achieve 
higher levels of education and delay marriage. For further discussion of this em-
ployment system see Durand and Durand-Sebag (1996) and Hart and Kawasaki 
(1999).
 14. From 1985 to 1990 Japan recorded rapid economic growth averaging an increase 
in the real gross domestic product of 4.6 percent a year, as well as a tripling of 
the value of the Nikkei Stock index and rapidly increasing land prices. By 1991 
it had become apparent that this “bubble economy” had grown due to gains from 
speculation on inflated stock and land prices. When this bubble burst, economic 
growth flattened and asset values fell; Japan went into the worst recession it had 
experienced since the 1940s. The Japanese government began in 1992 to develop 
macroeconomics policies to support a recovery. At this time it also began to 
address the major mismatches between Japanese institutions, which had been 
designed for a different set of economic forces, and the current global economy 
(Grimes 2001). Alexander (2002) argues that the relative stagnation and decline 
of the Japanese economy since the early 1990s is the result of the inability of 
both the Japanese government and businesses to replace the previously success-
ful ways of doing things that generated the economic miracle of post World War 
II, and to emphasize employment stability with new approaches appropriate for 
the flexibility needed for the current economic environment.
 15. Organizations that provide job placement assistance are referred to as “labor 
market intermediaries” because they facilitate matching workers seeking jobs 
(recruitment) with employers (placement). The national system of public em-
ployment services offices created in Japan provides free services, whereas private 
organizations may charge fees. Firms that provide placement are different from 
temporary employment agencies because their job is completed once a worker is 
placed in a job; these firms do not act as the employer and do not assume related 
responsibilities such as providing some fringe benefits.
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 16. See Vosko (1998) for the historical background to these multiple national ap-
proaches from the founding of the International Labor Organization in 1919 
through the present.
 17. Andresen (1992) identifies five particularly salient additional factors that result in 
differences between European nations that are substantially larger than regional 
differences in the United States and further complicate cross-national compari-
sons. These include language, social bonds to a local region which reduce labor 
mobility, educational systems, different experiences with migration, and distinct 
social security systems with different standards for benefits. 
18. For an example of this type of discussion see Jouen and Caremier (2000). For 
a discussion of the “new” psychological contract for employment, see Stone 
(2004).
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The Shadow Workforce 
in the United States
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Most individuals regard full-time, long-term employment as the 
preferred employment relationship. As such, those in alternative forms 
of employment may be cast as working in the “shadow” of the main-
stream. The term shadow	workforce thus refers to individuals engaged 
in forms of employment that differ from full-time, long-term employ-
ment. That is, they are engaged in nonstandard	work (Carré and Joshi 
2001). The shadow workforce garners public attention in headlines, ti-
tles, and statements proclaiming “The End of the Job,” The	Downsizing	
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of	America, and “Jobs in an Age of Insecurity,” and in judicial decisions 
developing case law concerning this group (Bridges 1994; Cahill 1996; 
Church 1993). 
Opinions on the shadow workforce are polarized. Some point to 
anxiety among workers about the disappearance of job security, career 
ladders, and benefits in the shadow workforce (Nollen 1996). Others 
argue that such sentiments are exaggerations of the extent of shadow 
work, its consequences, or both (Cohany 1998; Dennard 1996; Ettore 
1994; Lenz 1996). The latter view suggests that nonstandard employ-
ment offers greater flexibility to employees and employers and benefits 
society as a result of a more efficient and cost-effective use of labor. 
Both extremes are stereotypical attitudes to nonstandard work. The re-
ality is that the shadow workforce is not a homogeneous entity. Signifi-
cant differences exist among shadow workers in demographics, skills, 
income and education levels, and motivation. Researchers should not 
view contingent workers as a monolith, for such amalgamation prompts 
overly simplistic diagnoses. Differences between types of contingent 
workers are so pronounced that, for some workers, the shadow work-
force is preferred to the mainstream. For those strongly preferring the 
mainstream, some parts of the shadow are clearly darker than others. 
We begin with data on the extent and composition of the shadow 
workforce to provide an overview of trends in contingent and nonstan-
dard employment arrangements. We also examine differences in per-
spectives on the job consequences of such employment. We then adopt 
a psychological approach to understand growth in the shadow work-
force from both the demand or employer perspective and the supply or 
labor perspective. We reflect upon attempts to incorporate contingent 
employment into standard models of the employment system, conclud-
ing with some questions still seeking answers, living true to the motto 
that good research should recommend further research. 
DEFINING AND ESTIMATING THE SHADOW WORKFORCE
Computing the size of the shadow workforce is complicated by its 
heterogeneity. What unites its inhabitants is that they are not currently 
party to full-time, long-term employment and instead are engaged in 
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nonstandard work (Carré and Joshi 2001). Early attempts to quantify 
the shadow workforce referred to “contingent employees” and oper-
ationally involved aggregating some or all of the following groups: 
part-time workers, individuals employed in the temporary help–sup- 
ply industry, and contract workers with a single client (Callaghan and 
Hartmann 1991). This helped to narrow the group, but its impreci-
sion led to unreliable estimates. Fortunately, significant progress has 
occurred over time in the sophistication of available estimates of the 
shadow workforce. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), begin-
ning in 1995, has collected data on the phenomena through a supple-
ment to the Current Population Survey (CPS), administered monthly to 
approximately 50,000 American households. The supplement employs 
two conceptualizations: “contingent employment” and “alternative em-
ployment arrangement.”
The BLS defines contingent employment as work that does not 
involve explicit or implicit contracts for long-term employment. Con-
tingent work was initially conceptualized as “conditional and transi-
tory employment arrangements as initiated by a need for labor,” or in 
other words, individuals in employment relationships where the condi-
tions are likely to be immediately and directly contingent on changes 
in production processes and fluctuations in product and service demand 
(Freedman 1985). Such direct contingency might be illustrated by soft-
ware programmers in the dotcom bust, when decreases in demand for 
software skills produced decreased demand and greater idle time for 
software programmers employed on a per-project basis. Thus, in the 
BLS data set, contingent work is employment expected to last less than 
a year; contingent workers are individuals who do not perceive them-
selves as having an explicit or implicit contract for ongoing employ-
ment (Hipple 1998). 
Three alternative measures of contingent work are used by the BLS 
(Polivka and Nardone 1989). Estimate 1, the narrowest, measures con-
tingent workers as wage and salary workers who both expect to work in 
their current jobs and have worked for their current employers for one 
year or less. Self-employed workers and independent contractors, as 
well as individuals working for temporary help employment agencies 
or contract companies who expect to be employed under these arrange-
ments for more than one year, are excluded under this estimate. 
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Estimate 2 includes the self-employed and independent contractors 
who expect to be and have been in employment relationships for one 
year or less. This category also includes temporary help and contract 
company workers who expect to be working for the customers to whom 
they have been assigned for one year or less. For example, based on the 
above definitions, a temporary worker who has worked for the same 
temporary employment agency for five years but who moves from one 
client to another on a regular basis (e.g., weekly or monthly) would be 
considered contingent under Estimate 1 but not under Estimate 2.
Contingent employment is expanded in Estimate 3 to include all 
wage and salary workers who do not expect their employment to last 
for a year, except for those who, for personal reasons, expect to leave 
jobs that they would otherwise keep. For example, under Estimate 3, a 
worker who has been employed by a company for 15 years but expects 
to retire in four months would be contingent. 
Using Estimate 3, there were 5.7 million contingent workers in 
2005, representing 4.1 percent of the total U.S. workforce (Table 2.1). 
This is only a very slight increase from 2001 levels of 5.4 million con-
tingent workers, representing 4.0 percent of total employment. Also of 
note is that 1995, the first year of the series, yielded the largest estimates 
of contingent workers in both raw number and percentage terms. As a 
percentage of total employment, contingent employment in these sur-
vey data decreased in the 1997, 1999, and 2001 surveys, leveling with 
very similar percentages of employment figures in 2001 and 2005. To 
the best of our knowledge these facts cannot be attributed to changes in 
definition or survey methodology. Whether this 10-year swath of data 
portrays a longer-term trend, a portion of a cyclical trend, or perhaps is 
linked to other phenomena, such as trends in international outsourcing, 
is grounds for healthy speculation. 
A second conceptualization used in the supplement to the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) concerns “alternative employment arrange-
ments.” Specific alternative employment arrangements included are in-
dependent contractors, on-call workers, temporary help agency work-
ers, and workers provided by contract firms (Cohany 1998). 
Independent contractors work for themselves and thus are not em-
ployees in a traditional sense. They may work with several clients on 
different projects at the same time (e.g., a computer consultant). On-call 
workers are people who do not have a regular schedule for reporting to 
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Table 2.1  Contingent Worker Employment in the United States
Number of contingent workers (in millions) % of U.S. employment
1995 1997 1999 2001 2005 1995 1997 1999 2001 2005
Estimate 1 2,739 2,385 2,444 2,295 2,504 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.8
Estimate 2 3,422 3,096 3,038 2,963 3,177 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.3
Estimate 3 6,034 5,574 5,641 5,369 5,705 5.2 4.6 4.3 4.0 4.1
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, 
Employed Contingent and Noncontingent Workers by Selected Characteristics, February 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005.
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work. They fill in for regular, full-time positions due to staffing short-
ages or temporary absences (e.g., substitute teachers). Temporary help 
agency workers and workers provided by contract firms are employees 
of one company who carry out work assignments for another organiza-
tion. Temporary help services specialize in placing otherwise uncon-
nected individuals temporarily with clients for specific projects, while 
contract firms typically lease out their employees for significantly lon-
ger periods of time to client company sites (e.g., janitors, security staff, 
engineers, and information technology workers).  
The 2005 survey identified 10.3 million independent contractors 
(7.4 percent of the U.S. workforce), 2.5 million on-call workers (1.8 
percent), 1.2 million temporary help workers (0.9 percent), and 813,000 
contract workers (0.6 percent). The proportion of people employed 
in alternative arrangements increased from 9.3 percent (12.5 million 
people) in 2001 to 10.7 percent (14.8 million) in 2005. As shown in 
Table 2.2, the largest alternative employment arrangement category in 
all five surveys (1995–2005) was independent contractors, four times 













1995 8,309 2,078 1,181 652 111,052
1997 8,456 1,996 1,300 809 114,199
1999 8,247 2,032 1,188 769 119,109
2001 8,585 2,089 1,169 633 121,917
2005 10,342 2,454 1,217 813 123,843
% of U.S.  
employment
1995 6.7 1.7 1.0 0.5 90.1
1997 6.7 1.6 1.0 0.6 90.1
1999 6.3 1.5 0.9 0.6 90.7
2001 6.4 1.6 0.9 0.5 90.6
2005 7.4 1.8 0.9 0.6 89.1
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Con-
tingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Workers with Alterna-
tive and Traditional Work Arrangements by Selected Characteristics, February 1995, 
1997, 1999, 2001, 2005.
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as large as “on-call workers,” the next largest category. Interestingly, 
2005 marked the highest absolute number and employment percentage 
for three of the four alternative employment arrangements: independent 
contractors, on-call workers, and contract workers. The only segment 
that was not at a historical high in absolute numbers was temporary help 
agency work, which was below the record 1997 levels in absolute num-
bers and in percentage representation. Viewing the shadow workforce 
through the lens of alternative work arrangements portrays a sense of 
greater stability in the phenomena than when viewed through the lens of 
contingent work. “Traditional” work arrangements characterized 90.1 
to 90.7 percent of employment in the period 1995–2001, dropping to 
89.1 percent only in the latest survey year of 2005. 
In sum, whether viewed through the lens of alternative employment 
arrangements or that of contingent workers, the shadow workforce is a 
nontrivial proportion of the U.S. workforce, as measured from 1995 to 
2005. 
WHO IS IN THE SHADOW WORKFORCE?
The heterogeneity of the shadow workforce is evident in its demo-
graphic composition, briefly described here using CPS data on contin-
gent workers and alternative employment arrangements.
Age
The age distribution of workers in contingent and alternative work 
arrangements in 2005, contrasted with noncontingent and traditional 
employment, is shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The largest group of con-
tingent workers was between 16 and 24 years of age (27.2 percent). 
This is in contrast to noncontingent workers, where the largest group 
was the category of 35–44-year-olds (25.1 percent). Contingent work-
ers are twice as likely as noncontingent workers to be under 25 years of 
age. Table 2.4 provides an age breakdown across alternative work ar-
rangements. Workers in temporary and on-call work arrangements were 
more heavily clustered in the younger age groups than was the case for 
other work arrangements: nearly 20 percent of both on-call and tem-
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porary workers were between 16 and 24. The distribution of indepen-
dent contractors was more skewed to the older-age categories compared 
with any other work arrangement, including traditional arrangements. 
For example, workers ages 55 and older represented 27.3 percent of 
independent contractors, as opposed to 13.8 percent of temporary work-
ers. The age distribution of contract workers was most consistent with 
that of traditional work arrangements. 
Gender and Ethnicity
The distribution of workers across contingent and alternative em-
ployment by gender and ethnicity is shown in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. In 
Table 2.3  Age Distribution of Contingent and Noncontingent Workers, 
 2005 (%)
Age Contingent workers Noncontingent workers





SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Con-
tingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent and Non-
contingent Workers by Selected Characteristics, February 2005.




contractors On-call Temporary Contract Traditional
Over 55 27.3 18.0 13.8 16.3 15.5
45–54 27.1 17.0 16.4 22.8 23.7
35–44 26.6 23.3 20.8 24.1 24.7
25–34 14.7 21.8 29.8 25.2 22.2
16–24 4.3 19.9 19.3 11.6 13.9
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Con-
tingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Workers with Alterna-
tive and Traditional Work Arrangements by Selected Characteristics, February 2005.
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2005, women and minorities comprised a greater percentage of contin-
gent workers than noncontingent workers. Among alternative work ar-
rangements, the percentage of employment in temporary help agencies 
for women, African Americans, and Hispanics was higher than their 
employment percentages in traditional work arrangements. The per-
centage of independent contractors who were female, African Ameri-
can, or Hispanic was lower than the percentage of employees with these 
characteristics who were employed in traditional employment.
Education
The educational level of workers is shown in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. A 
larger percentage of contingent workers than noncontingent workers 
reported having less than a high school diploma. Interestingly, this was 
also true in 2005 for college education. Within alternative employment 
arrangements, the percentage of temporary help agency workers pos-
Table 2.5  Selected Demographics of Contingent and Noncontingent 
Workers, 2005 (%)




SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Con-
tingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent and Non-
contingent Workers by Selected Characteristics, February 2005.





contractors On-call Temporary Contract Traditional
Women 35.3 49.4 52.8 31.0 47.8
Black 5.6 8.6 22.7 14.9 10.9
Hispanic 9.2 15.7 21.0 16.4 13.1
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Con-
tingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Workers with Alterna-
tive and Traditional Work Arrangements by Selected Characteristics, February 2005.
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Table 2.7  Distribution of Contingent and Noncontingent Workers, by 
Educational Attainment, 2005 (%)
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Contin-
gent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent and Noncon-
tingent Workers by School Enrollment and Educational Attainment, February 2005.












15.5 24.5 23.5 36.6
Noncontingent 
workers
8.6 29.7 28.5 33.1
Table 2.8  Distribution of Workers in Alternative Work Arrangements, 
by Educational Attainment, 2005 (%)












7.7 27.6 29.1 35.6
On-call workers 13.7 27.8 28.8 29.7
Temporary help 
agency workers
16.9 29.5 32.4 21.2
Contract firm 
workers
13.0 19.9 30.5 36.6
Traditional  
arrangements
8.7 29.8 28.3 33.2
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Con-
tingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Workers with Alter-
native and Traditional Work Arrangements by School Enrollment and Educational 
Attainment, February 2005.
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sessing less than a high school diploma was larger than that of any other 
employment arrangement. Both contract firm and independent contract 
employment arrangements had a larger percentage of college-educated 
workers than did traditional employment. The employment arrangement 
with the largest percentage of workers in the “some college” category 
was temporary help agencies, suggestive perhaps of employment in this 
category being most consistent with continued progression toward de-
gree completion. 
Occupation and Industry
Table 2.9 shows that, compared to the distribution of workers in 
regular (noncontingent) employment, a larger percentage of contingent 
workers in 2005 was in the occupational categories of administrative 
support or operators, fabricators, and laborers, and a lower percentage 
was in professional specialties. Compared to the occupational distribu-
tion of workers within traditional employment arrangements, the distri-
bution of independent contractors was more concentrated in a profes-
sional specialty (57 percent) and substantially less among administrative 
support occupations (3.4 percent) (Table 2.10). The occupational distri-
bution of temporary help agency employment was more concentrated in 
administrative support (24.8 percent) and operators, fabricators, and la-
borers (37.2 percent) and less in professional specialties (22.4 percent) 
than was the case in traditional employment. The occupational distribu-
tion in contract firms and on-call employment were similar, both with a 
substantially higher percentage in service occupations and in the opera-
Table 2.9  Distribution of Workers in Contingent and Noncontingent 








Contingent 41.6 14.8 15.7 27.8
Noncontingent 47.3 13.9 15.6 23.3
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Con-
tingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent and Non-
contingent Workers by Occupation and Industry, February 2005.
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tor et al. grouping and less in administrative support occupations than 
was the case for traditional employment.
There were also differences among industries. Under all three defi-
nitional estimates of the contingent workforce, there was a higher per-
centage of workers in the services industrial classification than in the 
case of noncontingent employment (Table 2.11). Work in the service 
sector represented the majority of employment for on-call workers 
(55.7 percent) (Table 2.12). While the percentage employed in services 
among independent contractors and temporary help agency workers 
(44.4 percent and 47.7 percent, respectively) was similar to that of tra-
ditional employment (43.4 percent), a substantially lower percentage of 
contract firm employment (30.9 percent) was in services. Manufactur-
Table 2.10  Workers in Alternative and Traditional Work Arrangements, 









57.0 3.4 13.7 25.8
On-call 40.0 8.2 22.1 29.6
Temporary help 
agency
22.4 24.8 15.6 37.2
Contract firm 42.1 4.7 26.2 27.0
Traditional 46.7 14.9 15.5 22.9
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements: 
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Workers with Al-
ternative and Traditional Work Arrangements by Occupation and Industry, February 
2005.
Table 2.11  Workers in Contingent and Noncontingent Arrangements, by 
Selected Industry Grouping, 2005 (%)
Services Wholesale/retail Manufacturing
Contingent 57.6 8.6 6.4
Noncontingent 43.3 15.6 11.9
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements: 
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent and 
Noncontingent Workers by Occupation and Industry, February 2005.
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ing employment represented less than 5 percent of total employment for 
independent contractors and on-call workers, in contrast to 12.6 percent 
of traditional employment, and was a higher percentage of employment 
among temporary help workers (28.4 percent) than any other form of 
employment arrangement. 
vOLITION IN THE SHADOW WORKFORCE
An important issue in the study of contingent and alternative em-
ployment relationships is the extent to which the arrangement reflects 
employee choice. The CPS supplement lends itself to some explora-
tion of this question in that it asks individuals to report their preference 
for the current work arrangement, the response options for contingent 
workers being “prefer noncontingent,” “prefer contingent,” and “it de-
pends.” Across all three contingent employment definitions/estimates, 
the most frequently stated preference of workers currently employed 
in contingent employment was that of noncontingent employment ar-
rangements and by a wide margin (55.3 percent preferring noncontin-
gent employment to 35.5 percent preferring contingent employment in 
2005 [Table 2.13]). Investigating preference across alternative work 
arrangements reveals greater differences in attitudes. Independent con-
Table 2.12  Distribution of Workers in Alternative and Traditional Work 
Arrangements, by Selected Industry, 2005 (%)








Contract firm 30.9 6.5 14.1
Traditional 43.4 16.1 12.6
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements: 
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent and 
Noncontingent Workers by Occupation and Industry, February 2005.
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tractors expressed little interest in traditional employment (only 9.1 
percent), contrasted with significantly larger percentages of temporary 
help workers (32.1 percent) and on-call employees (44.6 percent) (Ta-
ble 2.14). 
EARNINGS AND ACCESS TO BENEFITS IN ALTERNATIvE 
EMPLOyMENT RELATIONSHIPS
Median weekly earnings for contingent workers ($405 to $488, de-
pending on operational definition of contingent employment used) were 
Table 2.13  Distribution of Contingent Workers, by Preference for 
Contingent Employment, 2005 (%)





SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements: 
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent Work-
ers by their Preference for Contingent or Noncontingent Work Arrangements, Febru-
ary 2005.







Prefers alternative 82.3 46.1 56.2
Prefers traditional 9.1 44.6 32.1
It depends 5.2 6.8 6.5
Not available 3.4 2.5 5.3
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements: 
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Workers with Al-
ternative Work Arrangements by their Preference for a Traditional Work Arrange-
ment, February 2005.
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lower than median weekly earnings of noncontingent workers (Table 
2.15). The median weekly earnings of independent contractors and con-
tract firm workers were higher than individuals who are on-call or tem-
porary help agency workers (Table 2.16). Perhaps somewhat surpris-
ing is that contract firm workers, not independent contractors, show the 
highest median weekly earnings level in the 2005 survey. The lowest 
median earnings level was that of temporary help agency workers, with 
on-call workers earning a higher median weekly income. 
In terms of benefits, only 18.1 percent of contingent workers re-
ported access to employer-provided health insurance. 52.1 percent of 
noncontingent workers and 12.4 percent of contingent workers were 
eligible for employer-provided pension plans, in contrast to 44.7 per-
cent of workers in noncontingent employment (Table 2.17). We would 
not expect independent contractors to have access to these benefits, as 
they are self-employed and responsible for providing their own. Nearly 
Table 2.15  Median Usual Weekly Earnings of Contingent Workers, 2005




SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements: 
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Median Usual Weekly Earn-
ings of Full- and Part-time Contingent Wage and Salary Workers and those with Alter-
native Work Arrangements by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, February 2005.
Table 2.16  Median Usual Weekly Earnings of Workers with Alternative 
Work Arrangements, 2005
Alternative worker arrangement Usual weekly earnings ($)
Independent contractors 716
On-call 519
Temporary help agency 414
Contract firm 756
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements: 
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Median Usual Weekly Earn-
ings of Full- and Part-time Contingent Wage and Salary Workers and those with Alter-
native Work Arrangements by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, February 2005.
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50 percent of employees in contract firms reported employer-provid-
ed health insurance, compared to only 8.3 percent of temporary help 
agency workers (Table 2.18). Similarly, 33.5 percent of contract firm 
workers were eligible for employer-provided pension plans in con-
trast to 3.8 percent of temporary help agency workers. In summary, 
contingent workers had less access to both health insurance and pen-
sion benefits than their noncontingent counterparts, and, with the ex-
ception of our expectation on independent contractors, the lowest 
level of health insurance and pension coverage was among temporary 
help agency workers. Combined, these data paint a complex portrait 
of the shadow workforce. It is a tapestry of diverse employment ar-
rangements with distinct demographic profiles, differing levels of em-
ployee volition, and very different outcomes as measured in earnings 
and benefits. 
To increase understanding of the forces that provide the impetus for 
the formation and the maintenance of the shadow workforce, we adopt 
the economist’s propensity for demand and supply. We first discuss the 
demand side, highlighting factors that may motivate organizations to 
increase their use of contingent workers. We then focus on the supply 
side, examining why employees choose to work in a contingent capac-
ity. In this examination we concentrate on temporary employees, where 
research exists to shed light on the question. Logic and evidence sug-
gest that the factors are likely a function of both supply and demand. 
The chapter ends with an examination of the consequences of contin-
gent worker usage for the organization. 
Table 2.17  Access to Employer-Provided Health Insurance and Pension 
Plans, 2005 (%)
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements: 
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent and 
Noncontingent Workers and those with Alternative and Traditional Arrangements 
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ORGANIzATIONAL REASONS TO HIRE  
CONTINGENT WORKERS
Numerous reasons have been cited in the literature for organization-
al usage of contingent employees, from filling in for absent permanent 
employees to avoiding the perception of wage inequity. These reasons 
can be divided into three general categories: cost reduction, increasing 
flexibility, and avoiding restrictions/consequences (von Hippel et al. 
1997). Although these reasons are presented separately, organizations 
may rely on the contingent workforce for all of these reasons (Liden, 
Wayne, and Kraimer 2003). 
Cost Reductions 
Reducing wage and benefit costs is a major motivation for com-
panies to turn to a contingent workforce. As a rule, most contingent 
employees do not receive the same wages as permanent employees do-
ing the same work (Coates 1997). Average benefits costs can increase 
compensation levels anywhere from 25 to 40 percent above the base 
levels. Consistent with this reasoning, a positive relationship has been 
documented in a large number of organizations between the average 
Table 2.18  Workers with Alternative and Traditional Work Arrangements, 
by Employer-Provided Health Insurance and Eligibility for 






Independent contractors 0.0 1.9
On-call 25.7 27.8
Temporary help agency 8.3 3.8
Contract firm 48.9 33.5
Traditional 56.0 47.7
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements: 
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent and 
Noncontingent Workers and those with Alternative and Traditional Arrangements 
by Health Insurance Coverage and Eligibility for Employer-provided Pension Plans, 
February 2005.
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fringe benefit level and the ratio of temporary to total employee use 
(Mangum, Mayall, and Nelson 1985). In addition, even when pay rates 
for contingent workers are not necessarily lower, resources can be saved 
by hiring employees only for a finite period of time. For example, a 
company may hire temporary executives, such as chief financial offi-
cers (CFOs), when unable to afford a permanent hire (Messemer 1994). 
The temporary CFO can bring key financial stewardship and insight to 
an organization for a limited time, within a manageable budget (World 
Future Society 1997).
Use of contingent workers can affect costs other than wages. Orga-
nizations may save on training-related costs by hiring contingent work-
ers who were trained elsewhere for the tasks they will be performing 
(Caudron 1994). Temporary employees in particular also may reduce 
organizational costs of recruiting and testing. For example, hiring from 
temporary worker ranks can serve as a screening tool for the organiza-
tion, and thus lower selection costs (Pfeffer and Baron 1988). This kind 
of strategy has been employed by organizations such as Hancock In-
formation Group, where 39 percent of its permanent employees began 
as temporary employees. Similarly, Universal Tax Systems typically 
brings in 40 temporary employees prior to its busy season, of whom 10 
to 20 are hired permanently afterward (Fenn 1995). Indeed, 70 percent 
of employers in a Robert Half International Survey said that they had 
hired a temporary employee for a permanent position after having seen 
the temporary employee “in action” (Financial Management Associa-
tion 1997). Finally, organizations may save on administrative overhead 
when the temporary agency is responsible for processing the employee 
paychecks and attending to paperwork associated with employment 
(Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993). 
Flexibility
Flexibility is another frequently cited reason for organizations’ use 
of contingent employees. Given our global economy, it is now a truism 
that output demand fluctuates tremendously over time. These fluctua-
tions may be more effectively managed through the use of a contingent 
workforce (Kochan et al. 1994). In a survey by the Society for Human 
Resource Management (1999), respondents indicated that the main rea-
son companies use flexible staffing arrangements is to meet workload 
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or business fluctuations. Such flexibility would be particularly attrac-
tive where the corporate culture favors employment security for perma-
nent employees. Rather than laying off permanent workers, the com-
pany may rely upon judicious use of contingent workers to respond to 
transitory fluctuations in output demand (Cappelli and Neumark 2004). 
Indeed, in a twist on this strategy, Lancaster Laboratories avoids layoffs 
during the slow season by having their employees work as temporary 
employees outside the company during their off months (Greco 1997). 
The use of contingent workers may also enhance flexibility by en-
abling the organization to focus permanent employees’ efforts on core 
competencies while having contingent workers perform more periph-
eral work. This approach has the potential to reduce structural differ-
entiation within the permanent workforce and thereby make integration 
easier among employees. That is, they develop a shared set of values, 
orientations, and activities as a result of focusing on the organization’s 
core competencies (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). This is consistent with 
the trend to outsource and the focus toward relying upon a small group 
of higher-paid employees who have firm-specific knowledge. Contin-
gent workers can also facilitate organizational access to skill flexibility 
by providing highly specialized functions that, while necessary, are in-
frequently recurring, or for which need is periodic or unpredictable. 
Avoiding Restrictions and Consequences 
Organizations also may be motivated to use contingent workers to 
avoid some of the potentially negative consequences of permanence in 
employment relationships. Organizations can avoid building commit-
ment to a large number of permanent workers and subsequently hav-
ing to fire unneeded employees by using contingent workers. That is, 
“contingent workers offer flexibility without long-term commitments” 
(Grossman 1998), as discussed in Chapter 3. Restrictions that may be 
avoided include those created by unions, the legal framework, the orga-
nizational budget, and internal wage levels.
It has been speculated by union officials that companies may use 
contingent workers, in particular temporary employees, as an attempt to 
avoid unionization (Kochan et al. 1994). But in an even broader sense, 
with the increase in use of temporary workers, unions are concerned 
that employers are using temporary workers to redefine the employee 
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relationships. To counteract this, unions have moved to reduce the re-
strictions on organizing temporary workers, thus reducing this organi-
zational rationale for their use (Dreazen 2000). For more information 
on union responses, refer to Chapter 4. 
Companies also avoid various legal restrictions by using contingent 
workers. Typically, the client organization pays a flat fee to a temporary 
employment service agency or a leasing company to cover the worker’s 
wages and benefits, as well as overhead to the agency. The client orga-
nization is not liable for benefits such as health care insurance, vacation 
pay, and holiday pay. At the same time, the organization also is relieved 
of paying unemployment taxes, workers’ compensation, and other pay-
roll taxes. This also may provide a strategy for avoiding the require-
ments of Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) 
and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); see Chapters 5 and 6 for 
more details. Thus, although the company may pay a higher hourly rate 
for the temporary worker, it eliminates many of the extra costs and risks 
associated with a permanent employee. 
One issue of concern, especially with temporary workers, is that of 
coemployment, the term used to describe the relationship between the 
client employer and the worker (Tansky and Veglahn 1995). That is, 
the temporary worker is employed by the temporary agency but works 
on-site at the client employer. Under this employment arrangement it 
is unclear who is legally responsible for the temporary worker. For ex-
ample, if the temporary worker is sexually harassed while placed at 
the client employer, does the temporary agency or client employer take 
legal responsibility? The laws are not entirely precise on these matters. 
These issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
In addition, companies may hire contingent workers as a means of 
avoiding internal budget constraints in place for permanent hires. For 
example, in many state and federal agencies authorization is neces-
sary to hire a new employee. Moreover, companies often impose hiring 
“freezes” for budgetary or even public relations reasons. Often, how-
ever, these companies or units within the company have discretionary 
budgets that are not subject to the same kinds of authorizations and 
constraints. Thus, if a department cannot hire a permanent employee, it 
may still be able to contract out the work by hiring a contingent worker 
(Grossman 1998). Additionally, companies may be under pressure to 
keep their personnel allocations down. By hiring contingent workers 
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they are able to achieve this goal since the costs are not permanently 
incorporated into the base budget.
Finally, organizations may access the shadow workforce to avoid 
perceptions of wage inequity among their permanent employees. For 
example, companies that pay above market wages may contract out 
those activities that can be staffed at lower relative salaries. Through 
the use of contingent workers, this may be done without damaging the 
organization’s reputation as a high wage provider. Alternatively, orga-
nizations may decide to contract out high-paying activities (e.g., con-
sulting) to avoid pressure to upgrade the current internal wage scale. It 
has been argued that by cutting overall employment costs, contingent 
workers can enable organizations to provide permanent employees with 
greater job security and better compensation (Davis-Blake, Broschak, 
and George 2003). 
INDIvIDUAL MOTIvATION TO WORK AS A  
CONTINGENT WORKER
Although companies have strong incentives to hire contingent 
workers, the individuals’ motivation to work as a contingent worker 
may bear little correspondence to these incentives. The desirability of 
permanent employment has been well ingrained in our culture, and per-
manent employment provides workers with better salaries, benefits, and 
a greater level of job security than contingent work (Connelly and Gal-
lagher 2004; Golden and Applebaum 1992). Why, then, would anyone 
choose to work in a contingent capacity?
Although there are a large number of idiosyncratic reasons why in-
dividuals are motivated to work as contingent employees, the research 
on temporary employees in particular points to a few critical factors. 
Specifically, temporary employees work in such a capacity because they 
cannot obtain the kind of permanent position they desire, they want the 
flexibility that temporary employment offers, they value the variety that 
temporary employment offers, and/or they seek the skills and training 
provided in temporary positions (Golden and Applebaum 1992; Men-
denhall 1993; Tetrault 1994; von Hippel et al. 1997). At a broader level, 
one could classify this list of reasons to propose that some people work 
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as temporary employees because they prefer various aspects of the job 
such as flexibility, variety, and skill enhancement, whereas others work 
as temporary employees because they have only limited opportunities 
to do otherwise (Feldman 1995; Nardone 1986). For example, a col-
lege student might find temporary employment attractive because of the 
flexibility it provides. A student can work during the summer months 
and school holidays, while turning down positions when exams and as-
signments are pending. In contrast, an employee who has been recently 
laid off from a downsizing company might be working in a temporary 
capacity until a permanent position becomes available.
In previous work, the implication of classifying temporary employ-
ees in this manner was explored (von Hippel et al. 2000). Specifically, 
temporary employees were categorized based upon their beliefs about 
the degree of choice they have to work as a temporary employee. Those 
employees who perceive themselves as having no choice but to work 
as a temporary employee were classified as “involuntary” temporar-
ies, whereas those who believed they were with a temporary agency by 
choice were classified as “voluntary” temporaries (Ellingson, Gruys, 
and Sackett 1998; Feldman 1995; Feldman, Doerpinghaus, and Turnley 
1995; Marler, Barringer, and Milkovich 2002). This classification ap-
pears to be meaningful in that voluntary temporary employees were 
found to have different sources of satisfaction with their work, com-
mitment to their employers, and perceptions of personal control over 
how they accomplish their work than involuntary temporary employees 
(von Hippel et al. 2000). Specifically, involuntary temporaries showed 
increased personal control, satisfaction, and commitment to the degree 
that they were gaining new skills from their temporary assignments. 
In contrast, voluntary temporaries showed increased personal control 
and satisfaction to the extent that they experienced variety in their task 
assignments. Thus, it seems that voluntary temporary employees are 
looking for variety in temporary placements, whereas involuntary tem-
porary employees are looking to gain new skills from their temporary 
placements. To the extent that voluntary and involuntary temporary 
employees experience these differential characteristics, work-related 
attitudes are more positive.
Feldman, Doerpinghaus, and Turnley (1994, 1995) propose a simi-
lar distinction. They find that temporary employees who work in a tem-
porary capacity by choice have more positive job attitudes than those 
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who believe they have no other option. Temporary employees who work 
in positions consistent with their expertise, and who are not trying to 
convert a temporary position into a permanent one, also manifest more 
positive job attitudes. Ellingson, Gruys, and Sackett (1998) also explore 
whether temporary employees who work in this capacity voluntarily 
are more satisfied than their involuntary counterparts. They find that 
both univariate and multivariate indices of “voluntariness” were com-
parable in predicting satisfaction among temporary employees. Volun-
tary temporary employees were more satisfied than involuntary tempo-
raries with temporary work, whereas no differences emerged between 
voluntary and involuntary temporary employees with regard to growth 
satisfaction, co-worker satisfaction, or supervisor satisfaction. Finally, 
Marler, Barringer, and Milkovich (2002), using a similar classification 
(termed “traditional” and “boundaryless” contingent workers), dem-
onstrate that voluntary temporary employees’ performance was more 
sensitive to job-related attitudes such as satisfaction and commitment 
compared to involuntary temporary employees.
This research does not speak to contingent workers more generally, 
however. Interestingly, although statistics indicate that an overwhelm-
ing percentage of the workforce is desirous of permanent employment, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that an increasing number are viewing 
contingent work positively. For example, in the high-tech area, many 
individuals move from one company to the next, hiring themselves out 
for limited projects, or allow themselves to be hired permanently with 
the knowledge that their stay will be relatively short. This flexibility 
enables them to continuously offer themselves up to the highest bid-
der, thus keeping their compensation at or above the market. It also 
permits them to maintain a skill set that is not company-specific; in so 
doing, that makes them far more valuable both to the company in which 
they work and the market in general. Finally, in some sectors of the 
economy, the growth of individual wealth over the past decade is such 
that some people, having satisfied many of their extrinsic interests, are 
free to focus on lifestyle and work and nonwork uses of time. People 
want to spend time with their families, to work at home, and to have 
extended periods of not working. Contingent work is enabling insofar 
as they can select positions aligned with their values and needs, leave 
positions that impose unacceptable demands on their time, and negoti-
ate for preferential arrangements.
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INTERFACE OF SUPPLy AND DEMAND FACTORS
We have approached the utility of contingent workers as main ef-
fects from both the demand and supply side, but in the economy of the 
twenty-first century, it appears as if the interaction of needs is more 
compelling. The convergence of thinking regarding the utility of con-
tingent workers has been a significant trend that may portend their in-
creasing use. The meeting of the minds regarding contingent workers 
can best be seen in two areas: the changing nature of the employment 
relationship and the changing nature of benefits. We will discuss each 
briefly.
Abundant research suggests that the nature of the employment re-
lationship is changing (Littleton, Arthur, and Rousseau 2000). Specifi-
cally, both employers and employees are seeing the benefit of keeping 
options open; flexibility allows a company to release people it no longer 
needs, and allows workers to easily leave when a better position be-
comes available. These examples best illustrate the changing mind-set: 
the diminishing stereotypes of the laid-off employee and the employee 
who job hops, the movement to more of a project orientation, and the 
outsourcing of noncore competencies. First, we all know that there has 
been a stigma associated with someone who was released from a job 
or who moves around “too frequently.” This stereotype has begun to 
change from a very negative one—reflected in a general desire to avoid 
the person—to a neutral or even positive one—an openness to see what 
the person has to offer, and in the case of someone who has moved 
around, an attribution that the individual might be highly sought after. 
Second, as companies become more project-oriented, they neces-
sarily use permanent employees in a more incidental nature and often 
need to “backfill” with contingent workers. This project orientation has 
necessitated frequent reorganizations in existing firms, but more impor-
tantly has served to make salient to employees the temporary nature of 
the work. That is, rather than being job focused and thus having perma-
nence because of the position, work is now seen as transitory, with a 
finite beginning and end. 
Third, the widespread use of outsourcing has led to the deterioration 
of the traditional companies. Even in the most conventional companies, 
it is common to see consultants come into the company to assist in ar-
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eas that fall outside the company’s basic expertise. Moreover, when a 
firm chooses to outsource, efforts are made to treat the individuals who 
assist as partners, thus blurring the separation between permanent and 
contingent workers. Finally, when individuals who had previously per-
formed the now outsourced function are replaced, the firm becomes de-
pendent upon the outsourced partners. As a consequence, the contingent 
workers from the outsourced partner develop a sense of permanence 
with the organization. 
Another area that has seen a convergence of the needs of both com-
panies and employees is benefits. Historically, benefits have rested 
within the company, so if an employee moved to a different organiza-
tion, she risked not being covered or having to wait for eligibility. This 
forced many employees—particularly those who might need to use the 
benefits—to stay with an organization regardless of their satisfaction. 
Recently, at least two significant changes have occurred in the nature 
of benefits that not only facilitate the movement between organizations, 
but also reinforce the normative nature of movement. First, retirement 
plans have moved from traditional plans to more portable plans, such as 
401(k)s and “cash balance” or “pension equity” plans. These plans—ig-
noring the problems of the new plans for older workers—are notable for 
their portability and thus are appealing to young employees who may 
want to change jobs frequently. With these new plans, employees can 
move to a different organization at will and can retire at any point of 
their careers. These plans facilitate flexibility and the kind of restructur-
ing in which dynamic organizations need to engage (Burlingame and 
Gulotta 1998). 
Second, with the spiraling costs of health care, insurance is a re-
quirement and is often the factor that motivates people to work. Stories 
of “dumping” noninsured patients to other hospitals abound. Although 
issues of insurability continue to be important, statutes (e.g., authoriz-
ing COBRA) now assist people in keeping their insurance when they 
change jobs. 
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DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Although the previous discussion provides evidence for the use of 
contingent workers, a variety of issues remain unexamined. The scope 
of this chapter does not allow for an exhaustive list of these issues, but 
we address a few of them here. Specifically, we discuss the implications 
of a blended workforce, that is, a blend of permanent and contingent 
workers. Next we examine the changes that occur in company culture 
when there are large numbers of contingent workers in the workplace. 
Finally, we address the question of what motivates the contingent work-
er, focusing primarily on the temporary employee. Other important 
questions, such as whether public policy changes are required with the 
increased use of contingent workers, are covered in Chapter 6.
Almost all workforces are blended in some important ways. For ex-
ample, there often are regional and divisional differences within a com-
pany, as well as differences in job description, training level, pay, and 
demographics. These sorts of blended workforces are unlikely to create 
the same sorts of problems and opportunities created by a blend of con-
tingent and permanent workers, however, because all of these workers 
accept and endorse the common in-group identity provided by the com-
pany that employs them. In contrast, the blend of contingent and perma-
nent workers brings people together who may share no common in-group 
identity at all. This lack of a bond between workers has the potential to 
create prejudice and conflict between groups (as discussed below), which 
in turn can be exacerbated by the inherent differences in status that exist 
between permanent and contingent workers (Pettigrew 1998). 
The existing research focuses on temporary employees and suggests 
that they have largely negative effects on permanent employees. Per-
manent employees often resent the presence of temporary employees, 
feeling that their work is not up to par, which then forces the permanent 
employee to compensate for the temporary workers’ poor performance 
(Smith 1994). Permanent employees who work alongside temporary 
employees also showed decreased trust in and commitment to the or-
ganization (George 2003). Not surprisingly then, blended workforces 
also reduced permanent employees’ intentions to remain at their jobs 
(Davis-Blake, Broschak, and George 2003). 
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More recent research has started to examine some of the psycho-
logical mechanisms underlying these negative consequences of blended 
workforces (Kraimer et al. 2005; von Hippel 1999). The results of this 
work suggest that a blended workforce produces negative outcomes 
when the perceived motives for using temporary employees are deemed 
inappropriate (e.g., hiring temporary employees as a way to cut costs 
rather than to increase flexibility or deal with fluctuations in demand), 
the layoff policy is unfavorable, and/or the relative rank of the tempo-
rary worker is equal to or greater than that of the permanent employee. 
These results further suggest that these conditions lead to negative out-
comes because the permanent workers feel threatened by their tempo-
rary colleagues. Specifically, perceptions of threat arise, which in turn 
lead to intergroup biases on the part of permanent employees, causing 
them to think and act negatively toward their temporary co-workers. 
The negative consequences of a blended workforce appear to trans-
late to permanent employees’ performance as well. In one study, per-
manent employees who felt threatened by the presence of temporary 
co-workers showed lower performance than employees who did not 
(Kraimer et al. 2005). Further research is necessary to fully understand 
the effects of a blended workforce, as well as to determine how to pre-
vent these negative consequences and thereby allow companies to reap 
the full benefits of a blended workforce. Indeed, recent research sug-
gests that temporary workers can also feel threatened by negative ste-
reotypes held by managers and their permanent co-workers (Gallagher 
and Parks 2001; von Hippel et al. 2005).
Another issue that has not been addressed deals with company cul-
ture when a workforce contains a blend of contingent and permanent 
workers. Most organizations pride themselves on their unique culture, 
and staffing decisions—hiring, retention, and promotions—often rest 
on the fit of the individual with the organization (which is to say the cul-
ture). With increasing use of temporary, contract, and outsourced part-
ners, two problems may result. First, as organizations are increasingly 
outsourcing their HR functions, the company’s culture becomes increas-
ingly similar to the culture of the company to which it has outsourced 
the human resource function. Companies try to hire employees who 
“match” the company culture and image, just as prospective employees 
try to determine if their values match those of the company. As a con-
sequence, the culture of the organization must take on components of 
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the culture of the partnering groups. The second problem results when 
a sizeable percentage of the company is composed of contingent work-
ers who come and go frequently. Contingent workers may not stay long 
enough to detect and assimilate to the client employer’s culture. These 
situations can result in either cultural blending or cultural blandness, 
depending on how well the employees are managed. These situations 
may have implications for the company’s long-term vitality. If human 
resources are outsourced or there are too many transient workers, there 
may be no “unique culture,” and thus, the organization’s competitive 
advantage will suffer. 
Because contingent workers, by definition, do not share the same 
sense of “permanence” with employees of the organization, managing 
their attitudes and performance may be an entirely different process 
than for permanent employees. Indeed, different antecedents and inter-
relationships among temporary employees’ attitudes and behaviors have 
been described in recent years (Moorman and Harland 2002; Parker et 
al. 2002; Slattery and Selvarajan 2005). Some new methods of manag-
ing contingent versus permanent employees have also been proposed. 
Through two case studies, Koene and van Riemsdijk (2005) have dem-
onstrated the benefits organizations reap through careful management 
of temporary employees in distribution centers. When temporary em-
ployees are “carelessly managed” they are treated as expendable, so-
cialization is nonexistent, and training is minimal. In this particular 
distribution center there was a standing joke whereby permanent work-
ers would not tell a temporary employee their names until the tempo-
rary employee had been working for six weeks. It was believed that 
providing your name before this time was pointless since temporary 
employees typically did not last six weeks—no wonder! Contrast this 
approach with the second distribution center, where temporary work-
ers were given extensive training, socialization, and support. Although 
temporary employees in this firm were treated differently from the per-
manent employees, this treatment was no worse (nor better, just differ-
ent). As a consequence, this careful management resulted in lower rates 
of sickness, minimal “no shows,” and increased tenure compared to the 
“careless” approach.
As this chapter has demonstrated, however, contingent employees 
are not a homogeneous group, and thus not all management strategies 
are likely to be equally effective with this diverse population. For ex-
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ample, von Hippel et al. (1997) show how human resource practices for 
temporary versus permanent employees vary according to the business 
philosophy regarding temporary employees (e.g., as strategic partners 
or a necessary evil) and by human resource functional area (e.g., staff-
ing, development, compensation). Additionally, as discussed previous-
ly, the management of contingent workers is likely to differ depend-
ing on whether the contingent workers are working as such voluntarily 
or involuntarily. For example, when managing voluntary temporaries, 
managers can try to provide a number of different tasks for workers to 
enhance feelings of variety. In contrast, a skills focus should be adopted 
when managing involuntary temporary employees, given the role that 
learning new skills plays in their levels of satisfaction, commitment, 
and personal control.
CONCLUSION
The shadow workforce is a sizeable, heterogeneous group. If it was 
ever the case, researchers certainly cannot now lump such workers into 
a single grouping category. There is also significant heterogeneity in 
motivation on the employing side of the labor exchange. Researchers 
and policymakers must distinguish among types of contingent work and 
contingent workers or risk simplistic analyses with simplistic solutions. 
Articulation of the construct of contingent worker is required, as sweep-
ing generalizations ignore critical differences inherent in this group of 
workers. This chapter demonstrates the diversity in demographic pro-
files, levels of employee volition, different job outcomes, and occu-
pational and industry representations among categories of contingent 
workers. The old stereotypes of the contingent employee must be re-
conceptualized and replaced with new understandings. 
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More than 4 percent of workers in the United States are in some 
form of alternative employment arrangement. Most large businesses 
now have a permanent budget category for temporary workers (CPA	
Journal 1998). 
Evidence suggests that employer demand—not labor supply—is 
driving contingent work. Firms apparently want the cost savings and 
flexibility of hiring workers with no expectation of permanent employ-
ment (Golden 1996; Golden and Applebaum 1992). Companies hired 
more temporary workers as the last two decades progressed, although 
there was not a corresponding increase in workers willing to take con-
tingent jobs (e.g., young people, married women, and older workers). 
In this chapter we explain how forces external to a company op-
erate to increase the demand for a flexible workforce and summarize 
evidence on how employers use contingent workers to manage labor 
and related costs. We then argue that, in many situations, creating a 
flexible workforce through investment in permanent employees may 
be a feasible alternative to the use of contingent workers and can be 
expected to lead more readily to a sustainable competitive advantage. 
This argument employs the concept of “real options” to link labor and 
related costs with decision making under uncertain conditions. It then 
combines the real options approach with the resource-based view of the 
firm to provide additional insights into the use of flexible permanent 
employees as a competitive strategy for organizations. This resource-
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based view contends that competitive advantage results from appro-
priately managing resources that are valuable, rare, difficult to imitate, 
and combined uniquely within an organization. We also provide sug-
gestions for future research. 
WHy DO EMPLOyERS USE CONTINGENT WORKERS? 
An employer wishing to determine the economic value of any em-
ployee’s contribution compares the costs associated with hiring and em-
ploying a worker relative to the additional production expected (labor 
productivity).1 Firms also need to consider how to plan to achieve the 
flexibility desired to manage variable and uncertain future economic 
conditions. Distinguishing between ongoing costs and transaction costs 
is important when explaining why employers use contingent workers.
Ongoing	Costs:	Wages	and	Benefits
Firms may wish to use contingent workers to lower wages or ben-
efits. According to the 1999 Current Population Survey (CPS) by the 
U.S. Census Bureau, the median weekly earnings for a full-time, adult 
male contingent worker were only 80 percent of earnings for a com-
parable noncontingent worker. Women in contingent work earned less 
than 72 percent of comparable noncontingent workers. The discrepancy 
holds across all levels of education, age, and race (von Hippel et al. 
1997). Contingent workers are eligible for employer-sponsored health 
insurance or pension coverage less than half as often as noncontingent 
workers (pp. 20–23). Efforts by temporary employees to demand bet-
ter pay and benefits—such as lawsuits filed by oil field workers against 
ARCO and by independent contractors against Microsoft—highlight 
the differential compensation offered to contingent workers (Eisenberg 
1999; Training 1999).
On average, contingent workers receive lower wages than equiva-
lent, noncontingent employees. Workers employed through temporary 
service agencies (TSAs) make approximately 7.7 percent lower wages 
than long-term employees in similar jobs (Segal and Sullivan 1997). 
Gleason.indb   66 11/13/2006   9:06:45 AM
Employer Perspectives   67
However, according to the 1999 CPS supplemental survey, full-time 
contingent workers in some occupations, such as “precision production, 
craft, and repair” and “construction,” earn nearly the same or higher 
median weekly earnings than noncontingent workers. However, wage 
comparisons may be deceiving because employers pay other costs, such 
as a markup to the TSA or the expenses of a self-employed consultant. 
On the other hand, a TSA could substitute for the employer’s internal 
human resources personnel, so not all of the markup should be attrib-
uted to wages. 
Several published studies support the claim that firms use tempo-
rary workers to save on fringe benefits.2 The growth of the temporary 
help supply industry is positively related to the ratio of quasi-fixed labor 
costs to variable costs (Golden 1996). Quasi-fixed labor costs, such as 
health insurance and pension contributions, are associated with a par-
ticular worker rather than with hours worked. At the firm level, a higher 
level of benefits as a percentage of total payroll is correlated with in-
creased use of temporary agency or call-in employees (Mangum, May-
all, and Nelson 1985). Firms may contract out for services to skirt the 
need to pay all workers the same high rate because of union pay scales 
or because workers believe equal pay is fair.3
Transaction Costs
Unlike wages and benefits, many costs associated with employ-
ees are not ongoing. Costs that are incurred each time an agreement 
is formed between two parties are called transaction	 costs,	 such as 
time spent interviewing job candidates and processing paperwork, the 
expense of training new employees in firm-specific skills, the loss of 
goodwill during negotiations, and strategies to protect core workers.
Using temporary employees generally would be expected to in-
crease transaction costs since temporary employees come and go more 
often than permanent workers. Some costs are borne by the human re-
sources budget, such as advertising, conducting interviews, or paying 
for travel. Time spent interviewing applicants can be a substantial in-
vestment for firms with high turnover. Another important transaction 
cost is the time and money spent on training new workers, especially 
when a job requires idiosyncratic skills or knowledge. Consequently, 
hiring new workers frequently entails high transaction costs. 
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Also, a less obvious transaction cost is that of continuing to employ 
the same workers under short-term contracts. Most employees develop 
some experience and information that is of more value to the current 
employer than to anyone else. This stock of knowledge, skills, and abil-
ities (called firm-specific human capital) develops over time. 
Because there is usually some uncertainty surrounding the particu-
lar tasks the worker should do, human capital often develops in ways 
that are not specified in the original employment contract. Thus, at the 
end of a short-term contract, the employee may wish to renegotiate the 
terms of employment to reflect his or her new perceived value to the 
firm. Likewise, the employer may argue that the worker cannot trans-
fer that firm-specific human capital to another company and should be 
satisfied with remuneration that only reflects what the market will pay 
for generic skills, regardless of the fact that the employee truly can add 
value to the current firm. Even if the employer and worker agree to split 
the value created, reflected in some small raise at the time of renego-
tiation, the time spent in the negotiation process and the potential for 
hard feelings and loss of goodwill impose real costs on both parties. 
Consequently, rather than renegotiate every time the situation changes, 
an employer often will prefer to sign the worker to a long-term employ-
ment contract. The long-term contract gives the employer the right to 
alter the worker’s use of the knowledge or skill as necessary to respond 
to unanticipated changes; it also protects the worker from an employer 
using bargaining power to renegotiate rewards downward. Particularly 
when a job requires substantial firm-specific training, the employer will 
prefer to hire permanent workers, even if it has to keep them on during 
slack periods when productivity is low (Williamson 1985).
The amount of firm-specific training may be decreasing as standard 
tools such as computer software make firms’ processes more similar 
(Szabo and Negyesi 2005). If so, temporary and contract agencies may 
have an economy of scale in training workers. For example, Manpower 
Inc. introduced a Web-based learning center (www.manpowernet.com), 
which allows its employees and applicants access to technical training 
material. The free information technology training is particularly at-
tractive to people trying to enter computer fields, precisely the level of 
workers Manpower typically places, but it also benefits Manpower’s 
own full-time employees. Manpower’s knowledge of clients and work-
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ers allows it to track which skills are most in demand. Delivery of train-
ing over the Internet is ideal for technology workers (Cole-Gomolski 
1999). Even in professions with more stable skill requirements, tem-
porary employment agencies may have the opportunity to train more 
workers in a given profession than most businesses. Client firms may 
be willing to give up some of their firm-specific training preferences to 
hire temps with strong generic skills. (See Cappelli and Crocker-Hefter 
[1996]. The authors cite examples of how flexible business strategies 
match well with outside development of employee competencies.)
On the other hand, if workers receive minimal training, the key 
transaction cost surrounding employment may be the bureaucratic sys-
tem of the employer. For a firm using generic labor in a seasonal busi-
ness, the administrative and legal costs of hiring and firing temporary 
workers can be prohibitive. Furthermore, the legal doctrine of “employ-
ment-at-will,” which allows an employer to dismiss an employee for 
almost any reason, has been weakened by federal regulation, thereby 
increasing the cost of firing a permanent worker (Lee 1996).4 In this 
case, the transaction costs associated with contingent workers are less 
than those associated with permanent workers. Moreover, a temporary 
agency has an economy of scale in processing workers. John Bowmer, 
CEO of TSA Adecco, cites the firm’s move to acquire Olsten’s staffing 
unit as a response to the importance of information technology, which 
makes size important (Studer and Stern 1999). Larger TSAs can spread 
the costs of central computers and software over more placements. Ad-
ecco pioneered interactive “Job Shop” kiosks in public areas, linked 
to the Internet via Monster.com (Sunoo 1999). Such efforts reduce the 
transaction costs related to contingent workers.
Another kind of transaction cost relates to the firm’s reputation with 
its core workers. The more frequent the layoffs, the more workers that 
the firm hopes to keep will look elsewhere for employment. By clearly 
identifying some jobs as temporary, firms can buffer their core workers 
from layoffs. The resulting loyalty of key employees can offset minor 
productivity losses that come from using day laborers or other contin-
gent workers.5 Respondents to a minisurvey from Compensation	and	
Benefits Review noted that temporary workers allow the respondents’ 
companies to cover the work performed by full-time workers when they 
take time off or to complete special projects (Jefferson and Bohl 1998). 
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The alternatives—requiring other employees to work overtime when 
someone goes on sick leave, or hiring extra programmers with no prom-
ise to recognize seniority after the project is over—would be more det-
rimental to the firm’s core workers. For example, Bell Atlantic used an 
interim marketing staff for its move into the long-distance marketplace. 
If the venture failed, no long-term Bell Atlantic Corp. employees would 
be affected. If the market opened up, the company could transfer or hire 
permanent employees to handle the increased work (Keenan 1999). 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON TRANSACTION COSTS
Empirical research supports the importance of transaction costs in 
the management of hiring decisions. Research has investigated how 
firms respond to temporary increases in workload, the role of firm-spe-
cific training, and the impact of bureaucracy and firm size. 
A nationwide survey of employers in the early 1980s, as well as 
archival and interview data, showed how different kinds of employ-
ers respond to temporary increases in workload (Mangum, Mayall, and 
Nelson 1985). In general, the researchers conclude that the use of tem-
porary agencies lowered transaction costs related to temporary work-
ers by eliminating various employer costs for a fixed fee paid to the 
agency, fulfilling an economic role similar to the union hiring hall. The 
study finds that the use of temporary employees from an agency, “call-
ins” (occasional workers on a list maintained by the company itself), or 
“limited duration hires” (day workers or others whose employment is 
for a brief, specific time) is more likely when 
• a firm has a high level of benefits (not true for call-ins),
• the firm’s employment level is changing,
• the firm is large, or
• the skills involved are less specialized.
Another study using employer survey responses defines transaction 
costs primarily in terms of firm-specific training (Davis-Blake and Uzzi 
1993). In general, the findings support the hypotheses that, in addition 
to employment costs and external economic forces, skill requirements, 
Gleason.indb   70 11/13/2006   9:06:46 AM
Employer Perspectives   71
organizational size, and bureaucratization affect the use of temporary 
workers, leased workers, and independent contractors. When a job re-
quires training, the position is less likely, albeit slightly, to be “external-
ized” (filled by someone not on the permanent payroll). The effect is 
statistically significant but extremely modest. A job that involved over 
seven months of training was only one-half of 1 percent less likely to 
be externalized than a job that required no firm-specific training. This 
result argues against transaction costs being the driving factor in the 
decision. On the other hand, this measure actually includes all hours of 
formal training, informal training by managers, and informal training 
by co-workers for the typical incumbent in that job. It reflects at least 
some industry-specific training and possibly occupational training as 
well. Only some of this training is truly firm-specific, so this measure 
may underestimate the true impact of this type of training. Also, since 
the survey asked managers to consider the last position they filled, there 
is a selection bias toward hard-to-fill jobs. In order to fill a difficult 
position, firms may be more likely to hire a worker who lacks prior 
training.
In the same study, the authors measure the amount of paperwork 
necessary to fire an employee at each firm. The assumption is that some 
firms are more bureaucratic than others. Based on the argument in the 
previous section, one might predict that the administrative costs in a 
bureaucratic organization would create more demand for temporary 
workers. However, the hypothesis here is that workers undergo a par-
ticular kind of firm-specific training in a highly bureaucratic firm: the 
orientation to the bureaucratic system. Since temporary workers may be 
less able to follow rules without direct management, bureaucratic firms 
should use fewer temporary workers. 
Firms with more employees tend to have more bureaucracy and 
can avoid layoffs in any business unit more easily by spreading jobs 
around. Therefore, the hypothesis is that firm size should vary inversely 
with the use of temporary workers. In contrast, contract workers gen-
erally manage themselves apart from the rules of the host firm. Since 
the diversified firm may need access to specialized skills occasionally, 
it should be more likely to use contract workers. As predicted, larger 
firms and those with higher levels of bureaucracy are less likely to hire 
temporary workers and more likely to use contract workers. Apparently, 
Gleason.indb   71 11/13/2006   9:06:46 AM
72   Miller and Barney
the transaction costs of actually hiring and firing are outweighed by the 
transaction costs of orienting an employee to a bureaucratic organiza-
tion.
The disadvantage of having temporary employees on site who have 
difficulty following rules is a cost of integration, even though the inte-
gration is only temporary. The same dynamic can work with contract 
workers in certain settings. For example, contract employees in the pet-
rochemical industry have less safety training than permanent workers 
(Kochan et al. 1994). Since the contract company supervises their em-
ployees, the host firm reduces its transaction costs. However, the host 
firm and its employees may be harmed if the safety problems caused by 
contract workers go beyond accidents that injure contract employees. 
Thus, it may be in the best interest of the host company to offer further 
safety training and oversight to contract employees to avoid accidents. 
This effectively increases the transaction costs associated with contract 
employees, which may still be outweighed by the transaction costs as-
sociated with hiring and firing permanent employees. 
PRODUCTIvITy
From the employer’s perspective, the decision to define a task as 
contingent work or noncontingent work employs a standard cost-ben-
efit analysis. The value of the expected contribution from either type of 
employee is productivity minus costs. Thus, if contingent workers are 
just as productive at a certain task as permanent employees, firms will 
hire contingent workers if the total cost is less. The total cost includes 
both ongoing and transaction costs. That is, 
Value created = Productivity – Total cost
Total cost = Ongoing costs + Transaction costs.
In the same job over the same duration, contingent workers may 
be slightly more or less productive than noncontingent workers. Most 
academic research on direct productivity comparisons has studied en-
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try-level employees because their tasks are generally the same across 
firms and settings. For instance, two case studies of data entry operators 
found that the productivity of part-time contingent workers was at least 
7 percent below that of core workers. Considering the relative wages, 
benefits, and training costs, the use of contingent employees did not 
seem to be cost effective, but the use of agency-provided temporaries 
did provide savings. The biggest difference between the two categories 
of contingent workers was that the agency temps required much less 
training (Nollen and Axel 1996). Contingent workers in professional 
and technical fields, such as independent contractors of engineering 
services, may be at least as productive as a firm’s own workers (see 
Jarmon, Paulson, and Rebne [1998]. A survey of managers in six high-
technology settings found that the perceived performance of contrac-
tors was similar to employees). 
Thus, the relative productivity of contingent and permanent em-
ployees depends on the circumstances. If an organization implements a 
new data entry system using off-the-shelf software, agency temps who 
have used the package at other establishments may be more efficient 
and accurate than the company’s own workers who are just learning the 
system. Regarding professional workers, hiring an attorney who spe-
cializes in the particular legal issues currently facing the firm may be 
preferable to keeping one attorney on retainer who is a generalist. It 
may be impossible to hire permanent workers who are able to handle 
every contingency or to pay them full time when the work is seasonal.
Returning to the Bell Atlantic example, another reason the compa-
ny decided to outsource may have been to access marketing people with 
skills related to the specific market or project. Many self-employed, 
independent contractors offer specialized expertise that employers need 
only on occasion. An extreme example is the U.S. Census Bureau, 
which hires thousands of workers for each decennial census (Potok and 
Holdrege 1999). The contingent work arrangement can provide an em-
ployer with flexibility to maintain high productivity, even when circum-
stances change. 
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USING “REAL OPTIONS” TO ExPLAIN  
FLExIBILITy PLANNING
A flexible workforce is one that can create value under various con-
ditions of production. There are two ways to achieve a workforce that 
can adapt over time to perform different tasks. One way is to hire dif-
ferent workers over time through contingent arrangements, including 
hiring into the firm with no long-term commitment. The other way is 
to hire and develop flexible permanent employees with either a broad 
range of skills or the ability and willingness to learn and adapt with the 
organization over time. In terms of the value equation above, a simple 
approach is:
Productivity =  (Productivity under one condition × Probability of  
 that condition) 
                     + (Productivity under another condition × Probability  
 of that other condition). 
If there are only a few possible conditions, and if an employer can 
anticipate their probabilities accurately, then it is possible to write those 
expectations into an employment contract. However, as the variety of 
potential tasks increases or the business environment becomes more un-
predictable, it becomes impossible to work out every possible scenario 
ahead of time. Then, flexibility is helpful not only because productivity 
is increased under various conditions, but also because negotiations are 
simplified. Uncertainty, not just variability, makes flexibility valuable. 
But how does one estimate the value of flexibility?
Mathematically, the employer can estimate probabilities and con-
duct a more complete cost-benefit analysis than discussed above. Theo-
retically, one could even generate expected cash flows resulting from 
the worker’s contribution. Standard financial analysis would use those 
cash flows discounted appropriately over time to produce a measure 
of net present value (NPV). Of course, realized cash flows may differ 
substantially from the expectation. Thus, a financial analyst will usually 
check to be sure conclusions do not change substantially if assumptions 
(e.g., the interest rate) change slightly. This “sensitivity analysis” con-
siders not only the mean of the distribution of potential returns, but also 
the variation around the mean. For example, one can use a mathemati-
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cal formula to estimate the value of mineral rights based not only on the 
expected price of the mineral and the costs of extraction, but also the 
possible drift in price in the future (Copeland, Koller, and Murrin 1995, 
Chapter 15). The right to drill for oil can be worth much more than 
might be revealed through a simple NPV analysis, because the owner 
only has to invest in extraction if the price of oil is high. 
Similar logic underlies the large market for financial options. A call 
option, for instance, gives the investor the right to buy a stock at a speci-
fied price at a future date. If the stock price drops, the investor loses 
only the initial purchase price of the option, which is usually a few dol-
lars for each share of stock. But if the stock price rises, the investor’s 
gain is potentially huge. The investor can buy the stock at a preset, low 
price and sell at a high price. If the stock price is certain, options do not 
matter much; but if a stock price varies widely, an option is highly valu-
able.6 The value of the option comes from the fact that the investor will 
only exercise the right to buy the stock if circumstances are favorable.7 
The prevalence of financial options has led financial analysts to ap-
ply the term “option” to other kinds of investment under uncertainty. 
For example, the right to drill for oil is considered a “real option.” The 
term “real” comes from the fact that this option involves investment in 
a real asset such as real estate rather than a financial asset such as stock. 
Also, the additional value not captured in the simple NPV calculation is 
sometimes called the “option value.” 
A real option usually will be reflected in a series of small, staged 
investments rather than a single, large investment, which is aimed at the 
same goal but is less flexible.8 For example, firms entering highly un-
certain new markets appear to invest in joint ventures rather than whol-
ly owned subsidiaries because a joint venture embodies an option (Chi 
and McGuire 1996; Kogut 1991). For a relatively small investment, 
the firm can 1) learn more about the market and its potential partners, 
2) wait to see if the market develops in some unpredictable manner, 
and 3) get out of the deal if necessary without damaging its reputation. 
The essential characteristic of a real option is that it allows the owner 
to make a claim when conditions are favorable, with limited downside 
risk. When change is likely but its direction is unpredictable, the firm 
may have different requirements than if the current environment is ex-
pected to continue. 
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Hiring temporary workers is a type of real option because the em-
ployer can switch labor inputs as conditions fluctuate (Foote and Folta 
2002). While this arrangement does not have a written purchase price 
or exercise period, there are parallels to financial options. The purchase 
price of the real option may be lower productivity, higher transaction 
costs, or even higher wages. The option may only be good for a certain 
period, either because temporary workers can be expected to move on 
to other employers more likely to offer permanent positions, or because 
government regulation prevents keeping workers contingent forever. 
Transaction costs incurred in switching from one set of contingent 
workers to another, such as the cost of firm-specific training, represent 
a price paid when the option is exercised. Using real options logic in 
the employment context does not negate the importance of costs, but 
it allows consideration of flexibility as well. Therefore, under high un-
certainty, the option value may flip the decision from hiring inflexible 
permanent workers to hiring contingent workers. 
On the other hand, investing in full-time employees can create a 
different real option in which the firm secures the right to ask the em-
ployee to vary activities. The purchase price is the cost of inducing the 
employee to develop firm-specific human capital, perhaps through a 
company-sponsored training program. The exercise period depends on 
the outside job market as well as the person’s age and ability to learn. 
There may be some further cost to exercise the right. For example, the 
manager may have to give some attention to restructuring work rela-
tionships, and the employee may not be at optimal productivity in the 
new setting right away. Both of these real options hedge against the 
same kinds of risks, and the value of both increases with higher uncer-
tainty. Of course, just as there are different kinds of transaction costs, 
there also are many kinds of uncertainty to consider. 
Factors Creating Uncertainty
There are three important categories of uncertainty: demand, tech-
nological, and measurement. Any change in demand can increase or re-
duce the number of labor hours (and therefore workers) a firm requires. 
These changes can result from shifts in buying power, consumer prefer-
ences, competition, or other factors. Moreover, cyclicality of consumer 
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demand can lead to increased demand for temporary workers, even if 
that cyclicality is perfectly predictable, as in the case of the decennial 
census of the United States. Given uncertainty about demand, a firm 
would prefer to collect more information and wait before hiring perma-
nent employees. The greater the degree of the uncertainty, the more ten-
uous the desired commitments to employees become. If it were costless 
to hire and fire permanent employees, dishonest managers might offer 
“permanent” jobs when needed, and simply lay off people to match 
fluctuating demand. However, the costs of such actions include the loss 
of company reputation and the breakdown of the internal labor market 
(e.g., people performing their best to get a promotion). 
In fact, the specific type of job influences the response to demand 
uncertainty, according to a study of contract services (Abraham and 
Taylor 1996, pp. 411–412). Organizations in industries with seasonal or 
cyclical workloads contract out significantly less of their janitorial and 
machine maintenance work. Cyclical firms also seem to contract out 
fewer engineering and drafting services, but more of their accounting 
work. The researchers offer a caveat that they had to construct season-
ality and cyclicality measures from employment data at the industry 
level since they did not have access to that information for each estab-
lishment. A different study used establishment-level data to construct 
a measure of employment variability over a two-year span prior to the 
survey. This measure, which blends seasonality, cyclicality, and trend 
effects, is positively related to the use of temporary workers, as ex-
pected, confirming the value of flexibility under variability in demand 
(Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993, p. 207).9 
Similarly, if a firm is uncertain about what technology will be the 
most efficient, it will be difficult to specify what tasks employees will 
do in the future. The greater the degree of technological uncertainty, 
the more problematic it is to commit to a group of employees with set 
skills. Any change that affects the labor supply—equipment purchas-
es, worker education, job process reengineering, or other factors that 
change the productivity of labor or the specific skills required to best 
implement production—can impact not only what tasks a worker per-
forms, but also what that worker must be able to learn. A computer soft-
ware designer can probably learn another programming tool. However, 
a company that moves from a business plan based on lean production to 
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one based on customer service may desire employee competencies that 
were not required previously.
Measurement uncertainty arises because an employee’s productiv-
ity in any specific task is never fully verifiable. The resulting possi-
bility of shirking work or other opportunistic behavior creates agency 
costs. Either the employer has to pay for someone to monitor the em-
ployee, the employee has to pay (perhaps in the form of self-financed 
education) to give assurance he can do the job, or the employer has 
to be willing to live with the potential losses. These agency costs are 
primarily characteristic of the task, not the employee. Some jobs are 
more difficult to monitor. Therefore, it is difficult to predict the impact 
of measurement uncertainty on the use of contingent workers. A per-
manent, internal employee may be more trusted, and can be rewarded 
based on long-term performance. On the other hand, using a contract 
worker or leased worker may allow a firm to share some of the agency 
risk with the contracting firm. A temporary employment agency might 
have an economy of scale or develop a particular skill in monitoring its 
employees or training them to a minimal degree of productivity. Also, 
externalized workers may have less opportunity to shirk duties if their 
assignments are more specific. To the extent that employers believe 
workers differ in their propensity to be opportunistic (and vice versa), 
temporary employment can be an effective screening device prior to a 
permanent hire. 
To summarize, real option theory generally would propose that, 
under high uncertainty, companies should desire a more flexible work-
force than required under low uncertainty. Flexibility can be achieved 
in two ways. One way is to employ more flexible permanent employees. 
In the face of demand uncertainty, companies will want to hire workers 
who will accept overtime hours and pay. If technological uncertainty 
makes it impossible to fully define the skills required in an employee, 
companies should aim to recruit employees with multiple competen-
cies. The increased value of the flexible permanent workers would then 
require higher overall compensation. Moreover, the transaction costs 
and agency costs associated with flexible employees would likely be 
higher than for focused employees, but the value of their productivity 
under various scenarios will outweigh the increased costs as uncertainty 
increases. The firm will only invest in such human capital if it can re-
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tain the right to exercise the option at its discretion. Thus, these flexible 
employees should be bound with contractual agreements that protect 
the firm’s options, such as long-term contracts and “do not compete” 
clauses. 
Alternatively, firms could achieve flexibility through the structure 
of the workforce: outsourcing work, or using leased or temporary em-
ployees (Foote and Folta 2002). In the case of demand uncertainty, the 
firm can hire temporary employees as needed. When technological un-
certainty is high, the firm can hire contingent workers with different skill 
sets, and hire permanently only those it needs. Or, the firm can hire the 
workers it needs today and replace them in the future with workers with 
other skills. As technological uncertainty increases to very high levels, 
it would be impossible to hire permanent workers with the ability or de-
sire to learn every possible skill required. The flexibility inherent in any 
one person is limited. When measurement uncertainty is present, firms 
may use temporary employment as a screening device. Firms can learn 
about specific employees and reduce the uncertainty involved in offers 
of permanent employment.10 For example, the company could put tem-
porary workers through a brief training program to see which are best 
suited to the company. Furthermore, certain firms may be able to hire 
these workers permanently at wages lower than for employees who did 
not temp first, because the temporary relationship convinced the worker 
that the company is a good place to work. The permanent hiring of 
temporary workers depends on the uncertainty being resolvable. In the 
extreme, hypercompetitive environment, a firm will desire to maintain 
the contingent relationship so it can swap skill sets as needed. 
EvIDENCE FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURvEy
Existing research has tested for the importance of various deter-
minants of demand for contingent labor. Unfortunately, studies to date 
have typically focused on one type of contingent work, or have mea-
sured only whether a form of contingent work is used at all, not the 
extent to which it is used. Gathering data on wages, benefits, transaction 
costs, and productivity for the same set of workers has been difficult. 
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However, to distinguish the economic importance of the various fac-
tors, they must all be included in the same statistical model.11 The bien-
nial supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS) on contingent 
work offer an initial approach to these issues using a large sample of 
workers. We offer the following analysis of these data to confirm gen-
eral facts and to point to issues deserving more rigorous research. 
The February 1995 supplement to the CPS was the first to focus 
on contingent workers, whom Polivka and Nardone (1989) define as 
“workers who have no implicit or explicit contract for ongoing employ-
ment.” The survey pertained to the worker’s length of expected service 
as well as work arrangement. Respondents are categorized as contin-
gent according to three definitions and their associated employment es-
timates. Estimate 1 includes wage and salary workers who have been in 
their jobs for up to one year and expect their jobs to last no more than an 
additional year. Estimate 2 includes those workers plus self-employed 
or independent contractors whose length of service matches definition 
1. Estimate 3 includes wage and salary workers who believe their jobs 
to be temporary, without a specific time frame, plus all self-employed 
and independent contractors.12 Thus, a worker is not defined as con-
tingent simply because he or she works for a temporary agency, for 
example. Temporary agencies have permanent employees, and some 
firms that hire from temporary agencies also maintain their own pools 
of on-call workers. Using definition 3, 66.5 percent of workers paid 
by temporary help agencies in 1995 were contingent workers, and 3.6 
percent of workers in traditional arrangements were contingent workers 
(Cohany 1996). 
Each estimate reflects worker responses rather than a formal de-
scription by a human resources person at the company. It captures all 
employment arrangements in which contingency is understood even 
if not recorded in a written contract. Moreover, it reflects all differ-
ent kinds of contingent relationships, which is important since these 
relationships can be substitutes for each other. The percentages of each 
estimate have remained similar in subsequent surveys.13 Thus, 400,000 
workers employed by temporary agencies see their positions lasting as 
long as they wish, while nearly 4 million workers employed directly by 
a firm consider their jobs more or less temporary. 
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Our analysis of data on 2,568 workers answering the 1995 CPS 
supplement reveals several important determinants in the choice of the 
relative importance of contingent and noncontingent jobs in the em-
ployment structure.14 The model presented here assumes managers go 
to the labor market and identify prospective employees who are will-
ing to accept a given level of compensation for their skills, experience, 
and education. Managers then choose whether to offer a contingent or 
noncontingent position based on the costs and benefits associated with 
those workers available to fill each kind of position.15 This is a model 
of labor demand, not supply, so no conclusions should be drawn re-
garding workers’ choices of positions. Furthermore, this model con-
tains no information on worker productivity. The implicit assumption is 
that contingent workers and noncontingent workers perform the same. 
These simplifying assumptions are clearly unrealistic to some extent, 
and make the results given in this section exploratory. However, clari-
fying the assumptions also can help identify what kind of data would 
better untangle the interrelationships between factors. 
All data in the discussion that follows are based on Estimate 1. 
Results are similar for the other definitions of contingency, except the 
impact of fringe benefits decreases when self-employed workers are 
included in the contingent ranks. The evidence shows the importance of 
ongoing costs, transaction costs, and flexibility in the decision to make 
a position contingent. 
The current legal and cultural environment allows firms to offer, on 
average, lower wages and fewer benefits to contingent workers than to 
permanent workers. Our evidence confirms previous findings that em-
ployers hire contingent workers to reduce ongoing costs. The higher the 
level of weekly pay, the less likely a worker is contingent. Furthermore, 
if the employer provides health insurance or a pension in conjunction 
with the job, the worker is less likely to be contingent. 
The CPS supplement did not ask about hours of training or other in-
dicators of transaction costs. No information is given on the employer, 
other than the industry. However, if temporary agencies and contracting 
firms reduce transaction costs through economies of scale in processing 
and training workers, then firms should hire more contingent workers 
when these agencies are available and can achieve economies of scale. 
Thus, jobs in metropolitan areas should be more likely to be filled by 
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contingent workers. The CPS identifies the worker by census tract into 
three categories: central city, nonmetropolitan, and other (e.g., subur-
ban). Indeed, we find that workers in nonmetropolitan areas are 2.59 
percent less likely to be contingent than workers in other areas. 
Firms can achieve workforce flexibility either through more flex-
ible permanent employees or through the use of specialized, contin-
gent workers. More flexible workers will therefore be less likely to be 
contingent employees. Age, education, and willingness to work non-
traditional hours may all relate to worker flexibility. First, older work-
ers have had more time to acquire a range of knowledge, skills, and 
abilities, including human capital specific to the firm. From the supply 
side, older workers also should be less willing to enter some contingent 
arrangements (such as temporary work) because their expected return 
on additional investments in human capital, such as learning new skills 
or acquiring new firm-specific knowledge, is limited by the time period 
available to benefit from the return. On the other hand, older work-
ers may be more willing to be self-employed to take full advantage of 
their experience or take part-time jobs to enjoy more leisure. Second, 
a worker with more schooling should be more capable of learning new 
tasks, so we control for education level. Third, workers who work more 
than 40 hours a week provide a buffer against demand variation and 
uncertainty. However, part-time workers may be a substitute for contin-
gent workers as defined in the CPS supplement. Firms may use workers 
for fewer hours each week on a permanent basis, rather than hiring full-
time workers for short durations. 
Including age in the model lessens the effect of pay, which makes 
sense since a worker’s earnings usually increase throughout his or her 
career. A change in age from 30 to 40 reduces the probability that a 
worker is contingent by 5.7 percent. However, education does not seem 
to make a difference. Considering raw correlation statistics, having a 
bachelor’s or graduate degree appears to be negatively related to contin-
gent status. However, in a full model including the other factors, educa-
tion has no effect.16 The more overtime hours a person works, the more 
likely he or she is to be a permanent employee of the firm. Part-time 
status has no effect after controlling for wage and other variables. 
Finally, firms facing higher uncertainty or variability should be 
more likely to hire contingent employees than firms facing lower uncer-
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tainty. Since firm-level data are not available due to privacy concerns, 
an industry-level measure is used. This measure is the mean variation 
in stock returns over a two-year period for each three-digit SIC code, 
matched to the industry codes used in the CPS. Only industries with at 
least five actively traded firms were included. Aggregating over the in-
dustry creates a proxy for changes that affect total demand and the tech-
nology shared by the members of that industry.17 We find that industry-
level variability has no bearing on the use of contingent workers. It may 
be that the option value is more closely tied to firm-level uncertainty, or 
that achieving flexibility through investment in permanent workers is a 
close substitute for hiring temporary workers. 
Overall, contingent positions pay less in wages, offer health insur-
ance and pension coverage less often, and are more likely to be located 
in a city and not in a rural area. Contingent positions are less likely to 
be filled by older workers and those who worked overtime hours in the 
previous week. These broad correlations reinforce the tabulated results 
released by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
COMPETITIvE ADvANTAGE THROUGH A  
FLExIBLE WORKFORCE
As explained above, employees add value to an organization, and 
this value varies according to different conditions. We have argued that 
firms desire a workforce that can adapt quickly and effectively, espe-
cially as the pace of change in technology, international competition, 
and other dynamic environmental forces require increased flexibility. 
Furthermore, the employer can adjust the mix of contingent work ar-
rangements and flexible permanent employees to address demand, tech-
nological, and measurement uncertainties. These two means of achiev-
ing flexibility can often substitute for each other. The key to gaining a 
competitive advantage is whether one firm can achieve flexibility that 
competitors cannot. Employers pursue strategic human resource man-
agement (SHRM) to compete effectively in these uncertain conditions. 
The primary theoretical perspective being used in studies of SHRM is 
the resource-based view of the firm.18 In this approach, an organization 
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gains competitive advantage from managing resources that are valu-
able, rare, difficult to imitate, and organizationally implemented (Bar-
ney 1991; 1997, Chapter 5). 
A resource or capability has value to the extent that it enables the 
firm to cut costs, increase price, or otherwise allow the firm to pursue a 
strategy in product markets. A resource or capability is rare when only 
one or a few competitors employ it in their strategies. Standard micro-
economic approaches usually assume that competitors all have access 
to the same resources and will adjust prices or quantities until the earn-
ings from the resource are just enough to cover the risk involved in its 
purchase. However, this “perfect competition” rarely, if ever, occurs. 
Some industries or geographic markets have only a few participating 
companies and, in emerging markets, a first mover may be able to gain 
high returns on its product while competitors try to catch up. Therefore, 
ongoing rarity is a function of how difficult a resource or capability is 
to imitate. 
One reason a competitor may not be able to imitate a resource is 
that it was acquired at a unique point in history that cannot be repeated. 
For example, pharmaceutical companies that already valued basic sci-
ence research in the 1970s were able to adopt new “science-driven” 
drug discovery procedures that led to highly profitable blockbuster 
drugs, whereas those companies that had relied on more random testing 
of existing chemicals to solve medical problems were unable to hire 
the scientists and create the culture needed to imitate them (Cockburn, 
Henderson, and Stern 2000). 
A second obstacle to imitation is that someone outside the organi-
zation may not be able to distinguish the resource that is making the 
difference. Even if the competitor knows which capability to imitate, 
it may be hard to achieve since value is often created by teams of peo-
ple working together in ways that are difficult to manage. Of course, 
those same management struggles affect the firm that already has the 
resource, so creating and maintaining an organization to get the best out 
of the resources is the final condition for competitive advantage. We 
now apply these concepts to the case of a flexible permanent workforce, 
with an emphasis on the issue of imitation. 
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The Flexible Permanent Workforce
For several reasons, a flexible permanent workforce built from 
training and rewarding permanent employees will be more difficult to 
imitate than a flexible workforce using contingent workers. First, cre-
ating a flexible permanent workforce takes time, whereas creating a 
flexible contingent workforce can be done more quickly, particularly 
with the aid of large-scale temporary service agencies. A permanent 
worker’s flexibility may increase naturally over time as the employee 
changes jobs within the organization, encounters different customers, 
or communicates with other workers about their jobs. Also, an employ-
ee’s long tenure often includes times when the employee sacrifices for 
the benefit of the firm, and other times when the company rewards that 
service by giving the employee extra consideration. The repeated reci-
procity builds trust and encourages the worker to be flexible again in 
the future. Since knowledge and trust are rooted in a particular history, 
it would be difficult for a competitor to quickly reproduce that kind of 
relationship. When a change in demand or technology occurs, the capa-
bilities must be already in place to be effective. In contrast, adjusting the 
workforce with contingent workers happens at the time of the change. 
A competitor can implement the same plan from scratch, assuming the 
purpose of the plan is apparent and does not rely on either reconfiguring 
the physical assets the contingent workers will use or redesigning jobs. 
The second argument for a flexible permanent workforce is that 
employment policies focused within the firm are less transparent to ob-
servers than are relationships with external parties. Temporary service 
agencies, contract agencies, or independent contractors may reveal the 
parameters and proposed benefits of their relationship with one firm 
to entice another firm to use their services. Competitors can even ask 
contingent workers how their previous employers used them. The flow 
of information makes the market for contingent workers fairly efficient: 
any employer should have to pay about the same amount to contract 
for similar services. However, matching cost is not the only aspect of 
benchmarking. Even more important is the issue of whether the re-
source or policy under consideration is central to the firm’s success. 
With a relatively minor investment, a competitor can investigate an em-
ployer’s contingent work practices and determine whether they are the 
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source of the firm’s competitive advantage or merely a convenient way 
to staff a firm that really gains its superiority from other factors besides 
human resources (e.g., its well-known brand name). On the other hand, 
an employer’s relationship with its permanent employees is harder to 
benchmark. A large organization follows complicated selection proce-
dures, conducts numerous training programs, transfers employees be-
tween departments, and offers various incentives. 
Part of what makes human resource systems so hard to understand 
is that they are very complex, involving informal communication and 
relationships. This complexity also makes it difficult to duplicate such 
systems, even when the key components are well understood. Competi-
tors thus find it difficult to determine which policies and practices have 
the desired effect. It is possible that an employer uses an outside con-
sultant to determine salaries or off-the-shelf software to train personnel. 
In that case, a competitor could use the same methods. However, if the 
key aspect of firm-specific human capital is something less obvious, 
such as the personal commitments of team members to one another, 
implementing all the standard solutions will be ineffective in matching 
the successful firm. For example, HR practices that target employee 
development can speed organizational learning, increase quality, and 
enhance the flexibility of manufacturing systems.19 So, does a firm’s 
manufacturing quality come from its proprietary machinery, used by 
merely competent line workers, or from highly involved workers who 
make constant suggestions for ongoing improvement to the machinery? 
The answer to this question could lead a competitor to invest in new 
equipment, new HR policies, or both.  
The third explanation for why it can be more difficult to imitate 
a flexible permanent workforce than one created through contingent 
workers is that the imitator firm’s own history and capabilities impede 
transfer of best practices from elsewhere. A small misunderstanding can 
have a large impact on employees’ loyalty and productivity. Firms must 
select, train, compensate, and commit to employees to create learning 
synergies—just one of those aspects probably is not enough. The diffi-
cult nature of implementing such systems may explain why many firms 
do not adopt “high-performance” work systems, and why many of these 
systems die off quickly (Pfeffer 1994). An important aspect of the com-
plexity in workforce flexibility is the relationship between a plant or di-
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vision and company headquarters. Employees will only welcome some 
practices (e.g., merit pay) if they are universally applied. Likewise, staff 
may establish uniform policies in order to simplify record keeping and 
avoid mistakes. Both pressures will work against the manager of a par-
ticular plant trying to benchmark to a competitor whose practices differ 
from the policies of his parent corporation. However, the harder a strat-
egy is to implement, the more likely the successful firms will have a 
source of sustainable advantage. A workforce that creates value through 
flexibility will remain rare only if there exist barriers to imitation. The 
challenge for managers is to create an organizational structure and cul-
ture that is consistent with the strategy, but not so formal or simple as to 
allow for easy benchmarking.
Combining the Resource-Based and Real Options Frameworks 
We have presented two frameworks for understanding flexible em-
ployment. Real options help managers know under what conditions 
flexibility is important for any organization. The real option approach 
also explains why contingent workers and flexible permanent employ-
ees are substitute methods of creating value under uncertainty. The re-
source-based view clarifies that gaining flexibility through permanent 
employees is more likely to sustain that value in the face of competition. 
Bringing the two frameworks together can generate some additional 
insights into how managers can use real options to gain competitive ad-
vantage. The resource-based descriptions of markets, uncertainty, and 
competitive advantage fit well with the type of economic framework 
represented by financial options and real options. Three keys to the use 
of financial options are information, complementarity, and efficiency, 
and the same aspects exist for the real option of a flexible workforce. 
Financial investors trade stocks based on information about the 
magnitude, timing, and direction of profits and price movements. Fi-
nancial options can be a less expensive way to profit from stock price 
movement. For the price of one share of stock, an investor could pur-
chase dozens of options that will also appreciate if the stock goes up. It 
is even possible to make money on financial options solely by having 
superior information about the amount of variability a stock’s price will 
exhibit over time. For example, a certain combination of call options 
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and put options may gain value if the stock price begins to move more 
erratically over time. An investor does not need to know whether the 
stock is going up or down, just whether world events or other factors 
will cause the company’s cash flows to be less predictable in the future. 
Likewise, purchasing and exercising real options can lead to competi-
tive advantage if a firm has superior information. 
Certain kinds of superior information may enable a firm to hire em-
ployees at an advantage. Suppose a firm has superior information about 
which knowledge and skills will be in greatest demand in the near fu-
ture. Competitors may be recruiting workers with broad skills, perhaps 
paying a premium for intelligence and industry experience. But the firm 
with superior information is able to select relatively inflexible workers 
with just the right skills. While other firms are paying higher transaction 
costs for churning through contingent workers, this firm can hire once. 
Also, the complementarity between financial options and the un-
derlying assets determines the value for each investor. The value of 
financial options depends on the other assets in the investor’s portfolio, 
often because investors use financial options to hedge against exposure 
to specific risks. For example, an American company doing business 
in Europe will earn revenues in euros, and will want to hedge against 
changes in the exchange rate of the euro versus the dollar. A purely do-
mestic U.S.-based company would have no need to hedge against cur-
rency risk. Even though traders and companies have sometimes been 
hurt by speculative investment in options, the market for them contin-
ues to be strong because they are a low-cost way to hedge against spe-
cific risks. On the individual level, an investor who already owns shares 
of stock can sell call options on those shares to lock in a limited profit; 
the call option thus serves as a form of insurance. Similarly, different 
real options will be worth more to some companies than others because 
of the uncertainty each faces and the resources under its control. 
A firm with a particular resource may find investment in a flexible 
permanent workforce to be more valuable to it than a similar invest-
ment would be to its competitor. For instance, a firm with a distinctive 
culture, brand name, managerial know-how, or location may be able to 
leverage that resource into greater profits by hiring more flexible per-
manent employees at lower cost or with greater productivity than their 
competitors. Consider an organization with superior proprietary tech-
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nology that allows a single worker to coordinate production of multiple 
items. For competitors, the same production requires multiple workers 
supervising multiple machines. The firm with the advantage can afford 
to bid more than its competitors for the workers with the best learning 
ability, and still be able to make an abnormal profit from their efforts. 
The reverse is also possible. A firm may use distributed manufacturing 
to meet demand as it arises. Because machines and systems are simple 
or standardized, the company can hire temporary workers for a rela-
tively low cost. A competitor committed to one large production facility 
may have expensive overhead even during downtimes. 
Finally, the U.S. stock market is still highly efficient in the sense 
that the mechanisms of trade are not costly (e.g., stocks trading in pen-
ny increments) and do not automatically bias prices one way or the 
other. The efficiency occurs despite the fact that the information avail-
able to investors is sometimes clouded by corporate misinformation 
(e.g., Enron’s off-balance-sheet accounting), and some risks cannot be 
anticipated (e.g., a terrorist attack). On the other hand, the markets for 
resources that create real options are not necessarily efficient. Firms do 
not frequently trade or sell real options, and managers may discount the 
value of flexibility if it means trying something new. 
Any input for sale in an efficient market will not be a likely source 
of competitive advantage. Competing firms should bid up the price of 
the resource to its fair market value. The market for contingent work-
ers, at least in large metropolitan areas, is fairly efficient. Temporary 
service agencies, contract agencies, and independent contractors gener-
ally provide their services at the same price to each employer. Likewise, 
if every potential employer knows that certain potential employees are 
more flexible, the cost of engaging those workers on a permanent basis 
should rise to a level that equals their value contribution. Many seem-
ingly different job abilities are highly correlated, at least as commonly 
measured (Campion 1989). Entering the market for flexible employees, 
an organization may find that everyone is its competitor, not just the 
other firms in its industry. Thus, although a flexible permanent work-
force can be achieved through the structure of work and the selection 
of workers, such processes are likely to cost a firm the full price of the 
flexibility. Structure and selection can bring the average firm to com-
petitive parity, but not competitive advantage.
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On the other hand, in order to gain or extend a competitive ad-
vantage through investment in permanent employees, a company must 
only have superior information relative to its employees. Companies 
typically have a better understanding of what a job requires than does 
the prospective employee. The difference in information allows the firm 
to hire the worker at a fair market price, but less than the full value the 
individual will create within the firm over time. Then, continued invest-
ment in firm-specific human capital can create more value to be shared 
between the employer and an employee. The employee is willing to 
learn from the employer because of the employer’s superior informa-
tion and resources. Even skilled workers who know more about their 
tasks than any manager will find it easier to prove their value to the or-
ganization by listening to how their tasks fit within the overall strategy, 
rather than trying on their own to unpack complex interactions among 
other workers. The agreement between the employer and employee is 
not an efficient market, but rather a negotiation, even if it takes place 
within the structure of a union contract. 
This is not to argue that all firms would do equally well to invest in 
permanent employees. Managerial skill, teamwork, distinctive reward 
systems, partnerships with universities, or other resources could cre-
ate a superior environment for developing the right kind of employee 
flexibility. An optimal strategy for any given firm may be to invest in 
real options through some permanent employees and some contingent 
workers. Periodically integrating outsiders can invigorate organization-
al learning and facilitate change, even in businesses relying primarily 
on core workers.20 Similarly, firms with good reason to employ many 
contingent workers may need to invest in a few key employees who can 
coordinate the constant flow of workers. Nevertheless, the resource-
based view clarifies that a flexible permanent workforce may be a more 
sustainable source of competitive advantage than a contingent work-
force, and the real options logic highlights the importance of informa-
tion about industry conditions, firm-specific risks, and how an employee 
can become part of a complex system to create value. 
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CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR  
FURTHER RESEARCH
Current research suggests that increasing rates of change in the 
economic environment and uncertainty have driven demand for contin-
gent workers. Temporary supply agencies, independent contractors, and 
other organizational forms have arisen to take advantage of economies 
of scale and reduce transaction costs related to hiring workers with a 
particular, identifiable skill. Contingent work situations are diverse and 
they are designed to address different costs and benefits. A multivari-
ate regression analysis using CPS data confirmed that employers are 
likely to hire contingent workers to save on wages, health insurance, 
and pension contributions, and to take advantage of the availability 
of large-scale agencies located in metropolitan areas. However, more 
flexible workers, such as those who have had more experience or are 
willing to work overtime, are less likely to be in contingent positions, 
which implies that employers also recognize the possibility of gaining 
a flexible workforce through hiring and training permanent employees. 
The resource-based view of the firm and the real options approach to 
valuing flexibility clarify that a company relying on multiskilled perma-
nent employees to adapt to change may be in a better position to gain 
and sustain a competitive advantage than a company using contingent 
workers to handle uncertain labor demand. 
Future research should shed light on two main areas. First, what 
are the most important factors driving demand for contingent workers? 
Second, under what circumstances is it preferable to invest in flexible 
permanent employees rather than using contingent workers? To answer 
both questions, there is a need for research designs that will measure 
all relevant costs and employee productivity. These studies would do 
well to move beyond studies of low-skilled temporary workers to con-
sideration of the kind of high-skilled and professional occupations that 
are more central to value creation in a business. The measurement of 
particular risks in each firm’s environment is necessary to test whether 
firms create the right real options.
An appropriate case study to address both questions might compare 
two firms that face ongoing technology changes, the timing of which 
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is unpredictable. One firm might make a commitment to its existing 
full-time workers, promising to train them in any new skill required. 
The other firm might cut back to a core of full-time employees and fill 
the other positions with temporary workers. When the change occurs 
(e.g., when a new time-saving computer technology is released), the 
first company pays to train its employees and may have to fire or of-
fer early retirement to some who cannot make the adjustment, but it 
retains people with years of firm-specific experience. The second firm 
can move more quickly to hire temps with the newly required skills, as-
suming they are available in the labor market, or rely on the agency to 
train workers. The company using temporary workers ramps up to full 
productivity more quickly and inexpensively, but perhaps the eventual 
peak productivity is less than at the firm using its own employees. After 
the fact, one could assess which firm had higher overall productivity. 
But such examples are hard to find. Managers facing the same uncer-
tainty often follow similar strategies, and estimating costs of training, 
turnover, and benefits is difficult. 
Such research would require detailed personnel data, as well as in-
tegrated theories. The worker’s own assessment of knowledge, skills, 
abilities, and motivation is relevant, as well as the employer’s evalua-
tion of the environment, the firm’s strategy, and the worker’s produc-
tivity and costs. Transaction costs are important, but theories also ac-
counting for firm-specific resources and the need for flexibility must be 
tailored to specific industry and occupational contexts. 
Finally, economy-wide evaluations of supply and demand for con-
tingent work should be replicated at the level of the industry and firm. 
The CPS supplements have helped to define contingent work and its im-
pact for the overall economy. However, new data sets at a more detailed 
level would allow tests of models considering worker and employer 
motivations. An understanding of both labor supply and demand is nec-
essary to untangle the multiple factors driving contingent work. 
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Notes
 1. This discussion builds on a review of workforce practices that concludes organi-
zations use temporary employees to cut costs, avoid restrictions/consequences, 
and increase flexibility. See von Hippel et al. (1997). 
  2.   The exception is a major study of employment externalization finding no rela-
tion between likelihood of a job being temporary and the level of fringe benefits. 
However, data on fringe benefits were only available at the industry level (2-digit 
SIC code), whereas the dependent variable is at the job level. This acknowledged 
mismatch might have diluted the statistical and economic impact of the benefits 
factor (Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993). 
  3.  This argument relies on empirical research that questions whether the dual in-
ternal labor market exists. Full-time employees may not believe managers who 
claim temporary workers are not competing for the same jobs (Abraham and 
Taylor 1996). 
  4.  The major exception is dismissal based on discrimination such as gender or race 
discrimination.
 5. While the distinction between core and periphery workers is intuitive, some em-
pirical evidence questions whether employing contingent workers actually pro-
vides any buffer against involuntary turnover among permanent workers (Capelli 
and Neumark 2004). Further research is needed on the effects of employing both 
contingent and permanent workers under different conditions.
  6.   The Black-Scholes model is the most famous example of a mathematical formu-
la to estimate the value of a financial option. The formula takes into account the 
option’s purchase price, exercise date or period, and exercise price. The formula 
also considers the amount of uncertainty about the price of the stock. 
  7.   This is why many executives who received stock options as compensation during 
the Internet stock boom of the late 1990s made so much money.
 8.   For a helpful categorization of real options, see Trigeorgis (1996).
  9.  Also, Abraham (1998) finds differences in mean use of staffing arrangements 
between firms with and without seasonality and cyclicality. 
 10.  The first published paper to apply real options logic to employment decisions 
was Malos and Campion (1995). The authors explain the up-or-out promotional 
systems in professional service firms as creating a real option that mitigates un-
certainty about employee productivity.
 11.   We use logistic regression analysis, which allows us to investigate the impact of 
independent variables on the probability that a position is contingent. Logistic 
regression is an extension of standard ordinary least squares analysis that is ap-
propriate when the dependent variable is of a yes/no nature. Technical details and 
tables of results can be obtained from the first author.
 12.  See Chapter 2 of this volume for a more detailed discussion of these three esti-
mates and the CPS definition of “alternative work arrangements” as distinct from 
contingent work.
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 13.  By 1999, the numbers had changed slightly to 60.7 percent and 2.9 percent, re-
spectively (DiNatale 2001, Table 6). 
 14.  We report results from our analysis of the 1995 data because little has changed 
over time in the CPS variables employed in this study. 
 15.  Managers and employees make decisions about the duration of a position, the 
compensation for the position, and the attributes of the workers simultaneously. 
To appropriately estimate all the relationships between these variables would 
require a system of equations. However, if employers can choose to save money 
on wages and benefits by hiring contingent workers, this choice implies that the 
employers are price takers. 
 16.  Using Estimate 3 of contingent work, with self-employed and independent con-
tractors included and the time frame restriction removed, those workers with 
some graduate work are 12 percent more likely than other workers to be contin-
gent. Well-educated people are apparently more likely to start their own busi-
nesses. 
 17.  In fact, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) argue that aggregate measures are superior to 
firm-level data at capturing technological risk because shocks should affect all 
industry users of the same technology. 
 18.  Articles discussing theoretical approaches to strategic human resource manage-
ment include Barney and Wright (1998); Gerhart, Trevor, and Graham (1996); 
and Snell, Youndt, and Wright (1996).
 19.  Several researchers have considered whether bundles of human resources prac-
tices are more effective than individual practices at creating value through peo-
ple. Influential papers include Youndt et al. (1996); MacDuffie (1995); Becker 
and Huselid (1998); and Arthur (1992). An interesting and readable study is Up-
ton (1995), in which the author finds that flexible manufacturing requires flexible 
employees.
 20.  Case studies show that the benefits of using contingent-knowledge workers can 
outweigh the costs (MacDougall and Hurst 2005). For a thorough discussion of 
how to use contingent workers to accumulate and disseminate knowledge, see 
Matusik and Hill (1998).
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Union Responses to the Challenges 







There are several terms for contingent work and the activities sur-
rounding the use of contingent workers. Some of the most common 
terms are strategic staffing, market-mediated work, temporary help, and 
alternative work arrangement. Furthermore, contingent employment 
arrangements take many forms, including agency temporaries who 
are paid by temporary employment agencies, contract workers whose 
services are contracted out by their employer, per diem or on-call day 
workers, part-time employees, independent contractors, and the self-
employed. 
We use the term contingent	 work in this chapter because it best 
characterizes the challenge this shift in the employment relationship 
poses for unions. The term contingent	workers was coined by Audrey 
Freedman in 1985 to refer to employees whose work is contingent on 
the variability of employers’ need for them (Nollen and Axel 1996b). 
This description expresses the essential problem for unions: the use of 
alternative work arrangements is largely an employer-driven phenom-
enon that will result in employment and earnings instability for many 
employees working under these arrangements. 
Several measures of contingent work are available. What they have 
in common are the characteristics of short-term work, variability in 
work schedule, absence of either an implicit or explicit contract, and 
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lack of worker attachment to a particular employer (Nollen and Axel 
1996a).1 Additional characteristics often are noted, such as the involun-
tary nature of such arrangements, inferior pay and benefits, absence of 
promotion opportunities, and lack of opportunity to build human capital 
(Barker and Christensen 1998, p. 223). 
Why Use Contingent Workers?
There are a variety of reasons for employers to use contingent work 
arrangements. Contingent workers can fill temporary vacancies, work 
during peak periods, and provide specialized skills needed for brief pe-
riods (Roberts and Gleason 1999). However, from the perspective of 
workers the use of contingent workers allows employers to pass on to 
workers the economic insecurity associated with changing product mar-
kets, new technologies, and the business cycle (Tilly 1992, p. 23). This 
is clearly antithetical to union goals of protecting worker earnings and 
job security. Historically, this goal has meant negotiating for long-term, 
stable employment for full-time employees, with little attention paid to 
part-time or other work arrangements (Cobble and Vosko 2000). 
The use of different kinds of contingent work arrangements rep-
resents two broad strategies by employers to gain greater flexibility 
in their production methods. One is the very short-term, often ad hoc 
strategy of using individuals to fill particular jobs or accomplish spe-
cific tasks. Often workers under these arrangements are working side by 
side with traditional full-time workers. Examples of these arrangements 
include using workers from temporary employment agencies, casual 
day workers, and perhaps part-time workers. The other strategic use of 
contingent work typically involves a relatively large-scale, long-term 
reorganization of how work is done and who does it, and frequently is 
associated with efforts to reduce labor costs. Usually this results in work 
being moved off site. Examples of these arrangements include subcon-
tracting portions of work previously done internally, the use of leased 
workers, and privatization in the public sector. From a union perspec-
tive, both of these strategies represent a common threat: the removal of 
work from the bargaining unit. This creates two serious problems: the 
workers are no longer subject to contractual protections, and the union 
is weakened by reduced membership. 
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How Do Unions Respond to Contingent  
Employment Arrangements?
The analysis in this chapter is based on the review of standard con-
tract language in the industrial and service sectors and the public and 
private sectors. The assumption underlying our methodology is that col-
lective bargaining agreements represent the negotiated resolution at a 
point in time of the classic conflict between management desire for full 
discretion in the use of labor and the union goal of protecting the wel-
fare of its members. Even when unions and management are working 
relatively cooperatively, a tension exists between management desire 
for unfettered authority over labor and the union objective to protect 
workers from management discretion (Sloane and Whitney 1994, p. 
458). Consequently, the content of the agreements is the operational 
articulation of that tension. 
Unions can respond to the use of contingent work by pursuing a 
strategy of exclusion or inclusion of contingent workers as reflected in 
the language of the contract. A strategy of exclusion entails deliberately 
excluding contingent work arrangements from the bargaining unit and 
attempting to limit the employer’s use of workers outside the bargain-
ing unit. The strategy of inclusion seeks ways to include contingent 
workers in the bargaining unit and attempts to negotiate good wages 
and working conditions for those workers while protecting traditional 
full-time union members, thus eliminating the cost advantage of non-
traditional workers. 
In this chapter, examples of each strategy are discussed for tem-
porary employees, part-time employees, leased employees, and other 
categories of employees. We review union responses to employer ef-
forts to remove significant numbers of workers from the bargaining unit 
through the use of subcontracting, outsourcing, privatization, and inde-
pendent contractors. We present mechanisms for inclusion of contin-
gent workers in the unit and the protection of their seniority rights and 
other benefits, and identify the issues that organized labor will face in 
the future. We conclude with a discussion of future research questions.
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HOW CONTINGENT WORKERS GAIN UNION 
REPRESENTATION: THE DEFINITION OF THE 
BARGAINING UNIT
When unions decide to follow an inclusionary strategy, they can 
either include contingent workers in the bargaining unit, which is the 
most common approach, or negotiate separate contracts for traditional 
and contingent workers (Sloane and Whitney 1994, p. 21). 
Selecting the Strategy of Exclusion or Inclusion
Our review of contract language suggests that the way in which 
a union responds to the threat of contingent work depends in part on 
whether the employer is a goods producer or a service producer. The 
language in the contracts of industrial or goods-producing employers is 
more likely to address subcontracting and the use of leased employees. 
These unions have pursued a strategy of exclusion which contractu-
ally excludes alternative work arrangements and attempts to limit man-
agement rights to subcontract bargaining unit work. Contract language 
in manufacturing, for example, tends to address the conditions under 
which work can be assigned outside the bargaining unit and when the 
employer can outsource. There is little language limiting the ad hoc use 
of individuals with the exception of fairly standard language about the 
number of days a temporary worker can work before becoming a per-
manent employee and a dues-paying member of the bargaining unit.
In contrast, service sector contract language is more likely to ad-
dress issues regarding the ad hoc use of individual contingent workers. 
In general, service sector unions tend to agree to include some types 
of contingent workers in the bargaining unit. As a result, the contract 
language must address a variety of issues clarifying the rights and uses 
of traditional and contingent workers in the same bargaining unit. These 
issues include distinguishing between different types of employees in-
cluded in the bargaining unit, the differential accumulation of seniority 
by employee category, and prorating benefits. One prominent exception 
to this service sector approach is privatization efforts by public sec-
tor employers. Over the last two decades, there has been an effort on 
the part of some state and local governments to privatize government 
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functions. Privatization is the public sector analogue to private sector 
outsourcing, since work is taken out of the bargaining unit and given 
to a separate organization. Depending on how the bargaining unit is 
defined, it is possible for privatization to effectively eliminate the unit 
(DuRivage, Carré, and Tilly 1998).
Deciding which approach to take is complicated by the fact that, 
in some instances, a contingent work arrangement meets the needs of 
union members (SEIU 1993). There are workers who prefer a flexible 
work schedule so they can manage family demands, return to school, or 
for some other reason. According to the American Staffing Association 
(2001), 28 percent of the temporary employees placed by their member 
agencies prefer temporary work to gain flexibility for nonwork inter-
ests, and 43 percent chose temporary work for family reasons. In its 
2001 survey, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2001) found that 39 
percent of workers in contingent arrangements preferred these arrange-
ments to traditional work. Furthermore, 14.9 percent of full-time and 
6.8 percent of part-time workers are union members, suggesting that 
part-time workers are an important union constituency. These figures 
suggest that a union taking a doctrinaire approach advocating the elimi-
nation of contingent work would not serve all of its members.
Defining	the	Bargaining	Unit
Organizing activities and the representation of contingent employ-
ees in the public and private sectors generally are governed by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA). (Some exceptions occur in states 
with separate legislation for public employees and in the few states that 
offer no collective bargaining rights at all. See SEIU [1993]). For con-
tingent workers to have the right to collectively bargain with their em-
ployer, there must be a union able to represent them. As is the case with 
traditional workers, union representation is obtained through a union 
organizing drive. 
Unions build their memberships through organizing campaigns that 
are regulated by federal or state agencies. Only one union can represent 
a group of workers at a time. Unions may specialize in the workers 
they attempt to organize. For example, some unions operate only in the 
public or private sectors, while others are organized along industrial, 
service, or craft lines. In general, unions determine their preferences for 
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who should be included in the bargaining unit based on the membership 
most likely to be successfully organized. During an organizing drive 
the union will determine the preferred bargaining unit membership and 
file a petition with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) or the 
state agency governing public sector industrial relations in that state. 
The relevant agency will determine if these workers are an appropriate 
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining. The composition of the 
unit is extremely important to both the employer and the union because 
this will be the electorate that determines the outcome of the election. 
Typically, each group attempts to create the bargaining unit that will 
best support its objectives. 
The NLRB refers to the “community-of-interest principle” when 
establishing the appropriate bargaining unit, which refers to what the 
employees within the potential bargaining unit have in common with re-
gard to wages, working conditions, and regularity of hours (DuRivage, 
Carré, and Tilly 1998). The more homogeneous the employees are ac-
cording to these criteria, the more likely it is that the board will find 
that they have a community of interest and are thus an appropriate unit 
for bargaining. Using the community of interest principle, the NLRB 
rulings have identified general principles or guidelines governing the 
inclusion of various types of workers within the bargaining unit (SEIU 
1993). 
If workers in contingent employment arrangements pass the com-
munity of interest test and other guidelines for inclusion, they may be 
included in a bargaining unit. Contract language suggests that unions 
address three types of contingent work arrangement: temporary em-
ployees, part-time workers, and leased workers. Other categories of 
employees also may be covered in some contracts such as student em-
ployees in university contracts. Unions must determine which aspects 
of the contract will apply to contingent workers. 
Temporary Employees
According to the NLRB, temporary	employees can be included in 
the bargaining unit when they are hired or employed for an indefinite 
period. The NLRB uses a “date to certain” test, meaning that a tem-
porary employee should be included in the unit if no certain date has 
been set for termination of employment.2 As discussed above, union 
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strategies vary in the handling of temporary employees. Our review 
suggests that, typically, although not always, service sector unions are 
more likely to use contract language that includes specific definitions of 
employee categories. However, some service sector unions use exclu-
sionary language and limit the hours of work of temporary employees. 
Industrial unions generally bargain for exclusionary contract language.
Contracts with both Sparrow Hospital in Lansing, Michigan, and 
Mercy Hospital of Buffalo, New York, provide examples of inclusive 
language. The Sparrow contract specifically includes regular part-time 
and per diem employees in the professional bargaining unit. 
The Hospital recognizes the Union as the sole and exclusive rep-
resentative of its full-time, regular part-time and per diem profes-
sional employees employed by the hospital for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining with the respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of 
employment and other conditions of employment.3
Because it covers such a broad spectrum of workers, the Sparrow 
agreement includes long descriptions of each category of employment. 
These descriptions are necessary to define precisely the duties and rights 
of each job classification. This agreement includes explicit definitions 
for three types of temporary workers (External Temporary Employees, 
Union Temporary Employees, and Float Employees) as well as Full-
Time and Regularly Scheduled Part-Time (Core) employees. Each of 
these descriptions details the number of hours available to be worked 
and is explicit about when an employee in each of these categories be-
comes a dues-paying regular employee.
In the agreement between Mercy Hospital of Buffalo and the Com-
munications Workers of America (CWA) the categories of employment 
also are specified carefully. The categories as defined in Mercy and CWA 
provide an example of the explicit specification of employee types:
Article 15, Purpose – A. Flexible employee is one who is hired for 
a specified number of hours per week . . . Flexible Employees re-
spond to variations in workload created by increases or decreases 
in census and/or acuity. Flexible employees also provide general 
staffing relief for planned and unplanned absences (e.g. Paid Time 
Off).
Article 16, Section 1 – A Per Diem Employee is one who works on 
a day to day as needed basis without a guarantee of set hours per 
week and without benefits.
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Article 17, Section 1 – A temporary employee is an employee des-
ignated as such, hired for a specific job of limited duration not 
exceeding six (6) months. This period may be extended for up to 
another six (6) months by mutual agreement of the Hospital and 
the Union.4
However, not all service unions take an inclusive approach. Some 
unions exclude temporary employees from their bargaining unit and 
then try to limit the encroachment of temporary workers through con-
tract language. Kaiser Hospital in Portland, Oregon, is a good exam-
ple of this. First, they exclude temporary workers from the bargaining 
unit.
Temporary or irregularly scheduled employees shall be excluded 
from this agreement so long as they are not used to deprive regular 
employees of work time. All regular employees must be working 
before temporary or irregularly scheduled employees are used. It is 
further agreed that such employment will not result in any reduc-
tion in the number of persons employed in the bargaining unit or 
in the number of regular hours of employment of any employee in 
the bargaining unit.5
Second, a limit is placed on the period of time the services of tem-
porary workers can be used. 
A temporary employee is one who is hired from outside the Bar-
gaining Unit to work for a specific period of time not to exceed 
three (3) consecutive months, or to replace a permanent employee 
not to exceed (6) months or to replace an employee on Union-re-
lated leave not to exceed twelve (12) consecutive months. Specific 
exceptions to provide for an additional and limited time period in 
a temporary status may be made by mutual agreement in writing 
by the parties.6
This explicit limitation on the number of hours a temporary worker 
can work is seen relatively frequently in service agreements, suggesting 
that the use of short-term temporary workers is a strategy commonly 
used by service sector employers.
Most industrial contracts use the exclusionary approach. One tactic 
is defining normal hours of work to ensure that only full-time, regu-
larly scheduled workers are used. A typical example is LTV Steel and 
the United Steelworkers of America agreement. The hours of work are 
defined as 
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[t]he normal work day shall be any regularly scheduled consecu-
tive twenty-four (24) hours of work comprising eight (8) consecu-
tive hours of work and sixteen (16) consecutive hours of rest ex-
cept for such rest periods as may be provided in accordance with 
practices heretofore prevailing in the Works of the Company. The 
normal work pattern shall be 5 consecutive workdays beginning 
on the first day of any 7-consecutive-day period.7
This language limits the use of nontraditional employees by restrict-
ing how hours of work will be assigned to employees. 
Part-Time Employees
According to the NLRB, regular part-time employees can be in-
cluded in a bargaining unit and are entitled to vote in an election. An 
employee is included in a unit if the employee works a sufficient num-
ber of hours on a regular basis to have a substantial interest in the wag-
es, hours, and working conditions in the unit.8 Thus, an employee who 
works only one day a week every week as a weekend relief can be 
included in the bargaining unit. 
Unions pursuing a strategy of inclusion generally have used one 
of three tactics: including part-time workers in the bargaining unit as 
regular part-time employees, including language converting part-time 
jobs to full-time jobs, or negotiating separate contracts for full-time and 
part-time workers. For example, the language in the Sparrow Hospital 
and Michigan Nurses Association contract cited earlier includes part-
time workers in the bargaining unit. Similarly, the language in the con-
tract between Mercy Hospital of Buffalo and Communications Workers 
of America, Service, Technical, and Clerical Employees also includes 
these workers.
Article 4, Categories of Employees; Section 2 – A regular part time 
employee is defined as one who is regularly scheduled to work less 
than thirty-four (34) hours per week but fifteen (15) hours or more 
per week.9
A third example is the contract between the United Food and Com-
mercial Workers, Local 951, and Meijer, Inc.
The Employer recognizes the Union as the collective bargaining 
agent for all full-time and regular part-time Grocery, Meat, Pro-
duce, General Merchandise, Warehouse and Property Services em-
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ployees at the covered units, excluding any employees of any lease 
operation, employees of any existing or future operations which 
are either not physically attached to a covered unit or are not oper-
ated within the same premises as a covered unit, Manger Trainees, 
Store Directors, Line Managers, Department Managers, Property 
Services Supervisors, Distribution Center Supervisors, Working 
Supervisors and the management to which such Managers report, 
Auditors, Registered Pharmacists, Pharmacy Technicians, Profes-
sional, Confidential, Office, Clerical, Systems Monitors, Mana-
gerial employees, Security employees and other Guards and Su-
pervisors as defined in the Labor Management Relations Act as 
amended and all other employees.10
The tactic of converting part-time jobs to full-time jobs is illustrat-
ed by the 1997 and 2002 contracts between the United Parcel Service 
(UPS) and the Teamsters. The 1997 Teamsters strike against UPS was 
an example of an aggressive approach to limiting employer use of part-
time workers. During this strike the Teamsters were able to generate 
public support in part because part-time work symbolizes reduced job 
security and benefits to much of the American public (Tilly 1998). The 
UPS-Teamsters contract clearly committed UPS to slowing the increase 
in the number of part-time jobs and beginning to convert part-time into 
full-time jobs. 
The 1997 contract was emphatic that full-time and part-time work-
ers would be included in a single bargaining unit:
All employees, Unions and the Employer covered by this Mas-
ter Agreement and the various Supplements, Riders and Addenda 
thereto, shall constitute one (1) bargaining unit. It is understood 
that the printing of this Master Agreement and the aforesaid Sup-
plements, Riders and/or Addenda in separate agreements is for 
convenience only and is not intended to create separate bargaining 
units.11
It was also clear that the purpose of including part-time workers in 
the bargaining unit was to facilitate their movement to full-time em-
ployment. 
The parties agree that providing part-time employees the oppor-
tunity to become full-time employees is a priority of this Agree-
ment. Accordingly, the employer commits that during the life of 
this Agreement, it will offer part-time employees the opportunity 
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to fill at least twenty thousand (20,000) permanent full-time job 
openings throughout its operations covered by this Agreement.
The result of contract renegotiation in 2002 was a UPS contract that 
has been described as “the richest contract in Teamster history” (LRA 
2002). In this contract UPS agreed to bring in-house nearly 10,000 sub-
contracted, nonunion jobs to create a pool of union jobs that would go 
to current part-timers. Thus, the Teamster agreement helped to reduce 
the gap between full-time and part-time workers by reducing wage dif-
ferentials and providing more job mobility, job security, and retirement 
security for both part-time and full-time workers. 
A third tactic unions use is to negotiate separate contracts for full-
time and part-time workers. Marriott Management Services and the 
United Catering, Restaurant, Bar, and Hotel Workers negotiated sepa-
rate contracts for workers providing food service to the Ford Motor 
Company, thereby creating two separate bargaining units. The two con-
tracts are virtually identical except for the provisions for hours of work 
and costs of benefits to employers.12
In the industrial sectors, the contract language is more likely to be 
exclusionary. One tactic to eliminate part-time workers from the bargain-
ing unit is to define the hours for shift work so that part-time employ-
ment is prohibited. This strategy is illustrated by LTV Steel contract. 
The normal work day shall be any regularly scheduled consecu-
tive twenty-four (24) hour period comprising eight (8) consecutive 
hours of work and sixteen (16) consecutive hours of rest except for 
such rest periods as may be provided in accordance with practices 
heretofore prevailing in the Works of the Company.13
Leased Employees
Leased employees are workers on the payroll of one employer (the 
leasing firm) who are supplied to another employer (the client employ-
er) based on a contract negotiated between the two employers. Leased 
employees can be included in the bargaining unit of the client employer 
if the client employer and leasing company are deemed to be “joint em-
ployers.” Joint employment occurs if the two employers share and co-
determine matters governing the essential terms and conditions of em-
ployment. The essential terms and conditions of employment typically 
include hiring, firing, discipline, supervision, direction, and scheduling 
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of work. To establish joint employer status, one must show that both 
employers meaningfully affect some or all of these matters relating to 
the employment relationship. 
The NLRB has found that two employers are joint employers where 
regular and leased employees have the same supervision, perform es-
sentially the same tasks, have functionally integrated work, and receive 
the same wages (Jenero and Spognardi 1995). Joint employment pro-
vides limited protection to workers because the NLRA does not prohibit 
the client employer from failing to renew a subcontract, thus eliminat-
ing the leased workers from the bargaining unit (DuRivage, Carré, and 
Tilly 1998). However, leased employees included in the bargaining unit 
are eligible to vote in NLRB elections to determine whether they are 
represented by a union. Consequently, leased employees who tradition-
ally receive fewer benefits than regular employers would have the right 
to unionize as a means of improving their terms and conditions of em-
ployment. 
Other Employee Categories
Unions also may seek to include other categories of employees in 
collective bargaining contracts to manage contingent work. For exam-
ple, students may be included in a bargaining unit depending upon their 
communities of interest. A student working after school on a regular 
schedule can be included in the unit as a regular part-time employee. 
The inclusion of students in an agreement is illustrated by the con-
tract between the Board of Regents Montana University System and 
the Montana Faculty Association. Since students are a major part of the 
university labor force, the union has included them as a tactic to control 
this form of employment.
Any student who is employed as a “temporary” employee on a 
“full-time” basis for seven hundred (700) or more hours in any one 
fiscal year, and is doing work within the position description of a 
classified position within a bargaining unit, or doing work which 
is within the described scope of work of a bargaining unit, shall 
be required, as a condition of continued employment, to pay the 
equivalent of initiation fees and/or monthly dues, or a service fee 
in lieu of dues, to the union in accordance with Article 11, Section 
A of this agreement.
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Furthermore, the contract includes language that specifies under 
what circumstances the university can use students as employees.
In keeping with the federal and state policies of providing employ-
ment for students to provide economic opportunity to obtain fur-
ther education, and in order to make available to students the ben-
efits of state and federal work-study and financial aid programs, 
the employer shall continue to employ students.14
However, the contract makes certain that student workers will not 
encroach on protected union positions. 
Students shall not be hired into any position, which would result in 
the displacement of any employee.
In the LTV Steel and the United Steelworkers of America contract 
student employment also is addressed. In an appendix to the contract on 
student employment in the summer, language establishes limitations on 
the period of employment and protects core jobs from being filled by 
student workers.
During the term of the labor agreement, the probationary provi-
sions of the Labor Agreements shall be modified as follows for stu-
dents hired for summer employment on or before May 1 provided 
those students terminate their employment on or before September 
15 of the same year.15
Other types of nontraditional employees also may be included in 
the bargaining unit under specified circumstances. On-call employees 
may be included in a bargaining unit if the employee works regularly, 
such as those needed by a large employer that has regular absences 
to be filled. Seasonal workers, such as resort or agricultural workers, 
may be included in a bargaining unit of regular full-time employees if 
the seasonal workers have a reasonable expectation of returning each 
season. Retirees who work regularly may be included in the bargaining 
unit even if working a limited number of hours. 
The NLRB uses a test to determine whether a trainee who might be-
come a supervisor or fill a management position is eligible to vote. This 
eligibility is determined by: 1) the kind of work being done, 2) whether 
work is done under the same conditions and for the same pay as other 
employees, 3) whether special training is required, 4) whether there 
is an eventual guarantee of a top management job, and 5) the length 
of the training period (Schlossberg and Scott 1983, p. 250). In a re-
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cent decision concerning a Massachusetts teaching hospital, the NLRB 
overruled a long-standing precedent about doctor trainees who are now 
considered employees under federal law. The NLRB found that doctor 
trainees were employees because they were involved in a master-ser-
vant relationship that provided services for the hospital, received com-
pensation for working in the physician-training program, and received 
fringe benefits similar to other employees. This change in board opinion 
opens up a new area for union organizing (Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, 
P.C. 2003).
Probationary employees with a reasonable expectation of complet-
ing their probationary periods and being permanently hired also are in-
cluded in a bargaining unit.
UNION EFFORTS TO LIMIT USE OF CONTINGENT WORK: 
RESPONSES TO SUBCONTRACTING, PRIvATIzATION,  
AND INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
The two major large-scale contingent work arrangements used by 
employers are subcontracting and privatization. Subcontracting, also 
called outsourcing, is the contracting out of a portion of the employer’s 
work that was previously done in-house, such as janitorial services. It 
can occur in both the private and public sectors. Privatization is giving 
to private individuals or corporations the assets or functions that were 
previously performed by state or local government employees. It occurs 
only in the public sector (Bilik 1990). An example is contracting with a 
private company to run a correctional institution. In addition, employers 
in both the private and public sectors also use independent contractors. 
All of these contingent work arrangements are perceived by unions as 
eroding the strength of the bargaining unit and consequently reducing 
unions’ ability to protect their members.
Subcontracting
One major goal of collective bargaining for industrial unions is to 
negotiate language that continues the work of the bargaining unit and 
limits the use of outside workers. Traditionally this has been done by 
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negotiating language that excludes contingent workers from the bar-
gaining unit and blocks or limits the ability of management to subcon-
tract work to outside companies and vendors. However, in recent years 
unions such as the United Automobile Workers (UAW) have recognized 
the importance of helping the employer remain competitive in a global 
market. As a consequence, unions have used different tactics, such as 
negotiating early involvement in outsourcing planning, to limit the im-
pact of subcontracting on the job security of their members. 
Under the NLRA, contractual limits on the employer’s ability to use 
contingent workers are a mandatory subject of bargaining. This means 
that the union may bargain over these issues to the point of impasse and 
then, if necessary, strike to obtain an agreement from the employer. The 
NLRB has ruled that if the type of subcontracting clause sought by the 
union is lawful, an employer has an obligation to bargain with the union 
over the issue of subcontracting unit work when subcontracting will 
adversely affect the bargaining unit (Helper 1990). 
The variations in the strength of the contract language indicate that 
some unions have been more successful than others in negotiating limi-
tations on subcontracting. One example of strong language limiting the 
use of subcontracting is seen in American Axle and Manufacturing, Inc. 
and the UAW contract.
In no event shall any seniority associate who customarily performs 
the work in question be laid off as a direct and immediate result 
of work being performed by any outside contractor on the plant 
premises.16
The agreement between the United Steelworkers of America 
(USWA) and LTV Steel is an example of weaker language that pro-
vides management the latitude to use subcontractors while generally 
acknowledging a spirit of limiting the use of subcontracting. Although 
the USWA contract states that the guiding principle should be to keep 
work in the bargaining unit, many areas are left to the discretion of 
management. 
The parties have existing rights and contractual understandings 
with respect to contracting out. These include the existing rights 
and obligations of the parties which arose before the parties in-
cluded specific language in their collective bargaining agreements, 
the arbitration precedents which have been established before and 
since the parties included specific provisions addressing contract-
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ing out in their collective bargaining agreement, and the agree-
ments resulting from the review of all contracting out work per-
formed inside or outside the plant under the provisions of the In-
terim Progress Agreement dated January 31, 1986. In addition, the 
following provisions shall be applicable to all new contracting out 
issues arising on or after the effective date of this agreement.
The General Motors Corporation and the International Union of 
Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine & Furniture Workers AFL-
CIO contract is another example where management retains consider-
able discretion in the use of subcontracting. The contract includes a 
general acknowledgment that management will not use outside workers 
unless necessary.
The corporation states that it will make a reasonable effort to avoid 
contracting out work which adversely affects the job security of its 
employees and that it will utilize various training programs avail-
able to it, whenever practicable, to maintain employment opportu-
nities for its employees consistent with the needs of the corpora-
tion.17
However, there is additional contract language that includes a pro-
vision requiring management to provide advance notice in writing of 
its intention to subcontract: “In all cases, except where time and cir-
cumstances prevent it, Local Management will hold advance discussion 
with and provide advance written notice to the Chairperson of the Shop 
Committee.”18
A loophole remains for management in the words “where time and 
circumstances prevent it.” Nevertheless, the inclusion of a written justi-
fication for subcontracting is a significant limitation on management.
More recently unions have used tactics to ensure their early involve-
ment in planning for subcontracting to limit its impact and protect the 
job security of their members. For example, the 1996 contract language 
from the UAW and General Motors negotiations is very explicit about 
the tendency toward subcontracting while demonstrating the ability of 
the union to limit that trend. This language ensures income security 
protection for workers by involving the union in the process.
During the life of the current Agreement, the Corporation will ad-
vise, in writing, the Union members of the Sourcing Committee of 
the Labor Policy Board meeting results relative to sourcing recom-
mendations, including the number of potential jobs affected. Addi-
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tionally, data regarding incoming and outgoing work will be given 
to the International Union in a quarterly meeting. (The Corpora-
tion will provide inquiry access to the International Union through 
the use of a computer terminal.) In this manner, the parties can 
judge the success of mutual efforts toward improved job security. 
The Corporation agrees to incorporate the procedures and struc-
ture outlined herein when making sourcing determinations during 
the current Agreement.19
The language reflects not only union concerns about job security 
but also its respect for management concerns about productivity. This is 
an important shift in position for the UAW since it reflects the recogni-
tion of the need for the employer to be economically competitive. It also 
provides the union with the opportunity to demonstrate its support of 
improvements in productivity by creating a cooperative labor relations 
environment.
This contract also addresses the extent to which management can 
use outside vendors for equipment maintenance. 
Employees of any outside contractor will not be utilized in a plant 
covered by this Agreement to replace seniority employees on pro-
duction assembly or manufacturing work, or fabrication of tools, 
dies, jigs and fixtures, normally and historically performed by 
them, when performance of such work involves the use of Corpo-
ration-owned machines, tools, or equipment maintained by Corpo-
ration employees.20
This language ensures protection for senior employees by limit-
ing the duties open for subcontracted work. It also restricts contract 
workers from using GM equipment, thereby limiting the use of contract 
workers on the shop floor. But the next section of the agreement builds 
in flexibility for management to contract out repair work:
The foregoing shall not affect the right of the Corporation to con-
tinue arrangements currently in effect; nor shall it limit the fulfill-
ment of normal warranty obligations by vendors nor limit work 
which a vendor must perform to prove out equipment.21
This language provides a loophole for management to continue the 
use of outside vendors but also indicates that the union will attempt to 
place some conditions on management. 
A separate UAW-GM contract provides another example of the rec-
ognition by the unions of the need to support productivity improvements. 
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The UAW has developed programs to provide income security and en-
courage union locals to form “productivity coalitions” to compete for 
work that management might otherwise outsource. One such program, 
referred to as the Job Opportunity Bank Security (JOBS) Program, has 
been negotiated between the UAW and the Big Three automakers. The 
General Motors Corporation and UAW contract language provides an 
example of increased job security through a JOBS Program, while not 
explicitly prohibiting the use of subcontractors. It “protects eligible em-
ployees against layoff for virtually any reason except volume-related 
market conditions.”22
Unions have consistently argued that their membership can do most 
of subcontracted work if given the proper equipment. Language such 
as that for the JOBS program provides a formal mechanism for them to 
demonstrate their productivity.23 Implied in this language is the guaran-
tee that core employees will not be replaced due to subcontracting as 
long as they meet productivity standards.
The above examples of contract language range from strong state-
ments prohibiting subcontracting to full management discretion over 
subcontracting decisions. In a few cases the union has been able to 
entirely prohibit the use of subcontractors. However, in general most 
contracts indicate that management retains this right to varying de-
grees. The effectiveness, therefore, of these provisions varies with the 
strength of the union local and the intransigence of management. The 
most promising resolution of this tension between the employer’s need 
for flexibility and the union’s need for job security appears in the UAW-
GM JOBS Program. This program gives the union the opportunity to 
demonstrate the productivity of its workers and their ability to do jobs 
that would otherwise be subcontracted outside the company. 
Privatization 
Similar to private sector unions, public sector unions are facing a 
variety of actions on the part of employers to reduce their workforc-
es. By reclassifying and relocating positions, public sector unions are 
moving work beyond the reach of bargaining agreements and personnel 
policies. While the term “subcontracting” is used in the private service 
and manufacturing sectors, “privatization” refers to the same actions in 
the public sector. 
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In the current antigovernment environment, where limiting the size 
and power of government is a popular bipartisan goal, the privatization 
of government services often is advocated as a way to provide these 
services more efficiently. However, privatization removes unionized 
employees from the public sector union. This erosion of public sec-
tor bargaining units is especially troublesome to unions in the United 
States because the public sector has been the only economic sector in 
which union membership has grown over the past quarter century. In 
2001, 37.4 percent of government workers were members of unions, 
compared to 9.0 percent among private sector employers (BLS 2001). 
Unions have two major concerns about privatization: 1) that privati-
zation will undermine wage and benefit standards and reduce the num-
ber of full-time public sector jobs, and 2) that privatization will result 
in the deterioration of the quality of public services since these will be 
delivered by organizations motivated by profit and cost control rather 
than a service orientation.
A wide range of state services have been privatized, including men-
tal health, parks and recreation, employment security, education, data 
processing, police, vehicle registration, corrections, and airport services 
(Bilik 1990). Mirroring their private sector counterparts seeking to con-
trol subcontracting, public unions have developed proactive strategies 
to counteract privatization, such as identifying the early signs of priva-
tization efforts in order to bargain, strong contract language prohibiting 
or limiting privatization, and legislative solutions. In addition, many 
unions also are using legal remedies as an ongoing tactic. An example 
is seeking court injunctions to stop employer actions opposed by the 
union.24
One example of the use of legal solutions is seen in the actions of 
Michigan State Government Local UAW 6000 in its opposition to the 
privatization of the Michigan Department of Corrections Health Care 
Unit. The department concluded a bidding process aimed at examining 
the feasibility of subcontracting health care unit staffing at five facili-
ties to a private sector company (Michigan Department of Corrections 
1999). The union opposed this measure because it would put the De-
partment of Corrections’ health care system under the jurisdiction of a 
private company and remove the current health care providers from the 
bargaining unit. UAW Local 6000 representatives testified before the 
Michigan Senate Committee on Corrections Allocations stating that 
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[t]he department wants to make physicians and PA’s the gatekeep-
ers of managed care systems. There seems to be a clear and direct 
conflict of interest, when the gatekeeper of a system is an em-
ployee of that same system. Local 6000 strongly urge you to stop 
the privatization of physicians and physicians’ assistants. (Rivera 
2000)
The union also contended that it is better to keep jobs within the 
system to ensure the quality of the service. It further argued that there 
is no conclusive research to document that privatization will result in 
cost savings (Rivera 2000). The Department of Corrections’ action is 
currently being grieved before the State Civil Service Commission. 
Independent Contractors
Another employer tactic is the conversion of current employees 
into independent contractors (Coalition for Fair Worker Classification 
1994). Independent contractors are excluded from the definition of em-
ployee under Section 2(3) of the NLRA and therefore are considered 
part of the contingent workforce. Independent contractors are gener-
ally distinguished from employees based on the amount of control the 
employer exercises over how a person does the work. However, there 
is often confusion about who is truly an independent contractor. Conse-
quently, misclassification has been a frequent problem, as discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 5. 
The impact of misclassification on employees is illustrated by the 
experience of reporters and photographers working for the Philadelphia	
Inquirer. The 175 employees who covered the news in the city’s subur-
ban bureaus were assigned stories and deadlines by managing editors. 
However, for many years the Inquirer classified the city reporters and 
photographers as full-time employees, while classifying the suburban 
workers as “independent contractors.” As a consequence the suburban 
workers did not qualify for health or pension benefits and were respon-
sible for paying their own employment taxes. It was not until the subur-
ban employees joined the Newspaper Guild/Communications Workers 
in 1997 that they were classified as Inquirer employees.
The AFL-CIO has responded at a national level by backing fed-
eral legislation making misclassification more difficult. Under current 
law, a 20-factor IRS formula is used to determine whether a worker 
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is classified as an employee or independent contractor. The Indepen-
dent Contractor Classification Act of 2001 addresses the worker-clas-
sification issue by creating a new section 3511 of the Internal Revenue 
Code to simplify the criteria used to distinguish between employees 
and independent contractors. It requires employers to reclassify as 
full-time employees many workers currently considered independent 
contractors (AFL-CIO 2002). The act reduces the classification test to 
three criteria. Workers will be considered independent contractors if 
1) their employers have no right to control them, 2) they can make their 
services available to others, and 3) they have the potential to generate 
profit and bear significant risk of loss. 
BARGAINING ON WAGES, SENIORITy, AND BENEFITS 
FOR CONTINGENT WORKERS
Once employees in a workplace have voted to be represented by a 
union, an employer is required by law to bargain with the union as the 
sole representative of the workers. The duty to bargain imposed by the 
NLRA entails a requirement of the employer to bargain in good faith on 
hours, wages, and conditions of work, which generally includes senior-
ity and nonwage benefits. The union, on the other hand, is obligated by 
the “Duty of Fair Representation” to represent the interests of all of its 
members (Feldacker 1990, p. 352). 
During contract negotiations unions consider the advantages, dis-
advantages, and effects on the different groups in its membership of the 
various clauses being discussed for inclusion in the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Typically the union will have to make some decisions 
that favor some bargaining unit employees over others. However, as 
long as the union does not act in an arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, 
or perfunctory manner, its legal obligations are fulfilled. Because of the 
differing interests within the bargaining unit, some negotiated language 
may have an adverse effect on contingent workers. Important issues 
regularly negotiated that affect contingent workers are wages, seniority, 
and nonwage benefits, including medical care, disability coverage, and 
sick leave.
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Wages
Unions use two strategies to raise wages for contingent workers. 
The first and most direct strategy is the inclusion of these workers in 
the bargaining unit so the discussion of their wages is included in ne-
gotiations. Examination of recognition clauses in collective bargaining 
agreements suggests that this approach is most often used for part-time 
workers. More rare is language covering wages for non–bargaining unit 
workers. The Teamster-UPS agreement settled in July 2002 (discussed 
earlier) was an example of a union using a strike to achieve consider-
able gains for part-time members. 
While full-time workers will receive wage increases of $5 per hour 
over the life of the six-year agreement, part-time workers will re-
ceive $6 per hour over the life of the agreement, achieving a long-
term Teamster goal of reducing the gap between full-time and part-
time wages. (LRA 2002) 
In a 2002 settlement, the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU) negotiated a contract for janitors in downtown Boston with 
wages equal to the hourly rate of full-time workers (Bureau of National 
Affairs 2002). 
Another union strategy is to support public policy changes and 
living wage ordinances to improve wages for all contingent workers 
(Carré and Joshi 2000). The Association of Community Organizations 
for Reform Now (ACORN), the oldest and largest grassroots organiza-
tion of low- and moderate-income people, is an example of this type of 
support. ACORN, which has 100,000 members in over 30 cities, argues 
that when public dollars are used to subsidize employers, these employ-
ers should not be permitted to pay their workers less than a living wage 
(ACORN 2003). 
Seniority
Seniority is a defining principle of unionism. Employees with the 
longest period of service with the organization receive the greatest job 
security, improved working conditions, and frequently greater entitle-
ment to employee benefits (Sloane and Whitney 1994). Under most 
collective bargaining agreements, seniority is the basis for determining 
pay, job opportunities and assignments, the right to paid time off, recalls 
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after layoffs, overtime options, and other nonmonetary aspects of work. 
An employee’s relative seniority status in the company usually depends 
on three basic considerations: when seniority begins to accumulate, the 
effect of changes in work assignments on seniority, and the effect of 
interruptions in employment on seniority.
Determining whether and how seniority can be accumulated for 
contingent workers remains a challenge to unions. Due to the impor-
tance of seniority in determining the economic welfare of full-time 
workers, many unions are reluctant to grant seniority rights to tempo-
rary workers. However, when seniority rights have been successfully 
negotiated for contingent workers, these rights generally are accrued on 
a prorated basis. One common feature of contract language governing 
part-time workers is that they never accumulate more seniority than 
full-time workers. This approach is illustrated by the United Food and 
Commercial Workers, Local 951, and Meijer, Inc. contract. 
7.3—Seniority shall be of two (2) types, full-time and part-time. 
Full-time seniority shall be convertible to part-time. Full-time se-
niority shall not accumulate during periods of part-time jobs, and 
part-time seniority shall not be convertible to full-time seniority if 
a part-time employee becomes full-time. Part-time seniority shall 
not be lost by transfer to full-time work. In no case will part-time 
employees accumulate seniority over full-time employees.25
In the American Red Cross and Service Employees International 
Union contract, per diem employees are allowed to accumulate senior-
ity but at a slower rate than full-time workers.
Per diem nurses shall be placed on the seniority list calculated on 
fifty percent (50%) of length of service with the Employer as a per 
diem nurse plus any seniority earned within any other classifica-
tion covered by the Agreement.26
This language ensures that for the purposes of layoff and recall 
these employees are the last on the list to be returned to work.
Sparrow Hospital and the Michigan Nurses Association allow tem-
porary workers to accumulate seniority if they convert to either full-
time or part-time status. Their seniority date is the date they convert to 
permanent status, not the date on which they began as temporaries.
Section 10.4—Employees hired for a limited period of time not 
to exceed a total of six (6) months shall be classified as temporary 
employees. Such temporary employment may be extended by the 
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Human Resources Director or designee if such extension is nec-
essary. A temporary shall be treated as a probationary employee 
under this agreement. In the event a temporary employee is reclas-
sified to full time to part-time status, the date of hire in the new 
classification shall be the date of hire as a temporary employee.27 
These examples indicate that unions clearly favor their full-time 
members with continuous service over those who work under contin-
gent arrangements. It also suggests, however, that unions are trying to 
negotiate the protection that comes with seniority for contingent work-
ers, although on a less preferential basis. 
Benefits	
When unions include contingent workers in their membership, 
there are two reasons to negotiate benefits for their contingent mem-
bers. First, these benefits enhance worker welfare, which is a central 
union objective. Second, one important strategic response to the use by 
employers of contingent workers is to try to eliminate the cost advan-
tage of contingent work arrangements. The closer the cost of noncore 
contingent workers to the cost of employing traditional core workers, 
the less attractive contingent work is to management. The types of ben-
efits commonly included in contracts are health care and dental insur-
ance, paid time off, including disability pay and sick leave, and holiday 
pay. Our review suggests that prorated health care benefits are offered 
to contingent workers more often than other types of benefits. 
The Sparrow Hospital contract is among the most generous in its 
treatment of contingent workers to support the recruitment and reten-
tion of registered nurses. It provides benefits to both full- and part-time 
employees. As seen in the language below, the employer pays the full 
medical health care premium for all workers and only prorates dental 
benefits.
Flexcare Plan
Section 33.1—Purpose. To provide full-time, part-time, and per 
diem employees with tax-free reimbursement for health care and 
dependent care expenses incurred on behalf of Plan participants, 
spouses, and dependents, and to allow participants to provide for 
additional expenses on a pre-tax basis through voluntary wage/sal-
ary reductions.28
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Dental Insurance
Section 32.1—All full and regular part-time employees (normally 
scheduled to work 32 or more hours per pay period) are eligible to 
enroll for dental insurance.
Section 32.2—The Employer will pay 100% of the premium for 
single coverage and 90% of the premium for applicable dependent 
coverage for eligible full-time employees. The Employer will pay 
100% of the premium for single coverage for part-time employ-
ees. Eligible part-time employees pay the full cost for dependent 
coverage.29
The agreement between 1199W/United Professionals for Quality 
Health Care and the State of Wisconsin is more typical in the health 
care coverage provided to part-time workers (referred to here as project 
workers). 
Article VI–Employee Benefits, Section 1, Health Insurance:
The Employer agrees to pay 50% of the above listed contributions 
amounts for insured employees in permanent part time or project 
positions defined under 230.27, who are appointed to work at least 
600 but less than 1,044 hours per year.30
Another example of a contract providing health care coverage is in 
the United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 951, and Meijer, Inc. 
contract. Benefits for part-time workers are not as extensive as those 
given to full-time employees, but the union did negotiate partial health 
care insurance for its part-time workforce.
Article 11: Employee Benefits:
Part-time employees are eligible for benefit coverage for the Com-
prehensive 200 Medical Plan (COMP200).
Medical Plan (including prescription drug coverage), the Dental/
Optical Plan, and the required weekly pre-tax contribution rates 
for health coverage are set forth in this subsection 11.1J.31
Although there is some variation in the generosity of the health 
benefits, these examples suggest that, when unions include contingent 
workers in the bargaining unit, they are able to negotiate at least partial 
medical benefits for them. To the extent that the contracts reviewed here 
are typical, they indicate that unionized contingent workers receive bet-
ter health care coverage than nonunionized workers (BLS 2001). 
Contracts also vary in how generously they provide for paid time 
off, including disability pay and sick leave, and holiday pay. The Uni-
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versity of Michigan nurses contract with the University of Michigan 
allows part-time workers to receive long-term disability benefits.32
Sick leave benefits also are provided to part-time employees in the 
agreement between American Red Cross, Southeastern Blood Services 
Region, and the Michigan Council of Nurses and Health Care Profes-
sionals, Service Employees International Union, Local 79.
Employees will earn sick leave benefits at the rate of one and two-
thirds days per month of service. Employees may accrue up to 
ninety days of sick leave. Part-time employees shall receive the 
proportion of sick leave, which the average days worked per week 
bear to the full-time employees’ five-day week.33 
Unlike full-time employees, part-time union members generally are 
unable to receive time and a half or double time for working on holi-
days. This can be seen in the language from two contracts shown below. 
The agreement between Sparrow Hospital and the Michigan Nurses As-
sociation shows that contingent workers are only paid for holidays if 
they work and only then at straight-time hourly rates.
Article 35, Holidays
Section 15.2 B. Part-time and per diem employees receive the base 
rate of pay for each hour actually worked on each of the six holi-
days as they occur. Holiday pay is paid for hours worked in excess 
of a full shift (i.e. 8 hours, 10 hours, or 12 hours).34
In the Kroger and United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 
951, Western Michigan Clerks agreement, contingent workers do re-
ceive some holiday pay if they have worked as scheduled both before 
and after the holiday. However, this limits their ability to take extended 
time off during holidays without losing pay.35
FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR UNIONS 
The discussion in this chapter has highlighted the challenges unions 
face in their efforts to contain or manage the use of contingent work ar-
rangements by employers. These approaches, particularly those used by 
industrial unions, still reflect a historical orientation toward traditional 
employment arrangements (Zalusky 1986). As a result, most unions re-
main structured to protect job and income security for full-time work-
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ers, particularly male workers in blue-collar jobs such as manufacturing, 
mining, construction, and transportation, whose relative importance in 
the economy is declining. 
If unions want to grow in membership numbers and relative im-
portance in the labor force, they must find ways to meet the needs of 
a workforce that is about 50 percent female—three-quarters of which 
is working in the service sector. Furthermore, with a 76 percent labor 
force participation rate among women between the ages of 25 and 54 
who worked in 1998 and 62 percent of women working with children 
under the age of six, flexibility and alternative scheduling arrangements 
must be addressed (Fullerton 1999; Hayghe 1997). Worker demands for 
family-friendly policies and flexible schedules combined with employ-
ers’ desire for workforce flexibility are forcing unions to rethink their 
adherence to the traditional employment relationship as the sole mecha-
nism for gaining economic security (Nussbaum and Meyer 1986). As 
discussed earlier, some unions in the service sector have already begun 
the process of adapting to the changing demographic characteristics of 
the labor force by including contingent workers in their bargaining and 
negotiating their wages and prorated benefits.
Unions will continue to be concerned about the negative impact 
of part-time and alternative employment arrangements on all aspects 
of economic welfare. However, unions must address these concerns in 
an environment in which some employers have legitimate needs for 
alternative arrangements and some workers prefer them. In facing these 
challenges, unions cannot afford to take an exclusionary approach that 
protects only the “haves” of the workforce. 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Using the lens of negotiated contract language, this chapter has re-
viewed strategies for inclusion and exclusion used by unions to cope 
with the challenges created by contingent work. What is clear from this 
review is that organized labor has not devised a consistent strategy for 
handling contingent work. Research can explore four important ques-
tions that will provide guidance to unions on appropriate future strate-
gies for managing contingent work. 
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First, investigation has rarely focused on why union locals pursue 
an exclusionary or inclusionary strategy and the factors influencing this 
decision. It is necessary to analyze the impact of factors such as the 
demographic characteristics of the workforce and member preferences 
for nontraditional work schedules, as well as the internal politics of the 
union, in the decision to exclude or include part-time workers. For ex-
ample, evidence indicates that women are more likely to work part time 
or in some form of alternative work arrangement to balance work and 
family responsibilities. The greater concentration of women in service 
occupations may partially explain the contract language negotiated by 
service sector unions. 
The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) executive council has 
long been concerned about the use of part-time faculty employment. 
The AFT notes that the use of part-time faculty jeopardizes the quality 
of education and is used to threaten full-time faculty. The union argues 
that these part-time positions
. . . provide the cheap, no-strings-attached labor which makes it 
unnecessary to declare regular positions open, enables an institu-
tion to staff classes even though faculty are denied tenure, reduces 
the proportion of a department entrusted with decision-making, 
and intensifies the burden of committee work and departmental 
governance for full-time faculty. (AFT Higher Education 2000)
A detailed case study can help unions understand why there have 
been so few examples of successful union activities on behalf of part-
time faculty. It has been argued that success has been limited in part be-
cause neither universities and colleges nor their full-time faculties have 
been willing to make equity for part-time faculty a negotiating priority 
(Leatherman 2000). In July 2002, the UAW won the right to represent 
more than 4,000 part-time faculty members at New York University, 
creating the largest adjunct-only union in the nation at a private univer-
sity (Smallwood 2002b). Adjunct faculty at the University of Massachu-
setts at Boston, assisted by the local chapter of the Chicago Coalition 
of Contingent Academic Labor (COCAL), pressured the local union to 
negotiate for higher pay and greater equity. With this success, COCAL 
 would like to move beyond this campus to the other 58 colleges and 
universities that lie within a 10-mile radius of Boston (Leatherman 
2001). 
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 A second related research topic is determining the effectiveness 
of various forms of language in protecting bargaining unit work while 
meeting the needs of the membership for flexibility. It is sometimes 
argued that contingent work actually protects “good” jobs by insulating 
core workers from market variability (Mitchell 1986). However, a care-
ful evaluation of this argument is needed.
A third area for investigation by researchers is the successes and 
failures in unionizing part-time and other contingent workers in other 
countries, which can provide guidance for future negotiating and or-
ganizing strategies in the United States. For example, Japanese unions 
are faced with the same dilemma as unions in the United States. In 
2000 their membership fell by 2.8 percent, partially because they con-
centrated their attention on regular full-time employment and failed to 
adjust to the diversification of employment arrangements toward more 
part-time and other nonregular forms of employment (Euroline 2002a). 
The Canadian experience contrasts with that of Japan. Zeytinoğlu 
(1992) conducted a survey of 188 employers in Ontario, Canada, who 
had collective bargaining contracts covering both “full-time and part-
time workers who are in the same occupation and who perform the 
same or substantially similar tasks.” This survey found that the major 
reason employers included both groups in their contracts was the desire 
for flexibility in scheduling work that part-time workers make possible. 
Research on collective bargaining practices in other countries that iden-
tifies lessons learned will be useful to U.S. unions.
Finally, future research should explore how public policy can be 
integrated with collective bargaining to protect part-time workers as 
well as those in other alternative work arrangements. Experiences in 
other countries can provide useful insights and models for the United 
States. For example, in the European Union (EU), some legislation and 
collective bargaining agreements have been designed to regulate part-
time work in a complementary fashion. The European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) believes that part-time work should be made 
more attractive and acceptable for workers while also providing the as-
surance of “decent social protection” (Euroline 2002b). If unions want 
to rebuild their memberships, they must find ways to unionize part-time 
workers. The research outlined in this chapter should provide insights 
into the appropriate strategies for success.
Gleason.indb   127 11/13/2006   9:06:49 AM
128   Lundy, Roberts, and Becker
Notes
The authors wish to express their sincere thanks to Danny Hoffman, specialist in the 
Michigan State University Labor Education Program, and Sharon A. Riviera, secretary/
treasurer of UAW Local 6000, for their time and support; and appreciation to the par-
ticipants in the Michigan State University and University of Illinois Labor Education 
Programs National Conference for Labor Representatives in the Health Care Industry, 
April 2–4, 2000, in Lake Buena Vista, Florida, for their comments about the current 
state of unions and contingent work.
 1.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) biennially collects information on contin-
gent employment and alternative work arrangements. The definitions used by the 
BLS are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
 2. The NLRB considers several factors in determining the existence of a commu-
nity of interest, including whether the employees:
• Perform similar types of work and have similar training and skills, such as 
craft work, clerical work, or production and maintenance work;
• Work in the same location and/or interchange and have regular work con-
tact with each other;
• Perform integrated production or service functions;
• Enjoy similar working conditions, such as working the same hours or shift 
schedules, using the same locker room and cafeteria facilities, or being 
subject to the same personnel policies or work rules;
• Have similar wage and benefits schedules; and 
• Have common supervision or centralized control over personnel policies 
or day-to-day operations (Feldacker 1990, p. 46).
 3. Sparrow Hospital and the Michigan Nurses Association, Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, 2004–2007, Article 1. Recognition, 2.
 4. Mercy Hospital of Buffalo and Communications Workers of America, Service, 
Technical and Clerical Employees, Collective Bargaining Agreement, 2004–
2008, Article 4, Categories of Employees, 14.
 5. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Northwest, 
and Oregon Federation of Nurses and Health Care Professionals, Local 5017 
AFT-FNHP-AFL/CIO, Collective Bargaining Agreement, 2005–2010, Article 7, 
Section D, p. 4.
 6. Ibid., 12.
 7. LTV Steel and the United Steelworkers of America, Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, 2004–2008, Section X, Coverage, p. 94.
 8. At one time the board held that an employee had to work a certain percentage of 
the workweek to be classified as a regular part-time employee, but that rule is no 
longer followed. See Feldacker (1990, p. 52).
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 9. Mercy Hospital of Buffalo and Communications Workers of America, Service, 
Technical and Clerical Employees, Collective Bargaining Agreement, 2004–
2008, p. 12.
 10. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 951, and Meijer, Inc., Collective 
Bargaining Agreement, 2003–2007, Article 2, Coverage, R-2.
 11. United Parcel Service and International Brotherhood of Teamsters Collective 
Bargaining Agreement 2002–2008 and Michigan Supplemental Agreement, Au-
gust 1, 2002.
 12. Marriott Management Services and the United Catering, Restaurant, Bar and 
Hotel Workers Local Union 1064, R.W.D.S.U., AFL-CIO, Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, 1998–2001 (1998), p. 10.
 13. See Note 7.
 14. The Board of Regents Montana University System and the Montana Faculty 
Association, Collective Bargaining Agreement, 2003–2005, Article I Section B 
– Student Workers, p. 45.
15. LTV Steel and the United Steelworkers of America, Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, 2004–2008, Section X, Coverage, p. 117.
16. American Axle and Manufacturing, Inc. and UAW, Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment, 2004–2008, (183)(e), p. 107.
17. General Motors Corporation and the International Union of Electronic, Electri-
cal, Salaried, Machine & Furniture Workers AFL-CIO, Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, 1996–1999, p. 201.
18. Ibid., Appendix B, 220.
19. Ibid., Appendix L, 233. In addition to this language the contract also has five let-
ters of understanding about specific subcontracting issues.
20. Ibid., (183) (a), 134.
21.  Ibid., (183) (b).
22. Ibid., 345.
23. Interview with D. Hoffman, Specialist, Michigan State University Labor Educa-
tion Program, April 2000.
 24. Interview with S.A. Rivera, Secretary/Treasurer for UAW Local 6000, April, 
2000. 
25. See Note 10.
26. American Red Cross, Southeastern Michigan Blood Services Region and Michi-
gan Council of Nurses and Health Care Professionals, Service Employees Inter-
national Union, Local 79, Collective Bargaining Agreement, 1993–1996, Article 
X, p. 21. 
27. See Note 3.
28. Ibid.
 29. Ibid.
30. 1199W/United Professionals for Quality Health Care and the State of Wisconsin, 
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 2002–2005, Article VI, Employee Benefits, 
2002–2005, p. 22.
31. See Note 10.
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32. The Regents of the University of Michigan and the Michigan Nurses Associa-
tion, Collective Bargaining Agreement, 2001–2004, p. 118.
33. See Note 26.
34. See Note 3.
35. Kroger and United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 951, Western Michi-
gan Clerks, Collective Bargaining Agreement, 1995–2000, p. 10. 
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No Safe Harbor 
A	Review	of	Significant	Laws	
Affecting Contingent Workers
Thomas A. Coens 
Alvin L. Storrs
Michigan	State	University
There has been an increase in contingent employment arrangements 
in the United States for more than two decades. This increase has gen-
erated much discussion in the legal and human resource practitioner 
communities, as well as legislative activity and litigation, about how 
to apply federal and state laws governing these forms of employment. 
However, many of the key precedents used to apply the laws to contin-
gent employment arrangements have been established already through 
case law. Consequently, the challenge has been to apply these guide-
lines to new emerging employment arrangements, such as the growth 
of employee leasing.
The overriding common purpose of U.S. labor and employment laws 
for more than a century has been to protect the wage-earning worker 
hired by an employer. This means that virtually every employment-re-
lated statute includes an explicit definition of the terms “employee” and 
“employer” to determine the coverage of the statute and permit enforce-
ment.1 As a result, many of the issues related to a given statute can be 
resolved through reference to guidelines and precedents that have been 
in effect for decades.2 Unfortunately, the fact that each law has its own 
unique definitions and evolving case law, and the lack of generic defini-
tions that may be used interchangeably from one statute to another, can 
be quite confusing to employers. 
This confusion has caused some employers to think that contingent 
employment arrangements offer an easy escape from the obligations 
and constraints imposed by these laws, and thus a way to reduce la-
bor costs. With a few notable exceptions, however, this belief is falla-
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cious. Classifying people as independent contractors, placing people in 
temporary or part-time jobs, or retaining employees through a leasing 
company does not provide a “safe harbor” for employers.3 Employers 
should not assume that their legal liabilities are reduced because they 
hire contingent workers.4 
This chapter discusses the basic criteria and provisions of the ma-
jor workplace laws influencing controversial issues pertaining to the 
contingent worker. Most of the issues are not new, but rather reflect 
the challenge of applying them in some new contexts and to a larger 
number of workers. The discussion focuses on the most critical and 
broadly applied legal interpretation issues embodied in the employ-
ment arrangements of independent contractors, temporary employees, 
and leased employees.5 The use of the common-law control test and 
the economic realities test in the interpretation of the laws is reviewed. 
The key issues then are discussed as they apply to the federal income 
tax, employment tax, and retirement benefit laws; wage and hour rules 
(minimum wage); workers’ compensation; and equal employment op-
portunity laws. In closing, recommendations to improve public policy 
focused on contingent employment issues and questions for future re-
search are discussed. 
vARIATIONS IN TERMINOLOGy AND LEGAL TESTS 
The application of employment-related laws by employers to the 
contingent workforce is clouded by the lack of common or universal 
terminology used to identify the different types of workers or employ-
ers within federal statutes or across state statutes. Furthermore, there 
is confusion about applications of the legal tests used to interpret the 
meaning of “employee” and “employer” for each law. 
variations in Terminology
Two variations are important to this discussion: the definition of 
an employee and the definition of an employer. For example, a person 
may clearly qualify as an independent contractor based on the definition 
of an employee in the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or the National 
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Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rules, but be classified as an employee 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and workers’ compensa-
tion laws. Thus, because of these differences, an attorney who is asked 
whether an individual qualifies as an independent contractor can only 
respond, “Under what law?” 
One illustration of the confusing variety of terms for employers is 
the identification of a temporary agency or employee leasing company.6 
These firms may be referred to as the leasing company, general em-
ployer, primary employer, labor broker, lessor, loaning employer, staff-
ing company, or contractor employer. Similarly, the employee placed 
by a temporary or leasing company may be referred to as a temporary 
employee, leased employee, borrowed employee (or servant), loaned 
employee (or servant), coemployee, or joint employee.
However, although these terms are similar, they are not necessar-
ily interchangeable due to differing technical definitions. Also, some 
laws regulate these categories but do not precisely distinguish them. For 
example, many employment statutes, such as FLSA and Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity (EEO) laws, generally do not distinguish between 
leased employees and temporary employees per se. However, under 
other laws, such as worker compensation statutes, these categories are 
addressed with great specificity.
This chapter will use the terminology commonly associated with 
the particular law being discussed. In some cases distinguishing fea-
tures will be noted, but every distinction cannot be articulated. 
Common-Law and Economic Realities Tests
Statutes, regulations, revenue rulings, and legal tests are used to 
interpret issues of worker status (for a more detailed discussion of these 
tests, see Muhl [2002]). The beginning point in analyzing the relation-
ship between a worker and a company is to determine whether the 
worker is an employee under a given statute. This question is critical 
because it determines the responsibilities of the employer for a variety 
of employment taxes in addition to pay and benefits. If a worker can 
be classified as an independent contractor instead of an employee, the 
employer can reduce costs.7
Two similar legal tests, or a hybrid of the two tests, have been used 
by the courts to make this determination: the “common-law control 
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test” and the “economic realities” test.8 These tests ask multiple ques-
tions to evaluate all aspects of the employment situation, and the courts 
examine each fact pattern independently. Particular attention is paid to 
who has the right to control the work process, but all factors must be 
considered to determine the outcome. If the employer has this right, 
then the person controlled generally will be considered an employee. 
Consequently, it is the conditions of employment that are key in deter-
mining employee status, not the classification of the workers assigned 
by the employer. 
These two legal tests vary in the breadth of the circumstances in-
vestigated. The common-law test is the most widely used in federal 
cases. It is based on the legal concept of agency in which the employee 
is given authority to act for the employer by the employer. This test 
generally uses 10 factors to determine who has the right to control the 
work process.9 
However, the IRS uses 20 factors to determine the presence or 
absence of control.10 Also, when presenting a case before the IRS or 
courts, taxpayers can introduce other factors beyond the 20 as persua-
sive evidence negating or establishing control. Moreover, some IRS 
agents use three types of evidence in determining a worker’s classifica-
tion: behavioral control, financial control, and the relationship of the 
parties. The intent of the parties, industry custom, independent contrac-
tor agreements, and the provision of employee-type benefits are other 
factors which have been considered by courts.11 
If a company misclassifies a worker as an independent contractor, 
the IRS will reclassify the independent contractor as an employee and 
impose taxes, interest, and penalties that can create large tax bills.12 In a 
typical reclassification, the company may be assessed for income taxes 
that were not withheld and employment taxes; the employment tax li-
ability would include both the employer’s and employee’s share.
The economic realities test usually is applied where the purpose of 
the law is to protect or benefit a worker who is financially dependent 
on an employer. It focuses on the nature of the economic relationship 
between the employer and the worker. It uses six factors to determine 
whether a worker depends on the employer for ongoing employment 
and economic livelihood. Since this test has a broader focus than the 
common-law test, individuals are more likely to be classified as em-
ployees by the court.13 
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The hybrid test also examines all of the circumstances affecting the 
employment relationship by combining elements from the common-
law and economic realities tests. It considers the economic realities 
particularly critical, but it also considers who has the right to control 
the work process.
These different tests have resulted in varying interpretations of who 
is an employee and who is an independent contractor across the spec-
trum of tax, labor, employment, and retirement benefit laws. As a con-
sequence, a worker in the same job category can be either an employee 
or independent contractor, depending on the facts and circumstances.14 
For example, in Consolidated	Flooring	Services	v.	United	States	(1997), 
a holding company owned two companies in which workers were in-
stalling floor coverings. The workers in both companies were doing the 
same work but were classified differently due to varying circumstances. 
One company, Monroe Schneider Associates (MSA), used union em-
ployees to install floor coverings while the other company, Consolidated 
Flooring Services (CFS), contracted with nonunion workers for instal-
lation services. The Court applied the common-law test to conclude that 
the CFS nonunion installers were independent contractors. The Court 
stated: “. . . where CFS did maintain some control . . . installers retained 
their independence with respect to the sequence, manner and skill with 
which jobs were completed. Installers bore the risk of profit or loss on 
their jobs and controlled their own work force.”
FEDERAL INCOME TAx, EMPLOyMENT TAx, AND 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS LAWS
Identifying a worker as an employee or independent contractor is 
critical for federal income tax, employment tax, and retirement benefits 
laws. The determination of employee or independent contractor clas-
sification is made by examining statutes, regulations, revenue rulings, 
and case law. Once it is established that a worker is an employee, then 
full-time, part-time, temporary, or leased employee status must be as-
certained. The full- or part-time status of an employee generally will 
be decided by the number of hours worked. The arrangement with an 
outside company will determine whether the worker is a temporary or 
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leased employee instead of an employee of the company for which a 
worker performs services. The application of the test and the factors 
used to guide decisions are discussed below. 
Federal Income and Employment Tax
Employee or Independent Contractor
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and Federal Insurance 
Contribution Act (FICA) are employment taxes.15 Employers generally 
prefer to hire independent contractors when appropriate because it re-
duces both their administrative costs of collecting and paying federal 
income and employment taxes. In contrast, the IRS prefers to have 
workers classified as employees so that it can collect the maximum 
amount of tax revenue. 
If the worker is an employee, the company as employer has the re-
sponsibility to withhold income and employment taxes (e.g., to pay for 
the Social Security and Medicare programs supported by FICA) from 
the compensation of the employee.16 The payment of one-half of the 
FICA tax with the accompanying filing and reporting obligations is a 
primary reason many companies attempt to classify a worker as an in-
dependent contractor. In addition, the employer must pay the FUTA tax, 
which covers the cost of administering the unemployment insurance 
system and the states’ Job Service programs, and provides 50 percent 
of the cost of extended unemployment benefits when unemployment is 
high.17
In contrast, payments to independent contractors are not subject to 
withholding of any taxes because the company is not considered an 
employer of this type of worker. Independent contractors therefore 
must pay the proper amount themselves in estimated quarterly income 
tax payments or be subject to penalties and interest.18 A negative con-
sequence for independent contractors is that they are not covered by 
unemployment insurance and are not entitled to these benefits if they 
become unemployed.19 Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 6, many part-
time employees are not eligible for FUTA coverage due to working too 
few hours.
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Coemployment
The determination of the “employer” who is liable for tax and em-
ployment law compliance can be particularly perplexing when a com-
pany is employing temporary workers provided by a temporary em-
ployment agency or leased workers provided by a leasing agency.20 The 
issue created by these arrangements is whether the worker can be an 
employee of both the employment agency and the client (customer) 
organization. This dual status where two or more parties both stand le-
gally as the employer of a single employee is “coemployment.”21 
In the typical one-to-one employment situation, the employer for 
whom the worker performs services is responsible for income tax with-
holding. However, in a coemployment situation in which another party 
has control over the payment of wages, then that party is considered to 
be the employer. For example, in a case involving the General Motors 
Corporation, the company was held not to be the employer for em-
ployment tax withholding purposes when it contracted with a foreign 
company to obtain design engineers (General	Motors	Corp.	v.	United	
States 1990). The court concluded that regardless of whether the auto 
company ultimately controlled each design engineer while on the job, 
the facts supported a finding that the foreign company was responsible 
for paying the wages of the design engineers. This court focused on 
which party had control over the payment of wages to determine which 
company was the employer and therefore responsible for the employ-
ment taxes. 
Retirement	Benefits
A qualified retirement plan offers attractive tax features to employ-
ers and employees. Generally, for federal tax purposes, an employer is 
allowed a deduction when an employee includes the amount in gross 
income; however, the employer receives an immediate deduction for 
contributions to qualified retirement plans, even though employees do 
not have to include the amount of the contribution in gross income.22 
The tax consequences for the employee are deferred until the employee 
receives a distribution from the qualified plan. Contributions main-
tained in a trust or other qualified fund accumulate tax free, resulting in 
an accelerated accumulation of pension funds for employees.
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However, a qualified plan must meet a strict set of statutory require-
ments. Generally, a qualified retirement plan by its design and opera-
tion must satisfy standards requiring coverage of a minimum percent-
age of employees and not discriminate in favor of highly compensated 
employees in contributions or benefits.23 The definition of employee is 
critical in the qualified plan arena.
Employee or Independent Contractor
A specific definition of “employee” for qualified retirement plans 
is not contained in the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). The Supreme 
Court applied the common-law test in determining whether a worker 
was an employee for the purpose of a qualified plan, but did not con-
clude that the common-law definition must apply in all employee ben-
efit cases.24 
The continuation of the qualified status of a retirement plan can be 
dependent on the proper classification of workers. If workers who are 
actually employees but improperly classified as independent contrac-
tors are excluded from a qualified plan, then the minimum coverage or 
nondiscrimination standard could be violated, resulting in disqualifica-
tion of the plan. Similarly, the requirement that the plan should be for 
the exclusive benefit of employees would be violated if an independent 
contractor was incorrectly classified as an employee and included, and 
could cause disqualification.25 Also, the qualified status of the plan may 
be in jeopardy if a sufficient number of part-time employees who have 
one year of service have not been allowed to join the plan.26 Even where 
the tax-qualified status of a plan is not in jeopardy, the erroneously ex-
cluded part-time employee would be entitled to participate in the plan. 
This would require the employer to make any missed past contributions 
to the plan on behalf of such improperly excluded employees. 
Disqualification of a qualified retirement plan is viewed as the ulti-
mate penalty because of the severe tax consequences on the employer, 
plan participants, and the plan trust. The IRS has recognized the se-
verity of the plan disqualification penalties and the need to encourage 
plan sponsors to correct defects by introducing a set of administrative 
programs that allow many defective plans to correct problems without 
disqualification.27
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Leased Employees
Leasing employees may be an attractive option for companies that 
are concerned with the higher costs associated with full-time perma-
nent employees, such as the payment of retirement benefits. The U.S. 
Congress was apprehensive that some companies might attempt to re-
duce their retirement benefit costs by hiring a large number of leased 
employees who would perform the same services as employees without 
being eligible to participate in the retirement plan. Congress therefore 
enacted strict statutory guidelines to provide leased employees with ad-
ditional qualified retirement plan protection. The statutory guidelines 
require the leased individual to be treated as the recipient’s employee 
when verifying standards such as coverage and nondiscrimination if 
 1) the services are provided pursuant to an agreement between 
the recipient and any other person,
 2) the individual has performed services for the recipient . . . on 
a substantially full-time basis for a period of at least one year, 
and 
 3) such services are performed under primary direction or control 
by the recipient.28 
As a result, when using leased employees, the employer must track 
the number of employees in this category to ensure that the stated per-
centage of employees benefit under the plan’s coverage and participa-
tion tests. If the company has too many leased employees who are not 
eligible solely due to their statuses, then the plan will be disqualified for 
failing the coverage and participation standards. 
Coemployment 
Two frequently cited cases illustrate the challenges of determining 
who is the employer in a coemployment situation: Vizcaino	v.	Microsoft	
(1997) and Bronk	 v.	 Mountain	 States	 Telephone	 and	 Telegraph,	 Inc.	
(1996). In both cases the workers brought their action under ERISA, but 
different outcomes resulted due to the differences in the interpretation 
of ERISA by the courts. In Vizcaino	v.	Microsoft	 the court ruled that 
workers were employees for the purposes of participation in a retire-
ment plan, while in Bronk	the opposite conclusion was drawn.
Gleason.indb   143 11/13/2006   9:06:51 AM
144   Coens and Storrs
Microsoft had a practice of supplementing its regular employee pool 
with workers who were classified as independent contractors or tempo-
rary agency employees. In some job categories the regular employees, 
independent contractors, and temporary agency employees were per-
forming the same work under the direction and control of Microsoft. 
The IRS, in an employment tax audit, made a determination that the 
independent contractors should have been classified as employees. Mi-
crosoft responded to the IRS audit reclassification by offering jobs to 
a small number of the independent contractors as regular employees. 
However, the majority of Microsoft’s independent contractors were 
given the choice of being fired or converting to temporary agency em-
ployees. The temporary employment agency merely provided payroll 
services; the working relationship between new temporary employees 
and Microsoft remained substantially the same as before the IRS audit. 
Former independent contractors then filed an action on behalf of 
workers who met the definition of employees under the common-law 
test but who were not allowed to participate in the retirement benefit 
plan because Microsoft considered them independent contractors or 
employees of a temporary employment agency. The 9th Circuit Court 
of Appeals stated: “Even if for some purposes a worker is considered an 
employee of the agency, that would not preclude his status of common 
law employee of Microsoft. The two are not mutually exclusive.”29 
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Bronk reversed the earlier Dis-
trict Court’s holding that employers must include in pension plans leased 
employees who were considered by the IRS as “employees” based on 
the common-law test. The Court of Appeals held that the I.R.C. and 
Treasury regulations governing the tax qualification of retirement plans 
did not implicitly modify ERISA to require employers to include in 
their retirement plans those leased employees who had been excluded 
from the plans because they were not “regular employees.” Moreover, 
the Court of Appeals reasoned that Congressional action would be re-
quired to modify the tax qualification provisions of the Code to permit 
retirement plans under ERISA to require the inclusion of properly ex-
cluded leased employees. Thus, some uncertainty remains about how 
“employee” will be interpreted by the courts as evidenced by the in-
consistent decisions in Vizcaino	(In	re	Vizcaino 9th Cir 1999),	the	lower 
court in Bronk	v.	Mountain	State	Telephone	and	Telegraph	Inc. (1996), 
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and other cases Abraham	v.	Exxon	Corp. (1996); Clark	v.	E.I.	DuPont	
De	Nemours	and	Co. (1997).   
FEDERAL WAGE-HOUR LAW: THE MINIMUM WAGE LAW
The FLSA is the primary federal wage-hour law.30 It imposes on 
covered employers a minimum wage, a requirement to pay overtime pay 
at time and one-half after 40 hours of work in a week to employees earn-
ing less than $24,000 a year, and child labor restrictions applicable to 
persons under 18 years of age. This law provides nearly universal cov-
erage for full-time and part-time employees with few exceptions other 
than independent contractors, white-collar exemptions, and trainees. 
Employee or Independent Contractor 
Historically, the DOL enforcement policy has carefully monitored 
and limited the use of independent contractor status because it creates 
a potential escape for employers from wage and overtime obligations.31 
Based on the influence of an early Supreme Court decision in Ruther-
ford	Food	Corp.	v.	McComb (1947a)	the DOL has applied the economic 
realities	test in deciding who qualifies as an independent contractor be-
cause, as the Supreme Court cautioned, “there is . . . no definition that 
solves all problems to the limitations of the employer-employee rela-
tionship” (Rutherford	Food	Corp.	v.	McComb 1947b). The economic 
realities test is strictly applied to achieve the purposes of the FLSA to 
ensure that workers are not deprived of protection due to an artifice of 
making a would-be employee into a contractor. 
The official guiding principles applied by the Wage-Hour Division 
emphasize four factors in the Field	Operations	Handbook	(U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor 2003, p. 10b06).32	These and additional control	factors, 
considered in combination with economic reality factors, resemble the 
approach used by the IRS discussed above (U.S. Department of Labor 
2003, p. 10b07). Interestingly, the wage-hour guidelines further advise 
that the method of compensation, the issuance of governmental licens-
es, the place where the work is performed, and the absence of a formal 
agreement are immaterial to the determination of contractor status. The 
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exclusion of these four factors may reflect the fact that each can be eas-
ily manipulated by employers to create the artifice of an independent 
contractor status.33 
In cases with many factors suggesting an employment relationship, 
the outcomes can vary, as illustrated by two well-known cases from the 
U.S. Court of Appeals: Brock	v.	Superior	Care	(1988) and Herman	v.	
Express	Sixty-Minutes	Delivery	Services (1998). In Brock	v.	Superior	
Care the U.S. Labor Department sought to classify nurses working for a 
nursing agency as “employees” under the FLSA to support the claims of 
the nurses for unpaid overtime compensation. Superior Care, a provider 
of temporary health care nurses to individual patients, nursing homes, 
and hospitals, contended that the nurses were independent contractors. 
The arguments employing six key factors from the economic realities 
test are summarized in Table 5.1.
In a two-to-one split decision in Brock, the 2nd Circuit U.S. Court 
of Appeals found that the nurses were employees under the FLSA, 
overruling the trial court’s decision. Noting the closeness of the case, 
the court found that the integral relationship between the work and the 
agency’s business, the lack of significant investment, and no risk of loss 
required a finding of an employee. The court further gave weight to the 
fact that the agency retained “employees” doing work similar to the al-
leged contractor nurses. However, the dissenting judge opined that the 
weight of evidence favored an independent contractor determination.
In contrast, in Herman	v.	Express	Sixty-Minutes	Delivery	Services 
(1998), where the facts of the case were not substantially different from 
Brock, the 5th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals majority opinion ruled 
against the DOL in a split decision.34 The court found that drivers for 
Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Service, a courier delivery service, 
were independent contractors even though they performed work that 
was integral to the nature of the company. In determining that the in-
dividuals were contractors, the court relied on the same tests used in 
Brock.35
These two cases demonstrate that the legal tests do not lend them-
selves necessarily to consistent interpretation and application; even 
learned judges with the benefit of extensive testimony and thousands of 
pages of documents cannot agree on the application of the independent 
contractor factors in the same	case. Such uncertainty may encourage 
prudent employers to classify borderline cases as employees.
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Table 5.1  Key Factors in Arguments in Brock v. Superior Care
Key factors in 
economic realities 
test
Company arguments for 
independent contractor 
status for nurses
DOL arguments for 
employee status for 
nurses
Degree of control 
exercised by alleged 
employer
No control: nurses worked 
with little supervision; 
primarily interacted with 
patients
Nurses’ hours and notes 
were reviewed; worked 
subject to procedures in 
extensive manual and 
received some direction 
from physicians
Degree to which 
employee’s 
opportunity for profit 
or loss is determined 
by alleged employer
Similar to independent 
contractor, some nurses 
paid flat fee per visit
No opportunity for 
profit and loss; nurses 





from a few days to a few 
months, depending on 
patient needs; not ongoing
Skill and initiative 
required
Highly skilled work 
requiring exercise of 
independent judgment and 
discretion and interactions 
with physicians and 
patients, similar to 
independent contractor
No indication that 




alleged employer  
for economic
livelihood
Permitted to work for other 
agencies and many did, not 
dependent on employer for 
livelihood
Some paid by the hour 
based on local labor 
market conditions; had 
on payroll some nurses 
doing similar work paid 
as “employees”
Performing core 
work of alleged 
employer
Work performed was 
integral to business
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Coemployment
Joint liability under the FLSA allows either party to be held account-
able for the full amount of liability. By making both the staffing con-
tractor and the client company responsible there is a greater likelihood 
that employees will be paid properly. Also, if one “employer” should go 
out of business, the other party is responsible for unpaid minimum and 
overtime wages. Furthermore, this avoids the legal complexities associ-
ated with determining which employer is responsible. Consequently, 
the DOL holds both temporary employment agencies and leasing com-
panies jointly liable with their customer companies for back wages and 
penalties. In theory, by making both employers liable, the client com-
pany may be more careful in choosing responsible staffing providers. 
Thus, although there are a variety of risks with coemployment, those 
under the FLSA are potentially the most expensive (Moldover 2005). 
The DOL provides this protection to employees by broadly defining 
coemployment	status in its compliance guidelines. The regulation states 
that two or more employers may be deemed to be coemployers under 
any one of three circumstances:
 1) There is an arrangement between employers to share an em-
ployee’s services even with separate payrolls.
 2) One employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of 
the other employer or employers in relation to the employee.
 3) The employers are not completely disassociated with respect 
to the employment of a particular employee and may be 
deemed to share control of the employee, whether directly or 
indirectly.
Client companies using temporary or leased employees may think 
that the above definitions do not cover them because they do not hire 
or assign the employee, or discipline or discharge. However, the sec-
ond criterion extends employer status to them since they act indirectly 
in relationship to an employee. Typically, the client company pays the 
staffing company amounts that are based on the hours worked and the 
hourly wage and benefit costs. The staffing company then acts directly 
in the interest of its client company with regard to the employment of 
individuals assigned to work at the client’s establishment. Also, the cli-
ent company typically “directly acts” through supervision of the tem-
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porary or leased employee in the performance of the day-to-day work. 
In many leasing and temporary arrangements, this may hold true even 
when the staffing company has a personnel administrator on the client’s 
premises to deal with attendance, payroll, disciplinary, and discharge 
issues. Accordingly, in conventional temporary staffing and leasing ar-
rangements, both the staffing company and client company are jointly 
responsible for FLSA compliance (see DOL 1969, 1975). 
The courts generally have been supportive of the DOL coemploy-
ment guidelines. For example, in a 1998 decision, Baystate	Alternative	
Staffing v. Herman (1998), the 1st Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals found 
that a corporate staffing company and its officers were liable for unpaid 
overtime even though the client employer directed the workers in their 
day-to-day work. Similarly, in Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand, Inc. (1973),	
the 5th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals found that a fruit and vegetable 
company qualified as a joint employer	of farm workers who were sup-
plied by independent contractor crew leaders. 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAWS
 The goal of the workers’ compensation programs since their cre-
ation36 has been to maximize the social safety net provided for employ-
ees when they are injured or disabled in the course of their employment. 
The program covers the loss of wages and medical expenses resulting 
from these injuries and disabilities. Except in a few industries such as 
railroads, air carriers, shipping, and the federal government, workers’ 
compensation is provided through state laws.37
Workers’ compensation was developed as “no-fault” insurance de-
signed to address quickly the financial effects of inevitable industrial 
accidents. The “exclusive remedy” doctrine grants employers immunity 
against personal injury lawsuits brought by employees for work-related 
injuries except in extremely narrow exceptions. In granting this immu-
nity, state legislatures require employers to participate in workers’ com-
pensation plans that cover virtually all work-related injuries regardless 
of whether the employee is full- or part-time. The basis of payment is the 
experience rating of each employer: the greater the number of claims, 
the more the employer pays. Overall, the workers’ compensation pro-
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gram is beneficial to the employer because the dollar amount awarded 
for workers’ compensation claims is only a fraction of what would be 
awarded by a jury if the employee could sue the employer in a personal 
injury lawsuit. Moreover, the claims adjudication process in workers’ 
compensation largely alleviates much of the costs of litigation.
Employee or Independent Contractor
Because only employees	 are eligible for workers’ compensation 
coverage, there can be savings from employing “contractors” instead 
of employees, especially when an employer has an unfavorable injury 
rating. This situation may tempt employers to classify workers as inde-
pendent contractors. However, legislatures and workers’ compensation 
agencies have imposed stringent limitations on classifying employees 
as independent contractors to provide the broadest basis for coverage, 
so the outcome is nearly identical to that of the FLSA. 
The difficulty for multistate employers and insurance carriers is that 
the economic realities tests used in these cases vary somewhat from 
state to state. For example, case law refers to a test that has been derived 
from various Michigan Supreme Court decisions over the years. This 
list identifies eight issues: 
 1) What liability, if any, does the employer incur in the event of 
the termination of the relationship at will?
 2) Is the work being performed an integral part of the employer’s 
business which contributes to the accomplishment of a com-
mon objective?
 3) Is the position or job of such a nature that the employee depends 
upon the emolument for payment of his living expenses?
 4) Does the employee furnish his own equipment and materials?
 5)	 Does the individual seeking employment hold himself out to 
the public as one ready to and able to perform tasks of a given 
nature?
 6) Is the work or the undertaking in question customarily per-
formed by an individual as an independent contractor?
 7) Control, although abandoned as an exclusive criterion upon 
which the relationship can be determined, is a factor to be con-
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sidered along with payment of wages, maintenance of disci-
pline and the right to engage or discharge employees.
 8) Weight should be given to those factors which will most fa-
vorably effectuate the objectives of the statute (McKissic	 v.	
Bodine	1972).
The court cautioned that these issues “must be applied as a whole and 
on a basis of common sense” (McKissic	v.	Bodine 1972).	
Other states apply factors similar to the above list with many expan-
sive questions on control, not unlike the IRS 20-factor test. However, the 
lack of legislative activity on this issue seems to indicate that the courts 
are applying strict standards for independent contractors since a liberally 
construed test would open the floodgates for employee lawsuits. 
Typically, employers err on the side of caution and carry workers’ 
compensation insurance to cover any independent contractor who ul-
timately may be determined to be an employee. Absent willful decep-
tion on the part of the employer, the employer will be fully covered as 
though the contractor was an employee. However, the carrier or state 
agency often will have the right to seek retroactive premiums for any 
misclassified individuals.
Coemployment Issues
For many decades workers’ compensation tribunals and state leg-
islatures have recognized the “borrowed servant”	doctrine (see, for ex-
ample, West Publishing Co. [2002]). This doctrine recognizes that both 
the general	 employer	 (in this context, the temporary agency, leasing 
company, or staffing company) and special	employer (the client compa-
ny) may be obligated to provide workers’ compensation benefits. This 
doctrine generally has been applied when one employer borrows an-
other’s employees or to specialty staffing companies, such as custodial 
firms, or employees that come with special equipment from the staffing 
company. However, it has not been consistently applied to temporary 
and leased employee arrangements. Because of the exclusive remedy 
provisions there have been inconsistencies in the interpretation of this 
doctrine for these two categories of workers. 
When an employer retains a temporary agency’s employee or en-
ters into an employee leasing contract, the working agreement provides 
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that the temporary agency or lessor company will handle all payroll 
and insurance matters and expressly includes the provision of workers’ 
compensation benefits. When the coemployment doctrine is applied to 
these arrangements, often the state statute requires or implies that both 
companies are legally obligated to ensure that workers’ compensation 
coverage is provided. Therefore, if the temporary agency should go out 
of business without providing this coverage, the employee can seek 
workers’ compensation benefits from the client company that directly 
supervised the employee in day-to-day work. This generally holds true 
even when the temporary agency has breached its contract by failing to 
provide workers’ compensation benefits. If the client company brings 
a lawsuit for breach of contract against the temporary agency, this will 
not alleviate any of its joint obligations in the workers’ compensation 
system.
However, the courts generally afford the client company immunity 
from lawsuits when workers’ compensation is provided by a temporary 
agency. For example, in Sorenson	 v.	 Colibri	 (1994),	 a Rhode Island 
case, an employee who was injured on the job collected workers’ com-
pensation benefits from the temporary agency’s policy and then filed a 
lawsuit against the client employer for the same injuries under tort law. 
Even though the Rhode Island workers’ compensation law requires that 
the “general” employer (the temporary agency) must provide the work-
ers’ compensation coverage, it upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit, hold-
ing that the client company was immune from employee lawsuits. The 
court reasoned that extending immunity to the client company was an 
equitable result because it is presumed that the temporary agency had 
charged an hourly rate to the client company that was high enough to 
recover the cost of workers’ compensation premiums.38 In a minority of 
states, however, different decisions have been made, particularly in the 
context of leasing arrangements, which do not give exclusive remedy 
immunity to the client employer.39
Concern has been growing among associations concerned with 
workers’ compensation, such as the International Association of Indus-
trial Accident Boards and Commissions and the National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners, about a relatively new challenge: the use 
of leasing arrangements by client employers to circumvent their experi-
ence ratings.40 For example, an industrial employer may experience a 
high injury rate, resulting in a large increase in the price of its work-
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ers’ compensation premiums. In response it could “terminate” all em-
ployees but continue to employ them through a leasing agency, thereby 
avoiding higher payments for its poor injury experience rating. In con-
trast, the leasing agency as a separate entity pays a neutral and lower 
rate for workers’ compensation premiums. Also, there may be deliber-
ate misrepresentations or concealments by the employer or its agents 
of the reported job duties of workers used for workers’ compensation 
underwriting and quarterly earning and payroll reports.41 Amendments 
to workers’ compensation statutes have attempted to create a basis for 
using the experience ratings of the client company when employees are 
leased.
FEDERAL EqUAL EMPLOyMENT OPPORTUNITy LAWS
The challenge for EEO laws is to hold accountable those who are re-
sponsible for ensuring equal opportunity and to prevent discrimination 
in the workplace. Application of the EEO laws to the contingent worker 
raises issues similar to those raised under wage and benefit laws.
This discussion focuses on the three major federal statutes: Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), and the 1990 Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA). The Equal Pay Act (EPA) is part of the FLSA, 
so liability for equal pay violations generally follows other FLSA ap-
plications as discussed above.42 State fair employment practice or EEO 
laws usually follow to varying degrees the precedents set in the federal 
laws. 
In 1997 the EEOC assembled what had been a scattering of court 
decisions, segments of language from various statutes and regulations, 
and formal guidance letters into one document addressing the applica-
tions of Title VII, ADA, and ADEA to the contingent workforce. These 
enforcement guidelines were provided in an easy-to-follow format il-
lustrated with examples.43 Although not binding on the courts, the docu-
ment generally follows the weight of the case law, and may be given 
“due deference” by the courts. The EEOC focus on contingent work 
is not surprising in light of the patterns related to race and gender dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. The enforcement guidelines expressly note that the 
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employees of temporary employment agencies are disproportionately 
female and African American, while workers provided by contract staff-
ing firms are disproportionately male (U.S. EEOC 1997a, pp. 1–2).
Employee or Independent Contractor
Employers commonly use the independent contractor status as a 
defense against EEO claims made by individuals who work with little 
supervision and are paid on a commission or incentive basis. However, 
the EEOC has maintained a conservative posture in allowing employ-
ers to assert the independent contractor defense. The EEOC has its own 
unique list of 16 factors that are used to determine independent contrac-
tor status, but none of them are controlling.44 The courts have liberally 
applied the hybrid test with varied outcomes, based on the facts of each 
situation.45 
Coemployment 
Like other employment law agencies, the EEOC has applied broadly 
the definition of employer to achieve the purposes of the laws for which 
it is responsible. In relationships between client companies and tempo-
rary agencies or employee leasing arrangements, the EEOC guidelines 
place great weight on whether one or both parties are in a position to 
control the outcome that is the subject of an alleged EEO infraction. For 
some infractions liability may extend to nonemployers. 
Customarily the temporary staffing agency hires the individual and 
pays her wages throughout her tenure with the client company. The 
client company supervises the employee, indirectly pays for her wages 
and benefits, and has the right to terminate the employee and ask the 
temporary provider to send another worker. Under these circumstances, 
the EEOC guidelines indicate that both the temporary staffing agency 
and the client company are “employers” under the civil rights laws 
(U.S. EEOC 1997, p. 10). In other variations, the gradations in control 
and lack of control by the respective parties may change the outcome. 
For example, although a staffing company provides landscaping em-
ployees that it trains and supervises, the client company also may le-
gally become an “employer” if it reserves the right to direct the workers 
to perform particular tasks or otherwise controls the specific manner of 
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performance (p. 11).46 In contrast, the guidelines indicate that in a leas-
ing arrangement in which the leasing firm merely provides services for 
wages and benefits administration, the leasing firm would not be con-
sidered to be the “employer” for the purposes of Title VII (p. 8). 
The EEOC broadly applies the coemployment doctrine even when 
one party more clearly seems at fault. For example, if a staffing firm 
providing nurses is asked to provide a “white nurse,” and the client firm 
says that it will only accept white nurses, the staffing firm nonetheless is 
liable. The firm making a discriminatory request also is liable if it meets 
the threshold size test for liability (U.S. EEOC 1997, pp. 18–19).47
In sexual harassment cases, liability is more closely related to fault. 
The guidelines provide an example of a temporary agency assigning 
a receptionist who then is sexually harassed at the work site by her 
supervisor. The supervisor is an employee of the client company. She 
complains to the temporary agency and the temporary agency advises 
the client company. The client company refuses to investigate and asks 
for another receptionist who is not “a troublemaker.” The temporary 
agency tells the employee that it cannot force the client to investigate 
and assigns another worker to the receptionist job. The guidelines con-
clude that, in this situation, both the temporary agency and the client are 
liable. The temporary agency failed to take adequate corrective action; 
it should have insisted that the client investigate and asserted that its 
workers have the right to work free from harassment. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The use of various types of contingent workers and the expansion 
in outsourcing to fill workforce gaps is predicted to continue in the fu-
ture (Society for Human Resource Management 2005). However, the 
complexity of laws, lack of clarity, and potential for adverse econom-
ic effects on employers using contingent workers will continue until 
changes are made. Public policy initiatives designed to reduce those 
compliance errors that occur despite the good faith efforts of employers 
and make compliance easier must be balanced against the objectives of 
the statutes to protect workers or provide benefits to as many workers as 
possible. Changes pursued jointly by the federal and state governments 
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should include agreements that create greater uniformity and consisten-
cy in the terminology, simplify and clarify the legal tests, and improve 
guidance for compliance. 
Greater Uniformity and Consistency in Terminology	
One of the major compliance challenges is the lack of a single defi-
nition of “employee” that can be used in all work-related laws. This 
challenge was recognized by the Dunlop Commission when it recom-
mended the adoption of one definition of “employee” and one definition 
of “employer” for all workplace laws (DOL 2004). This change would 
greatly simplify employer compliance, particularly for small and me-
dium-sized companies which, unlike large companies, cannot afford to 
retain legions of lawyers and consultants and employ staffs of dedicated 
experts in human resource departments. Furthermore, the cost of com-
pliance for large firms is substantial. An economic analysis detailing the 
time and costs associated with the absence of universal definitions, as 
well as inconsistent rules and practices, will provide useful insights into 
these employer costs. 
A comprehensive analysis of the compatibility of uniform terminol-
ogy and definitions for tax, employment, and retirement benefits laws 
is an important first step. This analysis could help encourage federal 
and state agencies to reach agreement on the usage of common terms 
and begin to apply the laws with greater consistency. In some instances, 
however, this change in approach will require diligent support from leg-
islative bodies. 
Such initiatives have already begun in some areas of the law. The 
development of uniform model laws and practices has been urged or 
adopted by industry associations. For example, model legislation draft-
ed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners has been 
designed to promote a common approach by state legislatures to the li-
censing of leased employees and to ensure the proper experience-rating 
of workers’ compensation premiums (Employee Leasing Registration 
Model Act 1997). To achieve optimal results in the interest of public 
policy, these cooperative efforts should be undertaken not only through 
the efforts of government, but with participation of the academicians, 
industry representatives, and technical professionals, such as lawyers.
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Simplify and Clarify the Legal Tests
At present each law has a unique definition of “employee” and is in-
terpreted by referring to lists of factors used to evaluate the facts of each 
situation. These legal tests have been developed over time by govern-
ment bodies or created by the courts. As a consequence the interpreta-
tions of many tax, employment, and benefit laws are needlessly arcane, 
verbose, and perplexing.
Despite each law having its own particular guidelines, the factors 
used to evaluate the facts of each situation are remarkably similar. There-
fore it is feasible that careful analysis of cases can lead to the develop-
ment of a uniform test, or perhaps two or three types of uniform tests, 
to classify workers consistently in all work-related laws. It is likely that 
greater uniformity can be achieved without significantly sacrificing the 
enforcement objective of minimizing the number of independent con-
tractors so the maximum number of employees is covered.
Provide Useful Compliance Guidelines
While it is evident that many employers struggle to understand their 
legal obligations when classifying workers and engaging in coemploy-
ment arrangements, governmental agencies have done little to help. 
Guidelines can be written in a user-friendly, “plain English” style with 
clear examples and illustrations that employers can easily understand 
for the various employment laws. An example of this approach is the 
EEOC’s enforcement guidance document (U.S. EEOC 1997). Although 
the agency enforces many different laws with unique legislative histo-
ries and lengthy tests, it has created a single document that presents the 
full range of contingent work issues with many helpful illustrations. 
Case-law authority, distinctions in the application of particular EEO 
laws, and clear explanations of principles in an easy-to-follow, ques-
tion-and-answer format are provided. More primers of this sort would 
be helpful to employers to demystify the legal enigmas of contingent 
employment arrangements. 
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Notes
Alvin Storrs is indebted to Matthew Rocky-Hawley, a student at Michigan State Uni-
versity Detroit College of Law, for his assistance with the research in this chapter. 
Although the topic of this chapter is legal in nature, its content is intended solely to 
facilitate the purpose of general information and learning. Nothing herein is intended to 
serve as legal advice relative to any specific or general legal question or problem. Legal 
advice should only be obtained through retained legal counsel who is fully informed of 
all of the particular facts and circumstances.
  1.  These include the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA), Federal Unem-
ployment Tax Act (FUTA), Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA), Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA), Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), and state laws gov-
erning unemployment and workers’ compensation. Citations for the federal stat-
utes in the order listed are: 42 U.S.C. § 410(e); 26 U.S.C. § 3306(a); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 203(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); 
42 U.S.C. § 12111(4); 29 U.S.C. § 2611; 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6); and 29 U.S.C. § 
652(6). For an example of state unemployment and workers’ compensation laws, 
see Michigan compiled Code Laws §§ 421.42, 418.161(b).
 2.  The major exception is the legislation in employee benefits. The tax code amend-
ments in the 1980s and 1990s significantly altered the arena of deferred ben-
efits.
 3.  In § 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978, Congress provided so-called safe harbor 
tests, which prevent the IRS from retroactively reclassifying an independent con-
tractor as an employee. This provision is extremely beneficial because it provides 
retroactive relief for employment taxes, penalties, and interest. A company seek-
ing relief under § 530 must meet these requirements: have a reasonable basis for 
classifying a worker as an independent contractor; demonstrate consistent treat-
ment of the worker as independent contractor for periods beginning after Decem-
ber 31, 1997; and file all required federal tax returns consistent with classifying 
the worker as independent contractor. Although the requirements appear to be 
straightforward, the interpretation has proven to be complex; only a relatively 
small number of businesses have qualified for relief. 
There are, however, other methods available to mitigate or reduce poten-
tially onerous employment tax penalties and interest. For example, see I.R.C. § 
3509 which provides reduced employment tax liability for certain retroactive re-
classifications of workers. Form 1099 is a document used to report nonemployee 
compensation for independent contractors. If Form 1099 is filed for workers, 
then the employer’s tax liability is 1.5 percent of wages for income tax withhold-
ing and 20 percent of employee’s share of Social Security taxes. If Form 1099 
is not filed, the above 1.5 percent is increased to 3.0 percent and the above 20 
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percent to 40 percent. I.R.C. § 6205 allows a special interest-free adjustment for 
certain underpayments of FICA and income tax withholding. I.R.C. § 3402(d) 
provides for retroactive relief from the assessment of income tax liability if the 
employer can prove that the worker reported the income assessed on the Form 
1040 return. Also, in I.R.S. Notice 98-21, 1998-15 I.R.B. 14, the IRS classifica-
tion settlement program has been extended indefinitely. This program is designed 
to resolve worker classification issues as soon as possible in the administrative 
process. If a taxpayer satisfies certain requirements then the taxpayer may pay a 
reduced employment tax liability.
 4.   For example, see the summary of the risks of leasing workers in Dunn and Berk-
ery (2005).
 5.  Part-time and seasonal employees are not discussed in depth. Contrary to popu-
lar belief, there is no universal or even prevailing definition of a part-time em-
ployee among the various labor, employment, and retirement benefit laws. Many 
of these laws employ exact definitions determined by the number of hours in a 
year or in a week that can affect coverage, exemptions, and obligations. Con-
sequently, human resources, employee benefits, and attorney practitioners are 
cautioned to review carefully how employees are defined relative to the number 
of hours worked and full-time status in every labor, employment, and retirement 
benefit law. For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) exempts from 
overtime certain seasonal employees connected with amusement industries (29.
U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)). Eligibility for coverage under statutes such as the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) often is defined in terms of a minimum threshold of a specific number 
of hours worked in a year or given time period. For example, ERISA requires 
a minimum threshold of 1,000 hours before existing law mandates that an em-
ployee cannot be excluded from participation in a retirement plan on the basis of 
hours worked. The FMLA does not apply to a worker who has worked less than 
1,250 hours during the 12-month period immediately preceding the commence-
ment of the leave.
  6.  Similarly, the firm contracting its services may be referred to as the lessee, lessee 
employer, special employer, secondary employer, client employer (or company), 
customer employer (or company), borrowing employer, or contracting employer. 
More recently, leasing companies have begun calling themselves professional 
employer organizations (PEOs) (BPI Communications 1999).
  7.  For example, in 1999 the U.S. Department of Labor alleged that Time Warner 
misclassified as many as 1,000 of its 40,000 workers to reduce its employee 
benefits costs (Herman	v.	Time	Warner,	Inc. 1999). A similar case occurred with 
FedEx in California when it classified drivers as independent contractors (Nicho-
las 2005).
  8.  The common-law test is used by the IRS and has been applied by the courts to 
the FICA, FUTA, ERISA, NLRA, and income tax withholding. The economic 
realities test has been applied by the courts to the FLSA and Equal Pay Act, Title 
VII, ADEA, ADA, and FMLA. The hybrid test has been applied by the courts to 
Title VII, ADEA, and ADA (Muhl 2002, p. 6).
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  9.  These 10 factors are 1) right to control, 2) type of business, 3) supervision, 4) 
skill level, 5) tools and materials, 6) continuing relationship, 7) method of pay-
ment, 8) integration, 9) intent, and 10) employment by more than one firm (Muhl 
2002, pp. 5–7).
 10.  The 20 factors are: 1) instructions; 2) integration; 3) right of discharge; 4) right 
to terminate; 5) services rendered personally; 6) hiring, supervising, and paying 
assistants; 7) training; 8) payment by hour, week, month; 9) payment of business 
and/or traveling expenses; 10) continuing relationship; 11) set hours of work; 
12) full time required; 13) working for more than one firm at a time; 14) making 
service available to general public; 15) furnishing of tools and materials; 16) do-
ing work on employer’s premises; 17) order of sequence set; 18) oral or written 
report; 19) significant investment; and 20) realization of profit or loss. See Rev. 
Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 for a description of each factor.
 11.  For example, see Illinois	Tri-Seal	Products,	Inc.	v.	U.S. (1965); Bonney	Motor	
Express	Inc.	v.	U.S. (1962); In	re	Rasbury (1991); and Butts	v.	Comm’r (1993).
 12.  For example, see the following sections of the Internal Revenue Code: 1) § 
6651: The penalty for the failure to pay employment taxes has a maximum of 
25 percent, which is calculated at 0.5 percent of the unpaid tax each month. This 
code section also has a penalty for failure to file employment tax returns with a 
maximum of 25 percent, which is assessed at 5 percent per month; 2) § 6662: It 
imposes a penalty of 20 percent of the underpayment attributable to negligence; 
3) § 6663: If serious abuse is found there is a 75 percent penalty of underpayment 
due to fraud; 4) § 6656: A failure to deposit penalty can range from 2 percent to 
15 percent of the underpaid deposit. This penalty is imposed in addition to failure 
to pay the penalty; 5) § 6721: A penalty of $15 to $50 per return is charged for 
the failure to file the correct information return such as a W-2. The maximum 
penalty is $250,000 with a reduced maximum of $100,000 for small employers; 
6) § 6722: If an employer fails to provide timely W-2s to employees, a penalty of 
$50 per return may be assessed. The maximum penalty is $100,000.
 13.  The six factors are 1) integration, 2) investment in facilities, 3) right to control, 
4) risk, 5) skill, and 6) continuing relationship (Muhl 2002, pp. 6–9).
 14.  Artists – Compare Rev. Rul. 57-155, 1957-I C.B. 333 with Rev. Rul. 65-262, 
1965-2 C.B. 391; Loggers – Compare Rev. Rul. 71-273, 1971-1 C.B. 286 with 
Rev. Rul. 71-274, 1971-1 C.B. 287; Repairers – Compare Rev. Rul. 55-248, 
1955-1 C.B. 117 with Rev. Rul. 55-370, 1955-1 C.B. 122.
 15.  I.R.C. §§ 3301–3311 (FUTA); 3101–3128 (FICA).
 16.  The Social Security tax is imposed at a rate of 12.4 percent on a changing wage 
base, while the Medicare tax is 2.9 percent on all wages. These taxes are imposed 
half on the employer as an excise tax and half on the employee in the form of a 
withholding tax collected from the employee’s wages by the employer.
 17.  The FUTA tax is imposed solely on employers at a rate of 6.2 percent on the first 
$7,000 of the employee’s wages. Generally, a credit is allowed against the FUTA 
tax for amounts paid into state unemployment funds. This credit cannot exceed 
5.4 percent of first $7,000 of wages. If the maximum credit of 5.4 percent is al-
lowed, the FUTA tax rate after the credit is 0.8 percent. 
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 18.  Compensation paid to independent contractors is subject to the Self Employ-
ment Contributions Act (SECA) tax. The self-employed tax rate is 15.3 percent 
(I.R.C. §§ 1401–1403). The independent contractor pays an amount equal to the 
employee plus the employer portion of the FICA tax. In an attempt to mitigate a 
double tax burden, the independent contractor is allowed to deduct one-half of 
self-employment taxes as an adjustment to gross income and for SECA purpos-
es (I.R.C. §§ 164(f)(1); 1402(a)(12)). The same definition of employee used in 
FICA also applies for SECA to exclude individuals who are not subject to SECA 
tax (I.R.C. § 1402(d)). 
 19.  Two recent cases in Idaho illustrate that this classification problem continues to 
create enforcement challenges. See the discussion of the problem of classifying 
workers at Excell Construction, Inc. (Idaho Supreme Court Reviews Test for 
Independent Contractor Status [2005]). 
 20.  A temporary employee is sometimes defined as one who is retained with an ex-
pectation of being employed for one year or less and who has worked for the 
current employer for less than one year. There are two categories of temporary 
employees: 1) employees of an organization in a “temporary” status with no 
expectation of continued employment and 2) employees who are hired, referred, 
and sometimes supervised in part by a temporary employment agency. See Hip-
ple (1998).
The terminology “leased workers” is somewhat new. However, the con-
cept of “borrowed servant”—when one employer borrows the employees of 
another—can be traced at least to the 1930s and the early years of workers’ 
compensation laws. An entire industry known as “employee leasing” emerged 
in the United States during the 1980s and early 1990s. Setting aside the various 
statutory definitions, in this discussion the term “leased employees” refers to 
employees who are hired, referred, assigned, and in some respects supervised by 
an outside firm (leasing agency) with an expectation of employment longer than 
one year, but the assignment can be indefinite. Thus, a leased employee is differ-
ent from a temporary employee since the latter is assigned with the expectation 
of employment for one year or less.
 21.  It also may be referred to as “joint employment” or “dual employment.” 
 22.  I.R.C. § 404.
 23.  I.R.C. §§ 410(b) and 401(a)(4).
 24.  See Nationwide	Mutual	Insurance	Co.	v.	Darden (1992), where the court used 
only 12 factors in making the decision. See also Hensley	v.	Northwest	Permanete	
P.C. (2001), in which it was determined that the plan administrator did not err 
when interpreting the undefined term “employee” in a pension plan by using the 
W-2 definition and not the common-law definition.
 25.  I.R.C. § 401(a)(2).
 26.  The definition of one year of service is a 12-month period during which an em-
ployee works at least 1,000 hours. I.R.C. § 410(a)(l)(a)(ii) & (3). Careful moni-
toring of hours worked is required to ensure that part-time employees expected 
to work less than 1,000 hours are included if they in fact work more than 1,000 
hours. 
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 27.   See Rev. Proc. 2003-44, 2003-C.B. where the administrative program is called 
the Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System (EPCRS) and includes 
the following corrective programs: Self-Correction Program (SCP), Voluntary 
Correction Program (VCP), and the Audit Closing Agreement Program (Audit 
Cap).
 28.  I.R.C. §§ 414(n)(3)(a) and 414(n)(2). However, there is a statutory exception that 
provides that the recipient organization will not be required to include the leased 
employees for testing purposes if the leasing organization maintains a money 
purchase plan which meets certain requirements and no more than 20 percent of 
the non-highly-compensated employees of the recipient are leased. The money 
purchase plan must provide: 1) a minimum contribution of 10 percent of com-
pensation; 2) immediate participation in the plan; and 3) 100 percent vesting in 
benefits at all times (I.R.C. § 414(n)(5)). However, it is unusual for a leasing 
organization to maintain such a generous qualified retirement plan. 
 29.  The protracted Vizcaino	v.	Microsoft litigation spawned appellate victories for 
independent contractors and Microsoft. See Vizcaino	v.	Microsoft	Corp. (1996, 
1997). Microsoft, as part of the settlement for the case, changed its worker clas-
sification practices. This resulted in 3,000 of the litigants being hired as regular 
employees entitled to participate in the retirement plans. A similar case occurred 
in Massachusetts (Langone	v.	USCO	Distribution	Services,	Inc. 2005). See Bar-
ran (2005).
 30.  The FLSA is enforced by the Wage-Hour Division of the U.S. Department of 
Labor. While state laws also regulate wages and hours and impose similar and 
additional obligations, this discussion is limited to the FLSA. The FLSA regula-
tions were revised to add income tests effective August 23, 2004. 1938 law, as 
amended (Fair	Labor	Standards	Act 2003).
 31.  A recent example of a company misclassifying street sweepers in California as 
independent contractors is seen in Garces v. Cannon Pacific Services (October 4, 
2005) (Cole 2005). 
 32.  The four factors are 1) the extent to which the services in question are an inte-
gral part of the employer’s business, 2) the amount of the alleged contractor’s 
investment in facilities and equipment, 3) the alleged contractor’s opportunities 
for profit and loss, and 4) the amount of initiative, judgment, or foresight in open 
market competition required for the success of the enterprise. 
 33.  The courts do not consider the wage-hour guidelines as controlling, although the 
weight of the case law is largely consistent with the guidelines. Some courts have 
amplified the tests with factors such as the skill level of the alleged contractor 
and the contractor having other clients. For example, see Brock	v.	Superior	Care,	
Inc. (1988). 
 34.  In a five-page dissenting opinion, Judge King concluded that the workers were 
employees. The majority opinion, he said, erred in departing from a long line of 
cases followed in that circuit.
 35.  The five tests used were 1) Control: Even though the individuals were required 
to wear uniforms and attend a special training session, the court found that they 
could control their own hours, days of work, and reject any delivery without re-
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taliation. 2) Opportunity for profit and loss: Drivers were paid on a commission 
basis, but the majority opinion found that profit and loss was nonetheless driven 
by worker’s ability to cut costs and understand the courier business. 3) Perma-
nency of relationship: The court observed that most of the drivers only worked 
for the company for a short period of time and were able to work for other com-
panies. No noncompete agreement was required. 4) Skill and initiative required: 
The court found that the drivers must determine the route, read MAPSCO, and 
choose alternate routes. The majority opinion further noted that these skills re-
quire the workers to use industry and efficiency indicative of independence and 
nonemployee status. 5) Relative investment of the worker and alleged employer: 
The court found that the necessity of owning a vehicle, paying insurance, and 
buying a dolly, tarp, a two-way radio, pager, and a medical delivery bag consti-
tuted a substantial investment.
 36.  Wisconsin was the first state to pass a comprehensive workers’ compensation 
law (1911), and Mississippi was the last state (1948) Guyton (1999). 
 37.  See Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA); 45 U.S.C. Section 5(1), et	seq. 
(airline and railroad employees); Longshoreman’s and Harbor Worker’s Com-
pensation Act, 33 U.S.C. Section 901 et	seq., and the Federal Employees’ Com-
pensation Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 8101 et	seq. Unemployment compensation ben-
efits also are offered under state laws to complement workers’ compensation. 
However, the basic features of these state programs must comply with federal 
laws to be eligible for revenues and funding from the federal unemployment tax 
(FUTA).
 38.  Other state jurisdictions have reached a similar conclusion in analogous cases. 
For example, a Florida court reached a similar conclusion. In Maxson	 Con-
struction	Co.	v.	Welch (1998), an injured leased employee brought a tort action 
against the client company of his leasing company employer. The Florida Court 
of Appeals held that immunity would apply to the client employer even though 
Florida’s leasing statute made the leasing company responsible for paying work-
ers’ compensation premiums. As in the Rhode Island decision, the court justified 
its decision pointing out that the client company indirectly paid workers’ com-
pensation premiums. Also see cases in California, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, 
New Hampshire, Texas, South Dakota, and Wisconsin (Wedeck	v.	Unocal	Corp. 
(1997); Jones	v.	Sheller-Globe	Corp. (1992); Danek	v.	Meldrum	Mfg.	and	Eng’g	
Co.,	Inc. (1977); Farrell	v.	Dearborn	Mfg.	Co. (1982); LaVallie	v.	Wire	and	Ca-
ble	Co. (1992); Regalado	v.	H.E.	Butt	Grocery	Co. (1993); Gansch	v.	Nekoosa	
Papers,	Inc. (1990)).
 39.   For example, an injured employee in North Dakota who was covered by the 
workers’ compensation policy of the leasing company that hired him brought 
a tort action against the client company. The North Dakota Supreme Court de-
clined to extend employer status and its accompanying immunity to both the 
leasing company and the client company. The court explained that the North 
Dakota workers’ compensation law relieves only “contributing employers,” even 
though the client company paid an hourly fee that “probably” covered the cost 
of workers’ compensation premiums. The court noted that allowing such indirect 
Gleason.indb   163 11/13/2006   9:06:52 AM
164   Coens and Storrs
payment to trigger immunity could extend immunity to most independent con-
tractors who indirectly recoup the costs of benefits from their clients (Cervantes	
v.	Drayton	Foods,	L.L.C. 1998). A similar decision was rendered by the Ohio 
appellate court, which also held that such indirect payments were insufficient to 
extend immunity to the client company (Carr	v.	Central	Printing	Co.	1997). 
 40.  Telephone and personal interviews conducted by Thomas Coens with representa-
tives and members of these associations in several states and Washington, D.C. 
(March 1999–September 1999).
 41.  For examples of cases of judgments against client companies in workers’ com-
pensation cases, see West Publishing Company (2001, 2003) and Del	Industrial,	
Inc.	v.	Texas (1998).
 42.  Equal Pay Act: 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1963). 
 43.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is responsible for the 
enforcement of Title VII, the ADA, ADEA, and EPA (EEOC 1997).
 44.  The 16 factors are 1) the firm or the client has the right to control when, where, 
and how the worker performs the job; 2) the work does not require a high level 
of skill or expertise; 3) the firm or the client rather than the worker furnishes the 
tools, materials, and equipment; 4) the work is performed on the premises of the 
firm or the client; 5) there is a continuing relationship between the worker and 
the firm or the client; 6) the firm or the client has the right to assign additional 
projects to the worker; 7) the firm or the client sets the hours of work and the du-
ration of the job; 8) the worker is paid by the hour, week, or month rather than for 
the agreed costs of performing a particular job; 9) the worker has no role in hiring 
and paying assistants; 10) the work performed by the worker is part of the regular 
business of the firm or the client; 11) the firm or the client is itself in business; 
12) the worker is not engaged in his or her own distinct occupation or business; 
13) the firm or the client provides the worker with benefits such as insurance, 
leave, or workers’ compensation; 14) the worker is considered an employee of 
the firm or the client for tax purposes, i.e., the entity withholds federal, state, and 
Social Security taxes; 15) the firm or the client can discharge the worker; and 
16) the worker and the firm or client believe that they are creating an employer-
employee relationship (U.S. EEOC 1997).
 45.  For example, see the following cases: Deal	v.	State	Farm	County	Mut.	Ins. Co.	of	
Tex. (1993); Jones	v.	Seko	Messenger,	Inc. (1997); and Lane	v.	David	P.	Jacobson	
&	Co.,	LTD. (1995).
 46.  The EEOC’s position stems, in part, from an earlier case, Amarnare	v.	Merrill	
Lynch (1984). In this case an employee of a temporary agency sued for race 
and gender discrimination under Title VII when she was discharged from her 
temporary assignment and the client company refused to offer her a regular posi-
tion. The client company contended that there was no employer-employee rela-
tionship. The court found, however, that the client company was the employer 
because it controlled the plaintiff’s hours, workplace, and assignments; it super-
vised and trained her; and ultimately it “discharged” her.
 47.  The threshold for liability for the client firm is 15 employees for Title VII and 
ADA and 20 employees for the ADEA.
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The growth of contingent employment from 1970 to the present has 
been met with a resounding silence about possible federal and state-
level public policy responses. This lack of response is not surprising 
since systematic public policy responses to changes in the labor force 
are difficult to enact in the United States due to the absence of a true 
national labor policy. There exists instead a fragmented system: federal 
legislation is implemented by the states, but the rules are interpreted by 
the courts. Policy responses therefore are limited by both U.S. federal-
ism and the autonomy of the states. (For one example see the detailed 
discussion of the constitutional issues surrounding the Social Security 
Act of 1935 in Haber and Murray [1966]). This cumbersome system 
often fails to keep pace with the needs of workers as labor market con-
ditions change. Current public policies governing contingent employ-
ment have arisen from the haphazard application of existing policies 
rather than the development of new policies designed to address the 
specific circumstances of contingent workers.
The policy difficulties inherent in the system stem from the single-
minded aim of policymakers when the existing labor market policies 
were being developed: to provide protections for the benefit of regu-
lar full-time workers. This focus was a historical accident because the 
workforce was primarily full time and male when the key U.S. labor 
policies such as unemployment insurance and the minimum wage were 
enacted in the 1930s. Policies that have an impact on nonstandard and 
contingent workers do so only because contingent workers are caught 
in the penumbrae of policies developed for full-time workers, not be-
cause policies have been developed specifically for the benefit of con-
tingent workers. 
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Eligibility requirements are the key to understanding the impact 
of labor market policies on contingent workers. These requirements 
establish the rules by which an individual qualifies for benefits. By 
specifying eligibility criteria, policymakers determine whom they want 
covered by the policy. Often the unintended consequence of these eli-
gibility requirements is to limit access to social insurance by minorities 
and women, who are disproportionately represented in the contingent 
workforce (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
There are essentially three ways in which a contingent worker 
may be deemed ineligible for coverage. Most commonly, the contin-
gent worker fails to meet the work-based requirements for eligibility. 
These requirements stipulate rules governing the hours worked, amount 
earned, or the distribution of earnings during the year. Those with full-
time jobs and those who earn more qualify for benefits, while those 
with part-time jobs or limited hours of work are deemed ineligible. A 
second factor determining ineligibility is employment in an industry or 
with a firm that is exempted from the legislation. There are numerous 
examples of farm workers and employees of small firms that are not 
covered by labor legislation. Finally, there are the gray areas of labor 
legislation where the courts have not yet decided whether the laws ap-
ply to certain types of workers. These gray areas have emerged in issues 
concerning the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) discussed 
on p. 192 and employer-provided benefits such as pensions and stock 
options, as in Vizcaino	v.	Microsoft	Corporation (May 12, 1999). 
When evaluating the impact of labor market policies, analysts use 
four criteria: 1) economic efficiency, 2) equity, 3) security, and 4) lib-
erty. (For a complete discussion of these criteria, see Stone [1988]). 
Economic efficiency is determined by evaluating the relationship be-
tween the increased coverage and its marginal cost. In this sense we can 
consider a policy efficient if the most people are covered for the least 
cost. Equity means treating people in similar situations in the same way. 
Security is defined as providing benefits to those most at risk. However, 
economic efficiency and security often will be at odds with one another. 
For example, providing health insurance to the most ill may improve 
security, but the extra cost is likely to be disproportionately high. Final-
ly, liberty examines when a policy intervention is justified: when should 
a government impress a collective outcome on an individual? This is 
generally interpreted to mean that government should intervene during 
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those times when an individual’s actions adversely affect other people. 
One example is when an individual does not take into consideration the 
effects of auto emissions on others. In this case there is an opportunity 
for government action to correct this outcome.
For each of the public policies discussed in this chapter, eligibility 
rules are used as a starting point to examine the efficiency and equity of 
the program. Eligibility rules determine whether contingent or nonstan-
dard workers are likely to be eligible and therefore covered (equity), 
and whether coverage can be expanded to include contingent work-
ers with only modest increases in cost (efficiency). The likelihood that 
nonstandard workers will need the program (security) and the rationale 
for altering the eligibility criteria and coverage of these public policies 
(liberty) also are examined. 
The discussion is focused on those policies that affect individual 
workers directly: employer-provided benefits of health insurance and 
pensions, unemployment insurance, family and medical leave, mini-
mum wages, and occupational safety and health. Clearly this is not 
an exhaustive list of public policies affecting workers; however, these 
policies are representative of those that are likely to directly impact 
contingent and nonstandard employment relationships. 
EMPLOyER-PROvIDED BENEFITS
Employer-provided benefits have recently been the subject of con-
siderable litigation and debate in the courts and state and federal legis-
latures. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found in the widely publi-
cized case Vizcaino	v.	Microsoft that temporary employees were in fact 
“common law” employees of the Microsoft Corporation. Consequently, 
the court found that Microsoft had wrongly denied benefits worth mil-
lions of dollars to employees because they had been misclassified as 
independent contractors or freelancers.
Legal challenges to the classification of contingent workers have 
a long history. Part of the challenge of properly classifying employees 
results from the ambiguity of the tax status of these workers. The Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) has filed a number of lawsuits in an effort 
to determine who is responsible for an employee’s payroll taxes. (For a 
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discussion of the legal relationship between temporary help employers 
and workers, see Parker [1994)]; Gonos [1997]; duRivage, Carré, and 
Tilley [1998]). The court also has made considerable headway in deter-
mining who is an “employee” and under what criteria the employer is 
responsible for enforcing a number of federal statutes. Carnevale, Jen-
nings, and Eisenmann (1998) have outlined many of the requirements 
necessary to be considered an employee (as opposed to a contractor 
or temporary worker). As discussed in Chapter 5, there are a number 
of multifactor legal tests for distinguishing between an employee and 
an independent contractor. One of the most important factors has been 
determining “the extent of the employer’s control and supervision over 
the worker, including directions on scheduling and performance of 
work” (p. 288). 
Health Insurance
Legislative changes extending employer-provided benefits to em-
ployees have been considerably more modest than legal rulings. Most 
changes have been concerned with maintaining worker access to health 
insurance benefits. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1985 (COBRA) allows employees (under certain circumstanc-
es1) to continue their employers’ group health care plan by paying for 
the policy themselves. COBRA provides insurance at group rates rather 
than individual health insurance rates for up to 18 months after cover-
age would have otherwise ended. More recently, the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 protects workers 
when they seek to buy, keep, or switch their health insurance, even 
when workers have serious preexisting medical conditions.
From the perspective of contingent workers, these workplace poli-
cies have two highly problematic eligibility criteria. To be eligible, your 
employer must have insurance that covers 20 or more employees. Also, 
the worker must have been laid off or had her working hours reduced. 
A worker fired for gross misconduct is ineligible. One of the most seri-
ous limitations of the policy is that it provides no subsidy for those who 
cannot afford the coverage. HIPAA protects only those who can dem-
onstrate health insurance coverage for 18 months without a significant 
interruption, where significant interruption is defined as an interruption 
that exceeds 63 days. 
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However, these policies are of little help to contingent workers since 
very few have health insurance coverage provided by their employer. 
We can see in Table 6.1 that most contingent workers and most nonstan-
dard workers do not receive health insurance from their employers.
The low rates of employer-provided health insurance among nearly 
all types of nonstandard employment demonstrates the narrow cast of 
HIPAA. Few workers are helped by a policy providing health insurance 
portability if they do not have health insurance initially. Looking at the 
insurance rates overall, a better picture emerges: workers in nonstan-
dard employment are approximately 12.6 percent less likely to have 
health insurance coverage than regular full-time workers (75.6 percent 
and 88.2 percent, respectively). It is also likely that some of those with 
insurance will fail to meet the continuous coverage requirements of 
HIPAA that ensure portability. The biggest differences are among part-
time and full-time workers. For example, only 18.5 percent of regular 
part-time workers receive health insurance from their employers, while 
69.0 percent of regular full-time workers receive employer-provided 
health insurance.2 
While Table 6.1 indicates that the majority of workers in nonstan-
dard employment do not receive health insurance benefits from their 
employers, the majority of nonstandard workers do have some insur-
ance, most likely through a family member or the government. While 
the lack of coverage is not dire for nonstandard workers, spousal cover-
age is costly since employers typically pay only their employees’ por-
tion of the premium. This means greater out-of-pocket expenditures 
for health coverage for workers in nonstandard employment relative to 
regular full-time jobs. 
Pensions
Much like health insurance, pension coverage for nonstandard 
workers is very limited. Table 6.2 shows that workers in full-time em-
ployment are about 3.5 times more likely to receive a pension from their 
employer than are workers in nonstandard jobs (52.8 percent and 16.0 
percent, respectively). The biggest differences in pension coverage are 
based on hours of work. Part-time workers are considerably less likely 
to have pension coverage. This finding is consistent with some literature 
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All 84.8 54.3 86.0 50.7 83.8 57.4
All nonstandard arrangements 75.6 13.7 77.7 14.8 73.0 12.4
Full-time
Temporary help agency 46.9 12.8 49.9 11.0 43.0 15.2
On-call/day laborer 69.1 49.0 76.4 39.8 66.3 52.5
Self-employed 82.2 n/a 80.1 n/a 83.0 n/a
Independent contractor, WSa 66.8 23.2 65.4 17.6 67.5 25.8
Independent contractor, SEb 73.2 n/a 75.2 n/a 72.5 n/a
Contract company 84.7 58.2 88.8 54.9 83.3 59.4
Regular full-time 88.2 69.0 89.6 66.8 87.0 70.8
Part-time
Temporary help agency 58.3 0.6 70.0 0.9 36.9 0.0
On-call/day laborer 67.0 11.0 69.9 10.6 60.8 12.0
Self-employed 85.6 n/a 88.0 n/a 78.5 n/a
Independent contractor, WSa 72.8 10.1 77.8 4.7 64.5 19.0
Independent contractor, SEb 75.1 n/a 81.5 n/a 61.4 n/a
Contract company 81.0 14.9 80.5 12.7 82.0 19.0
Regular part-time 76.6 18.5 78.5 19.4 72.0 15.9
a Wage and salary.
b Self-employed.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and 
Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 2001; analysis by author. 
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All 60.4 52.8 59.3 52.4 61.5 53.3
All nonstandard arrangements 38.5 16.0 37.7 20.1 39.6 11.1
Full-time
Temporary help agency 24.1 11.3 24.9 10.2 23.0 12.7
On-call/day laborer 51.9 47.7 48.2 40.4 53.3 50.4
Self-employed 51.7 n/a 38.8 n/a 57.0 n/a
Independent contractor, WSa 37.2 17.8 36.7 15.8 37.5 18.7
Independent contractor, SEb 44.5 n/a 44.4 n/a 44.5 n/a
Contract company 64.7 56.1 68.7 64.0 63.3 53.2
Regular full-time 68.3 66.2 68.9 66.5 67.9 66.0
Part-time
Temporary help agency 7.7 2.2 11.5 3.3 0.0 0.0
On-call/day laborer 30.9 17.3 33.6 18.7 25.5 14.4
Self-employed 43.9 n/a 42.7 n/a 47.2 n/a
Independent contractor, WSa 32.7 8.8 28.0 4.3 40.1 15.9
Independent contractor, SEb 41.5 n/a 44.9 n/a 34.0 n/a
Contract company 27.5 14.5 28.3 17.1 26.1 9.6
Regular part-time 32.0 25.2 36.1 28.0 21.4 17.1
a Wage and salary.
b Self-employed.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and 
Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 2001; analysis by author.
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that shows that firms use nonstandard work arrangements to offset the 
high benefits costs of regular full-time employees (Abraham 1988). 
Policy Evaluation
While these findings for health insurance and pension coverage are 
not surprising given the design of the public policies, there is little evi-
dence that public policy is moving to remedy the lack of coverage for 
workers in nonstandard employment. Temporary employment agencies 
have been sensitive to the criticism that workers are unable to receive 
health insurance; many of these agencies have begun to make it avail-
able to their workers. Despite the increased availability, few workers 
take advantage of the insurance, most likely due to the high costs rela-
tive to their earnings.
The health care and pension systems demonstrate the difficulty 
public policy has in adequately addressing incomplete markets, that is, 
those markets where there are only limited products available at a wide 
range of prices. From an economic efficiency standpoint (as defined 
above), it is unlikely that the market is efficient; many uninsured work-
ers with health statuses similar to workers with insurance do not get 
health insurance as a result of where they work. Thus, many workers 
who have relatively low insurance costs go without insurance. From 
a social standpoint health insurance markets are very flawed. Many 
workers who initially have low-cost insurance go without medical care. 
Some of them get treatment too late, raising overall medical costs and 
potentially decreasing their health outcomes. Since employers who 
do not provide insurance bear only a fraction of the cost of uninsured 
workers, there is little economic incentive to provide insurance. From 
an equity standpoint these markets are very inequitable: workers in os-
tensibly the same work situation receive different compensation. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of this policy is security. The 
analysis in Table 6.3 from the matched February/March 2001 Current 
Population Surveys indicates that workers in nonstandard employment 
are much more likely to report “fair” to “poor” health. Involuntary part-
time workers (part-time workers who would prefer full-time work) are 
4.5 times as likely to report diminished health status as regular full-
time workers. This may be due to a variety of factors, not the least of 
which is employee self-selection: fewer healthy workers may choose 
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these forms of employment based on employment flexibility. However, 
this reduced health status does point to the need for health insurance 
coverage. 
The rationale for government intervention is very strong in this case. 
Socially, the benefits of insuring this large group of workers are likely to 
be quite high, and the market has been unable to achieve these improve-
ments on it own. However, it is unlikely that we will see government 
mandate that businesses cover these workers. Their lower health statuses 
imply that they would be increasingly costly to insure. Under these cir-
cumstances government intervention is warranted and necessary. 
SOCIAL INSURANCE: UNEMPLOyMENT INSURANCE
The provision of employer-provided health insurance or pensions 
fails to provide systematic coverage since only workers whose employ-
ers provide benefits and who earn enough to afford the benefits actually 
receive the coverage. In contrast, social insurance is provided for all 
people who meet certain eligibility requirements. These requirements 
often have a differential impact on workers in nonstandard employment 
arrangements. The most important form of social insurance that directly 
affects employees is unemployment insurance (UI).
Table 6.3  Percentage of Workers Reporting Health Status as “Fair” or 
“Poor,” 2001







SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrange-
ments, February 2001 and March Annual Demographic file 2001; analysis by author 
of matched February/March CPS data.
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Overview of Unemployment Insurance
The UI system in the United States began with the Social Security 
Act of 1935, which provides the primary line of defense against earn-
ings losses when workers become unemployed. For those eligible for 
unemployment insurance benefits, the typical state program provides 26 
weeks of benefits at approximately 50 percent of the worker’s normal 
wage. Although federal and state statutes have been revised periodi-
cally to increase the level of benefits, the basic system created by the act 
has remained the same. The most significant change is that the program 
now covers nearly all employees; therefore, nearly all employees or 
their employers pay unemployment insurance taxes. However, cover-
age does not mean eligibility. Unfortunately, this first line of defense is 
so porous that it leaves many full- and part-time workers uninsured. 
The overall picture of unemployment insurance is one of a declin-
ing share of the full-time workers who lose their jobs receiving UI ben-
efits (Blank and Card 1991; Vroman 1991; Wenger 2001). In this situa-
tion, workers may have to choose some form of contingent work as an 
earnings substitute for UI benefits. While this may be a good strategy 
in a robust economy, during periods of economic malaise even these 
nonstandard jobs will be hard to find. During the current recession, the 
temporary employment sector lost more than 900,000 jobs. Under these 
conditions temporary employment is not likely to provide income secu-
rity to those who have lost jobs in other sectors. 
The situation for workers in nonstandard arrangements is even 
bleaker. Eligibility requirements for hours of work and earnings are 
particularly onerous for contingent workers. Clearly, both these criteria 
are related: as hours decrease we see a commensurate reduction in earn-
ings. Due to the sporadic nature of contingent work, hours and earnings 
are unpredictable, making eligibility difficult to establish. 
Determining Eligibility for UI
From the perspective of nonstandard workers, unemployment in-
surance has five major problems related to the determination of eligi-
bility for UI. First, the system is biased toward regular full-time work. 
Workers with low wages and those with fewer than full-time hours may 
have difficulty qualifying for benefits. 
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Second, the system is confusing. A wide array of initial and continu-
ing eligibility requirements create uncertainty about eligibility. Com-
plex payment and benefit duration formulae confuse workers about 
the potential value of benefits. Limited labor market experience only 
compounds the confusion since contingent workers do not have stable 
employment relationships that allow them to share information about 
eligibility and benefit amounts.
Third, waiting periods prior to eligibility have a disproportionate 
negative impact on low-wage workers, especially those with limited 
resources. Many states have waiting periods for eligibility of one to two 
weeks. Families with limited resources may find a two-week waiting 
period financially unmanageable, choosing instead to return to contin-
gent employment if they can find a job in that sector. 
Fourth, the most difficult eligibility rules for a nonstandard worker 
to satisfy may be the rules that deny benefits if the worker refuses to 
accept a job offer. Part of the ongoing eligibility requirements in UI 
are the job search requirements. To collect unemployment benefits the 
unemployed must continue to search for work. In most states a worker 
who turns down any job offer is no longer eligible to receive benefits. 
Federal law does provide some worker protections by prohibiting states 
from denying benefits under the following conditions: 
 1) if the job vacancy was the result of a labor dispute; 
 2)  if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered fail 
to meet prevailing standards; 
 3)  if joining a company union or being required not to join a bona 
fide union is a condition of employment. 
Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia stipulate that the 
worker must be available for any type of work to maintain eligibility. 
Ten states require the worker to accept “suitable work,” although this 
has a broad definition and changes as the duration of unemployment 
increases. Finally, nine states require the worker to accept work in his 
usual occupation or in jobs for which he is reasonably matched due to 
prior training or experience. The penalties for turning down a job offer 
vary from a reduction in benefits to benefits being postponed for the 
duration of the unemployment (U.S. Department of Labor 1996).
However, the nonstandard labor market is so volatile that part-time 
job offers for work in nonstandard jobs may be a regular facet of this 
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type of employment. For workers who seek to leave contingent em-
ployment and use their unemployment insurance benefits to subsidize 
their search for a full-time job, requiring contingent workers to accept 
any position may amount to placing them in a UI eligibility trap from 
which escape to better employment is difficult. Thus, this type of eligi-
bility requirement may be particularly difficult for a contingent worker 
to satisfy. Turning down a job offer in hopes of landing a better job may 
result in ineligibility.
Finally, a number of states explicitly exclude from eligibility work-
ers who search for part-time work exclusively. These workers are con-
sidered “not available” for full-time work and consequently are not eli-
gible to receive benefits (Wenger, McHugh, and Segal 2002). In essence 
these workers’ unavailability is evidenced by their substantial restric-
tions on the conditions of their employment. Consequently, for nonstan-
dard employees, especially part-time workers, eligibility requirements 
may all but eliminate them from collecting UI benefits in some states.
Empirical evidence suggests that the eligibility restrictions take a 
much higher toll on contingent and nonstandard employees. Table 6.4 
Table 6.4  Percentage of Workers Satisfying Monetary Eligibility 
Requirements for Unemployment Insurance, 2001




Independent contractor, WSa 63.1
Involuntary part-time 25.7
Voluntary part-time 30.0
Contingent worker type 1 26.3
Contingent worker type 2 30.5
Contingent worker type 3 11.6
Regular full-time 6.1
NOTE: Self-employed and independent contractors not paid by wage or salary are 
omitted since these workers are not covered by the UI system.
a Paid by wage or salary so covered by UI.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrange-
ments, February 2001 and March Annual Demographic file 2001; analysis by author 
of matched February/March CPS data.
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compares the monetary eligibility of contingent, nonstandard, and regu-
lar full-time workers.3 Regular full-time workers are more likely than 
any other group to satisfy the earnings requirements for unemployment 
insurance. The workers least likely to be eligible are the independent 
contractors who are paid a wage or salary.
Previous earnings determine both who is eligible and the amount of 
benefits the unemployed receive. Those workers who have lower earn-
ings and fewer hours of work receive smaller benefit amounts, and are 
likely to receive benefits for a shorter period of time. These differences 
in benefit calculations are not trivial; the maximum weekly benefit in 
different states varies by hundreds of dollars. Table 6.5 compares the 
maximum weekly benefits for the five highest and lowest paying states 
in the United States. 
The difference in maximum weekly benefits between Massachu-
setts and Alabama is striking. From a policy perspective we can see 
both sides of the UI debate reflected in these two states. Lower-thresh-
old earnings requirements increase the likelihood of being eligible but 
often result in low benefit levels. Conversely, higher benefit allowances 
usually require higher earnings and/or hours. These higher threshold 
levels may exclude low-wage workers from benefits. 
One initially surprising empirical finding is that contingent and 
nonstandard workers receive higher benefit levels than their regular 
full-time counterparts. Considering only those who received UI ben-
efits in 1994, nonstandard workers received on average $2,781 (N = 
417) while regular full-time workers only received $2,349 (N = 2435). 
This is likely due to self-selection: only those contingent workers who 
expect higher benefit payments are likely to apply. Typically these are 
workers with higher incomes and steadier employment such as contract 
workers who are independent contractors in the least volatile employ-
Table	6.5		Maximum	Weekly	Benefits,	Lowest	and	Highest	Paying	 
States, 2000 ($)
Alabama 190 Massachusetts 477
Mississippi 190 Washington 441
Arizona 205 Pennsylvania 430
South Dakota 224 New Jersey 429
California 230 New York 405
SOURCE:  U.S. Department of Labor (2001).
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ment arrangements and paid a wage or salary (see also Kunda, Barley, 
and Evans [2002]). 
Consequently, it appears that there are two groups of contingent em-
ployees who view UI options quite differently: those who are reason-
ably certain of a high benefit amount are likely to choose to apply for 
UI. However, given the confusing array of eligibility rules and complex 
benefit formulae, we can speculate that a second group—probably the 
majority of contingent workers—find it easier to seek other contingent 
work rather than apply for benefits. Employees in this second group 
find that reentering the contingent labor market is a way of avoiding the 
waiting periods, uncertain benefit amounts, administrative hassles, and 
the potential social stigma arising from being an unemployed worker. 
Policy Evaluation
The nature of UI usage is changing. The new labor market actors, 
contingent and nonstandard workers, are not using UI in the same way 
that regular full-time workers use the system. Yet despite the reduction 
in use and inapplicability to new work forms, systematic change is un-
likely. States compete among themselves to create favorable business 
conditions to attract employers. They are unlikely to yield to pressure 
from labor groups to systematically extend benefits to contingent work-
ers that will increase the cost of labor for employers. When jobs are 
relatively plentiful, this lack of concern for the public policy reform 
may not be problematic. Rather than suffer from the social stigma that 
may occur from UI use, workers will remain productively employed in 
the labor force, even if in less than full-time positions. However, as the 
economic climate shifts toward recession, job availability diminishes 
and contingent employment becomes less of an option. The opportu-
nity to use contingent work as a substitute for UI will be reduced for 
many of these workers. We therefore would expect UI rolls to increase 
because they will be more willing to tolerate the waiting period require-
ments, administrative hassles, and social stigma. 
From a policy perspective, unemployment insurance includes many 
complicated components to analyze. Economic efficiency, as measured 
by the cost of adding workers in nonstandard arrangements to unem-
ployment insurance, is not likely to be very costly. Wenger (2000) shows 
that the effects of unemployment insurance on the likelihood of workers 
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becoming unemployed are about the same for regular full-time workers 
and workers in nonstandard arrangements. It would appear that the cost 
per person of extending unemployment insurance benefits to workers in 
nonstandard arrangements is similar to the current per person costs of 
regular full-time employees.
Unemployment insurance suffers from considerable inequities. 
Particularly vexing is the inequity across states. Identical workers em-
ployed in different states will likely receive different benefit amounts, 
may have different eligibility outcomes, and may have different weeks 
of eligibility. This inequity is especially problematic to address since 
each state makes its own policy within loose federal guidelines. Creat-
ing a national policy from such a system would be nearly impossible 
since states control almost all of the important aspects of eligibility and 
benefits. 
There can be little doubt that workers in nonstandard employment 
arrangements need UI. They are more likely to become unemployed 
and less likely to be eligible for benefits. The least stable of these ar-
rangements, such as temporary employment, has both intermittent em-
ployment and low wages. This means that UI eligibility will be more 
difficult to attain due to low wages, but spells of unemployment are 
more likely due to sporadic employment. Overall, the current UI system 
is relatively inefficient, highly inequitable, and fails to provide security 
for a class of workers with considerable need. The justifications for 
government intervention are myriad. Government clearly has a role in 
easing the destructive forces that the market rains on the unemployed. 
Additionally, from a broader economic perspective, UI has a stabilizing 
effect on the economy as a whole (Chimerine, Black, and Coffey 1999). 
However, the real shortcoming of the current unemployment insurance 
program is its lack of modernization to adapt it to the new labor market 
realities in the United States. 
SOCIAL INSURANCE: FAMILy AND MEDICAL LEAvE  
ACT (FMLA)
One of the most recent additions to the U.S. social insurance system 
is the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), enacted in 1993. The act 
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was established to “allow employees to balance their work and family 
lives by taking reasonable unpaid leave for certain family and medical 
reasons.” The act also seeks to promote the “economic security of fami-
lies” and “national interests in preserving family integrity.” The FMLA 
accomplishes this by providing eligible employees with up to 12 weeks 
of unpaid, job-protected leave each year. Additionally, the act requires 
employers to continue to provide health benefits during the leave.
Unfortunately, for workers in nonstandard employment the FMLA 
provides at best a marginal benefit to those contingent workers who 
already have the option to sporadically leave the labor force for periods 
of time and receive no pay.4 While the job protections and especially the 
preservation of health insurance may be of some benefit for contingent 
workers and those in in nonstandard arrangements, eligibility rules and 
low levels of employer-provided insurance provide nearly nonexistent 
benefits. 
Factors That Determine Contingent Workers’ Use of FMLA
The FMLA eligibility requirements are much less complex than 
those for the UI system. However, they are far more likely to classify 
contingent and nonstandard workers as ineligible. There are three main 
criteria for FMLA eligibility: the employer must have more than 50 
employees, and the employee must have worked for the employer for 
12 months or more and worked a minimum of 1,250 hours in the previ-
ous 12 months (approximately 31 weeks of work at 40 hours per week). 
These criteria eliminate the majority of contingent workers from eli-
gibility. Part-time workers (those who work year round fewer than 24 
hours per week) or workers who move from job site to job site or who 
have multiple contracts are unlikely to satisfy the eligibility criteria. 
The ability to use the FMLA leave option is determined by the work 
schedules of contingent workers. Not all workers in nonstandard em-
ployment have flexible schedules. For example, part-time workers may 
have little control over their work schedules. Contract workers may 
only be able to take time away from work between contracts. The self-
employed must schedule time off during the ebb of customer demand. 
Consequently, for workers like these, the FMLA policies could provide 
flexibility while affording them some job security. However, contingent 
workers typically cannot afford the cost of taking the time off even if 
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they would benefit from the protections prescribed in the FMLA. Only 
long-term contractors and “perma-temps” are likely to benefit from the 
act. The primary benefit to these two groups is the continued availabil-
ity of employer-provided health insurance during a leave of absence. 
However, because contingent workers are unlikely to receive employer- 
provided health insurance, this benefit will cover few workers, as shown 
previously in Table 6.1.
Thus, the FMLA is unlikely to be an important policy for contingent 
workers since very few will be able to satisfy the eligibility criteria. 
However, the FMLA has created an increased dependence on workers 
in nonstandard jobs since contingent workers are likely to be hired to 
replace regular full-time employees when they use the provisions of the 
act. As of 2000, 98.2 percent of all firms reported assigning work to oth-
er employees, while 41.3 percent reported hiring outside temporary-re-
placement workers. The use of temporary workers declined from 1995 
to 2000, but their role in making FMLA successful remains important.
Policy Evaluation
The FMLA does not perform well in terms of our four policy criteria 
of economic efficiency, equity, security, and liberty. It is clear that the 
policy was essentially formulated for workers in standard jobs where 
leaves of absence normally would require an employee to quit a job. 
Therefore, from an equity perspective, the FMLA program treats ineq-
uitably workers in nonstandard jobs who are excluded from this leave 
option. From the business perspective it would appear that there is little 
additional cost if all employees are allowed to take leave, regardless of 
how many hours of service a worker had rendered in the previous 12 
months. However, it may be harder for employers to manage the loss of 
a full-time employee than a half-time employee. 
Evaluating the FMLA on the criteria of security poses an interesting 
problem. Many nonstandard arrangements offer little flexibility. Conse-
quently, workers in part-time and contract jobs may have a considerable 
need for the policy. In many cases, workers in these arrangements are 
more likely to meet the hours requirements for eligibility. For the other 
types of work arrangements such as temporary help agency workers, 
independent contractors, and the self-employed, these work forms may 
offer enough flexibility to be able to accommodate an unpaid leave. 
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After more than 12 years of experience with the FMLA, we have 
not managed to expand coverage, nor have we found a way to provide 
paid leave for those who need to take care of children or sick relatives. 
With an aging U.S. population the demand for this leave option is likely 
to increase. However, without a mechanism for paying for leave, much 
of that demand will go unsatisfied. Consequently, the federal govern-
ment is likely to experience increased pressure to intervene. 
Many of the U.S. labor market policies started by providing mod-
est coverage, and over time that coverage has been expanded. This was 
true for UI, the minimum wage, and disability insurance. It remains to 
be seen whether the FMLA follows this path as well.
MINIMUM WAGES
In contrast to the public policies discussed above, federal minimum 
wage legislation instituted with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
in 1938 provides nearly universal coverage. The FLSA establishes stan-
dards for minimum wages, overtime pay, and child labor. States may 
choose to set minimum wages above the federal level. As of January 
2003, 11 states had minimum wage laws that exceeded the federal mini-
mum wage.5 
While the FLSA provides nearly universal coverage, there are two 
notable exceptions: the self-employed and independent contractors. As 
a consequence, nearly one-third of all workers in nonstandard employ-
ment arrangements are not covered by minimum wage laws. For those 
who are likely to be covered, such as workers at temporary help firms, 
on-call workers, wage and salary independent contractors, and part-
time workers, they are more likely to earn low wages.6 Table 6.6 shows 
mean wages by work arrangement and gender. Average hourly wages 
are lowest for workers in part-time jobs and those who work for tempo-
rary help agencies. Regression analysis that controls for human capital 
characteristics also shows that regression-adjusted wages are lower for 
part-time and temporary workers relative to full-time workers.
The low levels of the minimum wage, the decline of its real pur-
chasing power, and tight labor markets throughout most of the 1990s 
have eroded the efficacy of the minimum wage.7 Analysis of the Feb-
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Table 6.6  Average Hourly Wages (1999) and Percent Change in Wage Since 1997, by Work Arrangement and Sex
All Women Men
1999 Wage ($) % Change 1999 Wage ($) % Change 1999 Wage ($) % Change
Regular part-time 11.86 12.2 11.81 11.4 12.00 14.7
Temporary help agency 10.84 −2.9 10.00 −1.9 12.01 −2.0
On-call/day laborer 13.19 8.0 12.89 12.8 13.47 4.0
Self-employed 17.68 2.8 14.21 8.3 19.57 0.5
Independent contractor, WSa 17.42 15.6 15.76 22.5 19.10 10.0
Independent contractor, SEb 19.60 −0.8 17.66 −3.6 20.50 0.4
Contract company 19.09 13.7 16.86 15.4 20.15 13.7
Regular full-time 15.83 3.7 13.78 0.7 17.43 5.8
All 15.56 4.3 13.51 2.9 17.37 5.6
a Wage and salary.
b Self-employed.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and 
Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 1997 and 1999; analysis by author. 
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ruary Current Population Survey Contingent Work Supplement from 
1999 indicates that, overall, approximately 10 percent of the labor force 
in 1999 earned less than the federal minimum wage of $5.50 per hour, 
as shown in Table 6.7. However, there were more low-earning workers 
in nonstandard arrangements than in regular full-time jobs. The only 
nonstandard group where the percentage of low earners was below the 
national average was contract workers. These findings may be some-
what misleading since many contract workers are self-employed and 
earn the difference between their revenue and expenditures, regardless 
of the number of hours worked. Consequently many of these workers 
have very low hourly wages. By contrast, workers in nonstandard ar-
rangements who are employed by others are also much more likely to 
be low earners. 
Since some state-set minimum wages are considerably higher than 
the federal minimum wage, they may provide more income security to 
contingent workers. In these states minimum wages ranged between 
$6.15 per hour in Rhode Island and $7.15 in Alaska. This means that 
considerably more workers in contingent employment will be covered 
by the minimum wage legislation in these states. In general, while all 
Table 6.7  Percentage of Workers in Nonstandard Arrangements Earning 
Less Than $5.50 Per Hour, 1999
Regular part-time 22.5
Temporary help agency 5.6
On-call/day laborer 17.1
Self-employed 18.6
Independent contractor, WSa 9.5





a Wage and salary.
b Self-employed.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrange-
ments, February 1999; analysis by author. 
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states are required to follow federal minimum requirements for the 
FLSA, many have chosen to raise the minimum requirements. This oc-
curs more frequently when the federal government fails to maintain the 
real value of the minimum wage as in the 1980s. 
Policy Evaluation
The heterogeneity of workers across nonstandard employment ar-
rangements means that earnings will vary. The lack of coverage for the 
self-employed and independent contractors means that the minimum 
wage is not a policy with a high score on equity. The economic effi-
ciency considerations for the minimum wage have been written about 
extensively. In general, researchers argue that increases in the minimum 
wage result in a reallocation of labor that is not efficient. The standard 
claim is that increases in the minimum wage increase unemployment, 
thereby displacing lower-skilled workers. However, research conducted 
using quasi-experimental analyses of state minimum wage increases has 
called into question much of the earlier results.8 There is little reason to 
believe that workers in nonstandard arrangements present a unique case 
in terms of efficiency. Empirical evidence suggests that the minimum 
wage does not cause meaningful reductions in efficiency within a rela-
tively narrow range of values. 
As with many of the other policies discussed in this chapter, the 
largest failing of the minimum wage is on the criterion of security. The 
people with the most exposure to the vicissitudes of the market are re-
ceiving neither enough coverage nor the same coverage. Simply stated, 
an increase in minimum wages will have a disproportionate impact on 
part-time workers and temporary help workers. 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of minimum wage policy 
from an economic point of view is determining whether the govern-
ment has a legitimate role to play in setting a wage floor (liberty). Many 
economic analysts believe that markets are better suited to determining 
wages and that government intervention is unwarranted. This neoclas-
sical or libertarian viewpoint overlooks some of the inequities between 
the parties negotiating a wage. Employers are in a much better bargain-
ing position; they have more resources, more information, and more 
bargaining power. Workers in contingent employment arrangements are 
often at a disadvantage. They have limited bargaining power, largely as 
Gleason.indb   189 11/13/2006   9:06:54 AM
190   Wenger
a result of many people vying for the same job, and often have limited 
information about the job requirements and hence an appropriate wage. 
In these cases it would seem appropriate to impose a collective outcome 
on the lowest wage earners and employers.
OTHER EMPLOyMENT POLICIES: SAFETy AT THE  
WORK SITE
The discussion in this chapter has shown that many of the employ-
ment policies in the United States were enacted before the large shifts 
to contingent and nonstandard employment occurred. The fundamental 
problem with these policies is that their institutional development took 
place at a time when the contingent workforce was minuscule. As the 
nature of work and U.S. labor markets have changed, public policy has 
increasingly relied on the judicial interpretations of the statutes rather 
than redesigning the policies to keep pace with the changing patterns of 
employment. Many of the statutes that seek to provide other protections 
for workers, such as the reduction of discrimination, protection from 
workplace hazards, and the protection of workers’ rights to fair wages 
and work conditions, also suffer from these same drawbacks. 
Although the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) 
is used here to illustrate the problems inherent in much workplace law, 
these lessons are applicable across a broad range of workplace policies. 
Included among these are the National Labor Relations Act (1935) that 
governs collective bargaining activities, the Fair Labor Standards Act—
Equal Pay Amendment (1963), the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1981, 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (1967), the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (1990), as well as a host of federal and state labor and 
employment statutes (Maltby and Yamada 1997). 
The mandate of OSHA is to provide, inasmuch as is possible, a 
safe and healthful work environment for every working man and wom-
an in the United States. The continuing problem for OSHA has been 
determining who is responsible for providing this safe and healthful 
workplace as these new employment relations and forms of work have 
been developing. OSHA places this burden squarely on the employer. 
The employer has the responsibility of providing “a place of employ-
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ment which is free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to 
cause death or serious physical harm to his employees” (OSHA 1970). 
However, identifying the employer is not always easy. One illustrative 
example is the case of workers employed through a temporary help 
agency who have dual employment relationships: they have one ad-
ministrative employer (the employer of record) such as a temporary 
help agency, and a host employer where the work is actually performed. 
Considerable litigation has resulted around this coemployment issue 
(see Chapter 5 for more details). 
Thus the determination of who employs the worker is the first step 
in determining the party responsible for carrying out the mandates of 
OSHA. The issues can be thorny. The administrative employer such as 
the temporary employment agency has little control over the risk as-
sociated with working at the host employer’s work site, and may have 
only limited knowledge of the potential employment hazards. As a con-
sequence, an information asymmetry is established. This may result in 
workers being unfamiliar with the risks associated with the work. Worse 
yet, the information asymmetry may be exploited by host employers 
who use temporary workers to perform tasks or work under conditions 
that their regular full-time employees would find objectionable.
The problem that has created much concern is employers classify-
ing their workers to evade the requirements of various federal labor 
and employment laws. The legal issues center on the legal definitions 
of “an employee” (Carnevale, Jennings, and Eisenmann 1998). While 
numerous criteria have been used, the policy consensus reached by the 
Commission on the Future of Worker Management Relations recom-
mends that a single definition of employer be developed based on the 
“economic realities” test employed by the courts (Dunlop Commission 
1995). The commission recommends “adopting a single definition of 
employer for all workplace laws based on the economic realities of the 
employment relationship.” The commission also advises the National 
Labor Relations Board to develop policies governing joint employment 
relationships to prevent employers from using “contract arrangements 
. . . as a subterfuge for avoiding collective bargaining or evading other 
responsibilities under labor law” (p. 4).
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Policy Evaluation
Perhaps the largest single factor relating to the inadequacy of our 
public policies and the concomitant gaps in coverage for contingent 
workers is multiple employer relationships for these workers. Enforce-
ment of antidiscriminatory or sexual harassment laws is difficult under 
these circumstances. The differences in coverage for contingent work-
ers and noncontingent workers is a considerable source of inequity. A 
worker employed by a temporary agency has the same rights as the per-
manent worker, but the mechanism for enforcement is not available. In 
this sense the contingent worker may be treated in a highly inequitable 
manner.
From an economic efficiency standpoint, there is no reason to be-
lieve that enforcing the health, discrimination, and equal pay rules for 
contingent workers would be more costly than enforcing them for regu-
lar full-time workers. However, from a security standpoint, contingent 
workers are more likely to need the protections since there are oppor-
tunities for employers to take advantage of the information asymme-
tries described earlier. If contingent workers are hired for the purpose 
of “protecting” core employees this would result in an increased role for 
government to ensure security for these workers. 
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR  
FUTURE RESEARCH
Labor market policies in the United States rarely work for contin-
gent and nonstandard workers. The problem is twofold: U.S. employ-
ment policies were not designed to protect contingent and nonstandard 
employees, nor have they kept pace with evolving trends in employ-
ment. The fault lies with the development and evolution of labor market 
policies rather than with the employers and employees. 
Public policies that fail to meet their objectives represent an oppor-
tunity for change. While any revisions will be complex matters of law, 
they should be based on consistent criteria.
 1) Economic	efficiency. Policies should be efficient in that they 
should not be so onerous as to cause undue hardship to employ-
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ers or eliminate the practice of contingent work. Since there 
is some evidence that both employers and employees benefit 
from certain types of contingent and nonstandard employment, 
eliminating or curtailing the practice may do more harm than 
good. 
 2) Equity. Policies should be fairly and justly applied to all work-
ers regardless of their employment relationship. To the extent 
possible, coverage should be extended to all employees re-
gardless of occupation, industry, or firm size. 
 3) Security. Policies should be targeted to protect the most vul-
nerable workers from the volatility of the market. There is 
considerable evidence that workers in nonstandard arrange-
ments are exposed to more market volatility than other types 
of workers. If this is truly the case, then protecting these work-
ers through social insurance and public policy is important.
 4) Liberty. To the extent that governmental intervention is un-
necessary, markets and private parties should be allowed to 
operate. However, private markets for the provision of disabil-
ity and unemployment insurance have not been forthcoming. 
Markets are not likely to provide many protections to these 
types of workers due to their limited bargaining power relative 
to employers. 
Analysts should avoid understanding liberty as the freedom from 
government intervention. Liberty is a much broader concept, and indi-
vidual preferences may be such that freedom from fear and want out-
weigh freedom from intervention. On occasion, liberty may justify gov-
ernmental intervention in the market rather than thwart it.
Making employment policy more economically efficient, equitable, 
and just means that both employers and employees understand their 
rights and responsibilities. Furthermore, these rights and responsibili-
ties are universal: they do not depend on the class or kind of employ-
ment. To that end reform should promote economic efficiency, equity, 
and security for both employers and employees. Therefore, reforms 
should do the following:
• Simplify the eligibility rules for workplace policies such as un-
employment insurance and family and medical leave. Addition-
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ally, reforms should extend these benefits to cover all workers 
regardless of the industry or size of employer. 
• Extend unemployment insurance so that it provides health insur-
ance during the period of unemployment. This could be done by 
paying the COBRA copayment to the previous employer.
• Strengthen the public pension system. Since so few workers in 
nonstandard employment receive a pension from their employ-
ers, many more nonstandard workers will have to rely on the 
public pension, Social Security. Nearly all workers are covered 
by Social Security, and 40 quarters of work are enough to qualify 
a worker for benefits, but the system must be made fiscally viable 
in the future to guarantee benefits for the next generation. 
• Increase the portability of benefits. For example, once eligible 
for family medical leave, a worker would remain eligible so long 
as they continued to work—even after they change jobs.9 Ad-
ditionally, increased pension portability would expand coverage 
for workers who move from employer to employer.  
• Provide incentives to business to allay some of the costs associ-
ated with increased coverage and portability.
• Adopt the Dunlop Commission’s recommendation calling for “a 
single definition of employer for all workplace laws.”
If enacted, these policy recommendations would provide increased 
coverage for contingent and nonstandard workers by making them 
equivalent, at least in the eyes of the government, to regular full-time 
workers. 
All responsible policy recommendations walk a fine line between 
job creation and employee protection. Those concerned with the rights 
of workers believe too little is being done to protect them from the haz-
ards and vicissitudes of the labor market and workplace. Others believe 
that saddling business with the burden of workplace protections reduces 
employment and leads to a more insidious harm, strangling innovation 
and job creation.
It can be argued that the development of contingent and nonstan-
dard employment forms was, and continues to be, a direct response to 
the increasing burden placed on firms in the form of new legislation. In 
particular, Autor (2001) has found that limitations on the employment-
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at-will doctrine have resulted in an increased use of temporary help by 
firms. (Employment-at-will basically guarantees the employer the right 
to fire or lay off an employee without cause. In many states the courts 
have curtailed the rights of employers to dismiss workers.) In programs 
such as UI and disability insurance, employer costs are experience-
rated; that is, employers are required to pay premiums based on their 
employees’ claims. More claims result in higher payments. Experience-
rated programs create incentives for firms to hire contingent workers 
so that when a worker is laid off or injured, the claim is made against 
the temporary firm. If policymakers believe that legislation protecting 
workers from discrimination, unemployment, and workplace hazards 
is important, they must work to close the loopholes that currently exist 
and make the system flexible enough so that responding to changes in 
employment relations is readily accomplished.
Given the increasing role of nonstandard employment both domes-
tically and internationally, the need for policy changes is likely to be-
come more pressing. The U.S. labor force is becoming older and the so-
ciety is experiencing more inequality. As a result, nonstandard employ-
ment will likely increase over time as workers demand flexible work 
schedules and employer demand for nonstandard employment services 
increases. 
Directions for Future Research
Scholarship on nonstandard employment to date has focused pri-
marily on identifying nonstandard workers by their characteristics and 
motives for engaging in this type of employment arrangement and why 
this type of employment has grown. Recent research has begun to out-
line the deficiencies of current public policies in achieving the goal of 
protecting these workers by providing them with the same safety net 
available to regular full-time employees. The next phase of research 
will have to answer the question “What can be done?” Much of the 
challenge of this research is that it must transcend traditional disciplines 
and employ an interdisciplinary approach. Four topics worthy of further 
research are discussed below.
First, the excellent economy of the latter 1990s masked consider-
able inequalities in the U.S. labor force. With the onset of recession in 
2001, health insurance coverage and pension coverage have emerged as 
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areas of concern. As health insurance costs continue to climb, coverage 
for workers in nonstandard employment will become more difficult to 
secure. Shoring up the existing Social Security program will become 
more important as the labor force ages. In both these cases research 
should be done that specifically focuses on older workers in contingent 
or nonstandard work arrangements. In particular, to what extent was 
reemployment in contingent work necessary for the older retirees who 
lost considerable sums in the equities markets? How will the lack of 
health insurance coverage impact the health of older workers in these 
types of employment?
Second, recessionary periods always refocus attention on the social 
safety—in particular, the unemployment insurance system. The UI sys-
tem is rife with inequality and fails to provide the security that many 
workers need. Policy research about the design of a system that better 
serves a more dynamic and mobile labor force than the one the current 
system was created to serve is much needed.
Third, casual empiricism indicates that few contingent workers are 
eligible for FMLA benefits. However, to understand the factors deter-
mining need, the Commission on Family and Medical Leave (1996) 
recommends “additional research should be done to assess the impact 
of family leave policies (both those required by the FMLA and those 
voluntarily provided) on temporary, part-time and contract workers.”
Finally, as this chapter has repeatedly noted, eligibility criteria 
determine who is covered under a specific law. Since the Fair Labor 
Standards Act does not cover the self-employed, there is an increas-
ingly large group of workers who are not protected by this act and its 
provision for overtime pay. Other workers are not covered by minimum 
wage laws for similar reasons. One promising area of research is to 
investigate how well the Fair Labor Standards Act is operating. Are 
workers being misclassified as independent contractors to avoid payroll 
taxes? Have workers used nonstandard employment to lower their ex-
perience ratings on social insurance? 
Workers in the United States have come to expect certain charac-
teristics in a “good” job: reasonable wages, health and pension cover-
age, and government policies that protect them from the volatility of 
the market (Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000). Unfortunately, many 
workers in nonstandard employment cannot expect any of these. Wages 
are typically below those of their full-time counterparts, pension and 
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health insurance coverage are limited, and government policies have 
not kept pace with these changes in the workforce. 
The four main criteria used in this analysis—economic efficiency, 
equity, security, and liberty—demonstrate very clearly the inadequacy 
of much of our safety net for contingent workers. The irony is that many 
of the policies that are inequitable (those that deny coverage to many 
contingent workers while covering the full-time labor force) are also 
those that would provide much-needed security to the contingent work-
force. In essence, the workers who most need protection from the vicis-
situdes of the market are denied coverage. Extending coverage to con-
tingent workers will likely cost more, but not disproportionately, so that 
making most of these extensions in coverage is relatively efficient. 
It is the issue of liberty around which much of the debate centers. 
The legitimate role of government to intervene is hotly contested and 
will be the battleground for this issue for years to come. Future re-
search on expanding the safety net for those in need will help determine 
how the characteristics of “good jobs” can be extended to nonstandard 
employment. But research alone will not make political decisions to 
extend the legitimate role of government. A deeper understanding of 
government’s role coupled with political pressure remains the catalyst 
for that type of change. 
Notes
  1. Typically, an employer must have at least 20 employees and offer a health insur-
ance plan. COBRA allows continued coverage only for those who would be los-
ing coverage for certain reasons such as the loss of a job, the reduction in hours 
of work, the death or divorce of a parent or spouse, or the change in status as 
dependent. 
  2. For a more general discussion of the role of professional part-time employees, 
see Lawrence and Corwin (2003).
  3. Monetary eligibility is determined by state requirements. It is a measure of 
whether a worker earned enough to qualify for the state’s minimum benefit.
  4. While the FMLA is not likely to provide much benefit to workers in contin-
gent and nonstandard employment arrangements, this should not be considered a 
wholesale criticism of the policy. There is considerable evidence that the policy 
provides real benefits to those 50 percent of full-time workers covered by the 
policy in small firms and the 95 percent of full-time workers covered by the 
policy in large firms (Waldfogel 1999). However, the use of the FMLA leave 
has been fairly modest. About 1.2 percent of all employees took leave under 
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the provisions of the FMLA between its enactment and 1999 (see Cantor et al. 
2001). Those who needed leave but did not take leave represent 3.4 percent of the 
sample. When asked, employees consistently remark that this low level of usage 
is brought about by the lack of paid leave. Of those who needed leave for a birth 
or illness in the family, fully 63.9 percent of respondents claimed they “cannot 
afford the accompanying loss of wages” (Cantor et al. 2001). 
 5. Alaska ($7.15); California ($6.75); Connecticut ($7.10); Delaware ($6.15); Ha-
waii ($6.25); Maine ($6.25); Massachusetts ($6.75); Oregon ($6.90); Rhode Is-
land ($6.15); Vermont ($6.25); Washington ($7.01).
 6. Wage and salary independent contractors are paid on a regular basis with a wage 
or salary instead of by the task.
 7. From 1981 until 1990, the nominal value of the minimum wage remained con-
stant at $3.35, while its real value shrank due to inflation. Phased increases in 
the minimum wage from 1995 through 1997 have done little to restore it to its 
pre-1980 levels. 
 8. There is considerable evidence that the employment disincentives have been 
overstated by previous research (see, for example, Card and Kreuger 1995).
 9. The only way to reform these types of policies is to generalize and make portable 
a fund for both UI and FMLA. In this way workers make contributions to the UI 
and FMLA funds. Once sufficient payments have been made, a worker may draw 
them down. This eliminates eligibility requirements and long-term employment 
relationships necessary for eligibility without eliminating the work requirement 
of the policy.
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Temporary clerical workers. Computer programmers on short-term 
contracts. Manual laborers hired by the day, part-time store clerks, mid-
dle managers on loan from related firms. The work they do is different, 
but all have something important in common: they are hiseishain, or 
nonregular workers, and by label at least they are non-core employees, 
handicapped in their ability to take advantage of Japan’s strong inter-
nal labor markets. They are less likely than co-workers with the status 
of regular employees to have access to the career ladders and relative 
employment security that are often referred to as Japan’s “lifetime em-
ployment system.”1 
According to a Japanese government survey, in July 2005 the coun-
try had an estimated 16.5 million nonregular workers in a workforce 
that includes about 50 million employees nationwide (Japanese Statis-
tics Bureau 2005). Nonregular workers thus represent nearly one-third 
of the nation’s employees. Their ranks have been rapidly growing over 
the past few years, while the number of regular employees has declined. 
Figure 7.1 illustrates how the percentage of Japanese employees with 
nonregular status has climbed as companies have turned to nontradi-
tional employment arrangements in their struggle to deal with years 
of economic malaise.2 Since the early 1990s, a sustainable recovery 
has seemed elusive. Throughout 2005 there were several positive signs, 
including the first rise in real estate prices in 15 years, an impressive 
stock market index rise of around 40 percent, and indications of an 
impending end to years of continued deflation. Many analysts are 
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optimistic that this time an end to years of misery is in sight, especially 
since there has been considerable restructuring in many areas (Fackler 
2006; Reuters, Bloomberg News 2005). Because of the economy, many 
companies have been forced to merge, restructure, and reduce the num-
ber of employees through attrition, early retirement programs, or lay-
offs. Affected companies have also limited the number of new regular 
employees hired, and many workers, both young and midcareer, found 
themselves joining the ranks of the shadow workforce.
Who are these people? In this chapter we look at contingent work 
in Japan and discuss the various types of workers that make up the 
nonregular category of employees. Government statistics on nonregular 
workers provide a good starting point for exploring this issue. Although 
the terms nonregular employee and contingent worker are far from syn-
onymous, these statistics are particularly helpful in understanding the 
situation because employers themselves classify the workers as regular 
or nonregular.3 We use demographic and industry data to identify the 
Figure 7.1  Changes in the Number and Ratio of Regular and Nonregular 
Employees
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kinds of people employed in nonregular positions, the kind of work 
they do, and where they work. 
In the second section, we focus on the largest group of contingent 
workers—part-time workers—and the group of workers expected to 
grow the most rapidly—workers dispatched by temporary employment 
agencies. From a policymaking perspective, the growth of contingent 
employment raises an important issue: whether becoming a contingent 
worker is a voluntary or involuntary decision. Are workers choosing 
these jobs because they find them appealing for some reason, or do they 
fall into them because they have few other options? To what extent are 
organizational needs and worker desires behind the growth in nonregu-
lar employment? To evaluate this, we review the results of government 
surveys of employers and employees. An important part of this issue is 
the effect of nonregular employment on workers, and we look briefly 
at some of the implications of such arrangements. We conclude with a 
discussion of recent social and regulatory trends that may affect growth 
in contingent work arrangements in the future and provide suggestions 
for future research.
CORE AND CONTINGENT WORKERS: CATEGORIES  
AND DEMOGRAPHICS 
To understand the position of core and contingent workers, it is use-
ful to first discuss the terminology. In Japan, the majority of workers are 
hired as seishain, which is frequently translated as “regular employees” 
or “lifetime employees.” This group of full-time employees works with 
the understanding that, barring serious misconduct or severe organi-
zational problems, they will have jobs until retirement; in this chapter 
we refer to them as regular or core employees. Those outside this cat-
egory are called nonregular or noncore employees. In general, regular 
employees have greater access to training, promotion tracks and as-
sociated pay raises, pensions and other forms of social insurance, as 
well as greater job security. However, it is important to note that these 
core employees will not all remain in their firms until their mid-sixties, 
and many nonregular workers form long-term ties to the organizations 
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where they work. Consequently, these categories are not as mutually 
exclusive as they may appear. 
To investigate where the changes in nonregular employment are the 
most pronounced, we use the results of the Japanese Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare’s (MHLW’s) Comprehensive Survey on Diversifi-
cation Employment Forms.4 This survey provides information on em-
ployment status based on industry, place of employment, gender, and 
firm size in 1999 and 2003; these are summarized in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. 
Because of changes in classification, comparison with earlier editions 
of the study are difficult; only data for 2003 are presented in Table 7.2.
As shown in the Table 7.1, in 2003 the vast majority of Japanese 
(65.4 percent) were classified as regular employees. In this chapter we 
focus on the remaining 34.6 percent who are nonregular employees. 
They have been divided into seven major categories: transferred work-
ers, reemployed seniors, workers dispatched by temporary employment 
agencies, part-timers, temporary and day workers, contract workers, 
and other nonregular workers, an ad hoc category that is not discussed 
in detail here. 
Transferred Workers
The first group of nonregular employees provides some insight into 
Japanese personnel systems: shukko	 shain, or “transferred workers” 
who are on loan from another organization, usually one with close ties, 
like a parent firm, main bank, or sister subsidiary. While there are vari-
ous reasons why a worker might be transferred, one increasingly com-
mon personnel practice is to transfer older workers who have reached 
a career plateau to smaller, related firms (Sato 1997). Initially, these 
workers remain part of their original firms and are paid at their cur-
rent salary rates, and their pay is often subsidized or provided by their 
original organizations. However, after two to five years they may be 
asked to officially join the new firm. If they do, they are no longer clas-
sified as transferred employees but rather would be considered regular 
employees of the new firm. Salaries at the new organization are often 
lower, but one advantage for individuals is that they may be able to 
work longer. This practice also can provide value for the new firm if it 
lacks experienced managerial personnel and is able to acquire them in 
this way. Transferred workers generally work full time. Although they 
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 Total Transfer Temporary Contract Dispatched Part-time Other
 1999 2003 1999 2003 1999 2003 1999 2003 1999 2003 1999 2003 1999 2003 1999 2003
Sex                
Total 72.5 65.4 27.5 34.6 1.3 1.5 1.8 0.8 2.3 2.3 1.1 2.0 14.5 23.0 6.5 4.8
Male 85.1 80.0 14.9 20.0 1.8 2.2 1.8 0.9 2.1 1.9 0.6 1.0 5.2 9.6 3.4 4.4
Female 53.0 44.4 47.0 55.6 0.4 0.6 2.0 0.8 2.6 2.9 1.8 3.4 28.9 42.5 11.3 5.5
Establishment size
1,000 + 74.9 81.0 25.1 19.0 1.0 1.8 0.4 0.2 2.7 2.4 2.0 3.7 14.1 7.4 4.9 3.4
500–999 75.7 73.8 24.3 26.2 2.0 2.9 0.9 0.4 1.7 3.4 1.1 3.9 12.3 11.1 6.4 4.5
300–499 69.1 69.1 30.9 30.9 2.5 1.9 6.7 0.2 3.3 2.8 1.1 2.6 12.1 18.1 5.2 5.4
100–299 73.4 68.6 26.6 31.4 1.9 1.5 0.7 0.3 2.8 3.1 0.9 2.3 13.8 18.5 6.5 5.6
50–29 69.8 63.9 30.2 36.1 1.5 2.0 2.2 0.6 1.7 2.5 0.7 2.6 14.9 23.6 9.3 4.7
30–49 74.6 63.4 25.4 36.6 0.7 1.4 1.8 0.7 2.2 2.2 0.5 1.5 13.4 26.1 6.9 4.8
5–29 70.2 62.1 29.8 37.9 0.5 1.2 2.6 1.3 1.8 1.9 0.4 1.2 17.3 27.5 7.2 4.8
NOTE: In 2003, the part-time worker category does not include pseudo-part-timers (those who are on part-time career paths but work over 
35 hours a week). In 1999, such workers accounted for 5.8 percent. 
SOURCE: MHLW Comprehensive Survey on Diversification of Employment Forms, 1999, 2003.
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& day Part-time Other
Industry          
Construction 85.6 14.4 1.8 1.6 1.0 1.9 0.8 2.5 4.8
Manufacturing 76.7 23.3 1.7 1.5 2.0 1.4 0.3 12.7 3.8
Utilities 91.2 8.8 1.1 2.0 0.8 2.2 0.0 1.6 1.1
Transportation 77.3 22.7 1.5 2.2 1.6 3.2 0.7 10.8 2.7
Wholesale/retail 54.7 45.3 0.8 0.8 1.4 1.4 0.7 37.3 3.0 
Finance/insurance 78.3 21.7 1.4 1.6 8.7 2.2 0.0 6.2 1.6
Real estate 64.1 35.9 5.0 5.2 2.0 4.8 0.5 15.5 3.0 
Restaurant/hotel 29.1 70.9 0.4 0.6 0.5 2.0 0.5 62.8 4.1 
Medical/welfare 70.2 29.8 1.5 1.3 0.8 2.8 0.2 20.7 2.4 
Education 60.8 39.2 0.4 1.7 2.0 10.3 0.3 21.7 2.8 
Complex service 79.8 20.2 0.6 1.0 0.7 1.9 1.1 7.9 7.0 
Service 58.7 41.3 2.6 2.3 2.2 3.5 2.8 23.6 4.4
Workplace         
Office 74.7 25.3 2.3 1.9 2.9 2.8 1.4 10.7 3.3
Factory 73.8 26.2 1.6 1.4 1.9 1.1 0.4 15.9 3.9
R&D lab 82.9 17.1 3.4 0.7 5.7 3.0 0.2 3.7 0.4
Branch 73.1 26.9 1.7 1.6 2.2 3.8 0.3 14.7 2.7
Sale outlet 35.2 64.8 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.1 0.8 57.8 3.7
Other 66.7 33.3 1.3 1.5 1.3 4.1 0.8 20.7 3.5
SOURCE: MHLW Comprehensive Survey on Diversification of Employment Forms, 1999, 2003.
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are not labeled as regular staff during this period, they are clearly still 
participants in the lifetime employment system and tend to be covered 
by social insurance and pension policies. 
While this system has been gaining in legitimacy, the number of 
workers on loan at any given time is fairly low. As shown in Tables 
7.1 and 7.2, transferred workers are more likely to be older males, and 
they are most strongly represented in the real estate industry. However, 
growth in this type of employment has been limited in recent years. 
Transferred workers made up only 1.5 percent of employees in 2003, 
similar to the percentage reported in 1999 and previous years. Such 
workers made up only 2.9 percent of employees in midsize firms with 
300–500 employees, where they were most strongly represented. It is 
important to recognize, however, that workers no longer fall into this 
category if they have officially become regular employees of their new 
firms, so this measure includes only those currently “on loan.”
Reemployed seniors
The second group of nonregular employees is older workers 
nearing the end of their careers. Shokutaku, reemployed seniors, is a 
group of older workers who generally have either resigned or retired 
from positions as regular employees. Most Japanese companies 
have mandatory retirement, usually at age 60 or 65.5 However, many 
companies find that they can still use senior citizens’ knowledge and 
skills. Employees, too, may wish to work longer for personal fulfillment 
or financial reasons. As a result, many companies are rehiring retired 
senior citizens as nonregular employees, often with different work 
responsibilities, conditions, and compensation packages. This approach, 
while likely to grow in importance as the workforce ages, is relatively 
new, so data were not collected on this group as part of the Survey on 
Diversification of Employment Forms until 2003. As Table 7.2 indicates, 
these workers are most concentrated in real estate, where they represent 
already 5.2 percent of industry workers. They also represent 2.2 percent 
of employees in the transportation industry and around 1.5 percent 
of employees in the construction, manufacturing, finance, medical, 
and education fields. Reemployed seniors are most likely to be found 
working in offices, where they make up about 2 percent of workers, 
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or factories and branches, where they make up about 1.5 percent. Few 
work in sales or research and development. 
Because of the falling birthrate, the number of young people entering 
the workforce has been declining over the years. Reemploying seniors 
is one way to deal with the challenges of an aging workforce, so this 
category of nonregular employees should be closely watched. 
Temporary and Day Workers
While the number of reemployed seniors seems poised to grow, the 
situation for the next category of nonregular workers is unclear—the 
numbers of temporary and day workers have been shrinking, but they 
may grow if the economy does. Approximately 2.8 percent of work-
ers in service industries and 0.8 percent of those in the construction 
industry are classified by their employers as temporary or day work-
ers (Table 7.2). Temporary workers are those with work agreements 
extending between one month and one year; day workers have been 
hired for a period of less than one month. Many, however, are regularly 
“rehired” under such agreements and may enjoy more employment se-
curity than this implies, particularly when the economy is strong. The 
current percentages, particularly in the construction industry, are much 
lower than in previous, more prosperous times.
In fact, employees in this category made up just 0.8 percent of the 
country’s total workforce in 2003, as shown in Table 7.2. This is a drop 
from the 1.8 percent estimated for 1999, which again is lower than in 
previous surveys. While currently small, the number of workers in this 
category, particularly in construction, may rise if economic recovery 
continues strong. 
Contract Workers
Contract workers, whose employment agreements have specific 
rather than open-ended time limits, made up 2.3 percent of all employ-
ees in both 1999 and 2003, as shown in Table 7.1. Both genders are 
represented: 1.9 percent of Japanese male workers and 2.9 percent of 
female workers were employed on a contract basis in 2003. Foreign 
workers and computer specialists are among those often hired on a re-
newable contract basis. Of all the categories of employment in Japan, 
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this one most closely resembles the short-term consulting or project-
based hiring that has become a regular practice in some U.S. businesses 
as firms have sought to downsize, only to discover that they still occa-
sionally need the skills of their former employees. However, contract 
workers in Japan are not necessarily former employees. The similarity 
is due to the fact that they are hired for their skills for limited periods 
which may be extended if the need continues. 
Contract workers are most likely to be found in the education field, 
where they made up 10.3 percent of all employees, or in real estate or 
services, where around 5 percent of employees were hired under such 
contracts. They are most often found working in branches, labs, or 
offices (Table 7.2). Another group of workers that are hired under time-
limited contracts are those who are dispatched by agencies.
Workers Dispatched by Temporary Employment Agencies
Although there were some firms that specialized in locating contract 
employees, temporary employment agencies were officially prohibited 
until 1985. This prohibition was at least partially because of Japan’s 
history of limiting the activities of temporary agencies to encourage 
long-term employment relationships between employers and employ-
ees. Even when legalized, temporary employment agencies were lim-
ited to providing staff for a few types of white-collar positions, such as 
computer programming or secretarial work. 
Workers dispatched by temporary employment agencies represent-
ed a mere 2.0 percent of all employees in Japan in 2003, as shown in 
Table 7.1, but this is up from just 0.07 percent in 1994 and 1.1 percent 
in 1999. This category has strong potential for continued growth due 
to regulatory changes. In 1985 the Japanese government instituted new 
regulations that opened the way for the expanded use of temporary em-
ployment agencies and gradually increased the number of occupations 
for which agencies were allowed to provide workers to 26 by 1996. In 
1999, the government further expanded the industries and occupations 
that could be staffed by temporary workers to include all except port 
transportation (longshoremen), construction, security services, and oth-
ers so designated by the government. More regulatory changes came 
into effect in 2004, when the length of time dispatched employees could 
be used for a position was increased from one year to three.6 The new 
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policy direction was chosen in the hopes of opening up new options for 
skilled women and older men seeking employment.7 
 Dispatched workers are most concentrated in the finance sector. Ta-
ble 7.2 shows that they made up 8.7 percent of workers in that industry 
in 2003, a jump from the 3.6 percent reported in a similar survey done 
in 1994. With the use of dispatched workers recently made legal in most 
jobs, continued growth can be expected and additional study is needed. 
The attention that dispatched workers have already received from re-
searchers and policymakers is rivaled only by employees in one other 
nonregular category, part-time workers.
Part-Time Workers
By far the largest group of nonregular workers is composed of 
part-time workers. As shown in Table 7.1, 23.0 percent of all Japanese 
employees were hired as part-timers in 2003, up from 14.5 percent in 
1999. While nearly 10 percent of male employees were part-timers in 
2003, 42.5 percent of female workers fell into this category, nearly equal-
ing the 44.4 percent of women who were hired as regular employees. 
As shown in Table 7.2, 62.8 percent of employees in the restaurant 
and hotel industry were part-timers in 2003, as were 37.3 percent of 
employees in the wholesale and retail field, and just over 20 percent of 
workers in the medical and education areas. Even in factories, nearly 16 
percent of workers are part-timers.
Although the data are somewhat older, one of the best sources of 
information on this group of workers is the 2001 MHLW Survey on 
Part-Time Workers. That study found that there were approximately 
11.2 million part-time workers, representing 26.1 percent of all employ-
ees and about three-quarters of all nonregular workers. The difference 
in percentages reflects a difference in the definition of part-timers. 
While the Comprehensive Survey on Diversification of Employment 
Forms includes only workers who work shorter hours, the MHLW study 
includes giji-paato, or what we refer to in this paper as “pseudo-part-
timers,” workers who are officially hired by their companies as non-
regular workers and classified as “part-timers” but who actually work 
over 35 hours a week. The study found that approximately 14.9 percent 
of the country’s part-time workers are “other part-timers,” a broad clas-
sification that comprises pseudo-part-timers and several different types 
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of nonregular employees, such as seasonal workers at auto factories. 
In Japan, then, there are two different types of part-time workers— 
those who work shorter hours, and those who have been labeled part-
timers as a way of showing that they are not regular “lifetime” employ-
ees. In the United States, the determination of part-time employment is 
based solely on hours of work. In Japan, on the other hand, the identifi-
cation of an employee as part-time is a description of a career path and 
the human resource (HR) practices that accompany it. The part-time la-
bel in Japan is similar to the American idea of a “mommy track” career 
option for women. In the United States, the idea of a “mommy track” 
first gained popularity in prestigious law firms where female lawyers 
wished to reduce their weekly work hours from the 70-plus often re-
quired at junior levels to a more reasonable 35 to 45 hours, giving them 
more time for their families. While a 40-hour week is not part-time, it 
involves working fewer hours than more career-focused colleagues at 
such firms. In Japan, the situation involving part-time workers is often 
similar. 
Many Japanese organizations have developed “part-time” positions 
largely as a way to hire women in their thirties and older who wish to 
combine work with caring for their families. These nonregular workers 
vary in the degree to which their positions are truly contingent. Some 
have low-skill, short-term, dead-end jobs, but others may do skilled 
work for the same organization for years. They often perform the same 
tasks as regular employees and work alongside them. While some orga-
nizations are experimenting with career paths specifically for part-tim-
ers or allowing workers to switch from part-time to regular employee 
status, one problem for motivated “part-time” workers is that they are 
less likely to have access to the same career options as regular workers. 
They also tend to have lower hourly wages, something we will discuss 
in greater detail later in the chapter.
Differences in education also provide some insights into wage dif-
ferentials. Table 7.3 indicates that 59.8 percent of workers with only 
a junior high education are in contingent work arrangements, while 
only 17.1 percent of university graduates are in such arrangements. Just 
under 40 percent of workers with a high school or technical school edu-
cation are in contingent work, along with just over 30 percent of junior 
college graduates.8
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Dramatic growth in the percentage of employees with part-time sta-
tus can be seen in nearly every industry and type of workplace. Because 
they represent the fastest-growing category as well as the majority of 
nonregular workers, we will explore the conditions and motivations of 
workers classified as part-timers in greater detail. 
Nonregular Employment: A Summary
While nonregular employment may not be strictly viewed as con-
tingent, workers in this category in general enjoy less job security and 
are less likely to be considered for training and promotion opportu-
nities. As nonregular employees, they would rarely be considered for 
middle- or upper-level management positions in larger organizations. 
Although there are slight differences in the findings of various govern-
ment surveys, it is clear that the number of nonregular workers is in-
creasing in Japan. This trend is important since more than one-third of 
the country’s workforce already falls into the nonregular category. 
We have discussed all of the categories generally included in non-
regular employment. We will now turn our focus to the largest group, 
Table 7.3  Employed Workers with Regular and Alternative Work 
Arrangements, by Educational Attainment (percentage of 









Regular employees 40.2 61.2 62.0 68.2 82.9
Nonregular employees 59.8 38.8 38.0 31.8 17.1
Transferred 1.4 1.5 1.1 0.8 2.5
Reemployed seniors 6.9 1.7 1.0 0.5 1.0
Temporary 2.3 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.4
Contract 3.4 2.0 4.3 2.5 2.6
Dispatched 1.5 1.6 2.9 3.7 1.9
Part-time 34.2 27.6 23.8 21.2 7.1
Other 10.1 3.9 4.4 2.9 1.6
NOTE: Figures indicate percentage of workers at each level of schooling whose jobs 
fall into the employee category.  
SOURCE: MHLW (2005).
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part-time workers, and the group most likely to show strong growth in 
the future: employees dispatched by temporary employment agencies. 
Because these two groups have been studied more extensively than oth-
er nonregular workers, there are more data available about them. 
WHy CONTINGENT EMPLOyMENT ARRANGEMENTS?
The two groups on which we have chosen to focus have one impor-
tant thing in common: they both are predominantly female. According 
to the Japanese Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts 
and Telecommunications (MPHPT) Labour Force Survey, in 2001 7.1 
million of Japan’s 7.7 million part-timers were female (92 percent), and 
women make up the majority of dispatched employees as well (MPHPT 
2003). Currently, well over half of all working women fit into one of 
these two categories, a marked contrast to 1960, when just 5.9 percent 
of working women were classified as part-timers and worker dispatch-
ing was not permitted. Over subsequent years the percentage of female 
employees who are classified as part-timers has gradually risen, pass-
ing the 20 percent mark in the early 1980s, the 30 percent mark in the 
early 1990s, and the 50 percent mark early in the new century (Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 2002, 2005). During that time, the percentage of 
self-employed women and those working in the fields or family en-
terprises also has declined. As women have moved into the corporate 
world, part-time employment and dispatching agencies have emerged 
as routes to jobs for those who have quit regular employment to focus 
on family. In this next section we will look at why employers and work-
ers are choosing nonregular employment arrangements and some of the 
broader implications. 
Nonregular Employment: The Employer Perspective
Firms in the United States have found that the potential benefits 
of using contingent workers include reducing wage and benefit costs, 
saving money on training by employing already trained employees, and 
flexibility in adjusting the size of the workforce to changing econom-
ic conditions. A common strategy is to keep core competencies in the 
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hands of more permanent core employees, with temporary workers do-
ing more simple and/or peripheral work and serving as buffers against 
changing circumstances and needs.9 Japanese employers apparently 
have found similar benefits in hiring nonregular employees.
As part of the General Survey on Part-Time Workers, the MHLW 
surveyed both employers and employees on their reasons for choosing 
this employment arrangement, analyzing the responses separately for 
part-timers working less than 35 hours a week and for those hired on 
part-time or other nonregular career tracks (pseudo/other part-timers) 
but working essentially full-time hours. The results are summarized in 
Tables 7.4 and 7.5. 
Employers were allowed to choose all applicable reasons for hiring 
part-time workers. As might be expected, the leading reason given for 
hiring part-timers in all cases was reducing personnel expenses, cho-
sen by 65.3 percent of employers in 2001 (see Table 7.4). While this 
was also the leading response in 1995, at that time it was selected by 
only 38.3 percent of employers as a reason for hiring part-timers, and 
29.3 percent as a reason for hiring pseudo-part-timers. Also among the 
top four reasons for hiring part-time workers in 2001 were coping with 
peak demand periods on an annual (39.2 percent) and daily (27.3 per-
cent) basis, and the fact that work tasks were easy (31.4 percent). While 
increased work volume was also a popular response in 1995, only 17.1 
percent of employers cited it as a reason for hiring part-timers in 2001, 
about the same number who said that it was easy to hire such work-
ers, and that such arrangements lead to easier employment adjustments 
when work volume declines. 
The 1995 survey asked employers to consider separately their rea-
sons for hiring “true” and “other” part-timers. Overall they were similar, 
but some differences did emerge. Respondents were much more likely 
to say that they had hired pseudo- and other part-timers because they 
wanted workers with skills, knowledge, and experience, and because 
this was viewed as a useful mechanism for rehiring women who had 
previously left the organization, presumably to care for their families. 
They were much less likely to say that such workers were easy to hire, 
that their tasks were easy, or that they were hired to help cope with an-
nual peaks in demand. 
Perhaps almost as interesting as looking at the reasons employers 
gave for hiring workers as part-timers are the reasons they did not. In 
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Table 7.4  Employer Perspective: Reasons for Hiring Nonregular 





Increased work volume 29.8 17.1 26.8 
Difficult to hire new graduates as regular 
employees
10.7 5.8 9.1 
Easy to hire such workers 19.9 17.8 9.8 
Cope with peak demand periods each day 9.3 27.3 10.7 
Cope with peak demand periods on an  
annual basis
37.3 39.2 9.2 
To hire workers with experience, skills,  
and knowledge
13.2 12.2 21.1 
The tasks involved are easy 35.7 31.4 19.0 
To reduce personnel expenses 38.3 65.3 29.3 
Easier to make employment adjustments 
when work volume declines
12.4 16.4 12.8 
Way of rehiring or extending the work years 
of older workers
4.4 7.3 3.6 
Useful to rehire women who have previously 
left the organization 
5.8 5.1 20.9 
Other 9.0 6.5 16.8 
NOTE: Figures given indicate the percentage of responding employers who checked 
each reason given for hiring such workers. Figures are totals for all industries; mul-
tiple responses were permitted.
a Pseudo-part-timers are those who are classified as part-time workers by their employ-
ers but who actually work over 35 hours per week.  Other part-timers are those who 
have been included in this category because they are not regular employees but gener-
ally do not work shorter than normal hours (e.g., seasonal factory workers).
SOURCE: MHLW (2002).  
2001 a mere 7.3 percent mentioned using this as a means to extend 
the employment of older workers, and only 5.8 percent said that they 
had hired part-timers because it was difficult to hire fresh graduates as 
regular employees. 
In summary, employers preferred to hire workers under a part-time 
arrangement because it reduced costs and provided labor force flexibil-
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ity. In the case of pseudo- and other part-timers, the firms hired these 
workers in part because of their skills and knowledge, often obtained 
through previous regular employment. Employers did not indicate they 
were hiring part-timers because they were unable to recruit regular em-
ployees; instead, they appreciated the benefits of hiring workers under 
nonregular agreements. 
Table 7.5  Employee Perspective: Reasons Women Work as Nonregular 




1995 2001 1995 2001
The hours are a convenient fit with my  
daily schedule
55.8 50.9 23.0 21.0 
Shorter hours 27.9 34.2 10.5 12.2 
Good pay and conditions 7.7 7.4 11.2 12.7 
Interesting work 18.0 21.7 23.6 25.0 
Easy to quit 7.8 5.6 6.1 3.7 
Could not find a full-time position 14.3 20.8 33.0 37.6 
Cannot work full time due to household 
responsibilities
19.8 18.3 8.9 9.0 
Cannot work full time due to elder/invalid 
care responsibilities
2.0 2.2 2.0 1.3 
Cannot work full time due to personal  
health problems
5.9 4.7 5.9 2.9 
Because my friends and acquaintances are 
part-timers
6.8 5.5 6.8 2.8 
Other 8.3 9.2 8.3 20.1 
NOTE: Figures given indicate the percentage of responding female employees who 
checked each reason given for taking a “part-time” position. Figures are totals for all 
industries and demographic groups; multiple responses were permitted.
a Pseudo-part-timers are those who are classified as part-time workers by their employ-
ers, but who actually work over 35 hours per week. Other part-timers are those who 
have been included in this category because they are not regular employees, but gen-
erally do not work shorter than normal hours (e.g., seasonal factory workers).
SOURCE: MHLW (2002).  
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Why Nonregular Work? The Employee Perspective
If economic benefits are the primary reason for employers to hire 
nonregular employees, what is the appeal for the workers themselves? 
The same study sheds some light on the issue. As shown in Table 7.5, 
in 2001 only 7.4 percent of true female part-time workers cited good 
pay and conditions as a reason they chose to take on their jobs. Only 5.6 
percent of the surveyed women cited ease of quitting. The most popular 
responses were that the hours were convenient given their daily routine 
(50.9 percent) and the shorter working hours (34.2 percent). About one-
fifth cited interesting work and the need to handle household responsi-
bilities as reasons for taking a part-time position. Almost 21 percent in 
2001 said they did so because they could not find a full-time position; 
14.3 percent gave that response in 1995. 
As might be expected, there were differences between the reasons 
given by true part-timers and those who are merely labeled as such. 
The leading reason pseudo- and other part-timers were in such a posi-
tion: they could not find a full-time job as a regular employee. A lack 
of regular employment options was cited by 37.6 percent of such part-
timers in 2001, up from 33.0 percent in 1995. On a more positive note, 
25 percent gave interesting work as a reason for choosing their posi-
tion, while about one-fifth noted that their work hours were convenient. 
Pseudo- and other part-timers were slightly more enthusiastic about the 
economic benefits of their jobs than their truly part-time colleagues: 
12.7 percent noted that the pay and conditions were good. As might be 
expected, given that these employees worked over 35 hours a week, the 
inability to work full-time was not a major factor; however, 12.2 per-
cent cited shorter hours as a reason for taking such a position.
A separate survey conducted in 2003 provides information on the 
motivation of part-time and dispatched employees of both sexes (MHLW 
2005). The responses of male part-timers were similar to their female 
counterparts, as shown in Table 7.6. The leading reason for taking a 
part-time position, mentioned by almost 50 percent, was convenient 
hours. About one-fourth gave shorter hours and the need to supplement 
family income as reasons for taking their part-time jobs, and about one-
fifth cited convenient fit with family or personal activities and a shorter 
commute. Over one-fourth of the part-time men could not find a posi-
tion as a regular full-time employee. The main differences between the 
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responses of male and female part-timers in this survey is that women 
were slightly more enthusiastic about work schedules that would allow 
them to balance their work and family lives, as well as somewhat less 
likely to have been unable to find a job as a regular employee. 
The inability to secure a position as a regular employee was one of 
the leading reasons both men and women chose to become dispatched 
workers, cited by 39.6 percent of women and 42 percent of men. Nearly 
one-fifth of female dispatched workers also cited family needs or the 
ability to use special qualifications or skills as a reason for taking a non-
regular position or reported disliking restrictions at regular jobs. Finan-
cially, too, some dispatched workers feel they have an advantage over 
employees in “regular” positions: more money was given as a reason by 
20.4 percent of men and 14.6 percent of women. While some men also 
referred to a dislike for company restrictions on regular workers (16.4 
Table 7.6  Reasons for Choosing Nonregular Jobs, 2003 (percentage of 
employees choosing each option, multiple responses allowed)
 Part-timers Dispatched workers
 Male Female Male Female
Utilize qualification or skill 11.9 9.0 35.4 17.8 
More money 6.8 7.0 20.4 14.6 
Could not find work as a regular 
employee 26.8 20.5 42.0 39.6 
Dislike restrictions by firms 11.5 6.7 16.4 24.6 
Shorter hours 23.3 29.9 4.9 17.0 
Convenient hours 45.4 37.6 8.6 16.7 
To qualify for income-related tax 
or social insurance benefits 4.3 13.9 1.6 5.7 
Easy tasks and less responsibility 11.9 10.6 6.1 6.3 
Supplement household income 23.4 46.0 5.9 17.7 
Compatible with family or other 
activity 17.9 27.3 10.2 26.6 
Shorter commute 18.5 36.0 12.1 15.7 
Health 2.5 6.2 2.1 2.9 
Earn personal spending money 30.7 27.4 10.8 18.1 
Other 0.5 1.9 6.7 3.8 
SOURCE: MHLW (2005).  
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percent), male dispatched workers were much less likely than women 
to have such feelings or to be motivated by shorter, more convenient 
hours, shorter commutes, or the notion that a nonregular position was 
compatible with family or other activities. 
To summarize, convenient hours that mesh well with personal 
schedules are one of the main reasons many nonregular employees, par-
ticularly women, have taken such positions. Shorter, convenient hours 
appear to provide a strong attraction for women in truly part-time po-
sitions, and even a fair number of dispatched workers appreciate this 
aspect of their work. On the other hand, high proportions of both men 
and women working as dispatched employees or pseudo/other part-tim-
ers reported that they had tried and failed to find positions as regular 
employees. For men, good pay or the ability to use skills often were 
reasons for choosing their work.
INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES
Several institutional characteristics influence the labor market 
choices made by Japanese women and the staffing decisions made by 
Japanese employers. 
Factors Affecting Women’s Choices
Some workers seek shorter hours because they need to combine em-
ployment with household responsibilities. Their decision is reinforced 
by the expectations placed on employees in the lifetime employment 
system and the income tax system. 
The benefits of being a regular employee are many in Japan: beyond 
a high degree of job security, career-track employees have traditionally 
gained through predictable salaries designed to match life-cycle needs. 
As regular employees’ skills (and often family responsibilities) grow, so 
does their income. On the downside, however, Japanese companies re-
quire regular employees to work long hours, socialize with co-workers 
and customers in the evenings, attend company sporting events on the 
weekends, and relocate whenever and wherever requested. The dedica-
tion required can make it difficult for regular employees to contribute 
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to the household in other respects since many will be away from home 
from 7 in the morning until 8 or 10 at night, leaving little time to wash 
the dishes or help children with homework. Thus, while the relatively 
stable economic contribution of a regular employee is valuable, it is 
difficult for a family to handle daily tasks if both parents work. Having 
one partner who stays at home or has a less time-consuming job makes 
sense for families with children or elders who require care.
Japanese personnel systems have traditionally tended to promote 
men and track women into lower-paying, dead-end positions with the 
often-fulfilled expectation that they will leave when they marry or have 
children.10 Generally it is the wife who adjusts her employment and 
handles the bulk of family responsibilities. A Japan Institute of Labour 
study on occupations and family life found that most wives working 
part time handled about 85 percent of household duties. Full-time work 
appears to be made possible with assistance from grandparents or other 
relatives, who reduce the wife’s share to 65 percent; 16 husbands con-
tributed very little.11 Thus, demands that regular employees work long 
hours and relocate when requested, combined with the need for some-
one to handle household tasks, is one source of institutional pressure 
encouraging some women to select a nonregular employment option.
There are also direct financial inducements for married women to 
choose less-lucrative employment options. The government does not 
assess income taxes on the wages of a household’s second earner if 
that person’s annual earnings fall below a certain threshold, currently 
set at ¥1.03 million (about $8,650), although due to tax deductions the 
actual level at which taxes are paid is generally higher.12 In addition, as 
long as earnings remain below ¥1.3 million (roughly $11,000), the sec-
ond earner does not have to pay national health and pension insurance 
premiums, while retaining access to such benefits through the primary 
earner.13 For families this means that when the second earner’s income 
falls into the range just above ¥1.3 million, there is a drop in real earn-
ings. Many companies also pay family allowances to male employees 
with wives whose earnings fall below a specified level, most commonly 
¥1.3 million or ¥1.03 million (about $8,650), with the amounts varying 
by firm.14 Thus, Japanese wives have several incentives to keep their 
earnings at a level equal to approximately $700 to $900 per month. In 
fact, the 2001 MHLW General Survey on Part-Time Workers’ Condi-
tions found that 29.1 percent of female part-timers earned between ¥.8 
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and ¥.1.0 million, and that 26.7 percent adjusted their hours so that their 
earnings would fall below these thresholds, with 19.4 percent of female 
part-timers seeking to keep their wages below ¥1.03 million (MHLW 
2002). 
Incentives for Employers
Companies also have financial incentives and the need for flexible 
staffing that make alternative forms of employment attractive, even if 
the wages paid regular and nonregular employees are the same. Employ-
ers bear one-half of the burden of supporting social insurance plans, but 
do not have to make contributions to unemployment insurance, pen-
sions, or health insurance, and do not have to handle payroll taxes for 
many part-time or temporary workers. They do not make unemploy-
ment insurance contributions for part-time employees who work less 
than 20 hours per week, and get a reduction on rates for those who work 
between 20 and 30 hours per week. Although they must make contri-
butions to social insurance schemes for those labeled as part-timers 
who work full-time hours, they do not pay pension or health insurance 
taxes for part-timers who work less than three-quarters of the weekly 
hours of regular workers.15 In the case of temporary workers, many of 
these costs are paid by the agencies that dispatch them (Houseman and 
Osawa 1995). Many firms also do not provide optional benefits, such 
as corporate insurance, company retirement allowances, or semiannual 
bonuses, to nonregular workers. 
Table 7.7 shows the proportion of employers who pay social in-
surance premiums for all, some, or none of their part-time employees, 
as well as the proportion providing retirement allowances, or bonuses. 
While most provide these benefits to all regular employees, few provide 
them for all part-time workers, and the difference may or may not be 
reflected in the wages paid to nonregular employees. The cost savings 
can be significant. Most regular Japanese employees receive bonus pay-
ments twice annually, in July and in December. Bonuses give Japanese 
companies some flexibility in personnel costs; they are adjusted to re-
flect firm performance and are therefore lower when the company is 
not doing well. In 2005, the average semiannual bonus for summer was 
¥470,00 ($3,917) (MHLW 2005). 
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Another reason that nonregular employment arrangements appeal 
to employers is their need for flexibility. Under the Japanese traditional 
lifetime employment system, employees joined the firm when young, 
worked hard for many years, and enjoyed gradual improvements in sal-
ary and position as they aged. As an organization grew, it was able to 
hire ever-larger numbers of young people who were relatively inexpen-
sive and managed by the more experienced workers. Without growth, 
there was an oversupply of more expensive middle-aged workers for 
the limited number of management posts available. 
For much of the period following World War II, the Japanese econ-
omy grew rapidly, allowing the lifetime employment model to develop 
and flourish. However, in recent years Japanese firms have found that 
constant growth is not possible. Furthermore, due to the rapid aging 
of Japan’s population, the average age of the Japanese workforce has 
increased. The high level of uncertainty that characterized the 1990s 





Unemployment insurance 100.0 53.2
Health insurance 100.0 36.0 
Pension insurance 100.0 33.1
Corporate insurance 23.0 3.1
Retirement allowance 66.1 7.3
Bonus 79.3 37.4
Employee survey
Unemployment insurance 99.4 56.4
Health insurance 99.6 36.3
Pension insurance 99.3 34.7
Corporate insurance 34.0 4.3
Retirement allowance 74.7 6.0 
Bonus 82.4 29.2
NOTE: Provision of unemployment, health, and pension insurance for regular workers 
is compulsory.
SOURCE: MHLW (2005).  
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took restructuring efforts, combined with the population demographic 
trends, made more flexible employment arrangements attractive. Con-
sequently, more temporary and part-time workers have been hired, 
without the implicit understanding that they will be trained, promoted, 
and given life-cycle wages. 
EFFECTS OF CONTINGENT EMPLOyMENT  
ON EMPLOyEES
How does being hired as a noncore worker affect the economic 
welfare of these employees? In this section, we look briefly at the dif-
ferences in compensation, social insurance coverage, career options, 
and legal protections. The question of whether employees voluntarily or 
involuntarily choose nonregular employment is discussed. Factors that 
may affect the future growth of nonregular employment are reviewed. 
Compensation
The best data on wage disparities deal with part-time workers. There 
is a significant difference between the average hourly wage for full- and 
part-time employees. In 2004, the average hourly wage for part-time 
female employees was ¥833 (roughly $7.00), less than two-thirds of 
the pay received by women in full-time positions (see Figure 7.2). Part-
time male employees earned more money, on average, but took home 
just over half of the average pay of their full-time counterparts (see 
Figure 7.3). Part-time workers of both genders earned, on average, con-
siderably more than the Japanese minimum wage.16 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 show how the difference between part- and full-
time wages has changed. In 1990, part-time women earned about 72 
percent of the wages full-time women did; this declined to about 65 
percent in 2004. Partly because full-time men tend to earn more than 
their female counterparts, the decline of about 7 percent has been less 
dramatic for part-time males. 
Due to the weak economy and continued deflation, wage growth 
for all types of workers in Japan has been limited. However, in general, 
part-time workers who stay with their employers do see their wages rise. 
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Some 29 percent of companies who participated in the MHLW study on 
part-time work reported that they had implemented periodic wage in-
creases for their part-time workers; 31 percent offered pay raises based 
on seniority and 56 percent offered semiannual bonuses to workers in 
this category (MHLW 2005). Several researchers have concluded that 
there is little difference in the pay raises offered to regular full-time and 
part-time female employees when wage data is adjusted for tenure with 
the employer and women who reduced their hours to remain under the 
¥1.3 million tax benefit threshold are eliminated from consideration.17 
The courts have prevented firms from taking unfair advantage of 
workers by simply labeling them nonregular workers. For example, in 
1996 an auto parts manufacturer was required to pay compensation to 
28 female pseudo-part-time workers who were doing essentially the 















































SOURCE: MHLW Basic Statistical Survey on Wage Structure, various years.  
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same work as full-time workers but were paid less. The court conclud-
ed that the guiding principle should be “same job, same pay” and that 
paying part-time workers less than 80 percent of the wages earned by 
full-time female employees in the same position with equal seniority is 
illegal (Japan Institute of Labour 1996).
Compensation, however, involves more than pay, and there are 
concerns that contingent workers may not receive important benefits. 
Health insurance coverage, a major issue in the United States, is not a 
problem for Japan’s nonregular employees due to the country’s national 
health insurance system, which covers everyone. Occupational safety 
and health coverage also is universal for all workers. However, the level 
of coverage for unemployment insurance, almost universal among reg-
ular employees, stands at only 53.2 percent for part-timers (Japan Insti-
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tute of Labour 1997). Similarly, just 33.1 percent of part-time workers 
are covered by the government’s mandatory pension scheme, similar to 
Social Security in the United States. However, married workers whose 
spouses are enrolled in these programs qualify for benefits through their 
working spouses (Houseman and Osawa 1995). 
Nonregular employees also may suffer from not being allowed to 
participate in employer bonus or retirement allowance programs estab-
lished for regular workers. Table 7.7 shows three-quarters of surveyed 
employers said that all of their regular employees were involved in re-
tirement allowance programs and 82.4 percent gave all regular employ-
ees bonuses, but only 6 percent reported offering retirement allowances 
to part-timers and only 29.2 percent gave bonuses to part-timers. As 
discussed earlier, those semiannual bonuses represent a relatively large 
amount of money: about $8,000 for 2005. 
Retirement allowances are one-time lump sum severance payments 
given to workers when they leave an organization. In firms that have 
such plans, the amount received is based on company policy, usually 
reflecting salary, level, and years of service. Even for young female 
workers the amounts can be significant, and for older workers they rep-
resent a considerable retirement resource. The average retirement al-
lowance paid to a 60-year-old male college graduate who retires after 
spending his entire working career at a single firm in clerical or techni-
cal positions and was promoted at an average rate was ¥24.35 million 
(approximately $202,000) in 2005.18 Nonregular workers who do not 
benefit from bonus and retirement allowance plans may be at a financial 
disadvantage compared with regular workers. 
To summarize, benefit coverage is not as complete for many non-
regular workers as for regular workers, although the lack of medical 
insurance is not a problem. Wages, on average, are lower, but those who 
remain in their positions see their earnings rise at about the same pace 
as regular employees with similar tenure.
Career Paths
Many part-time workers remain with the same firm for many years. 
Over 40 percent have tenure of 5 years or more, and 18.1 percent have 
been with their employers 10 years or more, with the average being 5.8 
years. This compares to an average of 4.8 years in 1995, when only 30 
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percent of part-timers had tenure of 5 years or longer. As these figures 
show, average tenure is growing as part-time workers remain with the 
same organization (MHLW 2002). Those who stay longer may become 
quite valuable to their employers. Several researchers have made a dis-
tinction between “core” part-timers, who may handle important tasks, 
including managing other part-time workers, and “supplementary” part-
timers whose work tends to involve more simple, repetitive tasks and 
who have little opportunity for advancement or pay increases. There are 
no data that provide a good estimate of how many part-time workers fall 
into the two categories. However, it is clear that some of these workers 
do have opportunities for skill development and advancement, although 
they do not have access to the same management-training programs 
available to regular career-track employees. In the case of dispatched 
workers, the main opportunities lie in improving skills to justify bet-
ter assignments and pay. In addition to development through work as-
signments, some dispatching firms offer training programs. While some 
dispatched workers are eventually hired by the firms to which they are 
sent, there currently is not a strong trend toward using temporary as-
signments as a way to screen prospective employees, as has become 
popular with some firms in the United States. However, the idea that 
such a strategy may work appears to lie behind the recent changes in the 
Worker Dispatching Law, and many larger companies do report having 
systems for switching workers to regular employee status.
Legal Protection
Nonregular workers have the same protections that regular work-
ers do and may not be discriminated against because of their national-
ity, age, or gender. Since so many nonregular workers are women, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Law passed in 1986 and strengthened 
in 1999 is particularly relevant. While the first version of the law en-
couraged employers to “endeavor” not to discriminate against women, 
the current (1999) version flatly forbids unequal treatment of male and 
female workers in terms of hiring, pay, promotion, and training, in ad-
dition to requiring employers to help prevent sexual harassment in the 
workplace. Part-time workers also have some legal protection under 
the admittedly weak Part-Time Work Law, which states that employers 
should “endeavor” to effectively utilize part-timers’ abilities and main-
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tain balance with regular workers in terms of working conditions, train-
ing, improving employee welfare, and improving employment manage-
ment. The law also says that part-time workers employed continuously 
for one year or more should be given advance notice when the employ-
ment contract is to be terminated (Kezuka 2000). 
Employment security is one major respect in which contingent 
workers are often viewed as being at a disadvantage. Japanese non-
regular workers can, however, obtain employment security through 
continual renewal of contracts and long tenure. In general, Japanese 
employers are prohibited from abusing their right to dismiss employ-
ees, and without being able to show significant cause, it is more dif-
ficult to justify the termination of workers who have worked at a firm 
for a long period of time, whether as a regular employee or through 
regular renewal of employment agreements.19 However, employers are 
more strictly bound in terms of their ability to dismiss regular workers 
with indefinite-term contracts than they are nonregular workers with 
fixed-term contracts. When economic conditions within a firm neces-
sitate layoffs, employers have been allowed to dismiss part-time and 
other such nonregular workers first, depending on the circumstances 
(Kezuka 2000). Recently, however, employers seem to be choosing to 
add nonregular workers rather than cut them. It is interesting to note 
that, despite the economic struggles that have forced many firms to lay 
off employees as part of restructuring efforts, the number of nonregular 
workers continues to grow. Fewer than one in five employers gave the 
ease of conducting employment adjustment as a reason for hiring non-
regular employees in the survey summarized in Table 7.4. Employers 
apparently are not simply seeking workers they can quickly eliminate. 
They are in large part motivated by the other benefits associated with 
hiring nonregular workers.
voluntary or Involuntary Decision?
Have nonregular workers taken such jobs by choice or because they 
did not have other employment options? The answers are complex. 
Workers in the two major groups of nonregular employees do not have 
the same benefits as core workers in terms of compensation or career 
options, but it does not appear that all of these workers have low-pay-
ing, dead-end jobs. In the surveys reported earlier we noted that many 
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enjoyed the shorter hours, flexibility, and in the case of male dispatched 
workers, good pay. On the other hand, the less-permanent nature of 
such employment agreements is bound to bother some. Indeed, in a 
1999 survey 22 percent of temporary and 20 percent of other nonregu-
lar employees and dispatched workers wished to change jobs. Some 
30 percent of the unhappy part-time and temporary workers cited the 
casual nature of their employment as a major reason, as did 26 percent 
of other nonregular workers and dispatched workers (Japan Institute of 
Labour 1999b).
As several writers have noted, the relatively high job-opening-to-
applicant ratio for part-timers seems to indicate that employer desires 
are driving the growth in nonregular employment (Osawa and Kingston 
1996; Wakisaka 1997). The same could be said of the rapid growth in 
dispatched employment, which has occurred during an economic slump 
that has made it more difficult for female workers, particularly, to find 
positions as regular employees. However, the issue is complex. As we 
have shown, there are many reasons why women with families may find 
more flexible working conditions and shorter hours attractive, particu-
larly if they are offered some opportunities for advancement and pay 
increases. For some workers, nonregular employment may in fact be a 
voluntary choice to support their preferred lifestyle. Others, however, 
are dissatisfied with these employment arrangements and have taken 
nonregular positions only because they were unable to find other work. 
While this may be partly due to the poor economy, it is somewhat of 
a concern that the majority of the affected workers are women. Not all 
women in Japan enjoy the financial support of an employed spouse. 
Divorced and widowed women and others who must earn money to 
support their families need access to regular employment opportunities 
that will provide them with good incomes and opportunities. 
Trends That May Affect Nonregular Employment
There are a number of trends in Japan that may have an impact on 
the growth in nonregular employment. The first is the rapid aging of 
the country’s workforce. Birthrates have been falling for years and are 
now at a record low, meaning there will be fewer young, inexpensive 
recent graduates for Japanese firms to hire in the future. The fertility 
rate in 2004 showed that the average Japanese woman is having just 1.3 
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children in her lifetime. Given the decline in fertility, a labor shortage 
is a strong possibility in the next 20 years. However, shortages have not 
yet occurred due to a decade of economic malaise and Japan’s “second 
baby boom generation.” The corporate restructuring and bankruptcies 
related to the weak economy, however, have left many former regular 
employees seeking jobs in an unwelcoming job market. Opportunities 
for older workers, particularly, are limited. 
The government has introduced a number of policies in response to 
these trends, and some of them have implications for nonregular em-
ployment in the future. First, the government has announced the goal 
of working toward a “gender-equal” society (Japan Institute of Labour 
1999c). Concrete measures include the introduction of a mandatory 
child care leave to care for infants up to 18 months old. The law was 
recently expanded so that both male and female workers qualify for 
leave. While government targets call for 80 percent of mothers and 10 
percent of fathers to use the program, current rates are 73.1 percent for 
women and a mere 0.44 percent for men. The government has recently 
set up a new grant program to encourage small and midsize firms to 
develop leave programs by partially subsidizing them. Workers also 
receive financial support for leaves. Through the social security sys-
tem mothers and fathers of new infants on leave receive 30 percent of 
their salaries, and upon return to work 10 percent of their salaries are 
temporarily subsidized. This leave program makes it possible for new 
mothers to keep their jobs as regular employees (Japanese Institute for 
Labour Policy and Training 2005b). Inexpensive, high-quality, govern-
ment-supported day care has long been available to Japanese women 
who are working, studying, or caring for invalids, although the centers 
are not necessarily open as late as many regular employees are expected 
to work. 
Officials are also encouraging firms to hire all regular employees 
—male and female—under the same system, rather than having both 
a “career track” for men and exceptionally promising women and a 
“support staff track” for other women, as has been common in the past. 
Although heavy work expectations still pose a barrier for those with 
families, such measures may open the way for more women to start in 
and keep the same sort of regular, career-track positions as their male 
colleagues rather than starting out as support staff, quitting, and then 
returning as nonregular employees. 
Gleason.indb   232 11/13/2006   9:06:59 AM
Japan’s Growing Shadow Workforce   233
For those who find themselves working in nonregular positions, 
laws on part-time employment and worker dispatching have been cre-
ated to ensure more fair treatment; a special panel convened to study 
these issues. These measures are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. 
The recent amendments to the Worker Dispatching Law, of course, hold 
great potential impact. In allowing nearly all types of jobs to be filled 
by dispatched workers, and permitting dispatched workers to be used 
for longer periods, the government has sought to introduce greater flex-
ibility in the external labor market and create new ways for workers to 
find firms that need their skills.20 The downside is the possibility that 
these policies could open the way for workers to fall into “permanently 
temporary” slots. This is one area that certainly bears close watching.
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR  
FUTURE RESEARCH
Nonregular employment has grown dramatically over the past few 
years, with about one-third of Japan’s workforce and over 40 percent 
of working women falling into this “contingent” category. Workers in 
part-time employment, the largest nonregular sector, are attractive to 
employers because of lower costs and flexibility. Many female employ-
ees choose part-time work because of shorter hours that fit with their 
schedules. Growth also appears poised to take off in the dispatched em-
ployee category due to regulatory changes that allow expanded use of 
temporary workers and a large pool of potential workers who have had 
fewer regular employment options in the sluggish economy, although 
this may be changing. However, the future of nonregular employment 
also will depend on changes in the way that companies are managed, 
social trends concerning women, and changing demographics. The ef-
fects of new regulations will need to be carefully researched in order to 
make any accurate projections.
There are several important topics to be addressed in future research. 
One important area for analysis is worker dispatching by temporary 
employment agencies. Researchers need to closely follow the effects of 
deregulation to uncover where and how such workers are used, as well 
as the characteristics of dispatched workers and the effects of nonregu-
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lar employment on them and their families. Particularly important from 
the standpoint of policy development is to determine whether a per-
manently less-advantaged class of workers is developing. Successful 
temporary-to-permanent hiring programs should be identified and any 
important lessons shared.
Additionally, it is important to track the effects of government ef-
forts to create a more gender-equal society. Until now, nonregular em-
ployment has been very much a gender issue with most affected work-
ers being female. If the new policies are effective, the percentage of 
nonregular employees who are women should fall. If it does not, future 
research should look at why the government’s approach is not working 
and what else can be done. 
Another important topic for future research is how the nonregular 
workers are being used in industries where growth in this type of em-
ployment is most noticeable, including transportation, wholesale/retail 
trade, and restaurants. Because of the prevalence of nonregular workers 
in the retail industry, this is one area where new ways of treating such 
workers has emerged. For example, one large supermarket chain has 
announced a policy allowing workers to switch between different em-
ployment tracks as their family situations change. Part-timers willing 
to switch to regular full-time status and accept transfers to other loca-
tions may be able to earn promotions; regular full-timers may choose 
to become part-timers assigned to just one area (Japan Institute of La-
bour 2002). Approaches like this one provide greater flexibility to make 
changes in employment status, work hours, and location throughout the 
very different stages of a worker’s family life cycle and career, with 
strong potential benefits for both workers and employers. Such innova-
tive programs need to be studied so that they can be improved and “best 
practices” spread throughout the country. 
Nonregular employment holds advantages for both workers and 
employers. However, both researchers and policymakers must closely 
monitor this growing phenomenon to ensure that nonregular workers 
are not permanently enshadowed by clearly inferior conditions without 
obtaining some benefits. 
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Notes
 1.  Japan’s so-called lifetime employment system represents an overall approach to 
human resource management. However, it does not necessarily mean a guaran-
teed job for life for all workers. This system involves a strong reliance on internal 
labor markets: firms focus their recruitment and hiring efforts on new graduates 
who are trained by the organization and promoted as their skills and experience 
increase. Students at high schools, technical schools, and universities are recruit-
ed for organizational career tracks designed to fit their presumed ability levels 
and interests. When faced with financial difficulties, firms try other approaches 
to boosting firm performance, including reassigning staff to new areas or related 
companies, before laying off regular employees in any career track. 
 2. Slow economic growth has been a problem for Japan for over a decade, as com-
panies have struggled to deal with the after effects of an investment “bubble” 
that developed in the late 1980s and burst as the Bank of Japan moved to raise 
interest rates and tighten the money supply at the end of the decade. Recovery 
has been complicated by the need to switch to a more service-oriented, advanced 
economy. Since the early 1990s, the Japanese economy has struggled with fall-
ing stock and real estate prices, which skyrocketed during the bubble period and 
have gradually fallen to the levels of a much earlier era. According to the most 
recent Japan	 Statistical	 Yearbook (Japanese Ministry of Public Management, 
Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications 2003, 2005), by 2002 real estate 
values in the country’s urban areas stood at just 65 percent of what they were 
at their peak in 1990, and in the country’s six largest cities average land prices 
were just 30 percent of 1990 levels, having fallen to where they stood in the early 
1980s. A similar pattern can be seen in stock prices. Despite an impressive rise 
during 2005, at year’s end the Nikkei average was still less than half where it 
stood in 1990. 
 3. Many writers have pointed out that workers at smaller subcontracting firms also 
have “contingent” employment as the work they do for larger companies may be 
handled internally during slow periods, leading to bankruptcy or layoffs among 
subcontractors. However, since regular employees at even small firms enjoy the 
full benefits of employment as long as their firms are operating, we have chosen 
to focus on workers in organizations of all sizes whose employment agreements 
are more flexible. For a lengthier discussion of how employment at subcontract-
ing firms may be viewed as somewhat contingent, see Clark (1988) and Abeg-
glen and Stalk (1990).
 4. Japan’s Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Labour (MHWL) performs many of the 
same functions as the U.S. Department of Labor. It is responsible for drafting and 
enforcing labor regulations, as well as gathering, synthesizing, and providing 
information on labor-related topics. The former Ministry of Labour was recently 
combined with the Ministry of Health and Welfare, creating a larger organization 
with a wider set of responsibilities.
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 5. Due to changing demographics in Japan, the workforce is growing older and the 
government has been working to gradually raise the age at which workers can 
benefit from the national pension system—just as the U.S. has been raising the 
age at which people can collect Social Security benefits. See Fujimura (2001) 
for a discussion of mandatory retirement as well as pensions. The article also 
describes a reemployment program for retirees at Matsushita.
  6.  See Morishima and Shimanuki (2005) for a discussion of dispatching, and for 
legal changes see Mizushima (2004). 
 7. For further information on the purpose and content of the legislation see Araki 
(1999). Also see Chapter 8 for a more detailed discussion of the changes.
  8. A breakdown of these data by age or gender is not available; however, historical 
trends in education are reflected here. In the 1960s only 15 percent of the popula-
tion attended college and 50 percent completed high school, while today these 
numbers are 50 percent and 95 percent, respectively. Returns to education have 
traditionally been lower for women, and men have historically been more likely 
to have a higher level of schooling. Therefore, many of those with low education 
levels are older workers, and quite a few of them are women.
  9. For a discussion of reasons temporary employment can benefit firms in the U.S. 
context see Greenberger, Heneman, and Skoglind (1997), pp. 93–104. Also see 
Chapters 2 and 3.
 10. For an analysis of reasons companies have treated women differently, see Waki-
saka (1997).
 11. A lengthier discussion and data are found in Imada (1997).
 12. Yen figures have been converted at an exchange rate of ¥120 = US$1, which has 
been a common level over the past few years.
 13. Women whose earnings fall above the threshold and thus must pay social insur-
ance premiums do not necessarily receive higher benefits, so married women 
working part-time are not disadvantaged in terms of health care or pensions. 
 14. For further discussion of the allowances see Houseman and Osawa (1995).
 15. While the United States has had a standard 40-hour work week in all industries 
for many years, Japan has phased out a six-day work week more recently, so 
three-quarters of the hours of a regular worker was used as a cutoff rather than 
30 hours.
 16. Minimum wage levels in Japan vary by region and industry. They are revised an-
nually by the government. In October 2005 the highest general hourly minimum 
wage in Japan was applied in Tokyo, at ¥714 per hour.
 17. For detailed analyses of the effects of financial and tax incentives on women’s 
work hours, see Ichino (1985, 1989). Also helpful are Kantani (1994) and Waki-
saka (1997). For an excellent discussion on how the ¥1.03 million tax/earnings 
threshold and minimum wage rates may affect part-time wages, see Abe (2002) 
and Nagase (2002).
 18. For more information see the September 2004 survey of companies belonging 
to Nippon Keidanren and the Tokyo Employers’ Association, as reported in 
Japanese Institute for Labour Policy and Training (2005a).
 19. Unlike U.S. companies who regularly initiate layoffs as a way of improving an 
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already-strong financial performance, legally Japanese firms must show that they 
are seriously suffering financially and have tried all other reasonable means be-
fore cutting staff. 
 20. For a discussion of the background of these changes, see Araki (1999).
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8
Employment Policies and  
Labor Union Activities for  
Part-Time Workers and  
Dispatched Workers in Japan
Kazunari Honda
Kokugakuin	University
This chapter discusses part-time workers and workers dispatched 
to client companies by temporary employment agencies from the view-
point of government employment policies and labor union activities in 
Japan. Although there are several types of nonregular employment in 
Japan, part-time and dispatched workers hired through temporary em-
ployment agencies are, respectively, the largest and most rapidly grow-
ing groups. Government and unions concentrate their policies, employ-
ment services, and activities on these two groups in the labor force.1
This chapter also provides an overview of the governmental insti-
tutional framework for the employment policies of the Japanese Min-
istry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW, formerly the Ministry of 
Labour, MOL) for part-time and dispatched workers. It discusses the 
content of the Part-Time Work Law (PWL) designed to protect the eco-
nomic welfare of part-time employees and employer efforts to imple-
ment the law, and reviews the main features and recent reforms of the 
Worker Dispatching Law (WDL) that legalized temporary employment 
agencies in Japan. In addition, the chapter describes the public employ-
ment services provided to these two groups of workers.
Another objective of this chapter is to review labor union activities 
focused on part-time and dispatched workers, in particular the role of 
unions in the development of the PWL and WDL and union organiz-
ing activities targeted at part-time workers. The chapter concludes by 
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discussing implications for future government and union activities and 
identifying issues for future research. 
EMPLOyMENT POLICIES: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK
According to Article 4 of the Employment Measures Law of 1966, 
the Japanese government is required to develop periodic employment 
plans to support the goal of full employment.2 The Ninth Basic Plan for 
Employment (covering 1999 through 2009) encourages several actions 
to improve employment conditions for part-time workers and workers 
dispatched by temporary employment agencies. These recommenda-
tions were developed in response to recent changes on both the supply 
and demand sides of the labor market. Some of the changes in the cur-
rent and future supply of labor include the reduced rate of child bearing 
by Japanese women, an increasing population of older workers, and 
interest in enhancing female labor force participation. The changing in-
dustrial and occupational composition of the Japanese labor force in re-
sponse to the growth of the technology and service sectors has resulted 
in a greater interest from Japanese employers in hiring workers who are 
not part of the lifetime employment system. These changes in the labor 
market have increased the need for part-time and temporary workers. 
The Japanese government considers part-time and dispatched work-
ers to be economically vulnerable; they need better job information and 
employment assistance to improve their working conditions. Also, they 
need protection from employers who have poor management practices; 
for example, cancelling a dispatched worker’s contract without notice 
prior to its expiration date. 
New protections through improvements in Japanese labor laws are 
recommended by the Ninth Basic Plan (for further details see Sugeno 
and Suwa [1997]). The plan recommends that the Japanese government 
help part-time workers find jobs by expanding the public employment 
offices and services and seeking appropriate treatment by employers 
for part-time workers based on the PWL discussed in the following sec-
tion. For dispatched workers, the plan recommends streamlining the 
labor market adjustment function by having the government monitor 
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the dispatching worker business in industries and occupations where 
the use of dispatched workers is already popular. Particular concerns 
are conditions of employment, training opportunities, and the provision 
of social security coverage. The plan also recommends further discus-
sion about dispatched work and the collection of data to document and 
analyze the workplace and labor market conditions that these workers 
face. The plan thus holds out the promise of a redesign of the range 
of the industries and occupations which can be served by temporary 
employment agencies and improvements in the working conditions of 
dispatched workers. 
EMPLOyMENT POLICIES FOR PART-TIME WORKERS
Japanese employment policies covering part-time workers include 
two major components: the PWL of 1993 and a national system of job 
placement assistance. However, since the PWL is not legally binding to 
employers, relatively few have fully implemented its requirements. 
Part-Time Work Law 
The PWL and the public policies that preceded it were a response to 
the many problems encountered by this group of workers. For example, 
although employers were required by the Labour Standards Law to hire 
part-time workers based on a written contract, contracts often were not 
provided. 
The PWL was based on two earlier public policies: a 1984 govern-
ment memorandum on part-time work and part-time work guidelines de-
veloped in 1989.3 The PWL defines part-time workers as those whose 
working hours in a week are shorter than full-time regular workers (nor-
mally 40 hours a week) in the same business unit. This means that part-
time workers who actually work full time are not covered by the PWL. 
For example, see the critical discussion of Mizumachi (1997). The law’s 
primary purpose is to improve the treatment of these workers through 
three objectives: 1) secure appropriate employment conditions, 2) provide 
education and training to support improvements in management practices, 
and 3) improve the social security system for part-time workers. 
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The critical section of the PWL is Article 6, which requires em-
ployers to provide both written employment contracts to part-time 
workers and advance written notice of the termination of a contract to 
a part-time worker who has been continuously employed for more than 
one year (Kezuka 2000). The MHLW has advised employers to issue 
written employment documents, called employment notices, which de-
scribe major working conditions. In addition, subsidies are provided by 
the Japanese government to help employers improve their systems for 
managing part-time workers, such as providing management training 
and hiring personnel who specialize in managing part-time workers. 
Unfortunately, the employer responsibilities defined by the PWL are 
not legally binding. As a result, many of the problems the PWL sought 
to remedy still exist. The current policy debate focuses on whether or 
not the law should shift to a compulsory basis to ensure equal treatment 
of part-time workers and full-time regular workers. Japanese labor law-
yers are divided over the creation of a new law with strict enforcement 
mechanisms (Mizumachi 1997). 
Employer Implementation of the PWL
Despite publicity about the PWL, many employers are unaware of 
it. According to the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (1998), which sur-
veyed employers in Tokyo to determine their awareness of the law, only 
29 percent of the respondents indicated the law was “known” to them. 
At the other extreme, 15.2 percent indicated they had “never known” 
about the PWL. The largest respondent category was 52 percent of em-
ployers who answered “knows the law, but does not know the condi-
tion,” that is, they did not know what the law required of them.
However, according to three MHLW reports on part-time workers, 
more employers have begun to use written rather than oral employment 
contracts with part-time workers (MHLW 2002; MOL 1991a, 1997). 
Table 8.1 indicates the methods used to explain the expected employ-
ment conditions to part-time workers during the hiring process. Three 
primary methods are identified: 1) reliance on oral contracts, 2) issuing 
written contracts specifying the conditions of employment, and 3) ap-
plying existing work practice rules.
The total indicating the use of “any methods to clarify the working 
conditions of part-time workers” did not change appreciably in 1990, 
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Table	8.1		Employer’s	Clarification	of	Part-Time	Working	Conditions	in	Hiring	(%)





Mainly issuing the 




workplace rules Others Not clarifying




employees 100.0 98.1 98.2 98.4 66.5 59.6 45.9 15.8 24.6 40.2 13.9 14.4 12.7 1.9 1.4 1.1 1.9 1.8 1.6
1,000+ 100.0 99.8 100.0 99.9 32.1 18.8 13.5 21.9 31.8 61.0 44.7 47.8 24.9 1.1 1.5 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.1
500–999 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0 24.0 23.3 13.4 40.2 38.9 68.1 27.4 31.8 18.4 8.3 6.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 —
300–499 100.0 99.1 100.0 100.0 27.1 30.7 23.6 39.5 46.5 62.7 26.2 22.5 13.6 6.3 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.0 —
100–299 100.0 97.7 99.8 99.7 49.7 42.1 44.3 20.9 37.7 44.3 26.3 18.8 11.2 0.9 1.4 0.2 2.3 0.2 0.3
30–99 100.0 98.3 97.7 99.6 64.3 62.3 45.9 21.7 26.3 41.2 9.1 10.9 12.5 3.2 0.5 0.4 1.7 2.3 0.4
5–29 100.0 97.5 97.2 96.7 81.7 81.2 66.6 9.2 12.4 23.5 5.5 5.5 8.5 1.1 0.8 1.5 2.5 2.8 3.3
SOURCE: MHLW 2002; MOL (1991a, 1997). 
G
leason.indb   245
11/13/2006   9:07:00 A
M
246   Honda
1995, and 2001, but some response categories changed. For example, 
the use of “unwritten oral contracts” decreased from 66.5 percent to 
45.9 percent between 1990 and 2001. Also “mainly applying the exist-
ing work practice rules” declined slightly, from 13.0 percent to 12.7 
percent. However, during the same period, the use of written contracts 
“mainly issuing the contract stating the working conditions” increased 
from 15.8 percent of employers to 40.2 percent. Clearly a trend toward 
switching from verbal agreements to written contractual agreements 
when hiring part-time workers is evident, particularly in large compa-
nies with 1,000 or more employees. 
Table 8.2 illustrates the same trend toward formalizing employment 
arrangements for part-time workers. Respondents replying “no part-
time working rules” decreased from 38.8 percent of employers in 1990 
to 15.2 percent in 2001. A marked decline occurred for all employers 
except those employing 500–999 employees.
Other evidence of the positive effects of the PWL on management 
practices is an increase in the percentage of employers who contract 
employment for a specified period and clearly indicate the termination 
date of the contract. As Table 8.3 shows, employers who have contracts 
with part-time workers for work for specified periods of time increased 
from 30.4 percent in 1990 to 52.9 percent in 2001. Employers who 
inform part-time workers of their end dates of employment 30 days be-
forehand increased from 15.8 percent in 1990 to 69.0 percent in 2001. 
These survey results are consistent with the results in Table 8.1 and 
Table 8.2 and for companies of all sizes. 
Table 8.2  Companies without Rules for Part-Time Workers (%)
1990 1995 2001
Total 38.8 19.9 15.2
Number of employees
1,000 + 11.4   5.6 2.4
500–999   1.8 10.9 1.8
300–499 20.5   7.2 3.1
100–299 24.3 19.0 5.8
30–99 28.8 23.6 6.5
5–29 53.1 25.4 27.7
SOURCE: MHLW 2002; MOL (1991a, 1997). 
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Table 8.3  Situations of Determining Employment Periods and Giving Previous Information Regarding the  
Termination of Employment (%)                                                                                                                                                                                 






30 days before Several cases Not determined




employees 100.0 30.4 40.6 52.9 15.8 66.5 69.0   4.5 4.5 5.3 10.2 29.0 25.8 69.6 59.4 47.1
1,000 + 100.0 71.6 80.4 92.2 49.2 79.1 76.4   7.0 5.0 7.4 15.3 15.9 16.2 28.4 17.8   7.8
500–999 100.0 67.2 82.2 85.1 44.4 66.3 86.1 13.8 10.3 1.0   9.0 23.4 12.9 32.8 26.1 14.9
300–499 100.0 70.2 73.9 66.7 40.3 62.9 80.9   9.7 6.9 8.5 20.1 30.3 10.6 29.8 50.3 33.3
100–299 100.0 41.2 49.7 62.6 22.8 63.2 59.9   7.9  2.7 7.4 10.5 34.2 32.7 58.8 62.8 37.4
30–99 100.0 27.3 37.2 47.4 12.3 60.3 63.8   4.2  3.6 6.2 10.8 36.1 30.0 72.7 80.5 52.6
5–29 100.0 16.8 19.5 30.1   6.6 55.4 61.5   2.8  3.0 2.9   7.5 41.6 25.6 83.2 80.5 69.9
SOURCE: MHLW 2002; MOL (1991a, 1997). 
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Public Employment Services for Part-Time Workers
The most significant MHLW service for part-time workers is the na-
tional system of public employment service offices,4 called “part-timers 
banks,” and their associated satellite offices. The satellite offices offer 
the same services as the banks, but are smaller offices placed in more 
locations to improve access by those workers needing their services. 
The first 3 banks were created in 1982 and the first 15 satellites were 
created in 1991, followed by the continual increases in the numbers of 
both types of offices. As of 1998 there were 80 banks and 85 satellite 
offices. 
Both the part-timers banks and satellite offices were created specifi-
cally to help part-time workers find jobs other than public employment 
positions. The MHLW provides a variety of services to accomplish this 
objective. These services include the provision of information about 
employment opportunities, skills training, individual career counseling, 
training in job search methods, and other forms of job placement assis-
tance. However, while workers are looking for part-time employment, 
they have to apply to the regular public employment service office to 
receive unemployment insurance benefits.
Figure 8.1 shows the number of part-time workers who looked for 
and found jobs by using all public employment offices, including the 
part-time workers offices. The number of part-time workers using these 
services rose from about 178,000 in 1980 to 1,046,000 in 2001. Of 
these, the number of those who worked more than one month and less 
than four months ranged between 5,000 and 8,000 in each year.
The number of part-time workers who had jobs rose steadily in 
most of the years from 1980 through 2001. There were about 485,000 
workers with jobs in 2001 as compared to about 76,000 in 1980. The 
ratio of those who sought part-time jobs to those who found part-time 
jobs was relatively stable in the range of about 35 percent to 47 percent. 
The number of the workers who sought and found part-time jobs has 
increased since the 1990s primarily because during the last recession 
employers shifted to hiring more part-time workers instead of full-time 
regular employees to reduce their labor costs. 
Figure 8.2 shows the number of part-time workers who looked for 
and found jobs by using only the part-time worker banks and their sat-
ellite offices. From 1982 (when these specialized offices were created) 
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through 2001, the percentage of part-time workers who found employ-
ment with their assistance ranged from approximately 4 percent to 40 
percent. 
The trend in Figure 8.2 is quite similar to that in Figure 8.1. The 
number of part-time workers using the services of these offices rose 
from about 8,500 in 1982 to about 305,000 in 2001. Part-time workers 
who found jobs also constantly increased from about 2,900 in 1982 to 
about 114,000 in 2001. The percentage of those being hired was be-
tween about 34 percent and 43 percent.
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EMPLOyMENT POLICIES FOR DISPATCHED WORKERS
Worker dispatching businesses, called temporary employment 
agencies in the United States and Europe, supply workers to clients who 
employ these workers in their businesses. Although worker dispatching 
businesses grew in Japan during the 1970s, their growth was restricted 
by the Employment Security Law, which prohibited them except where 
employment arrangements were made by written contracts with strict 
requirements about the content of the contracts. Since many worker dis-
patching companies disguised their work as contract work in the 1970s, 
most were probably illegal. 
Thus, although the Japanese government did not prohibit these busi-
nesses due to strong market demands for temporary workers, they were 
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strictly regulated. However, as the number of temporary employment 
agencies expanded, some regulation became necessary. Consequently, 
the Worker Dispatching Law (WDL) was enacted in 1985. It created a 
legal private sector mechanism to supplement the public employment 
offices in matching workers and employers, with strict regulation of the 
methods of operation of temporary employment agencies. In addition, a 
variety of public services were provided to dispatched workers.      
The WDL has four major components. First, the law restricts by 
occupation the kinds of jobs at which dispatched workers can work.5 
Second, it creates two types of worker dispatching businesses: those 
that handle workers who are already employed, and those that handle 
workers seeking jobs. The former is usually called “employment dis-
patching,” and the latter is referred to as “register dispatching.”6 One 
business unit cannot offer both types of service. Workers can be reg-
istered by one or more dispatching businesses. Third, the law aims to 
improve the working conditions of dispatched workers. For example, 
the law requires both the dispatching business and the client company 
hiring the workers to issue a written contract to dispatched workers, 
thereby regulating the conditions of employment and dismissal.7 Final-
ly, the WDL stipulates penalties for possible infractions of the law by 
dispatching companies. 
The last revision of the WDL became effective in December 2000.8 
This revision included four significant changes. First, it changed the 
regulation from listing only the 26 occupations that could be filled by 
dispatched workers (the “negative list” system) to listing only the nar-
row set of jobs for which dispatched workers cannot be hired (the “posi-
tive list” system). Second, it sets a limit on the employment period of 
one year for dispatched workers for the same jobs as those filled by full-
time employees to encourage employers to move dispatched workers to 
full-time regular employment.
Third, the law establishes client employers’ responsibilities for cov-
ering the damages of dispatched workers who were discharged before 
the end of their contracts. This change is designed to address identified 
abuses of treatment. For example, a Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
(1999) survey showed that 13.9 percent of register dispatched workers 
were asked to leave their jobs or were discharged during the contract 
period; 57.1 percent of dispatching agents had their contracts broken by 
the client employer.
Gleason.indb   251 11/13/2006   9:07:00 AM
252   Honda
Finally, the Japanese government was concerned about protecting 
the privacy of dispatched workers. The revision of the law outlines the 
responsibilities of the dispatching company for managing individual 
information. 
Public services for dispatched workers are administrated by the 
MHLW. The main services are the deployment of advisors to provide 
assistance to employers on managing their dispatched workers and on 
procedures for handling grievances. The advisors provide training for 
the management specialists at both the dispatching and receiving client 
companies. Also, subsidies are provided to help cover the employers’ 
costs for appropriate employment management services for dispatched 
workers. 
Assistance with the handling of grievances is important because 
there is a high rate of grievances from dispatched workers against both 
the dispatching and receiving companies. For example, according to the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government survey (1999), 30.6 percent of regis-
ter dispatched workers filed grievances. Grievances cover such mat-
ters as contract concerns, wage levels, and shop floor human relations 
issues. The MHLW also directly receives grievances from dispatched 
workers through telephone calls. However, since the system covers just 
a small portion of those who have grievances, it is unclear how effective 
the advice and consultation provided by telephone is in the settlement 
of grievances. 
UNION ACTIvITIES: THE CONTExT
Approximately 20 percent of the Japanese labor force was union-
ized in 2002 (MHLW 2002). Unions are particularly important in large 
enterprises with more than 1,000 employees; about 55 percent of work-
ers in these large companies are unionized. What makes the Japanese 
union structure distinctive is the dominance of unions organized at the 
enterprise level. These enterprise unions account for more than 90 per-
cent of all union membership.9 
Until relatively recently, Japanese unions did not actively seek part-
time workers and dispatched workers as members. However, as the em-
ployment of low-wage part-time and dispatched workers has grown, 
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unions have realized a potential danger: if a gap exists between the 
wage levels of full-time regular workers and part-time and dispatched 
workers, employers will seek to replace more expensive full-time regu-
lar workers with nonregular workers. 
In response to this threat, unions have used two strategies to main-
tain their bargaining power. First, unions have supported public poli-
cies that seek to reduce, and ultimately eliminate, the differences in the 
employment conditions between full-time regular workers, part-time 
workers, and dispatched workers. Second, some unions have begun to 
organize part-time workers as union members to enhance union bar-
gaining power. 
UNION ACTIvITIES FOCUSED ON PART-TIME WORKERS
Union Involvement in the Development of the Part-Time  
Work Law
Labor unions have been heavily involved in the development of 
Japanese government employment policies, including those aimed at 
part-time and dispatched workers.10 The Japanese Private Sector Trade 
Union Confederation (Private Rengo) strongly supported the PWL and 
urged the MOL to enact this legislation in 1984.11 Instead, the Japanese 
government produced a memorandum on part-time work, which failed 
to present a clear direction for the growth of part-time work. Subse-
quently, in 1988 Private Rengo developed its own policies for part-time 
workers to encourage government commitment to union guidelines. 
In response the MOL took two actions in 1989. First, it replaced 
the 1984 working memorandum with guidelines for employers on part-
time work. These guidelines clearly identified part-time workers as 
a key workforce in industry. They offered guidance to employers on 
providing appropriate working conditions. Second, the MOL extended 
the coverage of the Employment Insurance Law, which provides un-
employment insurance to qualified part-time workers. However, Rengo 
criticized the government guidelines because they only offered advice 
to employers and did not provide a legal enforcement mechanism. Ren-
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go continued to advocate the enactment of the PWL from 1990 until its 
passage in 1993. 
The passage of the PWL still did not satisfy Rengo, however. It ar-
gued that the PWL did not provide the level of protection for part-time 
workers that was needed, particularly due to the absence of legal penal-
ties for the employers who did not follow the law. Consequently, Rengo 
pursued two strategies simultaneously. It continued to develop draft 
proposals for revisions of the PWL, which were submitted to the MOL. 
In addition, Rengo again developed new policies on part-time work. It 
urged discussion of revisions of the PWL in 1996 in the government 
councils discussing part-time work. In response to pressure from Ren-
go, the MOL set up the Part-Time Work Special Committee composed 
of the government, union, and employer representatives. However, no 
further essential changes have been made in the PWL since its passage 
in 1993. 
Organizing Part-Time Workers
Like other industrialized nations, Japan has experienced a decline in 
labor union membership rates. However, one growth area is part-time 
workers. Although the number of unionized part-time workers remains 
small, the membership rate for part-time workers has increased slightly 
from 1.5 percent in 1990 to 3.3 percent in 2005 as shown in Table 8.4. 
However, labor unions are not enthusiastic about organizing part-
time workers, even though increasing part-time worker membership 
is predicted to strengthen unions. Table 8.5 shows that in 1990 only 
10.7 percent of Japanese unions had organized part-time workers and 
planned to continue to organize them, while 12.6 percent of unions had 
not organized part-time workers but planned to organize them in the 
future. In contrast, 56.0 percent of the unions did not and were not plan-
ning to organize part-time workers. The wholesale, retailing, and res-
taurant sectors were more interested in unionizing part-time workers 
than the service and manufacturing sectors.  
The unions that had organized or were planning to organize part-
time workers preferred to target only those workers who meet some 
specific requirements. As Table 8.6 shows, 39.2 percent of the unions 
targeted all part-time workers, while 56.4 percent of these unions iden-
tified potential members by some criteria such as minimum length of 
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service, hours of work, and annual earnings as a cutoff. For the latter 
group, the most important characteristics were length of service (45.3 
percent) and hours of work (37.6 percent). 
Table 8.7 shows the two major reasons unions have not sought to 
organize part-time workers. Unions reported that these workers do not 
join enthusiastically in the union activities (29.6 percent). Also, 44.7 
percent of the unions perceived the differences between the interests of 
full-time and part-time union members or part-time workers to be too 
large for accommodation in the same union. 
In contrast to the negative attitude of many unions toward organiz-
ing part-time workers, some part-time workers view union membership 








(3) = (1) ⁄(2) × 100
Union membership 
rate (%)
1990 97,150 6,290,000 1.5
1991 113,380 6,940,000 1.6
1992 131,880 7,540,000 1.7
1993 155,810 7,980,000 2.0
1994 168,120 8,370,000 2.0
1995 184,240 8,640,000 2.1
1996 196,090 8,890,000 2.2
1997 218,030 9,230,000 2.4
1998 239,600 9,570,000 2.5
1999 244,000 9,930,000 2.5
2000 260,000 10,170,000 2.6
2001 280,000 10,420,000 2.7
2002 293,000 10,970,000 2.7
2003 331,000 10,980,000 3.0
2004 363,000 11,070,000 3.3
2005 389,000 11,720,000 3.3
SOURCE: Number of union members from Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare,  Basic Survey on Labour Unions.  Number of employees from Japanese 
Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, 
Monthly Surveys on Labour Force.
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Total of unions 
where part-time 
workers are  
employed
Organized part-
time workers or 
will organize in 
the future
Did not organize 
but will organize 
in the future
Organized part-
time workers but 








All industries 100.0  10.7 12.6 1.0 56.0 15.5 4.1
Manufacturing 100.0   6.2 9.5 1.6 60.3 18.3 4.2
Wholesale, retailing, 
and restaurants
100.0 27.4 19.0 0.3 39.1 12.7 1.6
Service 100.0 13.1 14.3 1.0 53.1 13.6 5.0
SOURCE: MOL (1991b). 
Table 8.5  Union Interests in Organizing Part-Time Workers, by Industry in 1990 (%)  
G
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Table 8.6  Part-Time Workers Targeted by Union Organizing Activities in 1990 (%)
Subtotal of unions 



















All industries 100.0 39.2 56.4 (100.0) (45.3) (37.6) (8.0) (0.3) (6.7) (1.9) (4.4)




100.0 23.9 75.4 (100.0) (49.4) (35.7) (4.1) (0.2) (10.4) (0.3) (0.7)
Service 100.0 61.4 27.5 (100.0) (28.5) (40.0) (29.2) (2.3)   (0.0) (0.0)    (11.1)
SOURCE: MOL (1991b). 
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Boyles (1993) concluded that the attitudes of female part-time workers 
toward the unions were more positive than those of male and female 
full-time regular employees. Of the female part-time workers who were 
already organized in enterprise unions, 30.3 percent preferred the en-
terprise unions consisting of only part-time members, and 26.0 percent 
preferred the traditional full-time workers’ unions. This contrasted with 
the 4 percent who preferred other types of union organization, such as 
regional unions rather than enterprise unions. Thus, more than half of 
the organized female part-time workers preferred enterprise unions to 
outside unions.12 This perspective reflects the popularity of enterprise 
unions with Japanese workers. These views of part-time workers are 
consistent with this general attitude toward unions in Japan. 
The findings from Furugori (1997) help explain why part-time 
workers are interested in union membership. She finds that the wage 
levels of part-time workers in unionized companies are higher than 
in nonunionized companies. Consequently, joining unions should be 
advantageous for part-time workers. Boyles (1993) also finds that the 
union effects on the wage level and job content were relatively higher 
than expected. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that there is a mismatch between 
the negative attitudes of many unions toward organizing part-time 
workers and the positive attitudes of part-time workers toward union 
membership. However, it appears unlikely that the needs and interests 
of part-time workers will be served by unions in the near future due to 
the lack of aggressive union organizing activities. 
UNION ACTIvITIES FOCUSED ON DISPATCHED WORKERS
Union Involvement in the Development of the Worker  
Dispatching Law
Unions and employers disagreed on the need for the WDL even 
before it was enacted in 1985. Unions argued that strong employment 
protections were needed for dispatched workers because of abuses by 
client employers. One example was the sudden termination of employ-
ment before the expiration of the contract period. Employers who ter-
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Table 8.7  Reasons for Not Organizing Part-Time Workers in 1990 (%)
Total Did not identify reasons
Part-time workers do not 
join enthusiastically in 
the union activities
Interests between 
part-time workers and 
full-time regular 
workers do not match Other reasons
Total of three industries 100.0 7.5 29.6 44.7 18.2
Manufacturing 100.0 6.1 30.5 48.9 14.5
Wholesale, retailing, 
and restaurants 100.0 3.5 31.5 44.3 20.7
Services 100.0 9.5 29.2 39.7 21.5
SOURCE: MOL (1991b). 
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minated workers in this manner did not face any penalties. Employers, 
on the other hand, proposed complete deregulation for worker dispatch-
ing businesses. Rengo proposed changes during the reviews of WDL, 
which were conducted every three years. 
The perspectives of unions and employers remained the same in the 
1996 and 1999 WDL reviews. For example, Rengo’s official position 
for the revision in 1996 included limiting the type of jobs in which dis-
patched workers could be hired and promoting stronger protections for 
the working conditions of dispatched workers. The proposal submitted 
by Rengo contained five major points. The confederation  
 1)  opposed an increase in the number of jobs eligible for dis-
patched work, the expansion of eligible occupations, and an 
increase in the permissible length of the employment con-
tract;
 2)  clarified the differences between similar types of employment, 
such as subcontracted workers, temporary transferred work-
ers, and transferred shop assistants, and secured legal worker 
dispatching businesses; 
 3)  promoted the protection of the working conditions of dis-
patched workers and the enhancement of their working condi-
tions at the dispatching companies; 
 4)  promoted the protection of the working conditions of dis-
patched workers and enhancement of their working conditions 
at receiving client companies; and
 5)  supported the strengthening of the inspection system for dis-
patched working through MHLW.
In contrast to the advice provided by Rengo, the revision of the 
WDL in 1996 added 12 new occupations for which dispatched workers 
could be hired, thereby bringing the total to 26 occupations. However, 
throughout the discussions preceding the 1999 revisions, Rengo contin-
ued to argue for expanded use of formal employment contracts in hiring 
dispatched workers and setting limits on the number of occupations 
open to dispatched workers. It also continued to document the problems 
faced by dispatched workers with both dispatching companies and re-
ceiving client companies.
Gleason.indb   260 11/13/2006   9:07:01 AM
Employment Policies and Labor Union Activities   261
The debates preceding the 1999 revisions were intense due to em-
ployer efforts to open more occupations to dispatched workers. Rengo 
expressed three major concerns. First, Rengo argued that the new con-
cept of temporary dispatched worker proposed by employers would 
result in undesirable expansion of shorter contracted employment at 
the cost of employment of full-time regular workers. Second, Rengo 
requested that legal penalties be added to the law so it could be en-
forced and worker protection from abuses by dispatching companies 
improved. Finally, Rengo stressed that the law needed a statement of 
the rights of dispatched workers in the complex triple employment rela-
tionship in which they work. However, Rengo’s recommendations were 
not included in the revised law. The 1999 revision expanded both the 
industries and occupations that could be staffed by temporary workers 
so significantly that only a few exclusions were retained.
Supporting Dispatched Workers
In contrast to efforts made to organize some of the part-time work-
force, Japanese labor unions have not focused on dispatched workers 
as potential members. Instead of organizing these workers, Rengo has 
developed telephone services for receiving and handling grievances 
and troubleshooting for dispatched workers, and providing advice or 
consultation on issues related to employment and working conditions. 
These services are similar to the public services that the MHLW pro-
vides to dispatched workers.
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR  
FUTURE RESEARCH
Part-time and dispatched workers represent two segments of the 
nonregular labor force that have grown over the past 20 years in Japan. 
This chapter reviews the government employment policies and public 
services provided for part-time workers and dispatched workers in Ja-
pan. It also discusses the perspectives of Japanese labor unions on these 
two groups of workers and union efforts to improve their economic 
well-being. However, both the Japanese government and labor unions 
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can do more to protect these workers who are relatively vulnerable to 
abusive management practices and changing economic conditions. 
Several government actions are needed. The MHLW should work 
with employers to increase their awareness of both the Part-Time Work 
Law and the Worker Dispatching Law, as well as to enforce the already 
existing provisions of these laws. In addition, public services to assist 
part-time and dispatched workers should be expanded and improved. 
Furthermore, future revisions of these laws should strengthen the pro-
tections provided to these two groups of workers. However, improving 
employment protections for dispatched workers is more complicated 
since it involves both the dispatching and receiving client companies. 
Japanese labor unions have sought actively to counterbalance the 
influence of employers in the development of public policy toward part-
time and dispatched workers. However, unions have placed relatively 
little emphasis on organizing part-time workers as a means of provid-
ing protections for them, and have avoided any organizing activities 
targeted at dispatched workers. These modest organizing efforts will 
limit the potential for union growth in the future if these two types of 
nonstandard employment continue to increase.
There are several issues that should be studied to provide the basis 
for the development of appropriate changes in public policy for part-
time and dispatched workers in Japan. Three topics for future research 
are identified for each employee group. 
Research on part-time workers should examine wage equity, work 
sharing, and union organizing activities. It is well documented that a 
gap exists between the hourly wage paid to full-time regular and part-
time workers in Japan. Discussions have occurred about the need for 
equitable pay to eliminate the wage gap between these two groups of 
workers since this may be the ultimate protection for part-time workers. 
Researchers should identify policy options for the Japanese government 
and labor union actions that can eliminate the wage gap. 
A second research topic is work sharing. There was heated discus-
sion of work sharing as a panacea to increase employment throughout 
the recession in the 1990s in Japan. For instance, some companies have 
started to use “part-time regular workers” whose working hours are 
shorter than the full-time regular workers’. Since these part-time em-
ployees are regular workers, they should have better conditions of em-
ployment than traditional part-time workers and they should be paid the 
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same hourly pay as full-time regular workers. Research can determine 
how pervasive the use of part-time regular workers is, the availability of 
people who want to be part-time regular workers, and how their treat-
ment compares with that of full-time regular and traditional part-time 
workers. Also, the appropriate responses from the government and la-
bor unions should be determined. 
Finally, researchers can assist labor unions in a reexamination of their 
attitudes toward organizing part-time workers. In 2001, Rengo devel-
oped a plan to organize part-time workers through its regional branches 
rather than through the traditional approach of enterprise unions. This 
plan raises questions about whether the organizing functions of the na-
tional center and enterprise unions can be complementary.
Research on dispatched workers should focus on pay levels, the 
impact of deregulation, and union activities. During recessions com-
panies experience pressure to reduce labor costs, including the cost of 
dispatched workers. Dispatched workers therefore are at risk for lower 
rates of pay and unfavorable longer working hours. Research can mea-
sure the extent to which dispatched workers are economically disadvan-
taged during a recession and determine how the government and labor 
unions can address these problems.
In addition, research can explore the impact of the further deregu-
lation of temporary employment, in particular the effects of revising 
the WDL to open more occupations to dispatched workers by includ-
ing manufacturing and assembly workers and changing the permissible 
contract period. If the WDL is revised, the costs and benefits of the 
changes should be studied.
Finally, as discussed previously, enterprise unions have opposed the 
substitution of dispatched workers for full-time regular workers due to 
the impact on the employment opportunities of their members. How-
ever, since the latest WDL revision, increased numbers of dispatched 
workers have been converted to the status of full-time regular workers 
in the same company. This change from temporary to permanent status 
has occurred after the employee has served a trial period as a dispatched 
worker. The prevalence of this practice, and the implications for orga-
nizing efforts of enterprise unions, should be analyzed.
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Notes
 1.  As discussed in Chapter 7, “regular” or “lifetime” employees are grouped sepa-
rately from “nonregular” employees who are in nonstandard employment ar-
rangements. This chapter uses the term “nonregular” for consistency with the 
discussion in the earlier chapter. See Chapter 7 for further discussion of these 
two groups of nonstandard employees. Also see Wakisaka (1997). In addition to 
part-time and dispatched workers, the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare (MHLW) regulates employment policies for older nonregular workers, 
employees who are family members working in a family business, home helpers, 
and other groups of workers. However, this chapter does not discuss these poli-
cies or any tax or social security policies. 
 2.  Employment policies since 1998 have focused on three types of actions to main-
tain employment: 1) expanding traditional policy approaches such as subsidies 
for training or to help cover the costs of transferring employees to a related firm, 
2) using the traditional public works approach to absorb unemployed workers, 
and 3) developing new policies, including subsidies designed to support job cre-
ation by covering costs in small and medium-sized firms associated with addi-
tional human resource needs or wage subsidies for targeted groups such as older 
workers. For more details see Ohtake (2000). 
 3.  Since the 1984 revision of the Employment Insurance Law which provides un-
employment insurance, part-time workers have been able to receive unemploy-
ment benefits. Since 1994 part-time workers who work less than 20 hours a week 
are no longer eligible for unemployment benefits, while those working more than 
20 hours but less than 30 hours can participate on a short-term basis. However, 
they receive smaller benefits than the full-time workers. 
 4.  In addition to the public employment service offices, the MHLW also designates 
the 21st Century Vocational Foundation, a nongovernmental public agency, as 
an assistance center for part-time workers. Its main duties are subsidizing the 
improvement of the management of part-time workers at companies, develop-
ing management specialists for part-time workers, and providing consultants to 
assist employers with the management of part-time workers. According to the 
MHLW, approximately 18,000 part-time workers have received vocational train-
ing every year since 1995 through this organization.   
 5.  The 1994 amendment of the Older Persons Employment Stabilization Law per-
mitted dispatched workers to be over 60 years of age and allowed them to work 
in any job except those considered “port transport services, construction, guard 
services, and production services.” The 1996 amendment to the Child Care and 
Family Leave Act revision permitted dispatched workers to fill vacancies occur-
ring due to child or family care leave. See Araki (1997); Morito (1999). 
 6.  Employment dispatching businesses provide continuous employment for dis-
patched workers. They place workers for indefinite periods of time or more than 
one year. These businesses only have to register with the Minister of Health, La-
bour and Welfare. In contrast, the register dispatching businesses register work-
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ers and find employment for them. The worker is placed for a specified period of 
time. Since their services are similar to those of the public employment agencies, 
these businesses have to be approved by the MHLW to ensure they have the 
resources to operate properly. See Araki (1994). 
 7. The contract with the dispatching company describes the content of the work to 
be performed, the location of the work site, the direct supervisor, the length of 
the workday, including starting and ending times, when overtime may be paid, 
the length of the employment contract, health and safety concerns, and the staff 
responsible for the worker at both the dispatching and client companies. The 
conditions specified in these contracts are negotiated between the dispatching 
company and the client company. For more details see Araki (1994). 
 8.  Prior to this revision, dispatched workers were permitted to remain in a job for 
three years (for more details see Araki [1999]). In 2000 the permissible period of 
employment was reduced to one year. Employers were encouraged to employ in 
full-time jobs the dispatched workers who worked for them for one year. Debates 
about the effects of this revision are increasing, but little is actually known about 
what is being done by employers. For example, see Yashiro (1999). 
 9. In an enterprise union in Japan the wages and conditions of work are negotiated 
by the union and the employer with little involvement from higher-level union 
organizations. Decisions are influenced heavily by a sense of being part of a 
community whose members will share in the future of the business (Shinoda 
1997). This approach to labor-management relations has supported the “lifetime 
employment” practices followed by these enterprises (Nitta 1997) and has main-
tained stability through close ties between employees and management. Howev-
er, enterprise unions have evolved somewhat differing features in response to the 
characteristics of the industry and company in which they operate (Price [1997]. 
Also see Fujimura [1997]). “The three jewels of the employment system—enter-
prise unions, lifetime employment and seniority based wages—are not about to 
suddenly fade into oblivion . . .” (Osawa and Kingston 1996, p. 5).  
 10.  For a discussion of the evolution of the role of Rengo in the development of 
government employment policies and the consultation processes employed, see 
Shinoda (1997). 
 11.  Shinoda (1997) provides an overview of the history of the growth of national-
level unions in Japan following World War II. The Private Rengo was established 
by 1987 as the new national center for unions in the private sector. In 1989 Pri-
vate Rengo and the public sector unions combined to create the Japanese Trade 
Union Confederation (Rengo).
 12.  There are several ways to organize part-time workers. For instance, Honda ana-
lyzed the way a union organized part-time workers in retailing. He reported or-
ganizing methods that did not require these workers to join the existing full-time 
regular workers’ union. For example, there is a part-time council whose mem-
bers are only part-timers. The council is legally independent from the existing 
union of full-time regular workers, but it receives some advice and assistance for 
its activities from the union. For more details see Honda (1993, 2005).
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Temporary Agency Work in Europe 
François Michon 
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
European countries have been experiencing the growth of employ-
ment in nonstandard or flexible work arrangements. The basic causal 
factors have been similar to those experienced in the United States and 
Japan: global economic forces have required employers to adapt and 
change more quickly. In response to these economic forces, temporary 
agency work (TAW), one of a variety of flexible employment arrange-
ments, has expanded over the past 30 years.1 Although it existed earlier 
in some European countries, in others TAW has been authorized for 
only a few years. In some countries TAW is still restricted to a limited 
number of professions. 
A variety of approaches exist to regulate and monitor temporary 
work agencies (TWAs) and the services they provide. These variations 
reflect distinctive national approaches to the regulation of labor mar-
kets and their institutions. Because of the diversity of these approaches, 
TAW is one area where the efforts for harmonization of national labor 
markets within the European Union (EU) have failed in the last few 
years. As a result, no common standard for the regulation of TAW has 
been developed in the EU. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of TAW with-
in the EU and explain the challenges confronted as the EU continues 
its efforts to harmonize policies regulating TAW across its member na-
tions. The regulations of EU members and the social debates on TAW 
are reviewed. Much of the discussion is based on data collected in a 
1999 survey of the European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) 
(2000). A 2002 study of the Dublin European Foundation, which fo-
cused on the economic analysis of TAW in EU members, and a 2005 
study of the European Industrial Relations Observatory, which actual-
ized the 1999 survey in the context of the EU enlargement, were used 
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to provide updates on some major changes in national regulations that 
occurred after 1999 (Storrie 2002; Arrowsmith 2006).
The chapter first provides an overview of the growth of flexible 
work in Europe, including a brief discussion of the problems associated 
with trying to estimate the prevalence of TAW. Variations in the nation-
al definitions and regulations of TAW are then reviewed. The perspec-
tives on TAW of employers’ organizations and unions are presented, 
followed by a discussion of the differences in national approaches to the 
regulation of TAW through the use of laws and collective bargaining. 
The rules which the firms that use TAW must follow in each country to 
secure the social protection of employees also are described. Through-
out this discussion the extreme heterogeneity of the regulatory frame-
works of the EU nations is emphasized. Finally, concluding comments 
on the very brief history of “Social Europe” and the future of its labor 
market institutions are provided. Several future directions for research 
are identified. 
FLExIBLE WORK AND TEMPORARy AGENCy WORK  
IN EUROPE
The need for greater labor market flexibility has been discussed for 
almost 20 years in Europe. When compared to the United States, labor 
market flexibility in European countries often is viewed as inadequate 
except in a few countries such as the United Kingdom. Labor market 
rigidities such as those created by government regulations encouraging 
standard employment arrangements are often discussed as the main rea-
son for the slower economic growth and the high levels of unemploy-
ment in Europe. These discussions of the limited labor market flexibility 
in the EU focus primarily on adjustments of the number of employees. 
One of several forms of atypical employment that permit numerical 
adjustments to be made easily by employers is temporary agency work. 
However, due to poor data, it is difficult to accurately measure the ac-
tual prevalence of TAW in the EU as discussed in more detail below.
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EMPLOyMENT TRENDS AND FLExIBLE LABOR 
MARKETS IN EUROPE
Since the beginning of the 1990s the rate of economic growth in 
Europe has been lower than that of the United States. The key trends 
in Europe during the 1990s were an increase in the importance of both 
unemployment and atypical work.2 These trends resulted in greater at-
tention to how labor market flexibility is linked to the regulation of 
employment contracts such as TAW.
For a short period of time in the late 1990s it appeared that the rate 
of increase in unemployment had slowed due to the positive response 
of standard employment to the economic recovery and the creation of 
jobs. The strong job creation that occurred during the late nineties (Eu-
ropean Commission 2002) appeared to have been linked 
. . . to jobs of better quality . . . Recovery is now favoring more 
stable employment. The proportion of workers on fixed-term con-
tracts (temporary work) in all new jobs created was only slightly 
over a third in 1999, compared with 50 percent in previous years. 
. . . For the first time since 1990, full-time jobs created—some 63 
percent in 1999—exceeded the number of part-time jobs created. 
(European Commission 2000) 
However, the economic climate began to deteriorate in 2001 and 
worsened in the following year due to the uncertainty of the interna-
tional political situation. Since then the EU has had great difficulty re-
covering a fast and solid economic growth, especially in the old core 
of its member nations: Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Neth-
erlands. In these countries, the downturn had a significant negative im-
pact on job creation for both standard and atypical employment.
Since the late 1990s the EU has tried to promote a European em-
ployment strategy (the so-called Lisbon strategy) which focuses on an 
increase in employment rates and in the quality of jobs. However, as the 
European Commission (2005) stated, 
[t]he weak labour market performance in Europe over recent years 
is an important element in explaining the slow progress towards 
the Lisbon and Stockholm objectives. The overall employment 
rate remains 7 percentage points below the employment rate target 
for 2010.
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The evidence of limits, or even failures, of the Lisbon strategy has 
been presented in many reports, comments, and proposals to increase 
the efficiency of this strategy (see, for example, Kok [2004]). The main 
point repeated in these commentaries is that welfare and social justice 
remain largely a member country issue. Furthermore, many members 
are opposed to removing any national regulations in favor of the EU 
institutions. Consequently, in the present environment, the European in-
stitutions can only propose objectives, observe the situation of country 
members relative to these objectives, and give their opinions. 
Labor market flexibility, or the lack thereof, is often explained 
in the context of the regulations defining—and thus potentially con-
straining—employment contracts, with particular attention given to the 
amount of flexibility gained from atypical employment arrangements. 
It therefore is commonly associated with fixed-term contracts and TAW, 
and in some EU members (especially in France, Spain, and Italy) with 
part-time contracts. However, within Europe part-time employment and 
fixed-term contracts are better known than TAW because there are more 
of them. Part-time contracts are different from the standard full-time 
contracts because they imply in most of European countries a specific 
employment status. Part-time employees are not necessarily easier to 
fire, but it is easier to increase or decrease their daily, weekly, or even 
monthly work times. The increase in part-time employment and fixed-
term contracts from 1990 through 2004 is shown for 10 EU countries 
in Figures 9.1 and 9.2, respectively. For these two types of employment 
arrangements the European Labor Force Surveys provide good quanti-
tative data for intra-European comparisons.
The use of these employment arrangements varies by country. Fig-
ure 9.1 indicates that in 2004 in the Netherlands, part-time employment 
was over 45 percent of total employment but just under 10 percent in 
Belgium and Spain. The other seven nations range from about 15 per-
cent to 45 percent. Fixed-term contracts in Figure 9.2 show a different 
pattern of prevalence. In 2004 in Spain fixed-term contracts represent 
over 30 percent of total employment, but the other nine countries are in 
the range of 5 percent to 15 percent.
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Prevalence of Temporary Agency Work
TAW was one of the most rapidly growing forms of atypical em-
ployment in the 1990s (Storrie 2002). However, this growth is difficult 
to measure and compare across the EU nations. Unlike the measures of 
the prevalence of part-time employment and fixed-term contracts, there 
are no equivalent employment data for TWA. Due to the differences in 
national regulations, the terms temporary	agency	work or temporary	
work	 agency refer to very different and noncomparable employment 
arrangements between the three partners in the relationship: the em-
ployee, the TWA, and the client firm. This explains why the available 
data that compare TAW cross-nationally within the EU nations are un-
reliable, and there are no data at all for some countries. Due to the lack 
of common definitions, the Statistical Office of the European Commu-
nities (Eurostat) does not try to quantitatively measure the prevalence 
of TAW.3 It therefore is difficult to provide a precise and comprehensive 
picture of the prevalence of TAW in Europe, and estimates of the rate 
of growth of TWA are even more difficult.4 Consequently, the estimates 
provided below of the prevalence of TAW must be used with caution. 
In an effort to provide some data, the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions undertook a study of 
TAW.5 The resulting estimates range widely from no TAW in Greece to 4 
percent of total employment in the Netherlands, as shown in Table 9.1.
For the 13 nations that reported the use of TAW by sector in the 
1999 EIRO survey, 6 reported that TAW was concentrated in the in-
dustrial sector, and 7, the tertiary sector (services, public services, and 
retail). The industrial TAW was dominant in Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, and Spain; the tertiary TAW was dominant in Denmark, 
Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United King-
dom. The industrial sector consisted primarily of manual labor and a 
male workforce, while the tertiary sector was primarily a female and 
white-collar workforce. According to the European Trade Union Con-
federation (2005),
. . . in the UK, some 80 percent of temporary agency work is in 
the service and public sectors, while three-quarters is in construc-
tion and manufacturing industry in France. In most of the EU-15, 
the majority of workers are male, but in all three Nordic countries 
there are more women, and proportions are roughly equal in the 
Netherlands and the UK.
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A second estimate of the prevalence of TAW was developed by the 
French employer organization for TWA, Syndicat des Entreprises de 
Travail Temporaire (SETT). This organization published estimates for 
2004 derived from national sources for only eight EU countries. A com-
parison of Tables 9.1 and 9.2 suggests a relatively large increase from 
1999 to 2004 in TAW in the United Kingdom, but no clear trend in the 
other countries. 
Both tables reflect national historical differences in the treatment 
and regulation of TAW in the context of all forms of temporary work. 
Actual changes suggest that there are two reasons why limitations im-
posed by regulation based on the types of jobs and industrial sector are 
being reduced. First, there has been an increased acceptance over time 
of TAW in countries that for a long time were reluctant to expand TAW. 
This will result in a relaxation of these regulations. Second, temporary 
work agencies are developing their businesses to provide their services 
wherever temporary help is needed, and even when temporary help for 
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long periods of time is required (European Trade Union Confederation 
2005). Regulations are likely to be relaxed as employers become more 
dependent on these services.
Finally, what Tables 9.1 and 9.2 do not show is the importance of 
TAW in labor flows into and out of unemployment, and out of and into 
employment. The 1999 EIRO report provided this information for a few 
countries. For example, TAW in Spain accounts for 12.5 percent of new 
employment contracts. This is not surprising since temporary work ar-
rangements of various types are often entry-level jobs for persons enter-
ing the labor force and for those with relatively low levels of skills. 
DEFINING TEMPORARy AGENCy WORK AND 
TEMPORARy EMPLOyEES
In an effort to standardize the social protections provided to em-
ployees hired through atypical employment contracts, the EU author-
ities in the second half of the 1990s organized negotiations between 
the EU-level social partners (employers and unions) on “flexibility in 
working time and security for workers.”6 The European negotiations 
focused on three types of atypical employment: part-time work, fixed-
term contracts, and TAW. It was expected that some European standard-
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ization of the definitions and regulations in all three areas would result. 
EU-level negotiations were concluded successfully on part-time work 
in 1997 and on fixed-term contract work in 1999. They produced two 
official directives from the European authorities. The negotiations on 
TAW were the last to be organized, but in May 2001 they failed despite 
repeated efforts to resolve differences. 
The EU-level collective negotiations on TAW failed because the 
social partners were unable to negotiate an acceptable compromise. 
Unions blamed employers for the failure. They perceived employers 
as trying to completely deregulate TAW. However, the employer repre-
sentatives were divided among themselves along two lines: there was 
conflict between the interests of the client firms and temporary work 
agencies, and the objectives of employers varied from one country to 
another. The only result of the negotiations was a common “declara-
tion” that mainly stressed the general principle of equal treatment be-
tween temporary agency workers and permanent employees.
Even this declaration was ambiguous on some points and was hard-
ly discussed by the national members of the employers’ organization. 
It did not clarify what aspects of permanent employment should be the 
reference points for equal treatment, nor whether the permanent em-
ployment was in the TWA or the client firm. Making such determina-
tions was not an easy task in the European context. Some countries 
legally restrict the role of a TWA to offering temporary workers who are 
temporary employees of the TWA to client firms, while in other coun-
tries a TWA can in addition select, train, and hire permanent employees 
for their future employers. Consequently, the TWAs under these two 
different regulations are not the same businesses.
Further EU Actions to Standardize TAW Regulations
After the failure of the TWA negotiations, the European authori-
ties decided to seek an agreement between EU member governments 
instead of employers and unions. The basis for this step was the prior 
declaration by the EU social partners of the principle of equality of 
treatment of temporary agency workers and permanent employees. In 
March 2002 the European Commission issued a “draft directive” on 
temporary work. It was studied and extensively amended by the Euro-
pean Parliament in November 2002. Although the general principle of 
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equal treatment was accepted, there was much discussion of the defini-
tions of the comparable workers and the acceptance of the possibility of 
EU members being exempted or allowed to deviate from the principle 
(European Industrial Relations Observatory 2002). 
The formal objective of the directive proposed in November 2002 
by the Commission of European Communities is to ensure better work-
ing conditions for temporary workers. This directive defines TWA and 
TAW and the workers that will be covered. The Employment, Social 
Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council examined the directive in 
March and June 2003, but an agreement was not reached (European In-
dustrial Relations Observatory 2003). According to the European Trade 
Union Confederation (2005), adoption of such an “essential piece of 
social legislation” is blocked by a minority of EU member states, name-
ly: Denmark, Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Since then, 
nothing more has been done. 
Differences	in	National	Definitions	of	TAW
The major difficulty confronted in the EU discussions is that the 
national laws are very dissimilar and do not provide even a minimum 
basis for a common perspective on which an EU-level agreement can 
be developed. On TAW issues the situation is characterized by such 
significant heterogeneity between countries that regulations do not even 
use the same vocabulary. Recent changes in national regulations do not 
modify this general picture. There is no agreement on what is called 
“temporary agency work” and how is it specified relative to other forms 
of temporary work or even to standard employment contracts. Further-
more, there is no agreement on what is called a “temporary work agen-
cy” or how is it specified relative to other forms of services provided 
to firms or to the other forms of three-way relationships between an 
employee, an employer who has signed an employment contract with 
an employee, and another employer for whom the employee is working 
(e.g., service subcontracts or some workforce lending or leasing). Due 
to this lack of a common approach, the EU authorities’ proposals have 
been written in relatively vague language to avoid conflicts with the 
specific regulations of the member nations.
In some countries such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands, 
TAW is fully recognized as a specific employment relationship. In oth-
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ers, the definitions and regulations are vague, and there are no clearly 
defined categories. Consequently, the available information on atypical 
employment and TAW is extremely diverse and of variable quality. The 
public debate at both the national and European levels over appropri-
ate regulatory and collective bargaining approaches to TAW reflects the 
lack of accurate, high-quality data and standardized definitions of the 
activities being measured. 
The 1999 EIRO survey indicated that there are three approaches to 
the definition of TAW in Europe: 1) TAW is not clearly distinguished 
from other forms of flexible work and therefore can be measured poorly 
at best; 2) TAW is determined solely by identifying the companies given 
the status known as a TWA; the temporary employment businesses thus 
are formally recognized, but their temporary employees are not; and 3) 
a defined legal status is given to both the temporary employment agen-
cies and to the employees working for them, so TWA employment can 
be relatively easily measured.7 These approaches are discussed below 
for the countries using each approach.
No Distinction between TAW and Other Flexible Work
Temporary agency work is not clearly distinguished from other 
forms of flexible work in a few countries such as Finland, Ireland, and 
the United Kingdom. The lack of reliable quantitative data on TWA in 
these countries makes it difficult to determine whether this situation 
reflects a very small amount of this type of work in these countries or 
the lack of a precise definition that distinguishes TAW from other forms 
of employment, particularly other forms of temporary work. This data 
measurement problem can be illustrated by using the United Kingdom 
as an example. According to Morris (2002), the British Department 
of Trade and Industry reported 600,000 temporary agency workers in 
2002 in the United Kingdom, contrasting markedly with two other re-
ports. In spring 2002 the British Labour Force Survey reported 275,000 
workers (Office for National Statistics 2002), while the Recruitment 
and Employment Confederation (REC) reported 1,336,699 workers 
(REC 2002).
There is no precise definition of TAW in any of the three countries. 
In Finland the contract binding a temporary employment agency to its 
employees is almost identical to the contract required by regulations 
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for temporary work. Irish regulations hardly intervene in the relation-
ship between temporary work agency and the worker since the Irish 
worker has been considered an employee of the client company for a 
long time. 
In the United Kingdom no unique status is granted to TAW. It de-
pends on the same regulations as any temporary work regardless of 
whether workers are employed directly by the client firm or by the em-
ployment agency, or even are independent. This treatment of TAW re-
flects two factors. First, it is frequently the same company that acts both 
as an employment agency and as a temporary employment agency as the 
term is used in this chapter. No statutory regulation now distinguishes 
one activity from the other. As for the formal employment relationship 
itself, the courts must determine the employer to whom the employee 
is contractually bound: the employment agency or the client company. 
Second, temporary workers increasingly can be self-employed. This 
means that the agency is only a structure that manages administrative 
procedures associated with the employment of the temporary workers.
However, in the beginning of the 1990s the situation of TAW 
changed in these countries. For example, in 1994 Finland abolished the 
existing regulations on hiring, which distinguished between permanent 
and temporary employees. To provide some protection for workers, the 
responsibilities of a temporary employment agency and its client com-
pany were clarified instead. In 1993 Ireland acknowledged that tempo-
rary contracts could be renewed repeatedly, but left it to the courts in 
case of conflict to determine whether employer abuses were being per-
petrated. Furthermore, the principle was established that a temporary 
agency worker was not employed by the client company. In 1994 the 
United Kingdom abolished the necessity of TWAs receiving a permit 
to do business, and later contemplated new regulations to acknowledge 
that an employment relationship exists between the employee and the 
“employment agency.” The Employment Relations Act of 1999 re-
moved the prohibition against regulations which restricted employment 
agencies from paying temporary workers directly.
Defining	Only	Temporary	Work	Agencies
In some countries the presence of TAW is determined by a company 
status known as the “temporary work agency.” The prevalence of TAW 
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is determined solely by identifying the companies given this status. 
These temporary employment businesses are formally recognized, but 
their temporary employees are not. This pattern is quite frequent. 
The TWA “status” is conferred by very different regulations in these 
countries, however, and usually is determined in one of two ways. The 
first is to issue a permit for the TWA. A company given the status of a 
TWA then becomes the basis for specifying the temporary nature of the 
employment relationship between the agency and the employees the 
agency sends for assignment to the client firms. The second gives a per-
manent contract to all employees of a TWA who are sent to an assign-
ment. This permanent contract can be a specific one, or a standard one 
used for ordinary open-ended contracts. In this situation it is no longer 
the employment contract that separates TAW and other forms of em-
ployment but only the status of the employer. The principle of authoriz-
ing TWAs as employment agencies now seems established. However, 
the principle of a specific open-ended contract, or even a standard open-
ended contract, being used for temporary agency employees seems to 
be losing ground, and is now less frequently used than before. 
The different national approaches are illustrated by five countries: 
Spain, Germany, Norway, Austria, and the Netherlands. For example, 
in Spain TWAs have been legally recognized since 1994 and must be 
licensed by the state. The employee’s contract can be either permanent 
or temporary.
Private TWAs in Germany are subject to the approval of the Fed-
eral Employment Department. Until 1997 TWAs were bound to their 
employees by a permanent contract, basically similar to any standard 
employment contract but the periods of work were for a strictly limited 
period. However, a succession of deregulatory measures in 1997, 1998, 
and 2003 abolished these limitations. Temporary employment contracts 
such as those lasting only the length of a particular assignment were 
introduced. For these contracts there was the possibility of reemploying 
temps three months after a first assignment, subject to the limitations of 
the common regulation of fixed-term contracts.
In Norway temporary agency work is only allowed for unskilled 
office or commercial work. Its regulation has established the principle 
of the permanent contract, but acknowledges exceptions for which em-
ployment contracts can be temporary. The number of these exceptions 
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has risen since 1996. Today a temporary contract is more often used by 
TWA than a permanent one. 
The content of the contract of a temporary agency employee in Aus-
tria is prescribed by regulation. It is not required to be a temporary 
contract, but it must stipulate the level of pay, the duration of work as-
signment, the amount of notice required for job termination, the nature 
of the work, and the place of work. Thus, while no principle requiring 
temporary contracts applies, the content of the contract defines the work 
as temporary.
From the perspective of both the status of temporary employment 
agencies and the content of the employee’s contract, recent Dutch de-
velopments are atypical. The “Flexicurity” and “WAADI” Acts passed 
in January 1999 in the Netherlands abolished permits for temporary 
work agencies and determined that the temporary worker is progres-
sively bound as employment continues to the employment agency by a 
standard contract. This means that time thresholds determine in stages 
the increases in employee rights and wages. After 18 months at a single 
client firm or 36 months at various firms, the employment contract be-
comes a standard open-ended contract with the TWA. Storrie (2002) 
judges the new Dutch legislation as “rather innovative.” 
Defining	Both	TWAs	and	Temporary	Employees
Finally, in France, Portugal, Italy, and Belgium, a clearly defined le-
gal status is given to the temporary employment agencies. In addition, a 
special status differentiates their temporary employees from other tem-
porary workers with ordinary fixed-term contracts and their permanent 
employees such as the staff of the agencies. 
France has been one of the leaders in the development of TAW and 
its regulations since it was first regulated in 1972. Consequently, infor-
mation on TAW is relatively plentiful when compared to many other 
countries. In France, the TWA is not an ordinary firm. Until the be-
ginning of 2005, the provision of temporary employees hired and paid 
by the TWA had to be the only profit-making activity of the agency. 
However, a new regulation in 2005 allowed a TWA to perform as ordi-
nary employment agency in addition to its specific TWA business. The 
TWA also is subject to two special obligations. First, the company must 
file statements to document a specified level of financial resources and 
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regularly provide the government with a full account of its activities. 
Second, a temporary employee of this type of company has a unique 
legal contract known as an “assignment contract” with prescribed con-
tent, accompanied by a set of extensive rules protecting the employee.
Some other countries have chosen similar approaches. In Portugal, 
TWAs must be licensed. Employment contracts are subject to specific 
legislation that stipulates the regulations of the three-way relationship. 
In Italy, TAW was forbidden until 1997. A law passed in that year au-
thorized TAW for the first time and established the conditions for its 
use. The specific character of temporary work agencies was acknowl-
edged. This legislation established a contract for temporary work that 
is drawn up between the TWA and the client company. In addition, 
special provisions were included that relate to the situation of tempo-
rary employees. 
The legislation in Belgium defines the various forms of temporary 
work but appears to formally avoid defining a status for temporary em-
ployment agencies. However, the content required in a TAW contract is 
specified and known as “temporary for work on the premises of a third 
party.” However, TAW has been affected by the general trends in Bel-
gium toward regulating all nonstandard forms of employment. These 
efforts toward formal regulations include extending the required length 
of an employment assignment; less monitoring of employers to verify 
that they are observing the required length of employment, particularly 
by union representatives; and improving social security coverage and 
ongoing training for temporary agency employees.8
This section has discussed how regulations have been used to clarify 
the three-way relationship specific to TAW. Even those countries pursu-
ing labor market deregulation to extend the use of more flexible types 
of employment have developed regulations to provide a clearer legal 
framework and better social protection for temporary workers. Thus, 
nontraditional forms of employment may be regulated with the ultimate 
goal of deregulating more traditional forms of employment. But the 
result is the creation of a paradoxical situation: far from deregulated 
flexibility, more regulation is being introduced to increase the flexibility 
of the labor markets. 
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EMPLOyER AND UNION ORGANIzATIONS AND 
STRATEGIES TOWARD TAW
As discussed above, the temporary agency business in many Eu-
ropean countries is a relatively new and poorly regulated institution. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that the relationships between TWA 
employer organizations and unions also remain relatively underdevel-
oped, and that collective bargaining in this sector is still evolving.9 
In most EU countries TWAs are organized to varying degrees to 
create their own national employer organizations. Today in France, 
Luxembourg, Norway, and Portugal, there is one national employer or-
ganization. A single organization in France was created when two ear-
lier organizations merged in 1998. In Spain and the Netherlands there 
are two employer groups. Employers are not organized in a separate 
association in only a few countries, such as in Sweden. 
In contrast to employers’ organizations, the organization of tem-
porary agency workers in specialized unions is rare, as reported in the 
1999 EIRO survey. The report on Italy is the only one that indicates that 
unions are exploring concerns related to separate unions for temporary 
workers. However, although union attitudes toward TAW are generally 
changing as the importance of labor market flexibility is acknowledged, 
unions remain largely hostile to TAW. It is this hostility that explains 
why unions favor bargaining with the client firm rather than the TWA, 
despite the fact that regulations identify the employer for the purposes 
of collective bargaining as the TWA instead of the client firm. 
As a result of the relative lack of employer and employee organi-
zations, the organization of industrial relations in the TAW businesses 
remains relatively weak. A number of TWAs are not covered by the 
agreement between sectoral organizations of the social partners. These 
TWAs conclude work agreements with their own work councils. Ger-
many is one notable exception, however. An employer organization 
for the TWA businesses, the Unternehmensverband für Zeitarbeit e.V 
(UZA), was founded in 1969. The first collective bargaining agreement 
for TAW was signed in 1970.
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Employer and Union Attitudes toward TAW
The relations between TAW employers and unions are fraught with 
tensions and conflicts that arise from the relatively recent growth in most 
countries of temporary agency work. All employers who are potential 
users of TAW understand the benefits of temporary employment. They 
now advocate flexibility in employment arrangements and appreciate 
the options provided by TAW for adjusting their labor force with fewer 
restricting regulations. In contrast, unions in all of the EU countries per-
ceive the negative impact of TAW since it threatens the employment-
related rights of the permanent employees. Temporary agency workers 
are paid less than the permanent workers, do not have equivalent social 
protection, and continue to be subject to employer “abuses.” It is easier 
for employers to hire and fire temporary agency workers than perma-
nent employees, to hire temporary workers to replace strikers, and to 
fire temporary workers for minor causes without an appeal process. 
However, the strategic objectives of employers and unions are not 
always antagonistic. Since TAW in Europe is often considered by work-
ers as the worst type of flexible employment arrangement, employers in 
some countries have declared their willingness to limit abuses related to 
TAW and tried to improve the image of this work. For example, Man-
power France declared its willingness to limit TAW abuses, which led 
to negotiations with unions before the first TWA regulation in France 
in 1972. Also, the public relations activities of French temporary work 
agencies seek to convince workers that TAW can be highly skilled and 
better paid employment, which can introduce a worker to a real career 
for life. They try to convince potential client firms that they can provide 
to them highly skilled and better selected people at a lower cost. Span-
ish employers also agreed to limit abuses, although they disagree with 
the unions over what should be done. Swedish employers complain 
about the poor quality of temporary agency workers. They consider 
better training a more pressing need than any change in the regulations. 
German employers also have focused on finding ways to improve the 
relatively negative image of TAW. 
However, some progress has been made, as unions generally are no 
longer overtly hostile to TAW. This reflects either a strategic fallback 
position in the face of a fait	accompli, or the recognition that it is better 
to work toward the improvement of social protections that fit the spe-
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cial situation of TAWs. In some countries the unions now acknowledge 
the valid role of TAW. However, they retain the objective of providing 
a framework for this type of work, even if it is only to ensure that the 
uses of TAW remain within established limits. This is the case in the 
Netherlands, Denmark, and Italy.
Strategies for Compromise
The process of identifying common ground between employers and 
unions is not easy. However, appropriate strategies can create the condi-
tions for compromise through collective bargaining between temporary 
employment agencies and unions, or client companies and unions. 
France and Belgium are countries where some common ground has 
been found. French employers in the temporary agency industry called 
for standards to be adopted for TAW. Although historically the unions 
have long demanded a ban on TAW, they participated in the discussions. 
The 1990 cross-sector collective bargaining agreement, extended in the 
form of a law in the same year and still in effect today, deals with most 
aspects of the relationship between the temporary agency employer and 
its employees. A number of agreements in the client industry sectors 
relating to areas such as vocational training, safety and hygiene, and 
union rights have complemented this agreement. In Belgium, employ-
ers have declared themselves in favor of controlled growth for TAW. 
The unions within several client companies demanded long and renew-
able periods of temporary agency employment. However, they signed 
an agreement in 1997 supporting the principle that TAW is the best 
means for employment flexibility. This represents a major change in the 
attitude of the unions toward TAW.
In Italy, a cross-sector collective bargaining agreement quickly fol-
lowed the enactment of the 1997 law authorizing TAW, even though 
differences of opinion between employers and unions delayed the pas-
sage of this law. The agreement seems to have been based on the notion 
that regulation by collective bargaining agreement is the only way to 
avoid inflexible labor markets, and that legislators should not be writing 
these regulations.
Even in the United Kingdom, the idea has begun to take root that 
some action must be taken due to the increasingly widespread use of 
the services of temporary work agencies. The concern is that the lack of 
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regulation may create conflict between the dual functions of TWAs of 
selecting and hiring permanent workers for their clients, and providing 
their own workers for temporary use by the client. This turnabout in the 
United Kingdom attitude is particularly interesting since it is the most 
hostile country in Europe to any employment regulation other than the 
protections against discrimination. However, no major reform has been 
undertaken yet.
In addition to negotiations between temporary agency employers 
and unions, collective bargaining in client companies also can focus 
on TAW at either the firm level or the cross-industry level. In Austria, 
France, Italy, and the Netherlands, negotiations have become more 
prevalent in both the client company sectors and temporary employ-
ment industry, and in Italy and France, even at the cross-sector level. In 
a few countries, such as Belgium, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and 
Luxembourg, negotiations take place almost exclusively, and sometimes 
totally, at the level of the temporary employment agency industry. Or-
ganization in Belgium is exemplary. Since 1987 there has been a jointly 
run employers and unions committee in the temporary employment in-
dustry, which is similar to the organizations used for other industries in 
Belgium. In Finland and Sweden, however, there is no negotiation at 
the temporary agency industry level; negotiations occur only at client 
company level.
THE REGULATORy FRAMEWORK: LAW AND 
COLLECTIvE BARGAINING
Temporary agency work is a form of employment that has appeared 
in Europe because it initially provided employers with a way to avoid 
the constraining regulations governing standard employment. Legis-
lated and negotiated regulations on TAW were developed in response 
to limit the maneuvers of employers to cases in which exceptions to 
the standard of employment can be justified. As employer ingenuity 
found ways to increase the margin for maneuvering despite, or in paral-
lel with, the law or collective agreements with which they are supposed 
to comply, regulations have been updated in an effort to reduce the mar-
gin for maneuvering, reduce the scope of abuses, and impose standards. 
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Temporary agency work and its regulation have continued to evolve 
over the past 10 to 15 years, but are not reproducing the traditional in-
dustrial relations models previously used in Europe. 
A typology of three regulatory frameworks is commonly used in 
Europe. The first model is the Latin countries (the South), where the 
state imposes a large number of regulations which are not always prop-
erly obeyed. The second is the German-Scandinavian model (the conti-
nental North), in which regulation has historically imposed obligatory 
minimum standards. Finally there is the British model, largely influ-
enced by the dominant free market theories of the 1980s and 1990s. In 
this model there is an almost total absence of regulation for TAW. 
The following analysis of the national reports from the EIRO centers 
illustrates the limitations of these traditional industrial relations models 
when applied to the case of TAW because new employment trends are 
reducing the differences between the three models and thereby the rel-
evance of such a typology. Negotiation no longer augments the legally 
enforced standards as was the usual historical function of collective 
bargaining in many countries. Instead, negotiation may, under some 
conditions, remove or challenge the advantages granted to employees 
under the law. The interesting question is what the regulatory model of 
the future will be.
The Latin Model
According to the Latin model, the state imposes many regulations, 
but they are not always followed properly. However, there have been 
no regulations for TAW for a long time, and the need for a framework 
has surfaced only in the last few years. This change occurred in a period 
when the Latin model had already been altered to some extent through 
negotiated regulation achieved through collective bargaining. Although 
almost unknown in the past, negotiated regulation has become to vary-
ing degrees an accepted practice in recent years. Italy and Spain are 
examples of this model, while Greece and Portugal are exceptions. The 
early and protective regulation of TAW in France is unique. 
Italy is an excellent example of the change operating within the 
Latin Model. According to the 1999 EIRO survey, the late recognition 
of TAW in this country in 1997 is attributable to the deep-seated differ-
ences in the positions taken by employers and unions toward TAW. Two 
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collective bargaining agreements (one national across industries and the 
other national for the TWA business sector) were signed in 1998 imme-
diately after this recognition. Compared to the provisions of the 1997 
law, the negotiated agreements were more restrictive on certain points, 
such as the introduction of a maximum length for TAW assignments. 
However, the agreements were more flexible on other points, such as 
identifying new situations in which TAW can be used by a company and 
stipulating the rights of temporary employees. Thus, negotiation rapidly 
imposed its mark.
Spain has followed a pattern similar to that of Italy. Temporary 
agency work has been recognized in Spain by law since 1994 (with 
amendments in 1995 and 1997). Some unions refused any recognition 
of TAW. Others tried to limit the use of TAW to the strictly temporary 
needs of client companies or to give some special permanent contracts 
to temporary workers, and to provide better protections to workers. Em-
ployers recognized that abuses occurred. Finally, the collective bargain-
ing agreements of 1997 and 1998 attempted to improve the regulation 
of TAW. These agreements were negotiated cross-sector and within the 
TWA sector, including one known as the state agreement, which was 
later changed into a law. The 1999 EIRO survey stressed that TAW 
remains a central theme of collective bargaining negotiations in Spain, 
but it is the subject of incessant dispute between employers and unions 
about the desired model of TAW.
Greece and Portugal are the exceptions to the Latin model. In 
Greece, as already noted, there is still no official acknowledgment of 
TAW either in legislation or negotiated agreements. The 1999 EIRO 
survey stressed that in Portugal TAW is regulated by a 1989 law. This 
legislation supersedes a collective bargaining agreement that has never 
been enforced. However, union participation is occurring now as part 
of the general public debate over the changes that should be made to 
the 1989 law.
France is a special case within the group of Latin countries due to 
its early and very protective regulation of TAW. Moreover, contrary 
to the reputation of the French government that regulates everything, 
regulations negotiated through collective bargaining have been part and 
parcel of the French legislative decisions for many years. Although the 
regulation of TAW in France is principally carried out by enacting leg-
islation, on several occasions the law has only reviewed and modified 
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a number of the issues previously negotiated by employers and unions. 
For example, the first French law on TAW in 1972 was based largely on 
the previous provisions adopted by Manpower France. Again, in 1990, 
the government used the option known as “extension” in the French 
industrial relations system to confer legal status on the provisions of the 
cross-sector collective bargaining agreement for the temporary work 
business.
The German-Scandinavian Model
The principles of the German-Scandinavian model include mini-
mum standards imposed by legislation with almost all additional regu-
lations imposed by collective bargaining. This model is not any better 
suited to the field of TAW than the Latin model. Although Austria is 
still a good example of this model as applied to TAW, it does not fit the 
other countries well (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and 
Germany) due to one of two considerations. In some countries the law 
prescribes some limits and/or principles that significantly restrict the 
opportunities for collective bargaining negotiations on TAW. In other 
countries the current trend toward deregulation and increased flexibility 
in employment are changing profoundly the fundamental characteris-
tics of the relationship between legislation and negotiation to the detri-
ment of the former. 
Austrian law carefully frames the work of temporary employment 
agencies. These agencies must have permits to operate and observe the 
obligatory content of the contract binding the TWA and the employee. 
A TWA sector-level collective bargaining agreement complements the 
law on pay issues. Moreover, the collective agreements of many client 
companies deal specifically with the issue of TAW. The primary con-
cern is the requirement that temporary work agency employees must be 
recruited on permanent contracts. 
In contrast, TAW in Norway is an excellent illustration of how the 
legal framework significantly restricts the opportunities for collective 
bargaining negotiations on TAW, thereby deviating from the German-
Scandinavian model. The 1999 EIRO survey emphasizes that a wide 
margin has developed in Norway between the laws which establish le-
gal principles and bans on activities so that TAW is strictly regulated, 
relative to the actual practices of the client firms. Probably for this rea-
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son, TAW is as widespread in Norway as in many other EU countries, 
and now accounts for 2 percent of the labor force. The EIRO survey 
observes that collective bargaining seems to have neglected TAW since 
this sector is not yet covered by a collective bargaining agreement. 
However, TAW does not seem to be the subject of any significant dis-
pute. With no information available on disputes, the report can only 
theorize that issues related to TAW are discussed in the in-house nego-
tiations with the client companies.
The case of TAW in Denmark illustrates a change in the relation-
ship between legislation and negotiation. Prior to 1990, the regulation 
of TAW was carried out by legislation. The law only allowed TAW in 
a few industries (retail and office work) and only licensed temporary 
employment agencies were allowed to handle it. In 1990 both sets of 
restrictions were lifted. Subsequently collective bargaining has grown 
rapidly in the newly opened industries. 
Curiously, the regulation of TAW in Germany appears to be a bad 
example of the German-Scandinavian model. Regulations in this coun-
try have undergone a rather stormy passage. The first and only col-
lective bargaining agreement ever reached on TAW dates back to the 
1970s. The principle of a permanent contract binding a temporary em-
ployee to the TWA was laid out in the first piece of legislation in 1972. 
In 1989 the collective bargaining agreement was not renewed. In 1997 
statutory constraints were greatly relaxed. At present temporary em-
ployees still are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement and 
remain outside the participation system which regulates all the German 
industrial relations.10 
In the Netherlands the model of a complementary relationship be-
tween laws and negotiation is apparent. A law passed in January 1999 
altered the legal framework by removing any specific definition of 
TAW, requirements to license temporary employment agencies, and 
the need to acknowledge the temporary nature of the employment con-
tract. However, TAW has been the focus of a high degree of negotiation 
between temporary work agencies and unions, client companies and 
unions, and employers’ associations of temporary work agencies and 
associations acting on behalf of client companies.
A similar scenario to that of the Netherlands occurred in 1991 in 
Sweden, when the sector called “workforce rent” was deregulated. 
Since the deregulation collective bargaining in Sweden has devoted 
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more attention to TAW. For example, the local union must approve the 
hiring of any temporary staff, including temporary agency workers. The 
union also must participate in a discussion of pay between two assign-
ments for temporary agency workers. However, this is not as radical as 
in the contemporary Netherlands. Despite deregulation the Swedish law 
still guarantees temporary agency workers some minimal protection. 
Examples include the possibility of being hired on a permanent contract 
by the client company, and prohibiting a client firm from asking its em-
ployees whose fixed-term contracts have just expired to return to work 
as temporary employment agency workers. The current debate primar-
ily is focused on the possible introduction of a system of licensing by an 
independent authority for temporary employment agencies. 
The British Model
The British model is still in effect in the United Kingdom, even 
though the current administration is said to be thinking of regulating 
the employment contract by binding the employee and the “employ-
ment agency.” Since there are only a few regulations of employment 
relationships in the United Kingdom, and above all of TAW, firms do 
not have to use any innovative practices to avoid the prescriptions of 
the legislator. 
RULES GOvERNING THE USE OF TAW AND THE 
PROTECTION OF EMPLOyEES
The discussion in the previous section focuses on the differences in 
the policy approaches used to control the use of TAW. They typically 
involve the joint use of legislation and collective bargaining agreements 
in various combinations determined by the national industrial relations 
systems of each EU country. In this section the discussion is focused on 
the key aspects of TAW that legislation or bargaining seek to regulate.
In addition to the rules that control the business of TWAs such 
as the requirement to have a permit to operate, the regulations con-
trol the use of TAW by client firms and provide some social protection 
to the temporary employee. There are four main types of regulations: 
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those that 1) control the length of TAW contract; 2) define the employ-
ment situations in which user firms can ask for workers from agencies; 
3) require parity in the conditions of employment and pay between tem-
porary agency workers and permanent workers doing the same work 
in a client company; and 4) grant union and representation rights to 
temporary agency workers in the client company and/or in the tempo-
rary employment agency, and regulate union and representation rights 
to ordinary employees and union representatives in the client company 
when temporary agency workers are present.
Table 9.3 presents a brief overview of the key regulated aspects of 
TAW. It can be observed that a deep gulf divides the countries that have 
deregulated TAW to varying degrees (in some cases, almost complete-
ly as in the United Kingdom) and those that are maintaining or even 
strengthening the legislative or negotiated framework. 
Permitted Use of TAW, Contract Length, and Parity
Many European countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Portugal, and Spain) always control TAW in the first three key 
aspects simultaneously. Therefore, regulations determine the maximum 
length of assignment for which a worker is hired, the circumstances 
in which temporary agency workers can be used, and the principle of 
parity in conditions of work and pay between TAW and permanent em-
ployees. 
As discussed above, when TAW was legally introduced in Italy, it 
was with strict control of TWA businesses. The Italian law did not set 
any limitation on the length of assignments. However, two 1998 collec-
tive bargaining agreements limited both the use of TAW and the length 
of contracts. One contract that covered the TWA businesses determined 
that TAW could be used only in case of an absence of an employee, to 
provide skills that are not present within the client firm, or for any other 
reason negotiated through collective bargaining. The other contract was 
the April 1998 national multi-industry agreement. It identified which 
reasons are acceptable to use temporary agency workers: to provide 
coverage in periods of additional workload, skills not present on the la-
bor market, and employees who could perform specific tasks that could 
not be performed by an employee of the firm. Contract length, includ-
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ing four renewals, was limited to 24 months. Other regulations required 
parity with permanent employees.
Since TAW was first regulated in 1972, in France the regulations 
have been relaxed or strengthened in response to the interest of the po-
litical majority and new choices of collective bargaining. For example, 
a 1990 change reintroduced a list of authorized uses for temporary 
agency workers which had been suppressed a few years earlier. The 
list limited the use to the replacement of an absent employee, the re-
placement of a departing employee when the job must be filled only 
temporarily, filling a position until a new permanent employee arrives, 
handling a temporary additional workload, and completing tasks de-
fined as temporary “by nature.” Temporary agency workers thus cannot 
be used to do the standard work of the firm, to fill core permanent jobs, 
or to replace strikers. The standard length of assignments is limited to 
18 months, including renewals. The length of the contract must be in-
dicated in a written contract between the employee and the employer. 
In some very specific situations, such as those that arise when the end 
of the work assignment cannot be determined at the time the contract is 
written, the contract can be left open-ended. However, in these cases, 
the written contract must indicate a minimum length for the assignment. 
Parity with permanent workers is formally required. In this context, 
the recent 2005 change is often considered a “revolution.” Some new 
uses are authorized, which are not defined in terms of user firm needs, 
but in terms of worker profile: to contribute to employment policies, it 
is authorized to use temporary agency work for people with very low 
employability.
If controls are present generally in all the three areas simultane-
ously, there are countries where they may be very strict in some area or 
concerning some specific situation and weak in another. For example, in 
Belgium the maximum period of time for which temporary agency staff 
can be employed varies greatly. Temporary agency work contracts are 
limited to 15 days if the employee is covering for a permanent member 
of staff, or 12 months with possible extension for a further six months if 
there is an increase in company workload. Compared to Belgium, Italy 
with its maximum of a 24-month period and four renewals (see above) 
is the complete opposite.
For continental Europeans, it is not surprising to observe that the 
United Kingdom has no regulations stipulating a maximum length of 
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Table 9.3  Regulation of Key Aspects of Temporary Agency Work
Country
Regulation of maximum 
length of TAW contract







Austria None Very few Yes No special provisions





of employee, temporary 
increase in workload and 
special work)
Yes Mainly in agency
Denmark None None No (only by CB in 
some sectors)
No special provisions
Finland None None No No special provisions
France Usually 18 months 
(including renewal), 
but 9 of 24 months in 
some circumstances
Significant (replacement 
of employees, temporary 
increase in workload and 
inherently temporary work), 
specific workforce groups 
(very low employability)
Yes Mainly in agency
Germany None Very few Introduced in the 
2003 legislation, 
can be suppressed 
by CB
Divided but mainly in 
agency
Greece None None No No special provisions
Ireland None None No No special provisions
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Italy 24 months (including 4 
renewals) by CB
Significant (replacement, 
special skills, or—by CB—
for workload peaks, specific 
tasks/skills)
Yes Divided but mainly in 
agency
Luxembourg 12 months, including 2 
renewals
Significant (specific, non- 
permanent jobs, not part of 
enterprise’s normal activity)
Yes Divided but mainly in 
agency
Netherlands None Very few Yes No special provisions
Norway None Significant (replacement, 





Portugal 6–12 months Significant (replacement, 
temporary increases in 
workload, and short-lived 
seasonal tasks)
Yes In agency (user 
company after 2 years)
Spain No maximum in some 
cases, 6 months in 
others (up to 18 months 
by CB) 
As for other temporary 
work (replacement, 
specific work, market 
circumstances, temporary 
increases in workload)
Yes Mainly in the user 
company
Sweden None None No In agency
UK None Very few No No special provisions
NOTE: CB = collective bargaining
SOURCE: 1999 EIRO Survey (reproduced from EIRO [2000]). 
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contract, rules on parity, nor constraints restricting the activities of “em-
ployment agencies” to specific employment situations in which they 
can be used. Existing regulations only impose the principles of racial 
and sexual equality, and equal opportunities for the disabled and union 
members, for every type of employment contract. 
It is more surprising to observe the same absence of regulations in 
Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and the same exception for parity. In Den-
mark, for example, collective bargaining agreements in industries using 
agency workers include rules on wage parity. In Sweden, wage parity is 
not one of the basic principles enshrined in law, but temporary agency 
workers have the right to the same safety and hygiene conditions as 
permanent staff.
Two countries have recently relaxed their regulations: Germany and 
the Netherlands. Prior to 1997, Germany required open-ended contracts 
between an agency and temporary agency workers, and restricted TAW 
to a list of formally defined uses. In 1997 fixed-term contracts were 
introduced. These contracts must have exactly the same length as the 
assignment in the client firm, and maximum length of the assignment 
was increased from 9 to 12 months. Furthermore, the use restrictions 
were eliminated.
The Netherlands abolished maximum length limits on contracts in 
1999. At the same time the employment contract for TAW was trans-
formed into an open-ended contract after an employee worked for 26 
weeks for the same client company. Also, the regulation determining 
the content of every standard employment contract, whether fixed-term 
or open-ended, was changed. The dismissal procedure for the open-
ended contracts was relaxed. Furthermore, the existing regulations on 
parity were maintained. 
It is difficult to evaluate these changes in Germany and the Nether-
lands. It is not clear whether they represent deregulation or a change in 
the regulation of TAW (see Storrie 2002, p. 17).
Unions’ Effects on Key Aspects of TAW
The regulation of TAW within a country depends on the politi-
cal and social power relations and the features of the national labor 
markets. Predicting the union and representation rights for temporary 
agency workers within a country is difficult due to several consider-
Gleason.indb   298 11/13/2006   9:07:04 AM
Temporary Agency Work in Europe   299
ations. First, weak, nonexplicit, and poorly formalized regulation of the 
conditions of TWA does not mean that unions are without any power 
against possible abuses by employers. It can be the opposite: union 
control balances the weakness of formal regulations. In Sweden, for 
example, where the constraints on the use of temporary agency workers 
are minimal, the request for temporary agency workers must be ap-
proved by employee representatives in the client company. Belgium, 
which otherwise imposes much more constraint, is the only other coun-
try where the agreement of employee representatives is required. In a 
small number of other countries, such as Germany, Italy, Norway, and 
Portugal, union agreement is not required, but employee representa-
tives must be informed. In the other countries, whatever the regulations 
of the use of TAW—whether very detailed and strict, minimal, or no 
control—employers have no obligation to inform unions or employee 
representatives of the use of temporary agency workers.
Second, powerful unions and strictly controlled TAW do not neces-
sary imply either specific unionization or representation rights equiva-
lent to those of every ordinary employee. Union rights of temporary 
agency workers are not always recognized. And where they are rec-
ognized, this may be within the temporary employment agency, as in 
France, Luxembourg, and Norway, or within the client company, as in 
Sweden and Italy. In Germany, temporary agency workers cannot vote 
or stand for election to representative authorities, but may take part in 
meetings and consult employee representatives in their company. In 
Italy, the right to engage in union activity does not prevent temporary 
agency workers from being excluded from calculations to work out the 
number of seats granted to employee representatives within the user 
firm or the appropriate unit of the user firm.
Finally, there is little correlation between the existence of regula-
tions on the maximum length of employment, the circumstances of 
the valid use of temporary agency staff, and the principles of parity on 
the one hand, and the recognition of temporary agency workers’ union 
rights and the role played by the employees’ representatives on the oth-
er. It can be hypothesized that the more powerful unions are, and/or the 
tighter the labor market conditions, the more regulation of temporary 
agency work can be expected. However, this hypothesis has not been 
empirically tested. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR  
FUTURE RESEARCH
This chapter has provided an overview of the development of TAW 
in the EU. However, it also has shown how large the differences in 
TAW are between the EU members and how difficult it is to make com-
parisons within the EU. Additional comparative research therefore will 
help us to better understand TAW and its contributions to improving 
labor market flexibility. 
The history of temporary work agencies is highly variable within 
EU: some are relatively old businesses as in France, while others are 
very recent businesses as in Italy where TAW was authorized only a few 
years ago. In some countries TAW is highly regulated and strictly con-
trolled by national legislation and collective bargaining, while in others, 
such as the United Kingdom, it is relatively unregulated. Even if the 
present dynamics suggest some convergence to more deregulated TAW, 
no really common definitions of TAW are used throughout the EU. 
The widely varying status and regulation of TAW in the EU member 
states are closely linked to and dependent on those of standard employ-
ment relationships, which remain as different from one EU member to 
the other as those of the TAW relationships. Due to these significant 
cross-national differences, it is not surprising that any solid agreement 
at the EU level about TAW issues, even the principle of parity between 
temporary agency workers and permanent employees, remains illu-
sive.
Today European labor markets are trapped between two contradic-
tory dynamics. One set of increased pressures is working for a deregu-
lated labor market at EU member states level. This is being countered 
by the increased necessity to provide some regulation at the EU level 
to avoid social dumping from unregulated countries, especially the new 
EU members from Eastern Europe.
Only one trend has emerged that allows us to predict the directions 
in which TAW will evolve in the future: new employment relationships 
are being tested by EU members as ways of making European labor 
markets more flexible and adaptable to the changing economic forces 
of the global economy. Temporary agency work is one of these new 
relationships; it presently represents something like a social laboratory 
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in Europe. It can be expected to be an important issue at the heart of 
collective bargaining in Europe in the foreseeable future.
Several topics will provide useful insights to guide future develop-
ments in EU-level employment and industrial relations policies. First, 
in-depth national case studies will provide useful insights into the for-
ces resulting in changes in labor market institutions. The cases should 
discuss the recent trends in the development of temporary agency work 
and the contribution of TAW to greater labor market flexibility. Second, 
more information is needed about the best way to regulate TAW. Con-
ducting and comparing in-depth case studies in countries with different 
approaches to TAW will provide useful insights into the optimal poli-
cies for national regulation. Third, because at present only part-time and 
fixed-term contracts are measured by European surveys, while TAW is 
not, case studies will provide the knowledge needed to design statisti-
cal surveys to collect better comparative data on TWA and the other 
nonstandard employment arrangements that provide employers with 
options for better numerical flexibility. Fourth, national comparative 
case studies of the strategies of employers’ organizations and unions 
will provide better information on issues related to the future of TAW. 
Specifically, it is necessary to understand why the national employer 
organizations did not succeed in harmonizing their positions at the Eu-
ropean level and the implications for future harmonization efforts. 
Finally, at present TAW remains primarily low-skilled jobs. How-
ever, two changes have been observed that may affect the future direc-
tions of the development of TAW. First, it has been observed in many 
countries that temporary work agencies are beginning to prospect labor 
markets with better qualified workers, but we do not know whether this 
is a new strategy in all European countries. Second, TAW is primar-
ily present in the industrial sector in some European countries and in 
the service sector in other countries. It is not clear whether there is 
any convergence occurring between the European countries that will 
reduce these differentiations between European countries or whether 
such changes should be anticipated. Comparative case studies and com-
parative statistical surveys can be used to answer these questions.
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Notes
 1. The defining characteristic of TAW is the three-way relationship between the em-
ployee (the temporary agency worker), the company called the “temporary work 
agency” (the employer in most of the national legislation), and the client firm 
(the user of the employees of the temporary work agency). See Gonos (1997, p. 
105) for further discussion of this relationship. 
 2. From 1990 through 2004, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rates in the 
EU-15 (the members prior to May 1, 2004, when new members were accepted) 
ranged from a low of 7.4 percent in 2001 to high of 10.5 percent in 1994. During 
the same period in the United States, the unemployment rate ranged from a low 
of 4.0 percent in 2000 to a high of 7.5 percent in 1992 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2005a,b).
 3. The Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT) is the official 
institute for processing and publishing comparable data at the EU level. The 
statistical agencies of the EU member countries collect the data, but EUROSTAT 
works with them to define common data collection methods. EUROSTAT then 
consolidates the data and adjusts the data as needed so that they are compa-
rable. 
 4. National estimates that are not based on a standardized definition of TAW cannot 
be used for any serious international comparison.
 5. A summary of the study is available at the following Web site: http://www 
.eurofound.eu.int/working/tempagency_new.htm, updated December 2002. The 
summary presents the main findings and conclusions from Storrie (2002). The 
report is based on 15 national reports commissioned by the European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 
 6. Specifically, an industrial relations system for the EU is only beginning to 
emerge, and is in the very early stages of development. Many difficulties arise 
due to the fact that the national industrial relations systems are organized very 
differently, with varying rules for unions and different levels and competencies 
in collective bargaining.
   The Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) 
on one side and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) on the other 
are the main representatives of the national organizations and confederations 
for Europe-wide collective negotiations. Note that only confederations rather 
than the unions or associations themselves are represented in this organization of 
EU-level collective bargaining. Also, all of the national confederations of trade 
unions are not represented in ETUC. For example, one of the largest unions in 
France, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), was not a member of 
ETUC until a few years ago. Furthermore, newly created national unions and 
confederations rarely are represented.
 7. The one notable exception to these three categories is Greece. In this country 
even regular work is not formally defined, so there is almost no information 
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about the different forms of employment. However, TAW is known to exist in 
Greece.
 8. In Europe, depending on the country, social security refers to benefits such as 
illness coverage and pension contributions as well as employment security and 
unemployment benefits.
 9. There are three possible levels for collective bargaining on TWA: 1) the level of 
the actual TWA business when it exists in a specific sector depending on the rules 
of each country, 2) the level of client firms (each client sector or level of users of 
any sector), and 3) the cross-industry level including the TWA business and the 
client business. 
 10. The German participation system allows unions to be part of the decision system 
of the firm.
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The nonstandard workforce has grown in the mature industrialized 
nations of the United States, Japan, and Europe. On the demand side of 
the labor market this growth has been a response to a common set of 
forces for change. These forces include the globalization of economies, 
deregulation of labor markets, rapid advances in technology that have 
created the information age, and other factors that require employers 
to adjust more agilely to continuous change. On the supply side of the 
labor market the growth has reflected the desire of many workers for 
more flexible employment options to accommodate life stage and life-
style preferences. Due to these demand and supply forces, nonstandard 
employment is expected to continue to grow in the future.
The structural changes that mature industrialized nations are under-
going and the resulting (sometimes negative) impact on the nonstandard 
labor force highlighted the inadequacies of the present labor market in-
frastructures. For example, in the United States, policies, laws, and in-
stitutions developed in the New Deal in the 1930s structure the current 
employment relationship. However, the research presented in this vol-
ume shows that this system no longer meets the needs of many workers, 
employers, or the U.S. economy, because the premises on which the 
New Deal system was based have changed. Specifically, workers, who 
primarily were male, were expected to have a long-term, full-time em-
ployment relationship with only one employer during their careers. The 
system required reciprocity: employers provided employees with job 
security; in return, employees were a loyal and committed workforce 
for the employer. This set of bilateral expectations—often referred to as 
a “psychological contract”—defined the operational concept of a “good 
job” (Stone 2004). In contrast, the workforce of today—particularly the 
more educated workers in their twenties and thirties—expects to have 
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multiple employers during a career, is more diverse, desires greater 
flexibility, and has less concern for security (Kochan 1998). This ex-
pectation of a “boundaryless career” is part of the new psychological 
contract of the future (Stone 2004). 
Some authors have noted that the current definition of a “good job” 
is actually relatively new because it was developed in the twentieth 
century. The growth of contingent and short-term employment con-
tracts thus represents a return to the historical past when contingent 
employment was the norm for most workers. Nevertheless, despite the 
recency of our definition of “good jobs,” this is the definition used to 
frame much of the research on employment, and continues to provide 
the benchmark against which alternative employment arrangements are 
compared (Kelloway, Gallagher, and Barling 2004). 
The attention focused on nonstandard employment over the past 
several decades has changed the way we think about jobs, even though 
nonstandard employment has not—and will not—become the dominant 
model of employment in the countries discussed in this book. What has 
changed is the perception that a career-long tenure with one employer 
will no longer be the norm in the future. There is now an awareness that 
employees will bear more risks in the labor market than in the past as 
they move between different types of working-time employment ar-
rangements, such as from full-time to part-time status.1 The risks in-
clude job loss and fluctuations in pay. However, “these are changes of 
degree, not of kind. They . . . constitute . . . a reallocation within a stable 
institutional structure dominated by standard employment arrange-
ments” (Jacoby 1999).
Kochan (1998) argues that the situation in the United States today 
is analogous to the period from the turn of the century to the 1930s 
prior to the New Deal. It took about 30 years to develop the intellectual 
foundations of the New Deal. Similarly, researchers have been study-
ing for about 30 years the changes in nonstandard employment and the 
myriad forces determining them. However, they still are grappling with 
the realization that the fundamental premises on which the current em-
ployment relations system was built no longer apply to many workers, 
and trying to determine what this implies for the future. Consequently, 
we have not yet developed the intellectual foundation that will define 
the characteristics of a new system and a new social contract. Japan 
and the countries of the European Union (EU) also are facing a similar 
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challenge (see Jouen and Caremier 2000). The labor market institutions 
that worked well after World War II no longer fit the needs of their 
national economies. Kochan concludes that for the future “Identifying 
the specific features of these institutions and policies remains the key 
intellectual challenge and responsibility of this, and, perhaps, if his-
tory is any guide, the next generation of researchers and professionals” 
(Kochan 1998, p. 245).
THE CHALLENGES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The challenges in the development of appropriate labor market pol-
icies for a new social contract are to clearly identify the problems that 
need to be addressed, measure empirically their dimensions, determine 
which problems are the most important and therefore worthy of policy 
attention, and then select the “best” policy options in light of identified 
trade-offs. High-quality research is fundamental to this process. It must 
be based on a balanced analysis of the issues, rather than perspectives 
expressed in the media, which tend to be skewed to either promanage-
ment or prolabor viewpoints. 
When thinking about the identification and measurement of labor 
market problems, it is important to consider the challenges created by 
the heterogeneity of nonstandard workers and ongoing evolution of the 
theoretical models used to analyze the demand and supply forces. The 
heterogeneity of this segment of the workforce requires researchers to 
use data that permit the analysis of the subgroups of contingent work-
ers that are negatively affected by their employment arrangements. For 
example, a variety of U.S. government databases are available for this 
purpose, but must be combined and better organized to facilitate re-
search (U.S. Department of Labor 1994). However, it is not always pos-
sible to find data that define precisely the groups of workers of interest, 
so the severity of the negative effects of contingent employment may be 
overstated or understated (Lester 1998). 
Furthermore, the theoretical models on which empirical analysis 
can be based are continuing to evolve. For example, there is no general 
agreement on the correct theoretical model to use to frame the analysis 
of the labor market effects on those workers disadvantaged by contin-
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gent employment. Lester (1998) argues that we need an improved un-
derstanding of the “root harm” experienced by disadvantaged groups, 
which considers both workers’ abilities and preferences. This harm 
fundamentally is underemployment resulting from a mismatch between 
the jobs held by workers and their skills, interests, and human capital. 
While the New Keynesian models of involuntary unemployment seem 
to offer the best analytical approach for the analysis of “root harm,” 
they have not been tested empirically. Thus, their ability to provide in-
sights into appropriate legal reforms is unknown (Lester 1998). 
Similarly, as Michon notes in Chapter 9, cross-national research is 
complicated by the lack of data to compare groups of workers defined 
in the same way across nations and an absence of well-developed theo-
retical models. The reasons for variations and the extent of the diversity 
observed across nations in the use of different nonstandard employ-
ment arrangements have received little attention; this has hindered our 
understanding of how the established institutions and cultural contexts 
explain particular national adaptations and the variations in the rate of 
adaptation. However, since the 1990s the “new institutionalism” has 
been developing; this approach seeks to explain how rules embodied 
in various institutions shape economic, social, and political activities 
(Godard 2004, pp. 232–235). This approach requires the researcher to 
understand national institutions and values as a precursor to explaining 
national changes in response to global forces (Godard 2004, p. 246; 
Martin and Bamber 2004, p. 293). 
CONCEPTUALIzING POLICy EFFECTS 
The infrastructures of the United States, Japan, and the European 
Union were designed to meet the needs of an earlier era. The growth of 
the global economy has restructured many sectors of these economies. 
What is needed now are new ways to improve labor market flexibility 
through policy changes to, or redesign of, the infrastructure of tax, la-
bor, and employment laws and institutions.
Two major policy approaches have been identified to provide cov-
erage for a greater number of employees by extending coverage to con-
tingent workers: 1) to revise the laws to expand the eligibility standards 
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determining coverage, and 2) to eliminate the gray areas of legal in-
terpretations. Table 10.1 is used to illustrate how the two approaches 
would affect selected employment laws in the United States. 
Table 10.1 (which is based on the discussion in Chapters 5 and 6) 
presents the employer’s perspective on the coverage of workers under 
five categories of employment laws for six types of employment ar-
rangements. At one extreme are the full-time, permanent core employ-
ees in “good jobs,” while at the other end of the spectrum are indepen-
dent contractors. The legal standing of these two groups of workers 
generally is clearly defined. However, these usually are not the workers 
of concern to those advocating improvements in public policies affect-
ing nonstandard employment. The workers of concern are those in the 
middle—the part-time, temporary, and leased employees, differentiated 
by the firm that hires them. In Table 10.1, “Yes” indicates coverage 
Table 10.1 Employer Perspective: Coverage by Selected Employment

















Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Part-time worker  
hired by employer
Uncertainb Noc Yes Yes Yes
Temporary worker  
hired by employer
Uncertainb Uncertainc Yes Yes Yes
Temporary worker 
provided by agency
Uncertain Uncertain Yesd Uncertain Uncertain
Leased worker 
provided by agency
Uncertain Uncertain Yesd Uncertain Uncertain
Independent contractor No No No No No
aThese federal statutes provide unemployment insurance, Social Security, and Medicare 
coverage.
b Workers will quality for coverage only if the eligibility criteria are satisfied (see Chap-
ter 5).
cAn employee must work at least 1,000 hours, the equivalent of one year of service in 
a 12-month period, to qualify.
d The contentious issue is not the payment of the minimum wage, but rather the require-
ment that an employee must be paid overtime pay at time and one-half after 40 hours 
of work. However, independent contractors are exempt from this requirement. 
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by the employment laws of workers for each type of employment ar-
rangement; “No” indicates noncoverage; and “Uncertain” indicates that 
coverage is uncertain and varies with the eligibility requirements, legal 
interpretations, and compliance. The heterogeneity of treatment result-
ing from varying legal definitions and interpretations used to determine 
when a worker is an “employee” has created what Befort (2003) de-
scribes as “a veritable regulation-free zone in portions of the contingent 
work landscape,” a “Black Hole of Workplace Regulation.” 
The first policy approach is to revise the laws to expand the work-
based eligibility requirements for employment-based benefits to expand 
eligibility, thereby covering more nonstandard workers. For example, 
prorated benefits could be provided for pension coverage for workers 
who work less than the current requirement of one year of service in 
a 12-month period. A variation is to include under the coverage of the 
statutes any industries or firms that are currently exempted from the 
legislation to expand the number of workers covered. This approach 
requires changing each law in Table 10.1, thereby affecting the workers 
by column. 
The second policy approach is to eliminate the gray areas of legal 
interpretations that exclude some workers from employment protec-
tions, thereby expanding coverage to more employees. This approach 
can be partially successful without changing the content of the laws per 
se by using a two-pronged approach: clarifying terminology and im-
proving compliance within the existing laws. The Dunlop Commission 
addressed the issues of confusing terminology resulting from multiple 
definitions of “employee” by recommending the adoption of one defini-
tion of “employer” and one definition of “employee” for all workplace 
laws “based on the economic realities of the employment relationship” 
(U.S. Department of Labor 1994). If this recommendation was followed, 
such as through the development of model laws and practices based on 
the consistent use of definitions, the laws would have to be revised. In 
terms of Table 10.1, most if not all of the uncertain outcomes would be 
eliminated if consistent definitions were used for all laws. Improved 
compliance would affect both the columns and the rows. 
Improvements in compliance within existing laws can be achieved 
through several tactics. It will be helpful to employers to have clearer 
guidance about their legal responsibilities, such as more user-friendly 
guidelines for following the laws. Employer compliance is mandated 
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when low-wage workers are unionized because union contracts clearly 
define these workers as “employees.” In addition, some nonprofit orga-
nizations, such as the Center for a Changing Workforce (CFCW) and the 
National Employment Law Project (NLEP), work to enforce compliance 
by ensuring that employees are correctly classified by employers. 
The CFCW focuses on “permatemps”2 and provides “advice and 
consultations for individuals and organizations on employment issues, 
litigation, and public policy” while also analyzing policy and legisla-
tion related to permatemps and tracking litigation. An illustrative proj-
ect is its investigation in response to a request from AFSCME Council 
28 to determine whether the University of Washington Medical Center 
was misclassifying employees. The 2002 report presented to AFSCME 
stated that “there has been widespread misuse of hourly ‘temporary’ 
employees at UWMC” (Center for a Changing Workforce 2002; Han-
bey 2003). Similarly, the NLEP Nonstandard Worker Project “seeks to 
ensure that all workers regardless of what their employer calls them—
temp, independent contractor, part-timer—receive the full benefits of 
labor and employment laws” (National Employment Law Project). 
A two-dimensional table similar to Table 10.1 also can be developed 
for Japan and the countries of Europe to help researchers understand the 
potential impact of various policy changes. However, in the case of 
Europe, the analysis is compounded by the presence of EU regulations. 
This will require a three-dimensional diagram to more fully illustrate 
the potential of cross-national EU policy effects. 
Well-designed research can help predict and evaluate the effects of 
policy changes. This information then can be used to design the appro-
priate changes in policy based on the identified trade-offs and evaluation 
of economic efficiency, equity, security, and liberty of the policy (see 
Chapter 6 for a review of these concepts). This process of evaluations 
reminds us that we have choices in shaping how the forces for change in 
the global economy are managed. There are no “. . . overwhelming and 
uncontrollable market forces [that] have made the trend toward contin-
gency as we know it inevitable” (Gonos 1997, p. 104). Furthermore, 
pursuing the policy changes guided by research will “open up employ-
ment policy and practice to a period of experimentation and opportuni-
ties for further learning” (U.S. Department of Labor 1994, p. 13).
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DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Throughout this book a number of topics for future research re-
lated to the intellectual challenge posed by Kochan (1998) have been 
discussed. These are reviewed from four perspectives. First, research 
can explain more fully how employers make strategic decisions regard-
ing the best mix of permanent and nonstandard employees, as well as 
the best mixes of alternative employment arrangements. To guide pol-
icy choices, we need a better understanding of decision making under 
varying circumstances and the impact of these choices on management 
practices. Also, research can guide the expansion of the coverage of 
employment and benefits protections for contingent workers. In addi-
tion, more comparative research on the impact of variations in regula-
tion will help to guide policy development as nations learn from each 
other. Finally, research can help us evaluate the effectiveness of strate-
gies used by unions and nonprofit organizations to improve the condi-
tions of work and economic welfare of contingent workers. 
Employers’ Strategic Decision Making and Management Practices
The limited empirical evidence has identified demand-side factors 
as dominant when explaining the growth of nonstandard employment 
(Kahn 2000). Progress has been made in our understanding of the com-
plexity of employers’ strategies to mix permanent workers and varieties 
of nonstandard employees. However, future research focused on em-
ployers’ decision making can further clarify three issues. First, we need 
a better understanding of the factors influencing strategic decisions that 
result in the hiring of nonstandard workers. Second, we need better in-
formation about the conditions under which employers choose to imple-
ment standards that treat contingent employees more equitably. Finally, 
we need to know whether different management strategies are required 
for a workforce that blends permanent and contingent workers. 
Research can help determine the most important factors driving the 
demand for nonstandard employment arrangements, and the manage-
ment strategies that are the most effective in differing circumstances. 
As an illustration, the cost-minimizing strategy of hiring temporary 
workers to cover short-run needs such as the replacement of absent 
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full-time workers is different from the strategy that focuses on long-
run productivity enhancement through labor input flexibility. The latter 
strategy may require investing in permanent employees who are trained 
to be flexible in adapting to changing work assignments instead of using 
contingent workers. Also, we need to understand better how these strat-
egies mesh with hiring nonstandard workers in response to business 
cycle changes and structural changes in the economy. For example, 
improved understanding of these aspects of employer decision mak-
ing will help us analyze the forces affecting U.S. firms hiring part-time 
and temporary employees, as well as worker dispatching by temporary 
employment agencies and the use of part-time workers in Japan and the 
growth of temporary employment agencies in Europe.
Also, although standards for the equitable treatment of contingent 
workers are available, we have little understanding of why and when 
employers implement these models when the choice is voluntary. For 
example, the International Labor Organization (ILO) published recom-
mendations for the equal treatment of part-time workers relative to full-
time workers. The ILO recommends that part-time workers should be 
paid a comparable wage and have the same statutory coverage of Social 
Security programs on a pro-rated basis. Also, these workers should have 
the right to organize and bargain collectively, be protected by occupa-
tional safety and health laws and against employment discrimination, 
and be entitled to equivalent protections for maternity and sick leave, 
job termination, paid annual leave and public holidays, and transferring 
between part-time and full-time employment (for further discussion 
see Zeytinoğlu [1999]). Similarly, in 2002 the American Federation of 
Teachers (AFT) published “Standards of Good Practice in the Employ-
ment of Part-Time/Adjunct Faculty” (2002), which outlines appropri-
ate standards of treatment. These standards include equitable pay and 
a seniority system, as well as standards to ensure adjuncts are treated 
with professional courtesies.3 Research can help explain the conditions 
under which these guidelines will be implemented by employers. 
We know that hiring many contingent employees changes the or-
ganizational culture. We need to develop strategies that effectively 
manage the tensions and conflicts that arise in a blended workforce of 
permanent and contingent workers. The management of the attitudes 
and performance of contingent employees may require different meth-
ods than for permanent employees; the methods also may depend on 
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whether the workers are voluntarily or involuntarily in contingent jobs. 
Case studies of how various employers manage their blended work-
forces should provide useful insights. 
Extending	Coverage	of	Employment	Protections	and	Benefits	
We know that employees with less education and fewer skills—no-
tably women, minorities, younger workers, and those employed invol-
untarily in contingent work such as part-time jobs—have experienced 
the negative effects of nonstandard employment. These include lower 
wages and the receipt of few, if any, employment-related benefits from 
either the employer or the social welfare system. While some of the 
individuals in contingent employment can make education and lifestyle 
choices to move into full-time standard employment and improve their 
opportunities, many will be left with few options for change and there-
fore will remain relatively disadvantaged. Consequently, the challenge 
is to design a more flexible social welfare system to provide employ-
ment protections and benefits to contingent employees that mirror the 
protections provided to full-time permanent employees. Another way of 
stating this goal is to recognize that “[w]hile we cannot change the level 
of risk in today’s economy, we can change the rules that govern how risk 
is shared among the participants to the economic game” (Jacoby 1999, 
p. 145).
Two research projects would help move us toward this goal. First, 
in the United States we need to measure the extent of noncoverage of 
the various social welfare programs at the national level. This research 
would provide the information for the design of methods and policy to 
cover those presently excluded from coverage, as well as the evaluation 
of unintended consequences. Researchers can evaluate the advantages 
and disadvantages of different designs for prorated benefits, portable 
pension plans, unemployment insurance, and other programs. 
Because of the dominance of women in some of the most economi-
cally vulnerable forms of contingent work such as part-time employ-
ment, tracking and evaluating government efforts to support gender 
equality will help nations monitor their progress. In the United States 
attention must be given to finding ways to improve the safety net for 
these female workers. Japan also is seeking ways to address the needs 
of a changing female labor force in which fewer women are marry-
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ing and marriages are occurring later in life.4 In the EU “. . . the social 
contract has failed to incorporate the high-risk groups and ought to be 
reviewed. Above all, it must take account of the gender divide, which 
has been largely disregarded until now . . .” (Jouen and Caremier 2000, 
p. 29).
Comparative Research on Regulation
Comparative research provides insights into how a balance between 
supporting flexibility and extending social protections to relatively vul-
nerable contingent workers can be structured using different models of 
regulation (Vosko 1998, pp. 26–27). This in turn requires understand-
ing national preferences for “relative equality of compensation” and 
“relative equality in the form of labor market participation” since “not 
all forms of equality can be optimized simultaneously” (DiPrete et al. 
2004). These trade-offs can be explored in studies of temporary em-
ployment agencies and efforts to “harmonize” regulations within the 
EU for part-time employment.
We have seen that one of the fastest-growing forms of contingent 
employment in the mature economies of the United States, Japan, and 
Europe is temporary employment arranged by temporary employment 
agencies (Kelloway, Gallagher, and Barling 2004, p. 111). Unlike the 
United States, in both Japan and Europe this growth has resulted from 
deliberate national policy choices. However, we do not have much em-
pirical analysis documenting how temporary agency workers actually 
fare in the labor market.5 Empirical evidence from four countries with 
different regulatory environments—Britain (Booth, Francesconi, and 
Frank 2002); France (Blanchard and Landier 2002); Sweden (Holm-
lund and Storrie 2002); and Spain (Dolado, García-Serrano, and Jimeno 
2002)—suggests that overall an expansion of temporary jobs to increase 
labor market flexibility has measurable negative consequences for tem-
porary workers relative to permanent employment (Booth, Dolodo, and 
Frank 2002). Further comparative research is needed to explore this 
finding in other countries, as well as to differentiate the impact of in-
stitutions and culture on male and female part-time workers (Pfau-Ef-
finger 1998). 
A major goal of the EU is to create a single labor market in which 
workers can move freely by coordinating and harmonizing the ap-
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proaches to nonstandard employment used by its member nations. This 
requires creating consistent standards to determine the employment 
conditions of part-time workers and providing the same basic minimum 
social protections for temporary employees in all of the member nations 
(Vosko 1998).6 The achievement of the EU goals will require the use 
of voluntary coordination of policies (referred to as the “open meth-
od of coordination”) across nations and EU directives, i.e., “soft law” 
supplemented by “hard law” measures such as the Part-Time Workers’ 
Directives (Ashiagbor 2004; Sciarra 2004). Researchers can study and 
monitor the impact of the implementation of this European Employ-
ment Strategy over time.
Finally, research can consider how the lessons learned by the ma-
ture economies can provide insights for developing countries such as 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India to help them proactive-
ly design their legal structure and social safety nets to support labor 
market flexibility. The importance of these two nations in the global 
economy is growing rapidly, and their populations are moving rapidly 
from employment in agriculture to manufacturing and service sectors. 
However, in the PRC industrial restructuring reduced employment from 
1993 to 2002, creating the same problems for laid-off workers as those 
experienced in the United States and Japan (Lu et al. 2002; Banister 
2005b). In the PRC movement into contingent employment—often 
through migration to other parts of the country—can result in not only 
the loss of earnings and social welfare benefits such as pensions and 
unemployment pay, but also the loss of subsidies for transportation, 
housing, food allowances, and other benefits provided by employers 
(Banister 2005a).                 
Unions	and	Nonprofit	Organizations	as	Change	Agents
Labor unions and nonprofit organizations in the United States have 
directed their attention in recent years to improving the economic wel-
fare of the working poor—low-wage contingent workers. Some unions 
see the opportunity to serve as an advocate for contingent workers as 
an extension of their traditional leadership roles in the protection of 
workers’ welfare, while nonprofit organizations serve as advocates for 
economic justice for the working poor. Both use multiple strategies: 
conducting campaigns to publicize the economic realities faced by the 
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working poor, maintaining Web sites on which information is provided 
to assist contingent workers and those working on their behalf, sponsor-
ing research on the factors that determine the opportunities of the work-
ing poor, organizing community efforts, and pursuing legislative and 
political initiatives. In addition, unions are working to organize these 
workers. However, we know relatively little about how widespread 
such efforts are and what their actual impact may be. Case studies of 
the effectiveness of these change agents should yield insights into the 
impact of a variety of strategies on employment and wages. 
Stone (2004) argues that this expansion of union activities into the 
community and political action to represent a broader segment of the 
workforce, including contingent workers, is a predictable response to 
the transformations in the nature of work. As the attachment of employ-
ees to employers is reduced, unions must change from bargaining with 
one employer to bargaining with groups of employers to improve work-
ers’ compensation and conditions of work. She distinguishes two new 
models of union activity. The first is the “new craft unionism” based 
on occupations and bargaining industrywide with employer groups to 
facilitate worker mobility between employers. The focus is the creation 
of minimum standards and the provision of training. 
The second model of “citizen unionism” also focuses on facilitating 
contingent worker mobility, setting minimum standards, and providing 
training, but only works within a locality or region and is not necessar-
ily limited to a particular occupational group. In addition, efforts are 
made to improve the local social infrastructure through improved child 
care and legal assistance, and the encouragement of corporate support. 
Also, as discussed below, citizen unionism often is based on a collabo-
ration between nonprofit organizations, local unions, and other local 
community groups working together to achieve a living wage in a spe-
cific geographic location (Stone 2004, Chapter 10).
The efforts by the AFT, the leading organizer of part-time faculty 
(AFT 2003), to improve the welfare of part-time teachers is an example 
of the new craft unionism based on occupation. It provides protections 
for part-time faculty while enabling them to move between employ-
ers. A two-pronged approach is used: legislative and political action, 
and collective bargaining. This dual strategy was used by the Washing-
ton Federation of Teachers (WFT), an AFT affiliate. In 1999 the WFT 
successfully pursued a public campaign for pay equity and lobbied to 
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convince the governor and the legislature in the State of Washington to 
include additional funds in the state budget to increase the pay for part-
time faculty. Also, the criterion for participation in the retirement plan 
was modified, so more part-time faculty became eligible to participate.7 
Subsequently in 2000 a prorata sick leave policy was approved for part-
time faculty (AFT 2001). In addition, the AFT used collective bargain-
ing to improve the pay, benefits, and conditions of work for part-time 
faculty.8 
Another example is the media-intensive multiunion campaign be-
gun in 2004 that focused on retail workers employed by Wal-Mart. It 
was led by the AFL-CIO to pressure Wal-Mart to become a better cor-
porate citizen by increasing its wages and health benefits. Because of 
the size of the company, no single union can handle the challenge alone. 
The campaign was not designed as a unionization effort, but rather as 
a means of publicizing the relatively low wages that Wal-Mart pays 
throughout the United States, as well as the impact of the introduction of 
its supercenters into specific locations (Greenhouse 2004; Quisumbing 
2005).
Case studies of these and other union activities can help us under-
stand the conditions that determine whether a union will try to organize 
low-wage contingent workers, the factors determining which strategies 
are selected by the unions and why, and which organizing strategies are 
the most effective for different groups of contingent workers. Compara-
tive research on the strategies used by unions in other countries also 
may provide insights into strategies for unions in the United States, and 
perhaps vice versa.  
Examples of citizen unionism are the California Partnership for 
Working Families (CPWF) and Working Today. As part of their broad-
er commitment to economic justice, these nonprofit organizations are 
working for both decent standards of living for low-wage contingent 
workers and employer compliance in properly classifying employees 
(see Chapter 5). Their approach is aimed at improving social welfare 
through the payment of a living wage higher than the legally mandated 
minimum wage to all eligible workers. This objective is consistent with 
the employer responsibilities identified by the United Nations Subcom-
mission on the Promotion and Protections of Human Rights (2003)9:
Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall 
provide workers remuneration that ensures an adequate standard 
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of living for them and their families. Such remunerations shall take 
due account of their needs for adequate living conditions with a 
view towards progressive improvement.
CPWF is a nonprofit, statewide consortium that links organizations 
in four major population areas: the East Bay area of San Francisco, 
Los Angeles, San Jose, and San Diego. It is committed to an emerging 
model of economic development that includes as the primary goal “the 
creation of economic opportunity and the reduction of poverty and so-
cial inequality” so that development works for the benefit of communi-
ties rather than just providing profits to developers and sales tax income 
(California Partnerships for Working Families; Center on Policy Initia-
tives 2004; Karjanen and Baxamusa 2003). Ordinances and agreements 
already have been passed which require the payment of a “living wage” 
in the East Bay, Los Angeles, and San Jose. One of the CPWF partners, 
the Center for Policy Initiatives (CPI) in San Diego, is presently spear-
heading the San Diego Living Wage Campaign.10 More than 20 unions 
support this initiative in San Diego.
Another example is Working Today, which was created in 1995 to 
place on the national agenda the issues of part-time workers and others 
in temporary and short-term jobs. This national network includes a va-
riety of organizations ranging from labor unions to community groups. 
One of its first projects was the Portable Benefits Fund created to pro-
vide access to affordable health insurance (Horowitz 2000; Working 
Today). 
Case studies of organizations such as CPWF and Working Today 
can help explain the strategies selected, the factors determining which 
strategies are most effective, and the actual impact on the welfare of 
contingent workers.11 While these groups have often used city-by-city 
campaigns, we do not know whether this is the most effective way to 
generate change. Also, although there are more than 120 living wage 
laws across the United States, we do not know much about the extent 
of their actual impact on working families. For example, the Berkeley 
Living Wage Ordinance of 1999 requires city contractors and develop-
ers who receive project subsidies of more than $100,000 to pay the liv-
ing wage rate of $11.37 an hour (California Partnerships for Working 
Families). However, this means that many low-wage workers are not 
covered. We do not know whether employers have found ways to avoid 
complying with the law or what the unintended consequences, either 
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positive or negative, for covered and noncovered workers are. We do 
not know what factors will explain the success or failure of approaches 
such as the Portable Benefits Fund. 
CONCLUSION
All labor market participants, whether employers, employees, or 
unions, operate within the legal framework of their nations and the ex-
pectations of their societies. What they can and cannot do is regulated 
by government, which can play a supportive role or create barriers to 
change. Each nation therefore has to choose how it will address the 
challenges of designing its future employment relations system to ex-
plicitly include workers in nonstandard employment arrangements. The 
challenge for the future is to develop public policies to protect the truly 
contingent workers at least as well as we protect workers in standard 
employment arrangements.
Research will provide guidance for the selection of the components 
chosen by employers, unions, and governments for this future system. It 
also will help identify better approaches to balancing the employer and 
the employee interests.12 The need is for flexibility and efficiency while 
treating all employees equitably in a world of rapid and continuous eco-
nomic change. What is sought is “a more humane model of flexibility” 
(Jouen and Caremier 2000, p. 135).
Notes
 1. For a detailed discussion of the factors determining the dynamics of tran-
sitional labor markets see O’Reilly, Cebrián, and Lallement (2000).
 2.  The CFCW was created in 1999 in Seattle, Washington. Permatemps are 
defined as contingent employees who have been misclassified by em-
ployers and therefore ineligible for job security, equal pay, and benefits.
 3.   Many adjunct faculty, along with graduate students, perceive themselves 
to be exploited by the low pay and poor working conditions at colleges 
and universities in the United States. They are seeking unionization as 
a means of addressing their employment concerns. Unions as diverse 
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as the California Part-Time Faculty Association, the National Education 
Association, and the AFT have been organizing these contingent faculty. 
See Smallwood (2002).
 4.   This situation is a source of concern to the Japanese national govern-
ment. Since the latter half of the 1970s the birth rate has followed a 
steady downward trend. The country experienced in 2004 the lowest rate 
of population growth since 1899 when data collection began, and inter-
national migration adds to the population only marginally. At the same 
time the population is aging rapidly, and much faster than in Western 
Europe and the United States. For example, it is projected that in 2030 
the percentage of the population aged 65 and over in the United States 
will be about 19 percent, while in Japan it will be about 30 percent. See 
Ujimoto (2000) and Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Commu-
nications (2006). 
 5. It is important to remember that temporary employment firms are not 
necessarily inherently bad actors in the labor market. However, the way 
in which they conduct their business has disadvantaged the workers they 
hire by not providing many of the job protections available to full-time 
core workers. While temporary employment arrangements provide em-
ployers with an option for flexibility, they also relieve employers to vary-
ing degrees depending on the country from some of the costs associated 
with permanent employees. 
 6.  The “European Framework Agreement on Part-Time Work” was signed 
in June 1997. The agreement states the principle of nondiscrimination 
that “part-time workers shall not be treated in a less favorable manner 
than comparable full-time workers solely because they work part-time 
unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds” (p. 242). It 
also requires the member states to identify and eliminate obstacles that 
will limit part-time employment opportunities. Employers are expected 
to facilitate the movement of employees between part-time and full-time 
work and vice versa. However, this is not a comprehensive agreement. 
There is no reference to social security issues since these matters are left 
to each country. The wording in the nondiscrimination statement also 
permits employers to treat part-time and full-time workers differently 
under some circumstances. See European Union (1997). For a detailed 
discussion of the tension within the EU as it works to increase labor 
market flexibility see Teague (1999).
 7.  A recommendation also was made by the state agency overseeing com-
munity colleges to increase the number of full-time jobs and to use fewer 
part-time faculty.
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 8. Collective bargaining also was used to restore full-time faculty positions 
and negotiate provisions which permit full-time nontenured faculty to 
move to tenure-track positions. See Chapter 4 for additional examples of 
the use of collective bargaining to improve pay, benefits, and conditions 
of work.
 9.  Similar standards also have been set by other groups such as Social Ac-
countability International (SAI), a nonprofit organization based in the 
United States. SAI provides codes of conduct for business community 
organizations such as the Association of Community Organizations for 
Reform Now (ACORN) that also are pursuing policy changes to cre-
ate living wage ordinances. However, while such goals are expressed as 
ethical goals, it is not easy to reach agreement on a specific standard, al-
though minimal standards can be set. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, along with other business groups, has actively opposed 
the creation of living wage standards (Lafer 2005). For a more detailed 
discussion of codes of social accountability which support the concept of 
the living wage, see Wheeler (2005).
 10.  The CPI provides information and serves as an advocacy group for work-
ers in “retail and service jobs—jobs that are often just or above the mini-
mum wage with no health care benefits.” In 1994 the first living wage 
was adopted in Baltimore. See Center on Policy Initiatives (2006).
 11.  For additional examples of innovative ways to improve the welfare of 
nonstandard employees see Carré and Joshi (2000).
 12. For an expanded discussion of the importance of balancing employer 
and employee interests see Budd, Gomez, and Meltz (2004).
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